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August 20, 2013  
GO2-13-119

10 CFR 50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject: **COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2013-006-00**

Dear Sir or Madam:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 2013-006-00 for Columbia Generating Station. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

There are no commitments being made to the NRC by this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. J. R. Trautvetter, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor, at (509) 377-4337.

Respectfully,

W. G. Hettel  
Vice President, Operations

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 2013-006-00

cc: NRC Region IV Administrator  
NRC NRR Project Manager  
NRC Senior Resident Inspector/988C  
A. J. Rapacz - BPA/1399  
W.A. Horin - Winston & Strawn

JE22  
NRR

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**  
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to [infocollects\\_resource@nrc.gov](mailto:infocollects_resource@nrc.gov), and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

<b>1. FACILITY NAME</b> Columbia Generating Station	<b>2. DOCKET NUMBER</b> 05000397	<b>3. PAGE</b> 1 OF 3
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**4. TITLE**  
Accidental switch bump makes High Pressure Core Spray and Diesel Inoperable

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
06	27	2013	2013 - 006 - 00			08	20	2013	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

<b>9. OPERATING MODE</b> 1	<b>11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §:</b> (Check all that apply)									
<b>10. POWER LEVEL</b> 62	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)						
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A							

**12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER**

FACILITY NAME Diego Suarez	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 509-377-8652
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**13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT**

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

<b>14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	<b>15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE</b> MONTH: _____ DAY: _____ YEAR: _____
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**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On June 27, 2013 at 17:58 hours a laborer was exiting the Diesel Generator [DG] 3 Room when he inadvertently brushed against the control switch [JS] for the Diesel Mixed Air fan [FAN] causing it to turn to the OFF position. In response to an annunciator alarm in the main control room, an operations supervisor proceeded to the Diesel Generator 3 Room. After ascertaining what had happened by questioning the laborer, the operator turned the fan control switch back to ON and the switch operated smoothly. The Diesel Mixed Air fan was back in service at 18:19 hours, so the fan was inoperable for approximately 21 minutes.

With the Diesel Mixed Air fan switch in the OFF position, the following supported equipment were declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specifications were entered: Diesel Generator 3, High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) [BJ], Division 3 125 VDC battery charger [BYC], Division 3 battery [BTRY], and the Division 3 AC electrical power distribution system [JX].

The loss of the HPCS system resulted in the temporary loss of safety function for a single train system. There was no radiological release associated with this event. No safety system actuations or isolations occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Event Notification No. 49152 was submitted.



**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
CONTINUATION SHEET**

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Columbia Generating Station	05000397	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	2 OF 3
		2013 - 006 - 00			

**NARRATIVE**

**PLANT CONDITIONS**

The event occurred on June 27, 2013 at 17:58 hours when the plant was in Mode 1 at 62 percent power following a refueling outage.

**EVENT DESCRIPTION**

On June 27, 2013 at 17:58 hours a laborer was exiting the Diesel Generator [DG] 3 Room when he inadvertently brushed against the control switch [JS] for the Diesel Mixed Air fan [FAN] causing it to turn to the OFF position. In response to an annunciator in the main control room, an operations supervisor proceeded to the Diesel Generator 3 Room. After ascertaining what had happened by questioning the laborer, the operator turned the fan control switch back to the ON position. The Diesel Mixed Air fan was back in service at 18:19 hours, so the fan was inoperable for approximately 21 minutes. Technical Specifications were entered for the following equipment supported by the fan and declared inoperable: High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) [BJ], Diesel Generator (DG-3) [DG], Division 3 125 VDC battery charger [BYC], Division 3 125 VDC battery [BTRY], and the Division 3 AC electrical power distribution system [JX]. The Diesel Mixed Air fan and its supported equipment and systems were declared operable at 18:19 hours and returned to service.

The event affected the safety function for a single train system, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system; therefore, this Licensee Event report is filed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). There were no radiological releases because of this event, and there were no system actuations or isolations as a result of the event.

**IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION**

The proper control switch position was restored and the fan (DMA-FN-32) was placed back into service by Operations personnel.

**CAUSE**

The Cause Evaluation identified the apparent cause of this event as ineffective implementation of error prevention tools.

A contributing cause was identified as the station not having adequately addressed poor human factor designs in some cases for components susceptible to inadvertent contact due to their location and proximity in the plant.

**FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTION**

Conduct a briefing with Site Support Contractor craft workers focusing on procedure PPM 1.3.81 (Maintaining Plant Component Status Control) requirements and supporting behaviors.

Perform plant walk-downs and compile a list of components that are susceptible to bumping and provide recommendations for additional actions to prevent bump incidents.

**ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES**

The Diesel Mixed Air fan DMA-FN-32 functions as part of the DG-3 Engine Room ventilation supplying air flow to the room's air handling unit, and supports maintaining room air temperatures for diesel generator operation and for protection of electrical equipment. The fan serves the electrical equipment and generator area which are normally in standby. This HVAC component is required to ensure long-term emergency diesel generator and HPCS system operations. The HPCS system and Diesel Generator 3 were still available to respond to an accident condition. This event had no impact to the health and safety of the public.

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**NARRATIVE**

**SIMILAR EVENTS**

There have not been similar event reports at the station in the last ten years.

**ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (eiis) INFORMATION CODES**

EIIS codes are bracketed [] where applicable in the narrative.