#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

4/18)

## BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.

Docket Nos. 50-361 01 50=362 OL

(San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3)

> NRC STAFF RESPONSES TO THE FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES FROM GUARD AND MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER

In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.720(h)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 2.740b, the following are the NRC Staff responses to interrogatories propounded by Intervenor GUARD on February 20, 1981.\* Although not wholly in conformance with the procedural provisions of 10 CFR 2.720(h)(2)(ii), the interrogatories are responded to voluntarily by the Staff in the interest in assuring the devlopment of an adequate record in this proceeding.

#### NRC STAFF RESPONSES

Interrogatory No. 1:

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Describe an event initiating a GE and culminating in a release of radiation which exceeds EPA PAGs for whole body exposure for which evacuation of the 90°N Sector up to five (5) miles from the plant is the appropriate protective measure to be taken. For this postulated accident, identify and discuss: 50 5 1

(a) Initiating conditions(s) capable of creating this GE.

Pursuant to GUARD's direction at p. 9 of its Interrogatories, the \*/ Staff will not respond to Interrogatories Nos. 5, 14(a) and 16.

(b) All factors supporting a decision to evacuate as opposed to a decision to take other protective measures not including evacuation.

(c) All factors, including but not limited to projected level of radiation exposure (specify level), meteorological conditions (specify conditions), sufficient time for logical conditions (specify conditions), sufficient time for evacuation (specify time), etc. which support the decision to evacuate the 90°N Sector.

(d) The geographical area involved in this evacuation as well as the governmental jurisdictions involved in implementing evacuation and receiving evacuees.

(e) The estimated maximum number of persons who would be evacuated.

(f) The estimated length of time it would take to evacuate the 90°N Sector under ideal conditions.

(g) The estimated length of time it would take to evacuate the 90°N Sector if Interstate 5 were incapacitated by a collapsed freeway overpass near Camino de los Maria interchange.

(h) The estimated time between the time that the Site Emegency Coordinator declares a general emergency and the time that evacuation is actually begun.

(i) (i) The names and addresses of all licensed health care facilities in the 90°N Sector.

(ii) The names and addresses of licensed and unlicensed community care facilities of all categories in 90°N Sector.

(j) (i) The estimated number of ill, elderly, or infinm persons in licensed health care facilities requiring special evacuation by stretcher/ambulance.

(ii) The estimated time required for transferring these ill, elderly, or infinm persons t o appropriate sites outside of the  $90^{\circ}N$  Sector.

(k) (i) The estimated number of persons who are residents of licensed and unlicensed community care and board and care homes in this 90°N Sector who would also require special evacuation.

(ii) The estimated time required for transferring these persons to appropriate sites outside the 90°N Sector.

(1) The effect, if any, of these "special evacuations" on time estimates for total evacuation of the  $90^{\circ}N$  Sector as given in (f) and (g) above.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory because it requests information beyond the scope of the GUARD emergency planning contentions at issue in this proceeding. The Board, in its Memorandum and Order of January 27, 1978 at pp. 13-15, admitted two of GUARD's contentions dealing with emergency planning, subject to further refinement of those contentions at the close of discovery. Neither of those contentions encompasses events which might initiate a general emergency. Rather those contentions speak to the adequacy of the implementation and functioning of an emergency plan given a general emergency. Concerns identified include funding and staffing of agencies involved, coordination and feasibility of evacuation given alleged increased freeway use and alleged increases in transient and resident populations. The contention clearly does not question the types of events which initiate a general emergency. This reading of GUARD's contentions is confirmed by an examination of its Interrogatory Responses to the Applicant of August 17, 1978 and its Interrogatory Responses to the NRC Staff of October 17, 1978. Those Responses answering Applicant and Staff questions as to the nature of the GUARD contentions focus on implementation of the emergency plan and not events which could cause the declaration of a general emergency. The Commission's regulations provide that "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the proceeding," that discovery "shall relate only to those matters in controversy which have been identified by the Commission or the presiding officer in the prehearing (conference) order" and that "information sought (must appear) reasonably calculated to lead to

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discovery of admissible evidence". See 10 CFR 2.740(b)(1) and <u>Pennsyl-vania Power and Light Company and Alleghany Electric Cooperative, Inc.</u> (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317, 322 (1980). The instant interrogatory does not relate to any GUARD contention admitted by the Licensing Board. Furthermore discovery on this subject does not appear "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence". Accordingly, the Staff objects to this interrogatory.

The Staff further objects to this interrogatory for it in effect requires the Staff to perform a study or an analysis and thus is not proper discovery. While in discovery a party must identify information which it possesses and on which it bases its position, a party may not be required to perform extended studies or data gathering in order to respond. <u>Houston Lighting and Power Company, et al.</u> (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-80-11, 11 NRC 477, 478-79 (1980). Accordingly, the Staff also objects to this interrogatory on this ground.

#### Interrogatory No. 2

Describe an event initiating a GE and culminating in a release of radiation which exceeds EPA PAGs for which evacuation of any sectors within the plume exposure pathway is not the approrpaite protective measure. Specify:

(a) Initiating condition(s).

(b) Factors which support a decision not to evacuate off-site populations.

(c) Maximum levels of whole body and thyroid dose exposure rates which are projected within the plume exposure pathway along it radii at two (2) miles, five (5) miles, and ten (10) miles from the plant.

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(d) Protective measure which would be instituted.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same grounds as were stated above in the NRC Response to Interrogatory No. 1. Specifically, discovery with respect to events <u>initiating</u> a general emergency is not within the scope of either GUARD contention. Those contentions question the implementation of the emergency plan given that a general emergency has occurred. Furthermore, this interrogatory requires the Staff to perform a study or analysis to provide a response, and is objectionable on this ground.

#### Interrogatory No. 3:

(a) What mechanical devices, systems or other aids are now in place or planned to be installed to insure the simultaneous notification of all state and local response organizations warning points that an accident has occurred?

(b) How is this system(s) protected from breakdown caused by floods, power outages, subscriber overloading, etc.?

(c) How are acknowledgment and verification insured at each response organization?

(d) Is voice verification supported by written copy verification?

(e) For each offsite response agency, provide the name and title of the person to be notified in case of a GE.

(f) What is the estimated amount of time anticipated between the first notification of state and local response organizations and the first follow-up message which will contain information concerning the speed and direction which the plume will travel as well as the actual or projected exposure to radiation, whole body and thyroid, and protective measures recommended?

(g) What coordinated arrangements will be used by each organization for dealing with rumors? By whom and by what criteria shall

the content of press releases be reviewed prior to releasing information to the public during an emergency?

#### NRC Staff Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory for answers to the interrogatory are reasonably obtainable from another source. Under NRC Rules of Practice, the NRC Staff need only respond to such interrogatories where its answers "are necessary for a proper decision in the proceeding and ... are not reasonably obtainable from any other source ... ". 10 CFR 2.720(h)(2)(ii). <u>Susquehanna, supra</u>, at p.23. In this instance, the information sought by Interrogatory No. 3 is reasonably available from the Applicant. Indeed GUARD propounded this identical interrogatory to the Applicants in its First Set of Interrogatories served on the Applicant on February 20, 1981. Furthermore, the Applicant responded to this interrogatory in its Response of March 10, 1981. Consequently, the information sought is available from another source and indeed has been specifically been made available to GUARD by that source. On this basis, the Staff objects to this interrogatory. However, the Staff will provide the following response.

(a) Table 5-4, Offsite Response Agency Notification, of the Applicants' Emergency Plan, dated July 1980, lists the Offsite Response Agency to be notified, who on the staff of the Southern California Edison Company makes the notification, the location of the offsite agency communications, the primary means of communication, the alternate means of communications, the individual answering, and whether the agency communications is staffed at all times. Primary means of communication are direct telephone lines and the Pacific Telephone System.

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(b) The Applicants have informed the NRC Staff that the direct line is designed to cope with such problems.

(c) Response organizations on public lines verify by call-back.

(d) No.

(e) Table 5-4 referred to in the Response to 3(a) above, lists the Individual Answering.

(f) The first notification should contain the information referred to in the interrogatory.

(g) The Interagency Agreement between Orange County, Unified San Diego County, City of San Clemente, City of San Juan Capistrano, Capistrano Unified School District, U.S. Marines, California Department of Parks and Recreation (Section IXB) states that representatives shall coordinate releases to the press from the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

#### Interrogatory No. 4

(a) Describe the type, number and location of all devices which are planned to be installed for the purpose of notifying the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ that an emergency exists.

(b) What effect will power outages within the ten (10) mile EPZ have on the capability of the early warning system to function as designed?

(c) What is the anticipated cost of the devices, and of their installation?

(d) Who will bear the cost of these devices and of their installation?

(e) What is the anticipated yearly cost of maintaining these devices?

(f) Who will bear the cost of mintaining these devices?

(g) If the answer to (d) and/or (f) is "Applicant", are these costs to be factored into the rate base as part of the capital expenditure for the plant units?

(h) What is the projected date that this system will be in place?

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. In addition, the Staff objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff will provide the following response.

(a) In Amendment 22 to its FSAR, the Applicants stated that they had contracted for a public warning study in the area encompassed by the EPZ. This study recommends siren types and locations using the NUREG-0654 Appendix 3 criteria. The exact nature of the public warning system to be used by the Applicants has not been presented to the Staff.

(h) In Amendment 22, the Applicants stated that they will purchase and arrange for the installation of the necessary sirens with projected completion of installation by July 1, 1981.

#### Interrogatory No. 6:

What systems, policies and guidelines are in place to resolve disputes within and among local jurisdictions concerning the indications for evacuation in doubtful cases.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3.

#### Interrogatory No. 7:

In the event that evacuation has been undertaken and the levels of projected radiation exposure thereafter increase by a large factor over original projections, so that EPA PAGs are substantially exceeded for the evacuees en route to the EPZ borders, what protective actions are planned to mitigate the threat to the public health?

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

#### Interrogatory No. 8:

Do the plans under consideration in this licensing proceeding take into account the likelihood of "spontaneous" evacuation outside the ten (10) mile EPZ plume exposure pathway which may interfere with efforts within the EPZ? If so, how?

## NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

#### Interrogatory No. 9:

Do the plans under consideration in this licensing proceeding take into account the likelihood of "spontaneous" evacuation within the ten (10) miles EPZ plume exposure pathway but outside of the sector or zone for which evacuation has been recommended? If so, how?

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

#### Interrogatory No. 10:

Explain how spontaneous evacuation by the public will be discouraged.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

#### Interrogatory No. 11:

Have arrangements been made for appropriate reception centers for evacuees from licensed health facilities, licensed community care facilities, and other populations requiring specialized care? If so, state the nature of the arrangements, the name(s) of the persons responsible for implementing them, and the addresses where these evacuees requiring special care will be received.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

#### Interrogatory No. 12:

What provisions have been made for securing adequate supplies of thyroid blocking agents for the population around SONGS 2 and 3? What drug will be used? Are any written agreements in existence? If so, provide copies. What is the name of the vendor who will supply? How will it be stored and distributed? Are supplies presently available if needed?

#### FEMA Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff provides the following FEMA response.

No provisions have been made in the various emergency plans for securing supplies of thyroid blocking drugs for the general population. Most plans reflect that the utility will provide potassium iodide for on-site emergency workers. FEMA is not aware of any written agreements, who the vendor is, how the drug will be distributed and whether supplies are presently available in the vicinity of the San Onofre plant.

#### Interrogatory No. 13:

(a) Regarding the public information program, what provisions have been made with the phone company for inclusion of emergency information pertinent to a nuclear emergency in the phone book?

(b) Provide a sample of proposed copy, if developed, as well as copies of any agreements which have been made with the phone company concerning inclusion of such information.

(c) What information will be included in programs to acquaint new media with emergency plans and information concerning radiation?

(d) Will the information include reference to the harmful long-range effects of low level radiation?

(e) Will the public receive information concerning the Price-Anderson Act?

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

#### Interrogatory No. 14:

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(b) What budget allocations have been made by each of the state and/or local agencies for which plans have been prepared to meet the planning effort involved?

(c) What budget allocations have been made by the state and local agencies to review and update the plans currently under consideration?

(d) For each of the state and local agency plans, provide the names, addresses, and titles of persons with whom you worked in developing the plans and the dates of all meetings at which you worked with these persons or their representatives on developing the plans.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

#### Interrogatory No. 15:

Is it your position that the plans as submitted represent mutual understanding and acceptance by and among all of the state and local jurisdictions of their responsibilities for safeguarding the public health and safety in the event of a nuclear accident? Provide documentation for your position.

#### FEMA Response:

FEMA's position is that inherent acceptance of these responsibilities has been shown over a period of time by the leadership of the State of California in its active programs for the protection of the health and safety of its citizens -- both in its progressive legislation and development of its disaster planning and capabilities. The development of radiological emergency preparedness plans is specific evidence of this by the State and local governments. While not yet ratified -according to our understanding -- the Interagency Agreement and Evacuation Procedure plan for evacuation represents further mutual understanding and acceptance of these responsibilities.

#### Interrogatory No. 17:

(a) For each 90° Sector, locate and describe shelters which could be used by the public in a general emergency to reduce the risk of exposure to radioactive contamination.

(b) What arrangements have been made to secure access to these shelters in case of a General Emergency?

(c) What is the estimated degree of protection from the risk of exposure to whole body and thyroid contamination in excess of EPA PAGs which is afforded by these shelters?

(d) In each of the shelters described above, how many persons can be accommodated and for how long?

### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

#### Interrogatory No. 18:

(a) Is it your position that the present "state of the art" of equipment for monitoring post-accident levels of radioactive materials is sufficiently developed to assure accurate measurements of releases of various radionuclides and projection of dose exposure rates for whole body and thyroid exposure for a spectrum of accidents ranging from "moderately serious" to "worst case" accidents at various atmospheric levels?

(b) If your answer is "yes," provide current data in support of the reliability of "state of the art" monitoring equipment.

(c) If your answer is "no," describe the areas in which inaccuracies in detecting, monitoring and projecting levels of inaccuracies are most likely to occur along the spectrum of accidents referred to in (a) above.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff will provide the following response.

(a) Yes.

(b) Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Rev. 2), "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following An Accident" specifies instrumentation to assess conditions during and following an accident, and represents current state of the art.

(c) Not applicable.

#### Interrogatory No. 19:

(a) To what extent is radiation measurement instrumentation which is now in place both onsite and offsite at, above, or below the current "state of the art" of radiation measurement instrumentation?

(b) Provide a table which identifies, locates and classifies radiation measurement instrumentation both onsite and offsite as at, above, or below the current state of the art for such equipment for all equipment within the 10 mile EPZ plume exposure pathway and the 50 mile ingestion exposure path.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff will provide the following response.

(a) The Applicants in Amendment 22 of the FSAR have committed to install state of the art instrumentation that meets the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Rev. 2) and complies with NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements."

(b) Radiological monitoring systems to monitor radioactivity levels in all of the important process and effluent points are described in Section 11.5 of the FSAR. Additional listings of equipment available at the station for both initial and continuing assessment of emergency situations are in Tables 7-3 thru 7-7 of the FSAR and Appendix D of the Emergency Plan.

#### Interrogatory No. 20:

State the assumptions upon which the exclusion of women, but not of men, of reproductive age from emergency work is based.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory on the ground that it seeks to elicit information with respect to exclusion of women of reproductive age, but not men, from emergency work, a subject which is not in contention in this case. Furthermore, the question does not otherwise appear to be "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" and therefore is not proper discovery. 10 CFR 2.740(b)(1) and the <u>Susquehanna case, supra</u>. Accordingly, the Staff objects to this interrogatory.

#### Interrogatory No. 21:

Provide age data which gives the age range, the mode, the mean and the standard deviation for all onsite workers in the following categories:

- (a) Men
- (b) Women
- (c) Men and Women combined.

#### NRC Staff Response:

For the reasons given in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 20 above, the Staff likewise objects to this interrogatory. In addition, the Staff further objects for the interrogatory as it requires extensive data gathering in order to respond, and this is impermissible discovery. See the South Texas Project case, supra.

#### Interrogatory No. 22:

Provide the data requested in INTERROGATORY NO. 21 for all offsite health personnel, hospital based and otherwise, who will be involved in work with contaminated injured or ill persons and who are likely to be exposed to levels of radiation in excess of EPA PAGs.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory for the same reasons given in the NRC Staff Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 20 and 21 above.

#### Interrogatory No. 23:

Provide the data requested in INTERROGATORY No. 21 for all emergency workers from the various state and local response agencies who will be likely to be exposed to levels of radiation in excess of EPA PAGS.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory for the same reasons given in the NRC Staff Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 20 and 21 above.

#### Interrogatory No. 24:

In each of the state and local emergency response agencies, what commitments are in place to assure adequate numbers of emergency workers to protect the public health and safety of workers who are likely to be exposed to levels of radiation in excess of EPA PAGs?

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

#### Interrogatory No. 25:

In each of the hospitals listed as capable of treating radioactively contaminated patients, what commitments are in place for assuring that adequate numbers of health personnel to care for injured or ill contaminated patients will agree to remain on duty and be exposed to increased risk of contamination with radioactivity?

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff provides the following response.

The Applicants' Emergency Plan includes letters of agreement from the South Coast Community Hospital and the Tri City Hospital for the treatment of contaminated patients. The FSAR also include written commitments to treat patients at these hospitals from three local physicians.

#### Interrogatory No. 26:

(a) Have any mutual aid agreements specific to nuclear power plant emergencies been entered into by and among the response agencies and/or Applicant?

(b) If so, give the names of the parties to the mutual aid agreements and the effective dates of the agreements.

(c) Provide copies of any and all mutual aid agreements which you have in your possession.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff provides the following response.

(a) Yes.

(b) Letters of Agreement are contained in Appendix A to the Emergency Plan. The Interagency Agreement, dated December 1980, has been described in response to GUARD Interrogatory 3g.

#### Interrogatory No. 27:

Provide the names and addresses of all persons in the various response agencies who have taken courses in radiological monitoring, the location and date of their training in radiological monitoring, the number of hours of the training, and the qualifications of the persons providing the training, and whether the persons listed herein as trained in radiological monitoring are committed to serving the public health and safety as radiological personnel in the event of a nuclear accident at SONGS 2 and 3.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff provides the following FEMA response.

The only information available to FEMA with respect to who has been trained in the various response agencies is available from courses that have been sponsored by NRC and, more recently, by FEMA. A brief description of the three courses is attached along with a list of the number of individuals from the State of California, by course, who have completed them.

#### Interrogatory No. 28:

Provide the names and addresses of all health personnel within the 10 mile EPZ plume exposure pathway and the 50 mile ingestion exposure pathway who have had special training in decontamination of injured or ill persons, and who are qualified to undertake the care and supervision of care of such patients. Provide the location, dates, and hours of their training, and the qualification of their instructors, and the availability of these specially trained health personnel in the event of a nuclear accident at SONGS 2 and 3.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same basis stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The Staff further objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff provides the following FEMA response. The plans available to FEMA do not include this type of detail. This is the type of information that is included in the detailed procedures of planning organizations.

#### Interrogatory No. 29:

Provide the dates, times and extent of all drills and exercises which are planned to test the adequacy of the planning effort and its integration and coordination among the various state and local agencies and the applicants, as well as any and all documents, memoranda, and correspondence which has passed between Applicants and any of the state and local response agencies and/or Federal agencies responsible for concurring in plan adequacy which critiques, analyzes, comments upon or assesses any drill or exercise which has already taken place to test the adequacy of the emergency response plans, in any respect.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the same grounds as stated in the NRC Staff Response to Interrogatory No. 3. The information sought is reasonably available from another source, namely the Applicant, and indeed the information has been requested of the Applicant by a GUARD interrogatory and the Applicant has provided to GUARD its interrogatory response. Nonetheless, the Staff provides the following response.

A full scale exercise is tentatively scheduled for the week of May, 1981.

#### Interrogatory No. 30:

Provide cost data which demonstrates the cost to the Applicants of the planning, equipment purchase, training, testing and evaluating of personnel, systems, and equipment necessary in order to attempt to meet the criteria which have been set forth in NUREG-0654 FEMA Rep-1 Rev. 1.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The NRC Staff objects to this interrogatory on the ground that the information sought by the interrogatory concerns a matter i.e., equipment costs, which is not a contention in this case. Furthermore, the question does not otherwise appear to be "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" and so is not proper discovery. 10 CFR 2.740(b)(1) and the <u>Susquehanna</u> case, <u>supra</u>.

#### Interrogatory No. 31:

(a) what is the status of the interagency Task Force on Emergency Instrumentation (offsite) report?

(b) To what extent must its recommendations be adapted prior to issuance of a license for SONGS 2 and 3?

(c) Provide a summary of the recommendations of this task force as soon as available.

#### NRC Staff Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff provides the following FEMA response.

The report has been completed. It is titled "Guidance on Offsite Emergency Radiation Measurement Systems" (FEMA-REP-2) dated September, 1980. A copy is attached.

The recommendations are guidance and provide a methodology for assessment of potential radiological releases required by planning standard II, I, Accident Assessment, of NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1. The use of this methodology is not mandatory.

The recommendations of the report are summarized in Section 7.

#### Interrogatory No. 32:

(a) What is the status of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan?

(b) How are its recommendations integrated into Appliant's response plans and the response plan of the state and local agencies?

#### NRC Staff Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff provides the following FEMA response.

This plan is being drafted by the Department of Energy.

Pending the completion of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan, the Federal capabilities described in the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRPA) will be used by applicants and State governments to comply with the planning standard contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), which includes making a determination of what Federal resources can be expected and when and what support these resources will need from the licensee, State and local governments.

#### Interrogatory No. 33:

(a) what is the status of the FEMA review of the Applicant's Emergency Plan and those of the state and local agencies which it must review?

(b) Specify any and all recommendations for improvement, express reservations, disapproval or other negative comments which FEMA has or shall communicate to you concerning the Emergency Plan of Applicant and/or the State of California as well as the several local jurisdictions whose plans have been or will be served on parties in this proceeding.

(c) Provide any and all documents, memoranda, or correspondence from FEMA to NRC related to FEMA's review of these plans.

#### FEMA Response:

The Applicants' emergency plan is reviewed by the NRC.

The State and local plans are currently being reviewed by FEMA. The nature of the FEMA review process is described in a FEMA Proposed Rule, Appendix B to "Report to Congress on Status of Emergency Response Planning for Nuclear Power Plants", NUREG-0755, a copy of which is attached.

As the State and local plans are still under review, no recommendations or comments have yet been finalized by FEMA. Nor has FEMA corresponded with the NRC Staff with respect to the review of these plans.

#### Interrogatory No. 34:

(a) Are any radiological laboratory services available at a shorter time and space distance which are comparable to those currently provided by LFE Environmental Analysis Laboratories?

(b) Regarding the distance of the Richmond Radiological Laboratory, does the Staff recommend obtaining radiological services closer to the site of SONGS 2 and 3?

(c) Is the public safety compromised by the distance of the radiological laboratory plan from the site of SONGS 2 and 3?

#### NRC Staff Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff provides the following response.

(a) Yes.

(b) No.

(c) Public safety is not compromised by the distance separating the radiological laboratory from the site given the ready availability of transportation between these locations. In addition, through the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan, Department of Energy laboratories and facilities, e.g. Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Sandia Laboratories, are available for assistance. These facilities are more proximate than the facility identified by the Applicants.

#### Interrogatory No. 35:

To what extent have Applicants' Plan and the other plans met the burden of providing alternative evacuation routes in the event of inclement weather, high traffic density and specific radiological conditions?

#### NRC Staff Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff provides the following response.

Alternate evacuation routes are available both to the north and to the south of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. These alternate routes have been identified and considered by the various entities and agencies involved in their emergency planning documents.

#### Interrogatory No. 36:

Where is the "site boundary" of SONGS 2 and 3 in relation to the beach?

#### NRC Staff Response:

The Staff objects to this interrogatory as beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions, and as not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Staff provides the following response.

The site boundary to the northwest traverses the beach at a distance of 600 meters from SONGS 2. The site boundary to the southeast traverses the beach at a distance of 600 meters from SONGS 3. The site boundary between these lines, towards the Pacific Ocean extends to the mean high tide line.

#### MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER

The Staff has objected to a number of GUARD interrogatories on several grounds as is specifically set out in the NRC Staff Responses, <u>supra</u>. The Staff has argued that a large number of the GUARD interrogatories are beyond the scope of GUARD's contentions and are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. In certain instances, the Staff has responded but without waiving its objections.

The Staff has also objected that much of the information sought from the Staff by GUARD is reasonably available from the Applicants and indeed has been sought from the Applicants. The Staff has also argued that certain GUARD interrogatories require the Staff to perform a study which is impermissible discovery. Consequently, the Staff moves the Licensing Board, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.740(c), and for good cause shown, to issue an order (i) that discovery be limited to matters in controversy, to matters reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and to matters not reasonably available from another source; and (ii) that studies and data gathering need not be undertaken by the Staff.

Respectfully submitted,

Richard K. Hoefling Counsel for NRC Staff

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 1st day of April, 1981

# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

# BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of SUUTHERN CALIFURNIA EDISON COMPANY (Sen Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

Docket Nos. 50-301 0.L. 50-362 O.L.

# AFFIDAVID OF Marshall E. Sanders

I am Assistant Director, Policy Planning, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Division, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The Responses to GUARD's Interrogatories served on February 20, 1981 and numbered 12, 15, 27, 28, 31, 32 and 33 were propored under my supervision. The Responses given are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 31, 1981.

#### UNITED STATED OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

#### BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of ) SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY) (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 )

Docket Nos. 50-301 O.L. 50-362 O.L.

#### AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R. SEARS

I am a senior reactor safety engineer in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff's Emergency Preparedness Licensing Branch.

The Responses to GUARD'S Interrogatories served on February 20, 1981 and numbered 3, 4a, 4h, 18, 19, 25, 26, 29, 34, 35, 36 were prepared by me. The Responses given are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 31, 1981.

John R/ Sear

John R. Sea

#### Radiological Emergency Planning

A one-week course designed for radiological emergency planners. It focuses on the planning necessary to deal with the offsite effects of an accident at a nuclear facility. Emphasis is on development of State and local radiological emergency plans that meet current Federal guidelines.

#### Radiological Accident Assessment

A one-week course designed for radiological emergency planners. It focuses on the planning necessary to deal with the offsite effects of an accident at a nuclear facility. Emphasis is on development of State and local radiological emergency plans tht meet current Federal guidelines that may be required as an outcome of an accident in a nuclear power reactor. The course is technical and assumes a background in nuclear or nealth physics. Participants shold bring their scientific electronic calculators.

#### Radiological Emergency Response

A 8 1/2 day course conducted at the Nevada Test Site in Mercury, Nevada, and designed for radiological emergency response personnel. It focuses on the procedures and methods required for responding to a nuclear reactor accident or a transportation accident involving radioactive materials. Emphasis is on practice in simulation scenarios representing selected radiological accidents.

# Radiological Emergency Planning Course

Date	Location	# Students
Nov 17-21, 1975 June 7-11, 1976 July 18-22, 1977	Sacremento, CA Battle Creek, MI Denver, CO	35 2 6
Kadiological Accident Assessment Course		
March 24-28, 1980	Sacremento, CA	24
Kadiological Emergency Response Course		
Jan 14,-21, 1977 Sept. 5-14, 1977 Uct. 10-19, 1977		1 2 5
Uct. 11-20, 1978 Uct 25-Nov 3, 1978		1 4
Sept. 5-14, 1979 Sept 19-28, 1979 Uct 1U-19, 1979 Nov 28,-Dec. 7, 1979		2 3 5 1
April 2-11, 1980 June 14-23, 1980 June 18-21, 1980 Nov. 12 - 21, 1980		2 1 2 3
Jan. 21-30, 1981 Feb. 18-27, 1981		3 5