

In the Matter of:

Charlissa C. Smith  
(Denial of Senior Reactor Operator License)



**ASLBP #:** 13-925-01-SP-BD01  
**Docket #:** 05523694  
**Exhibit #:** CCS-092-00-BD01  
**Admitted:** 7/17/2013  
**Rejected:**  
**Other:**

**Identified:** 7/17/2013  
**Withdrawn:**  
**Stricken:**

Exhibit CCS-092

# Scenario 7

## The

# Administration of




# Scenario 7 –

# Impact on

# Attempt to Adjust

# Temp.



# Control of Tavg-Tref




The red dotted line indicated the exact same time on all graphs. The graph illustrate Tavg-Tref deviation, PZR Pressure Failure and the position of rods. The examiner states that the applicant did not attempt to adjust the deviation until at 2.3 F. Two attempts were made to adjust rods and each time a failure was put in place to prevent the adjustment. Notice on the top graph that at the red line (this was the second attempt to adjust) the deviation was very close to 2.0 F. The applicant tried to adjust rods when the PZR Pressure failure came in (illustrated on the middle graph). Notice on the bottom graph that the position of rods changed by one step at the exact same time and had to be stopped to address the PZR Pressure failure. Although the rods moved one step (causing the deviation to lower for a short period), it was not enough to improve the deviation. The deviation could not be adjusted until the actions to address the failure was complete. The examiners were aware of the intended actions of the crew because the intent to adjust rods was discussed in the briefing prior to the attempt to withdraw rods. If the examiners knew that the crew was addressing this issue why did they put in the next failure and penalize the crew for the event, versus allowing them to correct the deviation. If it was desired to put the failures in, then the crew should not have been penalized for the parameter exceeding 2F- especially since it was attempted on more than one occasion.

# Scenario 7, Group 2

"ti412a" "ti412a"



"rdpcm(4)" "rdpcm(4)"






Notice that this crew only made one rod withdrawal for the entire scenario. The failures had no impact because they were close to zero on the deviation at the time that failures were initiated. The crew had less opportunities to receive comments. All of the groups Tavg-Tref dropped approximately 1.5 F for the duration of the failures. So if everyone starts at +1 the lowest their deviation would be is ~ 0.5 F.

## No failures occurred at the same time, in comparison to C. Smith Crew

- This crew had no simultaneous failures
- This crew would not have exceeded 2F if they failed to withdraw rods

# Scenario 7, Group 3

"ti412a" "ti412a"



Notice that this crew received comments on the tagv - tref deviation, they made an error at the beginning of the scenario before the first failure was even put in place. They exceeded due to an operator error.

## No failures occurred at the same time, in comparison to C. Smith Crew

- This crew had no simultaneous failures
- This crew would not have exceeded 2F if they failed to withdraw rods