

In the Matter of:

Charlissa C. Smith  
(Denial of Senior Reactor Operator License)



**ASLBP #:** 13-925-01-SP-BD01  
**Docket #:** 05523694  
**Exhibit #:** CCS-099-00-BD01  
**Admitted:** 7/17/2013  
**Rejected:**  
**Other:**

**Identified:** 7/17/2013  
**Withdrawn:**  
**Stricken:**

CCS-099



Compare the way Scenario 6 was administered to the other crews for FIC 121 and PT508

Note the timing of the failures or issues (i.e., FIC 121 closing and PT 508 failure.

**1. Did everyone have to address FIC 121 and PT 508 at the same time?**



**2. Was the time that the controller was left in manual evaluated for all the crews?**

# Scenario 6, Group 2



Looking at the data this crew never took FIC 121 to automatic. Notice that prior to the MFP PT508 failure that charging was still being adjusted. Exam team likely moved on and put in the next failure. The controller was in manual for ~11 minutes. The arrow shows the last adjustment made. If our crew left the controller in manual for 18 minutes and group 3 left in manual for 8 minutes, then the same thing would have occurred if this crew would have returned the controller to auto (after 11 minutes). No simultaneous action or failures occurred here. **Notice the spacing between actions and failures (indicated by red dotted lines).** This crew received the failure before taking FIC 121 back to automatic, so the opportunity to test their knowledge was not challenged due to the timing of the failure. No penalty was applied (yet penalty was applied to C. Smith's crew when the PZR heaters were not returned to auto in another scenario).

# Scenario 6, Group 3



This crew selected the unaffected channel before taking FIC 121 to manual causing charging to lower PZR level (first red dotted line) and flashing. Then the crew took FIC 121 to automatic and it caused charging to lower as it did with my crew (second red dotted line). But notice that the PT 508 failure does not come in at the same time that the crew was dealing with the lowering of charging. (third dotted line). Although this crew performed the exact same actions they only received a comment for selecting the unaffected channel before taking FIC 121 to manual – no separate comment was given for the FIC 121 being taken back to auto and closing due to saturation ( two different errors). One of the applicants received one comment with both errors in the same comment. Personnel on my crew received a separate comment for each error even if it was in the same event. In addition the timing of the failure allowed the crew the opportunity to assess the issue and determine the cause, where my crew was dealing with two issues at the same time.

# Time Comparison: Controller was in Manual

One comment by the examiner was that his expectation was that FIC 121 would remain in manual until the controller output signal would maintain charging flow at an acceptable level ie until the controller was unsaturated. He stated “placing it back into auto too soon would result in a rapid lowering of charging flow”. Lets compare the results among the crews:

## Minutes that FIC121 was in manual

Group # 1  
(applicants group)

**18 minutes**

Group # 2

12 minutes – \*\*it was never taken to automatic

Group # 3

8 minutes

\*\*If the evaluator wrote that his expectation was that FIC 121 would remain in manual until the controller output signal would maintain charging flow at an acceptable level (implying that there was a success path) – then why was the next failure put in place for this crew and a comment not given in their evaluation for failing to return the controller back to auto.

Looking at the times that FIC 121 was left in manual between the crews – It appears that my crew had the biggest consideration for allowing the controller to stabilize. So why was the crew given a follow-up question and penalized? Note that my crew was the only crew that took the controller into consideration before switching to an unaffected channel. In addition identifying that the controller is saturated is only an assessment, it does not mean that a concurrent failure could not exist, this is a testing environment. Crew #2 was obviously not evaluated on this task because the next failure was put in place. Remember that returning the controller back to auto (per ES-D-2) marked the end of the event. Taking it back to auto and utilizing the RNO was the expected actions written on the outline. All actions performed were accomplished by C. Smiths crew.