UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

October 29, 2013

Mr. Matthew W. Sunseri
President and Chief Executive Officer
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Post Office Box 411
Burlington, KS 66839

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION – INTERIM STAFF EVALUATION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RE: OVERALL INTEGRATED PLAN IN RESPONSE TO ORDER EA-12-051, RELIABLE SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION (TAC NO. MF0781)

Dear Mr. Sunseri:

On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Order EA-12-051, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12054A679), to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. This order requires the licensee to have a reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of the following pool water level conditions by trained personnel: (1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck, and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water addition should no longer be deferred.

By letter dated February 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13071A419), Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC, the licensee) provided the OIP for Wolf Creek Generating Station, describing how it will achieve compliance with Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 by the first quarter of 2015. By letter dated July 17, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13197A205), the NRC staff sent a request for additional information (RAI) to the licensee. The licensee provided supplemental information by letters dated August 15 and August 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML13232A008 and ML13252A238, respectively).

The NRC staff has reviewed these submittals with the understanding that the licensee will update its OIP as implementation of the Order progresses. With this in mind, the staff has included an interim staff evaluation with this letter to provide feedback on the OIP. The staff's findings in the interim staff evaluation are considered preliminary and will be revised as the OIP is updated. As such, none of the staff's conclusions are to be considered final. A final NRC staff evaluation will be issued after the licensee has provided the information requested.

The interim staff evaluation also includes RAIs, response to which the NRC staff needs to complete its review. The licensee should provide the information requested in the 6-month status updates, as the information becomes available. However, the staff requests that all information be provided by July 31, 2014, to ensure that any issues are resolved prior to the

date by which the licensee must complete full implementation of Order EA-12-051. The licensee should adjust its schedule for providing information to ensure that all this information is provided by the requested date.

If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-2296 or via e-mail at fred.lyon@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

CFLyon

Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch IV
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-482

Enclosure
Interim Staff Assessment and RAI

cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv

INTERIM STAFF EVALUATION AND

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

OVERALL INTEGRATED PLAN IN RESPONSE TO

ORDER EA-12-051, RELIABLE SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION

WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-482

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Order EA-12-051, "Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12054A679), to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. This order requires, in part, that all operating reactor sites have a reliable means of remotely monitoring wide-range spent fuel pool (SFP) levels to support effective prioritization of event mitigation and recovery actions in the event of a beyond-design-basis (BDB) external event. The order required all holders of operating licenses issued under Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," to submit to the NRC an Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) by February 28, 2013.

By letter dated February 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13071A419), Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) (the licensee) provided the OIP for Wolf Creek Generating Station, describing how it will achieve compliance with Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 by the first quarter of 2015. By letter dated July 17, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13197A205), the NRC staff sent a request for additional information (RAI) to the licensee. The licensee provided supplemental information by letters dated August 15 and August 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML13232A008 and ML13252A238, respectively).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Order EA-12-051 requires all holders of operating licenses issued under 10 CFR Part 50, notwithstanding the provisions of any Commission regulation or license to the contrary, to comply with the requirements described in Attachment 2 to the Order except to the extent that a more stringent requirement is set forth in the license. Licensees shall promptly start implementation of the requirements in Attachment 2 to the Order and shall complete full implementation no later than two refueling cycles after submittal of the OIP or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

Order EA-12-051 required the licensee, by February 28, 2013, to submit to the Commission an OIP, including a description of how compliance with the requirements described in Attachment 2 of the Order will be achieved.

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 requires the licensee to have a reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of the following pool water level conditions by trained personnel: (1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the SFP operating deck, and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water addition should no longer be deferred.

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051, states that the SFP level instrumentation shall include the following design features:

1.1 Instruments: The instrumentation shall consist of a permanent, fixed primary instrument channel and a backup instrument channel. The backup instrument channel may be fixed or portable. Portable instruments shall have capabilities that enhance the ability of trained personnel to monitor spent fuel pool water level under conditions that restrict direct personnel access to the pool, such as partial structural damage, high radiation levels, or heat and humidity from a boiling pool.

1.2 Arrangement: The spent fuel pool level instrument channels shall be arranged in a manner that provides reasonable protection of the level indication function against missiles that may result from damage to the structure over the spent fuel pool. This protection may be provided by locating the primary instrument channel and fixed portions of the backup instrument channel, if applicable, to maintain instrument channel separation within the spent fuel pool area, and to utilize inherent shielding from missiles provided by existing recesses and corners in the spent fuel pool structure.

1.3 Mounting: Installed instrument channel equipment within the spent fuel pool shall be mounted to retain its design configuration during and following the maximum seismic ground motion considered in the design of the spent fuel pool structure.

1.4 Qualification: The primary and backup instrument channels shall be reliable at temperature, humidity, and radiation levels consistent with the spent fuel pool water at saturation conditions for an extended period. This reliability shall be established through use of an augmented quality assurance process (e.g., a process similar to that applied to the site fire protection program).

1.5 Independence: The primary instrument channel shall be independent of the backup instrument channel.

1.6 Power supplies: Permanently installed instrumentation channels shall each be powered by a separate power supply. Permanently installed and portable instrumentation channels shall provide for power connections from sources independent of the plant [alternating current (ac)] and [direct

current (dc)] power distribution systems, such as portable generators or replaceable batteries. Onsite generators used as an alternate power source and replaceable batteries used for instrument channel power shall have sufficient capacity to maintain the level indication function until offsite resource availability is reasonably assured.

1.7 Accuracy: The instrument channels shall maintain their designed accuracy following a power interruption or change in power source without recalibration.

1.8 Testing: The instrument channel design shall provide for routine testing and calibration.

1.9 Display: Trained personnel shall be able to monitor the spent fuel pool water level from the control room, alternate shutdown panel, or other appropriate and accessible location. The display shall provide on-demand or continuous indication of spent fuel pool water level.

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051, states that the SFP instrumentation shall be maintained available and reliable through appropriate development and implementation of the following programs:

2.1 Training: Personnel shall be trained in the use and the provision of alternate power to the primary and backup instrument channels.

2.2 Procedures: Procedures shall be established and maintained for the testing, calibration, and use of the primary and backup spent fuel pool instrument channels.

2.3 Testing and Calibration: Processes shall be established and maintained for scheduling and implementing necessary testing and calibration of the primary and backup spent fuel pool level instrument channels to maintain the instrument channels at the design accuracy.

On August 29, 2012, the NRC issued an Interim Staff Guidance document (the ISG), JLD-ISG-2012-03, "Compliance with Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12221A339), to describe methods acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with Order EA-12-051. The ISG endorses, with exceptions and clarifications, the methods described in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 12-02, Revision 1, "Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, 'To Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,'" dated August 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12240A307). Specifically, the ISG states:

> The NRC staff considers that the methodologies and guidance in conformance with the guidelines provided in NEI 12-02, Revision 1, subject to the clarifications and exceptions in Attachment 1 to this ISG, are an acceptable means of meeting the requirements of Order EA-12-051.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

Citations of NEI 12-02 in this interim staff evaluation refer to NEI 12-02, Revision 1, unless otherwise noted.

3.1 Background and Schedule

Wolf Creek Generating Station has a SFP, 50 feet (ft.) 0 inches (in.) long by 28 ft. 6 in. wide.

The licensee submitted its OIP on February 28, 2013. The OIP states that installation of the SFP level instrumentation at Wolf Creek will be completed by the first quarter of 2015.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's schedule for implementation of SFP level instrumentation provided in its OIP. If the licensee completes implementation in accordance with this schedule, it would appear to achieve compliance with Order EA-12-051 within two refueling cycles after submittal of the OIP and before December 31, 2016.

3.2 Spent Fuel Pool Water Levels

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that

> All licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall have a reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of the following pool water level conditions by trained personnel: (1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system [Level 1], (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the SFP operating deck [Level 2], and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water addition should no longer be deferred [Level 3].

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> Level 1 represents the HIGHER of the following two points:
>
> - The level at which reliable suction loss occurs due to uncovering of the coolant inlet pipe, weir or vacuum breaker (depending on the design), or
> - The level at which the water height, assuming saturated conditions, above the centerline of the cooling pump suction provides the required net positive suction head specified by the pump manufacturer or engineering analysis.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that Level 1 is the indicated level on either the primary or backup instrument channel of 24 ft. - 10.75 in. above the top of the fuel storage racks.

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

> WCNOC designated Level 1 to be Elevation 2046 ft. (24 ft. - 10.75 in. above the top of the fuel racks). This corresponds to the normal water level. This level is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, as required by Order EA-12-051. It is a higher level than either of the pump-limiting conditions specified in NEI 12-02, section 2.3.1, and as such, is conservatively safe.

The NRC staff notes that the licensee stated that the SFP elevation for Level 1 is set at a plant elevation of 2046 ft. This level is 24 ft. - 10.75 in. above the top of the fuel racks. However, as stated in NEI 12-02, Level 1 is to be established at the higher of two SFP elevations. At this time, the elevation necessary to provide the required net positive suction head (NPSH) specified by the pump manufacturer or engineering analysis is not available for staff review. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI No. 1

Please provide the results of the calculation used to determine the water elevation necessary for the pump's required NPSH to confirm that Level 1 has been adequately identified.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> Level 2 represents the range of water level where any necessary operations in the vicinity of the spent fuel pool can be completed without significant dose consequences from direct gamma radiation from the stored spent fuel. Level 2 is based on either of the following:
>
> - 10 feet (+/- 1 foot) above the highest point of any fuel rack seated in the spent fuel pools, or
>
> - a designated level that provides adequate radiation shielding to maintain personnel radiological dose levels within acceptable limits while performing local operations in the vicinity of the pool. This level shall be based on either plant-specific or appropriate generic shielding calculations, considering the emergency conditions that may apply at the time and the scope of necessary local operations, including installation of portable SFP instrument channel components.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that Level 2 is the indicated level on either the primary or backup instrument channel of greater than 10 ft. above the top of the fuel storage racks.

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee provided a sketch showing the approximate location of the elevations identified as Levels 1, 2, and 3, the top of the fuel storage rack and SFP instrumentation span. The NRC staff notes that Level 2 at an elevation of 2031 ft. - 1.25 in. is approximately 10 ft. above the top of the fuel rack. The staff also notes that the licensee designated Level 2 using the first of the two options described in NEI 12-02 for Level 2.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> Level 3 corresponds nominally (i.e., +/- 1 foot) to the highest point of any fuel rack seated in the spent fuel pool. Level 3 is defined in this manner to provide the maximum range of information to operators, decision makers and emergency response personnel.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that Level 3 is the indicated level on either the primary or backup instrument channel of greater than 1 ft. above the top of the fuel storage racks.

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee provided a sketch showing the approximate location of the elevations identified as Levels 1, 2, and 3, the top of the fuel storage rack and SFP instrumentation span. The NRC staff notes that Level 3 at an elevation of 2022 ft. - 1.25 in. is approximately 1 ft. above the top of the fuel rack. The NRC notes that this elevation is above the highest point of any spent fuel storage rack seated in the spent fuel pool.

The licensee's proposed plan, with respect to identification of Levels 2 and 3, appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG.

3.3 Design Features: Instruments

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051, states, in part, that

> The instrumentation shall consist of a permanent, fixed primary instrument channel and a backup instrument channel. The backup instrument channel may be fixed or portable. Portable instruments shall have capabilities that enhance the ability of trained personnel to monitor spent fuel pool water level under conditions that restrict direct personnel access to the pool, such as partial structural damage, high radiation levels, or heat and humidity from a boiling pool.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> A spent fuel pool level instrument channel is considered reliable when the instrument channel satisfies the design elements listed in Section 3 [Instrumentation Design Features] of this guidance and the plant operator has fully implemented the programmatic features listed in Section 4 [Program Features].

In its OIP, the licensee stated that the Wolf Creek SFP Instrumentation System will use fixed primary and backup guided wave radar (GWR) sensors. The licensee also stated that the primary and backup instrument channels will provide continuous level indication over a range of 23 ft. - 10.75 in., from 12 in. above the top of the fuel storage racks to the normal pool elevation.

The NRC staff notes that the range specified for the licensee's instrumentation will cover Levels 1, 2, and 3 as described in Section 3.2 above. The licensee's proposed plan, with respect to the number of channels and the range of the instrumentation its SFPs, appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG.

In its OIP, the licensee indicated that the level indicators would use a wireless technology to send signals from the transmitter panel to the receiver panel, which would include digital displays of the SFP levels.

Regarding wireless technology, NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> Wireless and other advanced technologies may be used provided that an evaluation is performed to address their interaction with other plant systems, failure modes, and impact on plant cyber security controls. The use of such wireless technology must be evaluated for any possible adverse impact it may have on other plant equipment likely to be in use at the same time as the wireless SFP instrumentation is functioning. Licensees should also consider the ability of a wireless communication link to perform in the environment (e.g., high humidity, radiation) in which it may be called upon to function. Wireless technologies must meet the same requirements as wired technologies as specified in this guidance document. Wireless technologies that might be used in either the permanent or backup water level instrument channels are not Critical Digital Assets as defined in NEI 08-09, *Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors* (Reference 7); however, licensees should be cognizant of the logical connections that the wireless system may enable and adhere to the controls in their plant-specific cyber security plans with respect to its implementation.

The NRC staff has concerns regarding the licensee's performance evaluation of the wireless technology to be used in the SFP instrumentation in accordance with the guidance on instruments as described in NEI 12-02. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI No. 2

Please provide the following:

a) **The plant-specific performance evaluation result and a brief summary of the proposed wireless technology that will be used in the primary and backup measurement systems to address the criteria summarized in Section 3.1 of NEI 12-02.**

b) **A description of the proposed wireless SFP instrumentation connections. Indicate whether the proposed SFP wireless instrumentation will use an existing wireless network or would use a dedicated point-to-point transmission path.**

c) **Further information on how the proposed SFP wireless instrumentation will be designed and installed to address electromagnetic interference/radio-frequency interference (EMI/RFI) emissions/susceptibility issues under BDB event conditions.**

d) **A description of the manner by which the proposed SFP wireless instrumentation will be operable and available under BDB event conditions.**

3.4 Design Features: Arrangement

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051, states, in part, that

> The spent fuel pool level instrument channels shall be arranged in a manner that provides reasonable protection of the level indication function against missiles that may result from damage to the structure over the spent fuel pool. This protection may be provided by locating the primary instrument channel and the fixed portions of the backup instrument channel, if applicable, to maintain instrument channel separation within the spent fuel pool area, and to utilize inherent shielding from missiles provided by existing recesses and corners in the spent fuel pool structure.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> The intent of the arrangement requirement is to specify reasonable separation and missile protection requirements for permanently installed instrumentation used to meet this order. Although additional missile barriers are not required to be installed, separation and shielding can help minimize the probability that damage due to an explosion or extreme natural phenomena (e.g., falling or wind-driven missiles) will render fixed channels of SFP instrumentation unavailable. Installation of the SFP instrument channels shall be consistent with the plant-specific SFP design requirements and should not impair normal SFP function.
>
> Channel separation should be maintained by locating the installed sensors in different places in the SFP area.

In its OIP, the licensee stated, in part, that

> A SFP walkdown identified preliminary locations for the primary and backup level sensing components. The preliminary locations of the primary and backup instrument sensing components are at the plant northeast and northwest corners of the SFP. The design for installation will include physical separation of the two sensors, separate extension cables from the electronics to the sensors, routing all cables in separate conduit/trays, separate UPS [uninterruptible power supply] power supplied from different ac sources, and seismically qualified mounting with physical separation of both the level sensing electronics and indications.
>
> The final location of the primary and backup system mounting brackets will be determined during the design phase with consideration of power availability and separation requirements to protect against missiles.

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee provided two marked-up plant drawings depicting the conceptual locations of the two permanently mounted level probes (primary and backup) within the SFP area. These drawings show that the two level sensors would be

located in opposite corners of the SFP. They also showed that the proposed cable routing from the sensor probes in the SFP to the wireless transmitters.

The NRC staff notes that the licensee's proposed location of the primary and backup level instruments for its SFP appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG.

The NRC staff notes that sketches provided by the licensee in its August 15 letter depict the cables for the sensor channels to be run side by side from the sensor probes in the SFP to the wireless transmitters. The NRC staff has concerns regarding the routing of these two channels in accordance with the guidance on channel separation as described in NEI 12-02. Additional information is needed to enable the staff to complete its evaluation. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI No. 3

Please provide additional information describing how the proposed arrangement of the routing of the cabling between the sensor probes in the SFP to the wireless transmitters meets the Order requirement to arrange the SFP level instrument channels in a manner that provides reasonable protection of the level indication function against missiles that may result from damage to the structure over the SFP.

3.5 Design Features: Mounting

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that

> Installed instrument channel equipment within the spent fuel pool shall be mounted to retain its design configuration during and following the maximum seismic ground motion considered in the design of the spent fuel pool structure.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> The mounting shall be designed to be consistent with the highest seismic or safety classification of the SFP. An evaluation of other hardware stored in the SFP shall be conducted to ensure it will not create adverse interaction with the fixed instrument location(s).
>
> The basis for the seismic design for mountings in the SFP shall be the plant seismic design basis at the time of submittal of the Integrated Plan for implementing NRC Order EA-12-051.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that the mounting of both the primary and backup system will be installed to maintain its integrity during and following a design basis seismic event and that all locations will be reviewed for two-over-one seismic interference.

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee also stated, in part, that

a) The mounting bracket for the sensing probe will be designed according to the plant design basis for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) seismic

hazard curve at the appropriate plant elevation. Loads that will be considered in the evaluation of the bracket and its mounting are: 1- Static loads including the dead weight of the mounting bracket in addition to the weight of the level sensing instruments, pipe guard and cabling; 2- Dynamic loads including the seismic load due to excitation of the dead weight of the system in addition to the hydrodynamic effects resulting from the excitation of the SFP water. A response spectra analysis will be performed for the seismic evaluation of the mounting bracket using a Finite Element Analysis (FEA) software and using floor response spectrum at the operating deck elevation (2047 ft.-6 in.) in the Fuel Building (i.e., mounting floor elevation). Damping values will be according to SSE and consistent with the design basis of the station. The material properties that will be used for the bracket and its mounting will take into consideration the environmental conditions in the SFP area following an event. The design of the bracket and its mounting will maintain a design margin of 10% or more from the plant design basis criteria. Hydrodynamic effects on the mounting bracket will be evaluated using TID-7024, "Nuclear Reactors and Earthquakes," August 1963. Plant acceptance criteria and applicable codes will be used for the design of the bracket and its anchorage.

b) Figure 1 shows a top view of the pedestal (stainless steel tube welded to the base plate and the channel shown in the figure) that will attach to the refuel deck. The bracket will be attached to the refuel deck using installed anchors that will be designed according to the plant existing specification for design of concrete anchors. The pedestal will be adjusted to the height of the poolside curb to ensure the SFP bracket extends over the pool horizontally level.

c) The attachment of the seismically qualified bracket to the refuel deck will be through permanently installed anchors that will be designed according to the plant existing specification for design of concrete anchors. With the permanently installed anchors, the pedestal will be secured to the refuel deck with adequate washers and bolts and the pedestal will attach to the bracket with adequate washers and bolts.

In addition, in its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee provided schematic showing details of the pedestal that would attach the bracket to the pool deck.

The NRC staff notes that the proposed application of such seismic design criteria appears to be reasonable and addresses the staff-endorsed NEI 12-02 guidance stating that the channel be designed to be consistent with the highest seismic or safety classification of the SFP. The licensee's proposed plan, with respect to the seismic design of the mounting, appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG. The staff plans to verify the results of the licensee's seismic testing and analysis report. The staff has identified these requests as:

RAI No. 4

Please provide the results of the analyses used to verify the design criteria and methodology for seismic testing of the SFP instrumentation and the electronics units, including, design basis maximum seismic loads and the hydrodynamic loads that could result from pool sloshing or other effects that could accompany such seismic forces.

RAI No. 5

For each of the mounting attachments required to attach SFP Level equipment to plant structures, please describe the design inputs, and the methodology that was used to qualify the structural integrity of the affected structures/equipment.

3.6 Design Features: Qualification

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that

> The primary and backup instrument channels shall be reliable at temperature, humidity, and radiation levels consistent with the spent fuel pool water at saturation conditions for an extended period. This reliability shall be established through use of an augmented quality assurance process (e.g. a process similar to that applied to the site fire protection program).

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> The instrument channel reliability shall be demonstrated via an appropriate combination of design, analyses, operating experience, and/or testing of channel components for the following sets of parameters, as described in the paragraphs below:
>
> - conditions in the area of instrument channel component use for all instrument components,
> - effects of shock and vibration on instrument channel components used during any applicable event for only installed components, and
> - seismic effects on instrument channel components used during and following a potential seismic event for only installed components...

The NRC staff assessment of the instrument qualification is discussed in the following subsections below: (3.6.1) Augmented Quality Process, (3.6.2) Post Event Conditions, (3.6.3) Shock and Vibration, and (3.6.4) Seismic Reliability.

3.6.1 Augmented Quality Process

Appendix A-1 of the guidance in NEI 12-02 describes a quality assurance process for non-safety systems and equipment that is not already covered by existing quality assurance requirements. Within the ISG, the NRC staff found the use of this quality assurance process to be an acceptable means of meeting the augmented quality requirements of Order EA-12-051.

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

> Appropriate quality assurance measures will be selected for the SFPIS [SFP instrumentation system] required by Order EA-12-051, consistent with Appendix A-1 of NEI 12-02 and similar to those imposed by Regulatory Guide 1.155.

The licensee's proposed quality assurance process appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG.

3.6.2 Post Event Conditions

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> The temperature, humidity and radiation levels consistent with conditions in the vicinity of the SFP and the area of use considering normal operational, event and post-event conditions for no fewer than seven days post-event or until off-site resources can be deployed by the mitigating strategies resulting from Order EA-12-049 should be considered. Examples of post-event (beyond-design-basis) conditions to be considered are:
>
> - radiological conditions for a normal refueling quantity of freshly discharged (100 hours) fuel with the SFP water level 3 as described in this order,
> - temperatures of 212 degrees F and 100% relative humidity environment,
> - boiling water and/or steam environment
> - a concentrated borated water environment,

In its OIP, the licensee stated, consistent with NEI 12-02, in part, that

> The normal operational, event, and post-event conditions for temperature, humidity, and radiation, will be addressed for no fewer than seven days post-event or until off-site resources can be deployed by the mitigating strategies resulting from the NRC issued Order EA-12-049, "*Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-*

Design-Basis External Events," dated March 12, 2012 (Reference 6). Examples of post-event (beyond-design-basis) conditions to be considered are:

1) radiological conditions for a normal refueling quantity of freshly discharged (100 hours) fuel with the SFP water level 3 (Section III, Item 3) as described in Reference 1,

2) temperatures of 212°F and 100 percent relative humidity environment,

3) boiling water and/or steam environment,

4) A concentrated borated water environment,

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

> Demonstration of the reliability of the permanently installed spent fuel pool instrumentation system (SFPIS) equipment under the beyond-design-basis conditions will be by design, analysis, operating experience and testing by the system vendor and the equipment manufacturer(s), as described below for each of the identified conditions.
>
> Temperature and Humidity
>
> SFPIS materials and components were selected and specified by design to meet or exceed the temperature and humidity in the Fuel Building and other buildings during the extended loss of AC power event. The design of system components will be supplemented by analysis or testing as shown below.
> ...
>
> Radiation
>
> Components subject to significant radiation under beyond design basis conditions are those in the Fuel Building. These components include the sensor probe, bracket, coupler and interconnecting cable. The sensor probe and bracket are stainless steel and will not be affected by the anticipated radiation. The coupler and cable are selected by design for the beyond-design-basis radiation service. Supplemental radiation testing of the interconnecting cable will be completed to demonstrate operation for more than one week with SFP water at Level 3, and indefinitely at Level 2 or above (refer to RAI 1).

In addition, in its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee provided information regarding the SFP instrumentation components and the basis for validating the design of these components. In this letter, the licensee explained that the sensor probe and sensor bracket are inherently tolerant to the effects of the specified temperature and humidity and this will be demonstrated by design and analysis. The sensor coupler is specifically designed by the manufacturer for high temperature and humidity applications. The coaxial cable will be selected by design for conditions and tested for performance at 212 degrees Fahrenheit (°F), saturated steam. The sensor electronics design temperature and humidity exceeds the requirements for the mounting

locations. The sensor and system electronics and wireless transmitters, design temperature exceeds the requirements for the mounting locations which will be in the Auxiliary Building. The wireless receiver and display design temperature exceeds the requirements for the mounting locations which will be in the Control Room A/C [air conditioning] Unit & Filtration Units Room "A" in the Auxiliary Building.

The NRC staff has concerns with the lack of information regarding whether the sensor electronics is capable of continuously performing its required functions under the expected temperature and humidity condition. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI No. 6

Please provide the following:

a) Information describing the temperature ratings for all system electronics (including sensor electronics, system electronics, level and wireless transmitter, wireless receiver and display) and whether the ratings are continuous duty ratings; and,

b) Information describing what will be the maximum expected temperature and relative humidity conditions in the room(s) in which the sensor electronics and wireless technologies will be located under BDB conditions in which there is no ac power available to run Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems.

c) Analysis of the maximum expected radiological conditions (dose rate and total integrated dose) to which the equipment will be exposed. Also, please provide documentation indicating the radiological dosage amount that the electronics for this equipment is capable of withstanding. Please discuss the time period over which the analyzed total integrated dose was applied.

3.6.3 Shock and Vibration

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> Applicable components of the instrument channels are rated by the manufacturer (or otherwise tested) for shock and vibration at levels commensurate with those of postulated design basis event conditions in the area of instrument channel component use using one or more of the following methods:
>
> - instrument channel components use known operating principles, are supplied by manufacturers with commercial quality programs (such as ISO9001) with shock and vibration requirements included in the purchase specification and/or instrument design, and commercial design and testing for operation in environments where significant shock and vibration loadings are common, such as for portable hand-held devices or transportation applications;

- substantial history of operational reliability in environments with significant shock and vibration loading, such as transportation applications, or

- use of components inherently resistant to shock and vibration loadings or are seismically reliable such as cables.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that demonstration of shock and vibration adequacy will be consistent with the guidelines in Reference 2 [NEI 12-02] and Reference 3 [ISG].

Passive components located within the SFP building

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

> The components located within the SFP are passive components, inherently resistant to shock and vibration loadings. These include the stainless steel sensor cable probe, sensor bracket, coupler and interconnecting cable.

Active components located outside the SFP building

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

> Active electronic components, located outside the SFP building, are permanently and rigidly attached to seismic racks or structural walls, and are not subject to significant shock and vibration loadings. However, assurance of reliability under conditions of shock and vibration is supported by manufacturer operating experience, which includes use of components in high vibration installations, such as compressed air systems and transportation industries.

The NRC staff notes that while the passive components may inherently be resistant to shock and vibration loadings, the actual resistance depends on the component material property, structure, and the final installation. The staff has concerns with the licensee's lack of information regarding the tests, applied forces and their directions, frequency ranges, and the operability of the sensor after shock and vibration tests are completed. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI No. 7

Please provide the following:

a) Information describing the evaluation of the sensor electronics design, the shock test method, test results, and forces applied to the sensor electronics applicable to its successful tests demonstrating that the testing provides an appropriate means to demonstrate reliability of the sensor electronics under the effects of severe shock.

b) Information describing the evaluation of the sensor electronics design, the vibration test method, test results, the forces and their frequency ranges and directions applied to the sensor applicable to its successful tests, demonstrating that the testing provides an appropriate means to demonstrate reliability of the sensor electronics under the effects of high vibration.

3.6.4 Seismic Reliability

The ISG recommends the use of Sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 344-2004 "IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," or a substantially similar industrial standard, for seismic qualification of the SFP level instrumentation.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that demonstration of seismic adequacy would be achieved using one or more of the methods listed in the ISG.

Passive components located within the SFP building

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

> The sensor cable probe and supporting bracket are functionally passive components. Analysis will be used to demonstrate they will maintain their structural integrity and design configuration and to establish their reliability. The coupler and interconnecting cable are also passive components; however, they will be included in the seismic testing of the sensor electronics. The active system components, including sensor electronics, system electronics, batteries, display and enclosures will be seismically tested based on rigid mounting conditions. Testing is tri-axial, using random multi-frequency inputs, in accordance with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 344-2004. Analyses and testing will envelope conditions at the equipment mounting locations resulting from the design basis maximum ground motion, plus margin.
>
> The components except for the stainless steel sensor cable probe and the stainless steel bracket will be seismically tested in a rigidly mounted condition equivalent to their as-installed condition. The cable probe and bracket are passive components for which maintenance of structural or physical integrity is the only requirement.

Active components located outside the SFP building

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

> The active system components, including sensor electronics, system electronics, batteries, display and enclosures will be seismically tested based on rigid mounting conditions. Testing is tri-axial, using random multi-frequency inputs, in accordance with IEEE 344 - 2004. Analyses and testing will conservatively

> envelope the conditions at equipment mounting locations resulting from the design basis maximum ground motion, plus margin.
> ...
>
> The active components of the SFPIS will be functionally tested before and after seismic simulation. Water level inputs to the system will be simulated by grounding the system probe at selected, repeatable positions. Acceptance will be based on a comparison of indicated levels before and after seismic testing, for the same simulated level inputs at the sensor probe.

The NRC staff notes that the licensee will demonstrate the reliability of the seismic design and installation in accordance with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG. The licensee's planned approach with respect to the seismic reliability of the instrumentation appears to be consistent NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG. However, the staff plans to verify the results of the licensee's seismic test when it is completed. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI No. 8

Please provide analysis of the seismic testing results and show that the instrument (including wireless technology) performance reliability, following exposure to simulated seismic conditions representative of the environment anticipated for the SFP structures at Wolf Creek Generating Station has been adequately demonstrated. Include information describing the design inputs and methodology used in any analyses of the mountings of electronic equipment onto plant structures, as requested in RAI No. 4 above.

3.6.5 Qualification Evaluation Summary

Upon acceptable resolution of the RAIs in Section 3.6, the NRC staff will be able to make a conclusion regarding the instrument qualification.

3.7 Design Features: Independence

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that

> The primary instrument channel shall be independent of the backup instrument channel.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> Independence of permanently installed instrumentation, and primary and backup channels, is obtained by physical and power separation commensurate with the hazard and electrical isolation needs. If plant AC or DC power sources are used then the power sources shall be from different buses and preferably different divisions/channels depending on available sources of power.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that the independence of the two systems includes: location, mounting, power sources, power and signal wiring, and indications, to prevent any failure of one system from affecting the other system.

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

a) Within the SFP area, the brackets will be mounted as close to the Northwest (primary sensor) and Northeast (backup sensor) corners of the SFP, as permanent plant structures allow. Placing the brackets and probes in the corners allows for natural protection from a single event or missile from disabling both systems. The cabling within the SFP area will be routed in separate hard-pipe conduit. All conduit routing and location of system components will be selected such that there will not be any seismic 2 over 1 hazard.

b) Each system will be installed using completely independent cabling structures, including routing of the interconnecting cable within the SFP area in separate hard-pipe conduits. Power sources will be routed to the electronics enclosures from electrically separated sources ensuring the loss of one train or bus will not disable both channels. The system displays will be installed in separate qualified National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) 4X or better enclosures, with the primary display in the Control Room A/C Unit and Filtration Units Room "A" and the back-up in the Control Room A/C Unit and Filtration Units Room "B". Primary and backup systems will be completely independent of each other, having no shared components.

The NRC staff notes that with this arrangement, the loss of one backup power supply will not affect the operation of the independent channel under BDB event conditions. The implementation of such design provisions appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG, and the electrical functional performance of each level measurement channel would be considered independent of the other channel. However, the NRC staff plans to verify the final electrical power supply design information when it is provided. The NRC staff has identified this request as:

RAI No. 9

Please provide the NRC staff with the final configuration of the power supply source for each channel so that the staff may conclude that the two channels are independent from a power supply assignment perspective.

3.8 Design Features: Power Supplies

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051, states in part, that

> Permanently installed instrumentation channels shall each be powered by a separate power supply. Permanently installed and portable instrumentation channels shall provide for power connections from sources independent of the

plant ac and dc power distribution systems, such as portable generators or replaceable batteries. Onsite generators used as an alternate power source and replaceable batteries used for instrument channel power shall have sufficient capacity to maintain the level indication function until offsite resource availability is reasonably assured.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> The normal electrical power supply for each channel shall be provided by different sources such that the loss of one of the channel[']s primary power supply will not result in a loss of power supply function to both channels of SFP level instrumentation.
>
> All channels of SFP level instrumentation shall provide the capability of connecting the channel to a source of power (e.g., portable generators or replaceable batteries) independent of the normal plant AC and DC power systems. For fixed channels this alternate capability shall include the ability to isolate the installed channel from its normal power supply or supplies. The portable power sources for the portable and installed channels shall be stored at separate locations, consistent with the reasonable protection requirements associated with NEI 12-06 (Order EA-12-049). The portable generator or replaceable batteries should be accessible and have sufficient capacity to support reliable instrument channel operation until off-site resources can be deployed by the mitigating strategies resulting from Order EA-12-049.
>
> If adequate power supply for either an installed or portable level instrument credits intermittent operation, then the provisions shall be made for quickly and reliably taking the channel out of service and restoring it to service. For example, a switch on the power supply to the channel is adequate provided the power can be periodically interrupted without significantly affecting the accuracy and reliability of the instrument reading. Continuous indication of SFP level is acceptable only if the power for such indication is demonstrably adequate for the time duration specified in section 3.1[.]

In its OIP, the licensee stated, in part, that

> The 4-20 milliamp (mA) signal from the sensor electronics module is connected to a mounted, seismically qualified power supply and transmitter panel. The panel contains a 24-volt (V) direct current (dc) (Vdc) uninterruptible power supply (UPS), a wireless transmitter for the sensor signal, and batteries for continued system operation during a loss of alternating current (ac) power for a minimum of 72 hours, in which time an alternate external source of power can be supplied. A bulkhead connector and transfer switch is externally accessible for the connection of an alternate power source. The panel is located with or near the sensor electronics housing, outside of the spent fuel pool area. The interface between the sensor electronics and the mounted panel is a twisted, shielded pair cable.

> The transmitter panel will send a signal to the wireless receiver panel. The mounted seismically qualified wireless receiver panel contains a 24-Vdc UPS, door-mounted digital display of SFP level, and batteries for continued system operation during a loss of ac power until an alternate external source of power can be supplied. A bulkhead connector and transfer switch is externally accessible for the connection of an alternate power source. The mounted receiver panel is located in one of the accessible locations in the vicinity of the control room.

In addition, in its OIP, the licensee stated, in part, that

> An ac source will be selected for each system's 24-Vdc UPS, with power cables routed separately through existing or new tray / conduit and penetrations.
>
> Both channels will be powered by independent batteries following a loss-of-ac power. The minimum battery life will be 72 hours. The 72 hour battery life is sufficient amount of time for an alternate source of power to be provided by the plant-specific procedures to address Reference 6 [EA-12-049]. Each channel will include an externally accessible bulkhead connector and transfer switch for connection of an alternate power source.

In its letter dated August 28, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

a) A description of the electrical AC power sources and capacities for the primary and backup channels will be developed as part of the detailed design and more information will be provided in the 6-month status update in February 2014.

b) Battery sizing is in accordance with IEEE 485-2010. Design criteria applied are: continuous system operation for 72 hours following loss of AC power. Calculation of system power consumption is based on the specified values listed in component manufacturer specifications. A 10% capacity margin is added to battery sizing calculations, following guidelines of IEEE 485-2010, Section 6.2.2. The time to restore AC power to the primary and backup channels will be within 72 hours, and will be established in the diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) Support Guidelines.

The NRC staff notes that the proposed criteria for sizing of the battery backup appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG. However, the staff notes that the licensee will provide the description of the electrical AC power sources and capacities for the primary and backup channels in the 6-month status update in February 2014. The staff also plans to verify the results of the licensee's calculation for required duty cycle given the final design load of the instrument channel for its installed configuration. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI No. 10

Please provide the following:

a) **A description of the electrical ac power sources and capabilities for the primary and backup channels.**

b) **Please provide the results of the calculation depicting the battery backup duty cycle requirements demonstrating that its capacity is sufficient to maintain the level indication function until offsite resource availability is reasonably assured.**

3.9 Design Features: Accuracy

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that

> The instrument channels shall maintain their designed accuracy following a power interruption or change in power source without recalibration.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> Accuracy should consider SFP conditions, e.g., saturated water, steam environment, or concentrated borated water. Additionally, instrument accuracy should be sufficient to allow trained personnel to determine when the actual level exceeds the specified lower level of each indicating range (levels 1, 2 and 3) without conflicting or ambiguous indication.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that instrument channels will be designed such that they will maintain their specified accuracy without recalibration following a power interruption or change in power source.

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

a) The instrument channel accuracy will be established during the design phase. An estimate of the expected instrument channel accuracy under normal and beyond-design-basis conditions will be provided in the 6-month status update in February 2014.

b) The calibration procedure, and the methodology and basis for establishing both the criteria indicating the need for recalibration, and the acceptance

criterion to be used with the procedure, will be established during the design phase. The methodology for defining these criteria will be provided in the 6-month status update in February 2014.

The NRC staff notes that further information regarding SFP level instrumentation accuracy is not available for review and that the licensee will provide further information to the staff in the February 2014 6-month status update. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI No. 11

Please provide the following:

a) **An estimate of the expected instrument channel accuracy performance under both (a) normal SFP level conditions (approximately Level 1 or higher) and (b) at the BDB conditions (i.e., radiation, temperature, humidity, post-seismic and post-shock conditions) that would be present if the SFP level were at the Level 2 and Level 3 datum points.**

b) **A description of the methodology that will be used for determining the maximum allowed deviation from the instrument channel design accuracy that will be employed under normal operating conditions as an acceptance criterion for a calibration procedure to flag to operators.**

(This information was previously requested in RAI-7 of the NRC letter dated July 17, 2013)

3.10 Design Features: Testing

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that

> The instrument channel design shall provide for routine testing and calibration.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> Static or non-active installed (fixed) sensors can be used and should be designed such that testing and/or calibration can be performed in-situ. For microprocessor based channels the instrument channel design shall be capable of testing while mounted in the pool.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that the instrument channel design will provide for routine testing and calibration consistent with Reference 2 [NEI 12-02] and Reference 3 [ISG].

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

a) Details of the capabilities and provisions of the level instrumentation for periodic calibration and testing will be established during the design phase. A description of these features and the way they will support

in-situ testing will be provided in the 6-month status update in February 2014.

b) A description of how the defined testing and calibration will enable the conduct of regular channel checks of each independent channel against the other, and against any other permanently-installed SFP level instrumentation will be provided in the 6-month status update in February 2014.

c) Details of functional checks and instrument channel calibrations will be determined during the design phase. A description of how functional checks and calibration tests will be performed, and the frequency at which they will be conducted, will be provided in the 6-month status update in February 2014. An explanation of how these surveillances will be incorporated into the plant surveillance program will be included.

d) The preventive maintenance tasks required to be performed during normal operation, and the planned surveillance intervals will be determined during the design phase. A description of these tasks and intervals will be provided in the 6-month status update in February 2014.

The NRC staff notes that further information regarding the design of the SFP level instrumentation to provide for routine testing and calibration is not available for review and that the licensee will provide further information to the staff in the February 2014 6-month status update. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI No. 12

Please provide the following:

a) A description of the capability and provisions the proposed level sensing equipment will have to enable periodic testing and calibration, including how this capability enables the equipment to be tested in-situ.

b) A description of how such testing and calibration will enable the conduct of regular channel checks of each independent channel against the other, and against any other permanently installed SPF level instrumentation.

c) A description how calibration tests and functional checks will be performed and the frequency at which they will be conducted. Please discuss how these surveillances will be incorporated into the plant surveillance program.

d) A description what preventive maintenance tasks are required to be performed during normal operation, and the planned maximum

surveillance interval that is necessary to ensure that the channels are fully conditioned to accurately and reliably perform their functions when needed.

(This information was previously requested in RAI-8 of the NRC letter dated July 17, 2013)

3.11 Design Features: Display

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that

> Trained personnel shall be able to monitor the spent fuel pool water level from the control room, alternate shutdown panel, or other appropriate and accessible location. The display shall provide on-demand or continuous indication of spent fuel pool water level.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> The intent of this guidance is to ensure that information on SFP level is promptly available to the plant staff and decision makers. Ideally there will be an indication from at least one channel of instrumentation in the control room. While it is generally recognized (as demonstrated by the events at Fukushima Daiichi) that SFP level will not change rapidly during a loss of spent fuel pool cooling scenario[,] more rapid SFP drain down cannot be entirely discounted. Therefore, the fact that plant personnel are able to determine the SFP level will satisfy this requirement, provided the personnel are available and trained in the use of the SFP level instrumentation (see Section 4.1) and that they can accomplish the task when required without unreasonable delay.
>
> SFP level indication from the installed channel shall be displayed in the control room, at the alternate shutdown panel, or another appropriate and accessible location (reference NEI 12-06). An appropriate and accessible location shall have the following characteristics:
>
> - occupied or promptly accessible to the appropriate plant staff giving appropriate consideration to various drain down scenarios,
> - outside of the area surrounding the SFP floor, e.g., an appropriate distance from the radiological sources resulting from an event impacting the SFP,
> - inside a structure providing protection against adverse weather, and
> - outside of any very high radiation areas or LOCKED HIGH RAD AREA during normal operation.
>
> If multiple display locations beyond the required "appropriate and accessible location" are desired, then the instrument channel shall be designed with the

capability to drive the multiple display locations without impacting the primary "appropriate and accessible" display.

In its OIP, the licensee stated, in part, that

> The primary system indicator will be located in the vicinity of the control room. The backup system indicator will be located in an accessible location. The locations will allow for reading of the indicators following an event. The display will provide continuous indication of the SFP water level and will be consistent with the guidelines of Reference 2 [NEI 12-02] and Reference 3 [ISG].

In its August 15, 2013 letter, the licensee stated, in part, that

a) The primary display will be located in the Control Room A/C Unit and Filtration Units Room "A", Room 1512 Elevation 2047 ft. - 6 in., on the approximate centerline of the Plant West wall. The backup display will be located in the Control Room A/C Unit and Filtration Units Room "B", Room 1501 Elevation 2047 ft. - 6 in., on the approximate centerline of the Plant West wall.

b) Below is an excerpt of a plant drawing being used as a sketch showing the locations of the displays and the control room. The displays are on the wall separating the control room from the Auxiliary Building, to the Plant East. The displays can be promptly viewed by control room staff due an access from the control room to the Control Room A/C Unit and Filtration Units Room "A". An alternate path can be utilized through the Communication Corridor, into the Auxiliary Building and into either the Control Room A/C Unit and Filtration Units Room "A" or "B". During and after an event, the area of the displays will be accessible by Operations personnel from the control room. The Control Room A/C Unit and Filtration Units Rooms "A" and "B" are located in the control room envelope. The control room envelope is isolated and pressurized during an accident involving the release of radioactive gases in the surrounding zones. Due to the close proximity between the control room and the display locations, use of wireless handheld radios or other equipment for communications will not be necessary.

c) During drain-down scenarios and external events the control room will be manned. With the displays just outside the control room they are considered "promptly accessible."

The NRC staff notes that the NEI guidance for "Display" specifically mentions the control room as an acceptable location for SFP instrumentation displays as it is occupied or promptly accessible, outside the area surrounding the SFP, inside a structure providing protection against adverse weather and outside of any very high radiation areas or LOCKED HIGH RAD AREA during normal operation. The licensee's proposed location for the primary and backup SFP instrumentation displays, inside the control room envelope, appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG.

3.12 Programmatic Controls: Training

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that

> Personnel shall be trained in the use and the provision of alternate power to the primary and backup instrument channels.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> The personnel performing functions associated with these SFP level instrumentation channels shall be trained to perform the job specific functions necessary for their assigned tasks (maintenance, calibration, surveillance, etc.). SFP instrumentation should be installed via the normal modification processes. In some cases, utilities may choose to utilize portable instrumentation as a portion of their SFP instrumentation response. In either case utilities should use the Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) to identify the population to be trained. The SAT process should also determine both the initial and continuing elements of the required training.

In its OIP, the licensee stated, in part, that

> The Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) will be used to identify the population to be trained and to determine both the initial and continuing elements of the required training. Training will be completed prior to placing the instrumentation in service.

The licensee's proposed plan to train personnel in the use and the provision of alternate power to the primary and backup instrument channels, including the approach to identify the population to be trained appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG.

3.13 Programmatic Controls: Procedures

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that

> Procedures shall be established and maintained for the testing, calibration, and use of the primary and backup spent fuel pool instrument channels.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> Procedures will be developed using guidelines and vendor instructions to address the maintenance, operation and abnormal response issues associated with the new SFP instrumentation.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that procedures will be developed using guidelines and vendor instructions to address the maintenance, operation, and abnormal response issues associated with the new SFP instrumentation.

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

> Site procedures will be developed for system inspection, calibration and test, maintenance, repair, operation and normal and abnormal responses, in accordance with WCNOC procedure controls.

In addition, in its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee provided a list of procedures to be developed and identified the technical objectives to be achieved in each procedure.

The NRC staff notes that the licensee plans to develop procedures for SFP level instrumentation inspection, calibration and testing, maintenance, repair, operation and responses. The licensee's proposed plan to establish and maintain procedures for the testing, calibration, and use of the primary and backup spent fuel pool instrument channels appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG.

3.14 Programmatic Controls: Testing and Calibration

Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that

> Processes shall be established and maintained for scheduling and implementing necessary testing and calibration of the primary and backup spent fuel pool level instrument channels to maintain the instrument channels at the design accuracy.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> Processes shall be established and maintained for scheduling and implementing necessary testing and calibration of the primary and backup SFP level instrument channels to maintain the instrument channels at the design accuracy. The testing and calibration of the instrumentation shall be consistent with vendor recommendations or other documented basis.

In its OIP, the licensee stated, in part, that

> Processes will be established and maintained for scheduling and implementing necessary testing and calibration of the primary and backup spent fuel pool level instrument channels to maintain the instrument channels at the design accuracy. Testing and calibration of the instrumentation will be consistent with vendor recommendations and any other documented basis.

In its letter dated August 15, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that

> WCNOC will establish and implement procedures for control and scheduling of SFPIS maintenance and testing. The new procedure(s) will include requirements for the necessary tests to be performed, frequency of testing and, acceptance criteria. As these procedures are developed, information will be provided to the NRC in the 6-month status update in February 2014.

> WCNOC will implement measures to minimize the possibility of either the primary or backup channel being out of service for any extended period. Sufficient spare components and materials will be maintained to enable timely repair or replacement of defective components. WCNOC will follow the NEI 12-02 guidance with regard to the time during which one or more channels may be out of service.
>
> If a channel is non-functional, a corrective action document will be initiated and actions taken to correct the deficiency within 90 days as described in NEI 12-02. The technology selected for level instrumentation is easily replaceable, as components are passive and modular. Sufficient spares will be available on-site and the vendor can supply parts in a timely manner.

In its letter dated August 28, 2013, the licensee restated its approach regarding compensatory actions to be taken when an instrument is out-of-order. In addition, the licensee noted that procedures are being developed, and thus information would be provided to the NRC in the February 2014, 6-month status update. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI No. 13

Please provide the following:

a) Further information describing the maintenance and testing program the licensee will establish and implement to ensure that regular testing and calibration is performed and verified by inspection and audit to demonstrate conformance with design and system readiness requirements Include a description of your plans for ensuring that necessary channel checks, functional tests, periodic calibration, and maintenance will be conducted for the level measurement system and its supporting equipment.

b) A description of the in-situ calibration process at the SFP location that will result in the channel calibration being maintained at its design accuracy.

c) A description of what compensatory actions are planned in the event that the non-functioning instrument channel cannot be restored to functional status within 90 days.

(This information was previously requested in RAI-11 of the NRC letter dated July 17, 2013. However, based on feedback from the licensee, it has been revised as above.)

3.15 Instrument Reliability

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that

> A spent fuel pool level instrument channel is considered reliable when the instrument channel satisfies the design elements listed in Section 3 [Instrument

Design Features] of this guidance and the plant operator has fully implemented the programmatic features listed in Section 4 [Program Features].

In its OIP, the licensee stated that reliability of the primary and backup instrument channels will be assured by conformance with the guidelines of Reference 3 [NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03] and Reference 2 [NEI 12-02], Section 3.4, Qualification, and Section 4.3, Testing and Calibration.

Upon acceptable resolution of the RAIs noted in the sections above, the NRC staff will be able to make a conclusion regarding the reliability of the SFP instrumentation.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The NRC staff is unable to complete its evaluation regarding the acceptability of the licensee's plans for implementing the requirements of Order EA-12-051 due to the need for additional information as described above. The staff will issue an evaluation with its conclusion after the licensee has provided the requested information.

date by which the licensee must complete full implementation of Order EA-12-051. The licensee should adjust its schedule for providing information to ensure that all this information is provided by the requested date.

If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-2296 or via e-mail at fred.lyon@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/ra/

Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch IV
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-482

Enclosure
Interim Staff Assessment and RAI

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