

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Official Hearing Exhibit	
In the Matter of:	Charlissa C. Smith (Denial of Senior Reactor Operator License)
	ASLBP #: 13-925-01-SP-BD01
	Docket #: 05523694
	Exhibit #: CCS-041-00-BD01
	Admitted: 7/17/2013
	Rejected:
Other:	Identified: 7/17/2013
	Withdrawn:
	Stricken:

[REDACTED] **CCS-041**

April 26, 2013

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of) CHARLISSA C. SMITH)) (Reactor Operator License for Vogtle) Electric Generating Plant)	Docket No. 55-23694-SP
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AFFIDAVIT

Personally appeared before the undersigned attesting officer, duly authorized to administer oaths, the undersigned deponent signatory hereto, who, have been duly sworn, on oaths states and deposes as follows:

1.

I, [REDACTED], am 33 years old and I am a resident of Richmond County, Georgia living at [REDACTED]. I am a Nuclear Plant Operator at Plant Vogtle. I was a part of Charlissa Smith's crew during the 2012 examination. I was assigned to perform three scenarios with Charlissa Smith. I was in direct observation of the actions that occurred during the examination.

3.

This statement is to address the issue with the comment about Charlissa Smith's failure to maintain the temperature deviation less than 2F. This was scenario 7, Event 1. My position during this scenario was the Unit Operator. I recall Charlissa updating the Shift Supervisor about the temperature issue on more than one occasion. On her first attempted, I attempted to provide a peer check to withdraw rods for temperature control. I could not complete the peer check because I had to respond to the next failure. She also could not perform the actions because she was directed by the Shift Supervisor to stop the manipulation. She continuously reminded the Shift Supervisor about the temperature status. On her next attempt I actually completed the peer check and before she could complete the action another failure occurred. She had to address the failure because it was on her board. By the time the failure was complete in accordance with the procedure, the deviation was over 2F.

My observation was that she made every attempt to address the temperature issues. Her attempts were in a timely manner.

4.

This statement is to address the issue with the comment about the RWST sludge mixing valves not being closed in a timely manner. This was scenario 7, Event 6. My position during this scenario was the Unit Operator. The examiner states that the extended time was because the crew did not know the location of the valves. The crew spent the extended time looking for procedural guidance to close the valves. I provided a statement for Charlissa to submit with her

initial appeal request to the NRC. A copy of that statement can be viewed on page 20 of ML13080A128 (and below)

Pg. 20 response:

██████████ directed me to pull the ARP for ALB06-E04 while Charlissa (RO) was directed to monitor reactivity. After reviewing the ARP, I informed ██████████ that the automatic action of the valves going shut should have occurred. I waited on direction from ██████████ to shut the valves. There was no confusion on where the valves were located. ██████████ discussed with me procedural guidance for shutting the valves and directed me to find the SOP for removing the sludge mixing system from service. I agreed with this action so that challenging the automatic action of the pump tripping would not be challenged; not challenging automatic actions of systems is an expectation of both Operations and Operations Training being reinforced throughout license training.

5.

This statement is to address the issue with the comment about the EHC Pump. This was scenario 3, Event 5. My position during this scenario was the Reactor Operator. I notified Charlissa that the first EHC pump tripped. She had the surrogate Unit Operator to pull the procedure to address the trip. While she was reviewing the procedure I did observe the annunciator for the EHC pressure illuminate.

6.

This statement is to address the issue with the comment about the SI/SLI Block. This was scenario 3, Event 7. My position during this scenario was the Reactor Operator. I provided a

statement for Charlissa to submit with her initial appeal request to the NRC. A copy of that statement can be viewed on page 9 of ML13080A113 (and below)

Pg. 10 response:

Charlissa (SRO) asked me (RO) if pressurizer pressure was less than 2000psig. I informed her it was not at the time and she directed me, per continuous action step 12 of 19030-C, to block SI/SLI when pressure was below 2000psig:

WHEN PRZR pressure is less than 2000 psig and the high steam pressure rate alarms are clear, THEN block low steamline pressure SI/SLI by performing Step 12.d.

At approximately 1998 psig as read on the pressurizer pressure digital recorder Charlissa directed me, per the continuous action step, to block SI/SLI. I attempted to block it at this time, but was unsuccessful due to P-11 status lights still being lit while all indications of pressure were below 2000psig. After verifying the P-11 status lights were extinguished I was able to successfully block SI/SLI per step 12.d.

7.

This statement is to address the issue with the comment about TE130. This was scenario 7, Event 3. My position during this scenario was the Unit Operator. After Charlissa acknowledged the alarm, I was assigned by the Shift Supervisor to address the failure. Charlissa identified the failure before myself and the Shift Supervisor recognized the failure.

Charlissa's location was in front of the TE130 controller when she acknowledged the alarm associated with the failure. When she was told to monitor reactivity, she moved back to her previous location in front of the C panel. The C panel is adjacent to the panel that the TE130 controller is located. It is not in the direct vicinity of the controller and Charlissa was not in direct vicinity of the controller. Charlissa remained in front of the C Panel until the Shift Supervisor directed her to open the valve after she point out the failure to the crew. Then she moved in front of the controller to operate it.

This 26 day of April, 2013



Sworn to and subscribed before me

This 26th day of April, 2013

Jean H. Shockey
Notary Public
Comm. Expires 02/14/14