



ASLBP #: 13-925-01-SP-BD01
Docket #: 05523694
Exhibit #: CCS-097-00-BD01
Admitted: 7/17/2013
Rejected:
Other:

Identified: 7/17/2013
Withdrawn:
Stricken:

Scenario 7

Lets compare the
crews in regard to
who received
comments on
Scenario 7, Event
6 for RWST Valve

From NRC-023, page 4 Michael Meeks exit notes:

#15 - Notes that Michael Meeks use to Debrief the facility on the license exam.

Michael Meeks identifies that ALL Teams had problems with RWST

believed a loss of charging condition had occurred and isolated letdown.

(15). {DEBRIEF ONLY} All teams had problems with RWST sludge valves and ARP response; procedure for service air specifies QPCP panel, ARP does not. Also procedural usage—some other plants ARPs state to verify automatic actions occur, yours do not.

(16) {DEBRIEF ONLY} In plant IDM i step for "VERIFY ACCW pumps

Recall this is the comment C. Smith received, because she did not provide a recommendation although the testing outline does not include her position for this event. Examiners identified that others received this comments and the standard was applied consistently.

Consistency in grading
Did ALL crews receive this
comment?

Which Operators Received Scenario 7 with the RWST

From CCS-086 page 16 Operator M

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-1
Facility: <u>Vogtle</u>	Scenario No.: <u>7</u>	Op-Test No.: <u>2012-301</u>
Examiners: <u>Michael Meeks</u> <u>Mark Bates</u> <u>Phil Capehart</u>	Operators: [REDACTED] (SRo) U [REDACTED] (OATC) S [REDACTED] (uo) M	

From CCS-089 page 18 Operator L

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-1
Facility: <u>Vogtle</u>	Scenario No.: <u>7</u>	Op-Test No.: <u>2012-301</u>
Examiners: <u>Michael Meeks</u> <u>Mark Bates</u> <u>Phil Capehart</u>	Operators: [REDACTED] (SRo) R [REDACTED] (OATC) Q [REDACTED] (uo) L	

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 29% power, BOL, steady state operations, control rods in manual.

From CCS-090, page 23 Operator N

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-1
Facility: <u>Vogtle</u>	Scenario No.: <u>7</u>	Op-Test No.: <u>2012-301</u>
Examiners: <u>Michael Meeks</u> <u>Mark Bates</u> <u>Phil Capehart</u>	Operators: [REDACTED] (SRo) V [REDACTED] (OATC) T [REDACTED] (uo) N	

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 29% power, BOL, steady state operations, control rods in manual.
(Base IC # 36, snapped to IC # 187 for HL17 NRC Exam)

Based on this INFO cited from the various documents, the following people were assigned scenario 7, with the RWST

- Operator U
- Operator S
- Operator M
- Operator R
- Operator Q
- Operator L
- Operator V
- Operator N

C. Smith is Operator T

These Operators Received Comments, can be verified with documents cited, Look for Scenario 7, Event 6

From CCS-081, page 7 Operator U

ES-303, Rev. 9 Individual Examination Report Form ES-303-1
PRIVACY ACT INFORMATION - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPLICANT DOCKET NUMBER 55-██████

CROSS REFERENCE:
1.c: Interpretation/Diagnosis – Understanding

SCENARIO/EVENT:
Scenario 7, Event 6: The Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Developed a Leak With RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves Failed to Automatically Close

EXPECTED ACTION/RESPONSE:
The applicant, as Senior Reactor Operator (SRO), was expected to understand that the RWST sludge mixing valves should automatically close on a RWST LO LEVEL alarm and ensure that

From CCS-057, page 7 Operator V

ES-303, Rev. 9 Individual Examination Report Form ES-303-1
PRIVACY ACT INFORMATION - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPLICANT DOCKET NUMBER 55-██████

CROSS REFERENCE:
1.c: Interpretation/Diagnosis – Understanding

SCENARIO/EVENT:
Scenario 7, Event 6: The Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Developed a Leak With RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves Failed to Automatically Close

EXPECTED ACTION/RESPONSE:

From CCS-074, page 10 Operator M

ES-303, Rev. 9 Individual Examination Report Form ES-303-1
PRIVACY ACT INFORMATION - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPLICANT DOCKET NUMBER ██████████

CROSS REFERENCE:
3.a: Control Board Operations – Locate & Manipulate

SCENARIO/EVENT:
Scenario 7, Event 6: RWST Sludge Mixing Line Pipe Break With Failure to Automatically Isolate

EXPECTED ACTION/RESPONSE:
The applicant, as UO, was expected to respond to a RWST Low Level Alarm in accordance with alarm response procedure ALB06-E04, recognize that the automatic action for the RWST Sludge Mixing Tank did not occur and take manual action to shut the RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valve(s) on the QPCP.

From CCS-090, page 14 Operator N

ES-303, Rev. 9 Individual Examination Report Form ES-303-1
PRIVACY ACT INFORMATION - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPLICANT DOCKET NUMBER ██████████

CROSS REFERENCE:
2.b: Procedures/Tech Specs – Procedure Compliance

SCENARIO/EVENT:
Scenario 7, Event 6: RWST Sludge Mixing Line Pipe Break With Failure to Automatically Isolate

EXPECTED ACTION/RESPONSE:
The applicant, as Unit Operator (UO), was expected to respond to an RWST Low Level Alarm in accordance with alarm response procedure ALB06-E04, recognize that the automatic action for the RWST Sludge Mixing Tank did not occur, and take manual action to shut the RWST Sludge

From CCS-080, page 11, Operator S

ES-303, Rev. 9 Individual Examination Report Form ES-303-1
PRIVACY ACT INFORMATION - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPLICANT DOCKET NUMBER 55-██████

CROSS REFERENCE:
3.a: Control Board Operations – Locate & Manipulate

SCENARIO/EVENT:
Scenario 7, Event 6: RWST Sludge Mixing Line Pipe Break with Auto Valve Closure Failure

EXPECTED ACTION/RESPONSE:
The applicant, as Reactor Operator (RO), was expected to ensure that the crew closed the sludge mixing isolation valves when ALB06-E04, RWST LO LEVEL, was received.

*****C. Smith was Operator T – It is already established that she received this comment, it was on page 20 of CCS-045**

The following operators did not receive a comment:

Operator R – CCS-079

Operator Q – CCS-078

Operator L – CCS-089

All personnel on the same crew

No scenario 7, event 6

Conclusion

The Examiner Exit notes stated that ALL crews had a problem with RWST

This Exhibit shows that subjectivity is used to determine who should receive the comment

If ALL Crews had a problem with the RWST valves then ALL crews should have received a comment

This does not follow rules of consistency, C. Smith was told on every comment that we “grade based on competency not consequences”