



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000

July 29, 2013

10 CFR 50.73

ATTN: Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 3
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33 and DPR-68
NRC Docket Nos. 50-259, and 50-296

Subject: Licensee Event Report 50-259/2011-009-03

Reference:

1. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Licensee Event Report 50-259/2011-009-00," dated December 5, 2011
2. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Licensee Event Report 50-259/2011-009-01," dated January 31, 2012
3. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Licensee Event Report 50-259/2011-009-02," dated April 25, 2012

On December 5, 2011, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) submitted Revision 0 to Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-259/2011-009 (Reference 1). At that time, TVA was completing the causal analysis of the as-found undervoltage trip for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 1A1 relay. The causal analysis indicated that the RPS 1A1 relay did not meet acceptance criteria during several surveillances. After completing the causal analysis, TVA submitted Revision 1 to LER 50-259/2011-009 on January 31, 2012 (Reference 2). The TVA submitted Revision 2 to LER 50-259/2011-009 on April 25, 2012 (Reference 3), after discovering that RPS 3C1 relay did not meet its acceptance criteria during previous surveillances for the same reason reported in the previous revision. After further review of the condition, the causal analysis has been revised. These changes are detailed in the enclosed LER revision. Also, the LER was revised for clarity and consistency.

The TVA is submitting this supplemental LER in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

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There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact J. E. Emens, Jr., Nuclear Site Licensing Manager, at (256) 729-2636.

Respectfully,



K. J. Polson
Vice President

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 259/2011-009-03 - As-Found Undervoltage Trip
for the Reactor Protection System 1A1 Relay that Did Not Meet
Acceptance Criteria During Several Surveillances

cc (w/ Enclosure):

NRC Regional Administrator - Region II
NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

ENCLOSURE

**Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Units 1 and 3**

Licensee Event Report 259/2011-009-03

**As-Found Undervoltage Trip for the Reactor Protection System 1A1 Relay that Did
Not Meet Acceptance Criteria During Several Surveillances**

See Enclosed

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 1	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000259	3. PAGE 1 of 10
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4. TITLE: As-Found Undervoltage Trip for the Reactor Protection System 1A1 Relay that Did Not Meet Acceptance Criteria During Several Surveillances

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
10	06	2011	2011	009	03	07	29	2013	BFN Unit 3	05000296
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									N/A	05000

9. OPERATING MODE 1	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)			
10. POWER LEVEL 100	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	<small>Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A</small>

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME Mark Acker, Licensing Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 256-729-7533
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13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
E	JC	RLY	X000	N					

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED <input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH N/A	DAY N/A	YEAR N/A
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On October 6, 2011, while performing an evaluation for past operability on the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 1A1 relay undervoltage trips, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant determined that the as-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 1A1 relay was less than the required acceptance criteria during several Technical Specification (TS) Surveillances performed from April 2007 to August 2011. Therefore, the RPS 1A1 relay was inoperable for an indeterminate period of time between these surveillances. During a review of the surveillance procedure performance for RPS circuit protector calibration and functional test for 3C1 and 3C2 relays, it was determined that the as-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 3C1 relay was less than the required acceptance criteria during several surveillances performed from June 2006 to February 2012. The RPS 3C1 relay was inoperable for an indeterminate period of time between these surveillances.

The root cause of these events was determined to be the surveillance test program did not provide specific instructions for past operability reviews when out of TS conditions are corrected during surveillances.

The corrective actions to prevent recurrence were to revise the surveillance test program procedure, issue a new past operability evaluation procedure, and revise the operability determination and limiting condition for operation procedure to provide guidance on performing past operability evaluations and to address the requirements associated with past operability evaluations.

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NARRATIVE

I. PLANT CONDITION(S)

At the time of discovery of Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JC] 1A1 relay [RLY] inoperability, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 1, was at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power and unaffected by the event.

At the time of discovery of RPS 3C1 relay inoperability, BFN, Unit 3, was at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power and unaffected by the event.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A. Event

Event 1: BFN, Unit 1, RPS 1A1 Relay

On October 6, 2011, while performing an evaluation for past operability on the RPS 1A1 relay undervoltage trips, BFN determined that the as-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 1A1 relay was less than the required Acceptance Criteria (AC) during several Technical Specification (TS) Surveillances. The Past Operability Evaluation (POE) indicated, based on a review of equipment history and the cause of the failure, that the RPS 1A1 relay was considered unreliable from April 30, 2007 to October 5, 2011. As a result, for the purposes of this report, the RPS 1A1 relay is treated as being inoperable from April 30, 2007 to October 5, 2011, when the relay was replaced. BFN, Unit 1, TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.8.2 requires that two RPS electric power monitoring assemblies be Operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3; and in Modes 4 and 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies for each inservice RPS Motor Generator (MG) [MG] set or alternate power supply [JX]. If one or both inservice power supplies with one electric power monitoring assembly were inoperable, the associated inservice power supply(s) would be required to be removed from service in 72 hours. If this TS 3.3.8.2 Required Action is not met within 72 hours, the unit is required to be in Mode 3 within 12 hours and in Mode 4 within 36 hours. Also, TS LCO 3.0.4 prohibits Mode changes when an LCO is not met except under certain conditions that were not applicable to this event.

Since the as-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 1A1 relay was less than the required AC during several TS Surveillances, it is probable that BFN, Unit 1, operated with an inoperable RPS electrical power monitoring assembly longer than allowed by the TS. In addition, due to the RPS 1A1 relay condition, TS LCO 3.0.4 was not met for each applicable Mode change and for any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies in Modes 4 or 5 that occurred since April 2007.

Event 2: BFN, Unit 3, RPS 3C1 Relay

During review of the last performance of TS Surveillance 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C), BFN personnel determined that the as-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 3C1 relay was less than the required AC during several TS Surveillances leading to the initiation of Service Request (SR) 485662 on January 6, 2012. The POE indicated, based on a

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review of equipment history and the cause of the failure, that the RPS 3C1 relay was considered unreliable from June 9, 2006 to February 2, 2012, when the relay was replaced. Therefore, RPS 3C1 relay is treated as being Operable beginning with its installation on August 7, 1990 to June 9, 2006, and inoperable from June 9, 2006 to February 2, 2012. BFN, Unit 3, TS LCO 3.3.8.2 requires that two RPS electric power monitoring assemblies be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3; and in Modes 4 and 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies for each inservice RPS MG set or alternate power supply. If one or both inservice power supplies with one electric power monitoring assembly were inoperable, the associated inservice power supply(s) would be required to be removed from service in 72 hours. If this TS 3.3.8.2 Required Action is not met within 72 hours, the unit is required to be in Mode 3 within 12 hours and in Mode 4 within 36 hours. Also, TS LCO 3.0.4 prohibits Mode changes when an LCO is not met except under certain conditions that were not applicable to this event.

Since the as-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 3C1 relay was less than the required AC during several TS Surveillances, it is probable that BFN, Unit 3, operated with an inoperable RPS electrical power monitoring assembly longer than allowed by the TS. In addition, due to the RPS 3C1 relay condition, TS LCO 3.0.4 was not met for each applicable Mode change and for any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies in Modes 4 or 5 that occurred since June 2006.

B. Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event

There were no inoperable structures, components, or systems that contributed to this event.

C. Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences

Event 1: BFN, Unit 1, RPS 1A1 Relay

October 3, 2007

As-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 1A1 relay was less than the required AC during the performance of surveillance 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A), RPS Circuit Protector Calibration/Functional Test for 1A1 and 1A2.

September 3, 2008

As-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 1A1 relay was less than the required AC during the performance of surveillance 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A).

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- August 5, 2009 As-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 1A1 relay was less than the required AC during the performance of surveillance 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A).
- September 3, 2010 As-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 1A1 relay was less than the required AC during the performance of surveillance 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A).
- February 1, 2011 As-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 1A1 relay was less than the required AC during the performance of surveillance 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A).
- August 7, 2011 As-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 1A1 relay was less than the required AC during the performance of surveillance 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A).
- October 5, 2011 The RPS 1A1 relay was replaced.

Event 2: BFN, Unit 3, RPS 3C1 Relay

- November 15, 2006 As-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 3C1 relay was less than the required AC during the performance of surveillance 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C), RPS Circuit Protector Calibration/Functional Test for 3C1 and 3C2.
- March 31, 2008 As-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 3C1 relay was less than the required AC during the performance of surveillance 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C).
- September 18, 2008 As-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 3C1 relay was less than the required AC during the performance of surveillance 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C).
- March 4, 2009 As-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 3C1 relay was less than the required AC during the performance of surveillance 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C).

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February 22, 2010 As-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 3C1 relay was less than the required AC during the performance of surveillance 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C).

September 14, 2011 As-found undervoltage trip for the RPS 3C1 relay was less than the required AC during the performance of surveillance 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C).

February 2, 2012 The RPS 3C1 relay was replaced.

D. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected

There were no other systems or secondary functions affected.

E. Method of Discovery

Event 1 was discovered during the evaluation for past operability of the RPS 1A1 relay undervoltage trips identified by 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A).

Event 2 was discovered during review of 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C) TS Surveillance performance.

F. Operator Actions

There were no operator actions.

G. Safety System Responses

There were no safety system responses.

III. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

A. Immediate Cause

The immediate cause of these events was the as-found undervoltage trip for the RPS relays being less than the required AC during the performance of several TS surveillances.

B. Root Cause

The root cause of these events was determined to be the surveillance test program did not provide specific instructions for past operability reviews when out of TS conditions are corrected during surveillances.

C. Contributing Factors

The contributing factor for these events was determined to be the use of the maintenance management system which failed to communicate critical information. The governing procedure for the maintenance management system did not provide guidance on how to close a Work Order (WO) properly in the electronic work management program. Procedure MMDP-1, Maintenance Management System, has been revised to provide the necessary guidance for closing WOs.

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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is submitting this report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's TS.

The RPS electric power monitoring system is provided to isolate the RPS bus from the RPS MG set or an alternate power supply in the event of overvoltage, undervoltage, or underfrequency. This system protects the loads connected to the RPS bus against unacceptable voltage and frequency conditions and forms an important part of the primary success path of the essential safety circuits.

These events involve the as-found undervoltage trip of the two referenced RPS relays. The required TS AC for undervoltage is ≥ 108.5 volts. In the event of an undervoltage condition for an extended period of time, the scram solenoids can chatter and potentially lose their pneumatic control capacity, resulting in a loss of a primary scram action.

Event 1: BFN, Unit 1, 1A1 RPS Relay

The past performances of 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A) from April 2007 to August 2011, were evaluated as seen in the RPS 1A1 Relay Calibration Data table below.

RPS 1A1 Relay Calibration Data

Date	RPS 1A1 Relay As-found	Problem Evaluation Report (PER)
04/30/2007	109.7	N/A
10/03/2007	106.3 ⁽¹⁾	131365
03/18/2008	109.7	N/A
09/03/2008	107.79 ⁽¹⁾	151812
03/19/2009	110.1	N/A
08/05/2009	107.6 ⁽¹⁾	178286
02/04/2010	110.1	N/A
09/03/2010	107.6 ⁽¹⁾	248513
02/01/2011	107.2 ⁽¹⁾	None
08/07/2011	106.4 ⁽¹⁾	413140

(1) These values indicate as-found undervoltage below required AC.

There were six different performances of 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A) where the as-found relay values were in violation of the required AC. In each case, the as-found condition was documented in the WO to perform 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A), which demonstrates proper use of the procedure and understanding of the expectations regarding out of tolerance

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conditions. In all cases except for the February 1, 2011, performance of 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A), a PER was generated and the control room was notified. The missed PER for the February 1, 2011, performance of 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A) has been documented by PER 443793.

During the performance of 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A), the RPS 1A1 relay was calibrated within AC on each occasion. When making the operability determination, Operations personnel were not aware of past surveillance performance results that were below the AC prior to the August 7, 2011, performance of 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A). There is no evidence that this type of performance data is, or has been, trended for past performances to determine the impact on operability between surveillances.

For this event, the past inoperability began on April 30, 2007, when the RPS 1A1 relay as-found undervoltage trip reading was acceptable, and ended on October 5, 2011, when the RPS 1A1 relay was replaced. This conclusion was based on a review of the equipment history and the cause of the failure documented in the POE.

Event 2: BFN, Unit 3, 3C1 RPS Relay

The past performances of 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C) from June 2006 to February 2012, were also evaluated as seen in the RPS 3C1 Relay Calibration Data table below.

RPS 3C1 Relay Calibration Data

Date	RPS 3C1 Relay As-found	PER
06/09/2006	108.5	N/A
11/15/2006	107 ⁽¹⁾	114861
05/06/2007	111.3	N/A
10/18/2007	108.7	N/A
03/31/2008	107.1 ⁽¹⁾	141235
09/18/2008	107.5 ⁽¹⁾	152847
03/04/2009	107.95 ⁽¹⁾	164999
08/19/2009	109.66	N/A
02/22/2010	108.26 ⁽¹⁾	217991
08/17/2010	110.2	N/A
03/05/2011	N/A	491208
09/14/2011	106.1 ⁽¹⁾	486780
02/02/2012	107.2 ⁽¹⁾	Replaced after surveillance

(1) These values indicate as-found undervoltage below required AC.

There were seven different performances of 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C) where the as-found relay values were in violation of the required AC. In each case, the as-found condition was documented in the WO to perform 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C) and a PER was generated. Data

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for March 5, 2011, is missing. Documentation for this issue can be found in PER 491208.

During the performance of 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C), the RPS 3C1 relay was calibrated within AC on each occasion. When making the operability determination, Operations personnel were not aware of past surveillance performance results that were below the AC prior to the 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C) performance review.

For this event, the past inoperability began on June 9, 2006, when the RPS 3C1 relay as-found undervoltage trip reading was acceptable, and ended on February 2, 2012, when the RPS 3C1 relay was replaced. This conclusion was based on a review of the equipment history and the cause of the failure documented in the POE.

Extent of Condition

The extent of condition includes the RPS relay calibration surveillances on BFN, Units 1, 2, and 3. Also, the extent of condition includes all surveillances that have failed an AC step that did not result in a component failure. The extent of condition is being addressed by reviewing the 2010 LCO Actions and the 2011 LCO Actions that have been entered for out of tolerance and out of TS compliance conditions that occurred during the performance of surveillances and determine if any past operability issues were missed.

The review, completed on February 28, 2012, identified two issues. The first issue was due to the as-found leak rate of 2-FCV-001-0056 exceeding the established administrative leak rate during 5 of the last 6 performances of 2-SI-4.7.A.2.g-3/1e, Primary Containment Local Leak Rate Test Main Steam Line Drain: Penetration X-8. Further investigation determined a trend did not exist, but the valve will continue to be monitored by the Containment Leak Rate Program. This condition is documented in PER 509459. The second issue was due to 3D Raw Cooling Water (RCW) failing 3-SR-3.3.3.2.1(24) on 3 of the last 4 performances. Further investigation determined a trend did not exist because each failure was due to a separate cause. This condition is documented by PER 509465.

Extent of Cause

The extent of cause extends to all Preventive Maintenance (PM) WOs and surveillances. The extent of cause was addressed by revising procedure MMDP-1, Maintenance Management System, to require a trending SR to be initiated for each component found out of calibration during PMs.

V. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

The RPS provides timely protection against the onset and consequences of conditions that threaten the integrity of the fuel barrier and the nuclear system process barrier. The system is designed such that no single failure can prevent a reactor scram. The RPS includes the MG power supplies with associated control and indicating equipment, sensors, relays, bypass circuitry, and switches that supply a signal to the control rod drive system to cause rapid insertion of the control rods to shut down the reactor. Based

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on parameters that deviate from normal, the RPS is designed to automatically shutdown the reactor. With one RPS electric power monitoring assembly (RPS 1A1 or 3C1 relay) for an inservice RPS power supply that is inoperable, the remaining operable RPS electric power monitoring assembly will still provide protection to the RPS bus powered components under degraded voltage or frequency conditions.

Therefore, TVA concluded that there was no significant reduction to the health and safety of the public for either of these events.

VI. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS - The corrective actions are being managed by TVA's corrective action program.

A. Immediate Corrective Actions

Standing order 174 was issued to establish Operations department expectations when as-found data is found outside of acceptable regulatory guidelines.

B. Corrective Actions

The RPS 1A1 relay and 3C1 relay were replaced.

C. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence

To address this issue, procedure NPG-SPP-06.9.2, Surveillance Test Program, was revised to require the test performer to initiate an SR anytime a System, Structure, or Component fails to meet the surveillance acceptance criteria and to update form TVA 40753, Surveillance Task Sheet.

Once an SR has been written, procedure NPG-SPP-03.1.4, Corrective Action Program Screening and Oversight, requires the Operations Shift Manager or a Senior Reactor Operator to assess the SR for potential operability concerns and document the results in accordance with OPDP-8, Operability Determination and Limiting Conditions for Operation Tracking.

When this condition was discovered on October 6, 2011, OPDP-8, Revision 5, did not include requirements specifically addressing when a POE is required. On February 29, 2012, OPDP-8, Revision 6, was issued containing specific requirements addressing when POEs are required. These requirements guide Operations to request a POE when a SR is reviewed that questions the operability of a TS Safety Critical Component or TS Support System, Structure, or Component prior to discovery of a degraded or nonconforming condition. In addition, new procedure NEDP-27, Past Operability Evaluations, was created and issued on March 30, 2012. This procedure provides the guidance on performing POEs and addresses the requirements associated with POEs.

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VII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. Failed Components

The failed components were the RPS 1A1 relay (original equipment, manufacturer indeterminate) and RPS 3C1 relay (installed August 7, 1990, manufacturer indeterminate).

B. Previous Similar Events

Previous similar events occurred during the earlier performances of 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A) and 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C). PERs 131365, 151812, 178286, and 248513 relate to 1-SR-3.3.8.2.1(A). PERs 114861, 141235, 152847, 164999, 217991, 491208, and 537704 relate to 3-SR-3.3.8.2.1(C).

C. Additional Information

The corrective action documents for this report are PERs 413140, 442914, and 486780.

D. Safety System Functional Failure Consideration

These events were not a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI 99-02.

E. Scram With Complications Consideration

These events did not include a reactor scram.

VIII. COMMITMENTS

There are no commitments.