

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY  
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

September 3, 2013

10 CFR 50.90

Attention: Document Control Desk  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Serial No.: 13-311A  
SPS-LIC/CGL R0  
Docket Nos.: 50-280/281  
License Nos.: DPR-32/37

**VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY**  
**SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2**  
**PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST REGARDING TEMPORARY**  
**SERVICE WATER JUMPER TO THE COMPONENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS**  
**CORRECTION OF IDENTIFIED DISCREPANCY**

By letter dated September 26, 2012 (Serial No. 12-615), Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion) requested an amendment in the form of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-32 and DPR-37 for Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, respectively. The proposed amendments establish the requirements for the use of a temporary supply line (jumper) to provide service water (SW) to the component cooling heat exchangers (CCHXs). Use of the temporary SW jumper is required to facilitate planned maintenance activities (i.e., cleaning, inspection, repair (as needed), and recoating (as needed)) on the existing, single, concrete-encased SW supply piping to the CCHXs.

In support of the proposed license amendment request (LAR), a discussion of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Technical Adequacy was provided in Attachment 4 of the September 26, 2012 letter. On page 2 of 18 of the attachment it states, "The [PRA] model has been updated to address all Category A, B, and D facts and observations (F&Os). There are only 3 Category C F&Os that need to be addressed:..." However, subsequent to the preparation of a PRA technical adequacy review for a separate LAR, it was recognized that a Category B F&O should have also been identified in the September 26, 2012 letter for the temporary SW jumper LAR as follows:

<b>F&amp;O</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Significance</b>	<b>Importance to Applications</b>
IE-5	Determine if an ISLOCA pathway caused by a leak in the RCP thermal barrier heat exchanger and a failure to isolate the CCW lines that provide cooling water to the heat exchanger is applicable to Surry model and address it appropriately.	B	The increase in CDF and LERF associated with this scenario is expected to be negligible based on the low frequency of the initiating event and the redundancy in isolating the leak. Therefore, this gap has no impact on the results for this application.

A001  
NRC



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