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July 25, 2013
NND-13-0423

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3
Docket Numbers 52-027 and 52-028
Combined License Numbers NPF-93 and NPF-94

Subject: Reporting of 10 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests, and Experiments and 10 CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII Departures

Reference: 1. Letter from Ronald A. Jones (SCE&G) to Document Control Desk (NRC), January 24, 2013, Reporting of 10 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests, and Experiments and 10 CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII Departures

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2), VCSNS Units 2 and 3 is required to submit a report to the NRC containing a brief description of any changes, tests or experiments made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(c), including a summary of the evaluation of each. This 10 CFR 50.59 report is for the period beginning January 25, 2013 and ending July 25, 2013. During that period there were no changes, tests or experiments made pursuant to paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 50.59.

Additionally, as required by paragraphs X.B.1 and X.B.3.b of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52, this submittal contains a report of all plant-specific departures made in this reporting period. The 10 CFR 52 Appendix D Departure Report is provided in Enclosure 1 to this letter and covers the period beginning in January 25, 2013 and ending July 25, 2013.

If you have any questions please call Al Paglia, Manager – Nuclear Licensing, at 803-941-9876 or April Rice, Supervisor – Nuclear Licensing, at 803-941-9858.

Sincerely,

for Al Paglia

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Enclosure 1: V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3 Departure Report: January 25, 2013 through July 25, 2013.

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V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3 Departure Report
January 25 through July 25, 2013

SCE&G Identifier	Originating Document	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-001	APP-FSAR-GLN-069	Containment Internal Structural Module Stud Size and Spacing. The proposed change would revise Note 2 to DCD Figure 3.8.3-8, Sheet 1, which presents typical structural wall module details. This information was changed to be consistent with the design basis calculations. As noted in DCD Section 3.8.3.1.3, Structural Wall Modules, the information in the Note is designated as Tier 2*.The need to change Note 2 was inadvertently overlooked when the design basis calculations were previously revised and incorporated into the DCD.	This request was submitted to NRC as LAR 13-05. This change has been reviewed and approved by the NRC as License Amendment Number 3, dated 5/23/2013.

SCE&G Identifier	Originating Document	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-021	APP-FSAR-GLN-040	Additional Electrical Penetration Assemblies This change adds two non-Class 1 E Low Voltage Power and Control (LVP&C) and two non-Class 1E Instrumentation and Control (I&C) containment electrical penetration assemblies (EPA). It also removes an erroneous EPA on DCD Tier 2 Figure 1.2-9. The Associated Plant-Specific Tier 1 Departure Requiring an Exemption: • Add four new electrical penetrations- Table 2.2.1-1, Figure 2.2.1-1, Table 2.2.3-6 Plant-Specific Tier 2 Departure: • Add four new electrical penetration test isolation valves- Table 3.2-3, Table 3.11-1, Table 31.6-3 • Clarify that electrical penetrations are located in rooms 12321 and 12421 -Table 3.7.3-1 • Add four new electrical penetrations and test isolation valves- Figure 6.2.5-1 • Remove a EPA between column lines 7 and 7.3- Figure 1.2-9 The primary purpose for adding the four non-Class 1E EPAs is that the current number of containment vessel electrical penetrations cannot support all electrical loads and instrumentation signals inside containment. The primary purpose for removing one EPA is because it is erroneous and not described elsewhere in the licensing basis.	This request was submitted to the NRC as LAR 12-01. This change has been reviewed and approved by the NRC as License Amendment Number 6, dated 7/1/2013.

SCE&G Identifier	Originating Document	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-032	CR-NND-12-00398 CR-NND-13-00049	A typographical error in UFSAR Chapter 3, Appendix D, pg 30-91 to 92, examples D.4.3.1 and D.4.3.2 was corrected. In the example calculations D.4.3.1 and D.4.3.2 a"+" should be a"=". A change was also made by adding an additional line to the calculations showing unit conversions to improve readability.	This is an editorial change. A typographical error in the referenced sections was corrected. In the example calculations D.4.3.1 and D.4.3.2 a "+" should be a"=". A change was also made by adding an additional line to the calculations showing unit conversions to improve readability. This departure did not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 10 CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined that no prior NRC approval is required.

SCE&G Identifier	Originating Document	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-037	APP-FSAR-GLN-126	This license amendment was to update plant-specific Tier 1 (i.e., COL Appendix C) Table 3.3-1 for technical consistency, clarity and completeness. Plant-specific Tier 1 Table 3.3-1, "Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building" had some inputs that were updated to be made consistent with their related plant-specific Tier 2 information, and to provide clarity to support ITAAC closure or provide completeness of information.	This request was submitted to NRC as LAR 12-02. This change has been reviewed and approved by the NRC as License Amendment Number 4, dated 5/30/2013.

SCE&G Identifier	Originating Document	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-13-002	APP-FSAR-GLN-168	The activity changes requirements for anchoring of basemat shear reinforcement in the licensing basis to alternative requirements. These alternative requirements lead to a change in the thickness of concrete below the elevator pits and sump in the nuclear Island basemat and the spacing of the shear reinforcement in the sump. The requirements for development of shear reinforcement using headed reinforcement are changed to the provisions in ACI 318-11, Section 12.6. These requirements are incorporated in to UFSAR Section 3.8 as an alternative to requirements in ACI 349-01. The headed reinforcement bars used as shear reinforcement in these areas are increased in length and the spacing is revised under the sump. The thickness of the concrete in area below the elevator pits and sump in the nuclear island basemat is increased to accommodate the longer shear ties. The spacing for the headed reinforcement bars used as shear reinforcement under the sump in the radioactively controlled area of the auxiliary building is changed.	This request was submitted to the NRC as LAR 13-02. This change has been reviewed and approved by the NRC as License Amendment Number 2, dated 3/1/2013.

SCE&G Identifier	Originating Document	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-13-003	APP-FSAR-GLN-163	The change corrects an inconsistency in the licensing basis on the requirements for design spacing of shear reinforcement in the basemat. Subsection 3.8.5.5 of the UFSAR includes a supplemental requirement which refers to provisions in ACI 349 Subsection 11.8.3 for continuous deep flexural members. The USFAR commits to these provisions without exception or qualifications. The requirements in ACI 349 Subsection 11.8.3 include a spacing requirement for shear reinforcement such as included in the nuclear island basemat design. The provisions in ACI 349 Subsection 11.8.3 have a spacing requirement that is inconsistent with figures in the UFSAR figures which include the design spacing for shear reinforcement in the basemat. The proposed change revises Tier 2* information in the UFSAR to remove the direct reference to ACI 349 Subsection 11.8.3 and replace it with supplemental provisions from ACI 349.	This request was submitted to the NRC as LAR 13-01. This change has been reviewed and approved by the NRC as License Amendment Number 1, dated 2/26/2013.

SCE&G Identifier	Originating Document	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-13-004	CR-NND-13-00048	This activity corrects an issue identified in a previously approved Revision Notice for UFSAR Figure 3.8.5-3 Sheet 1 where the final approved markup did not match what was evaluated in the consortium change package. Layers 4 and 5 on the Figure were inadvertently reversed. This corrects the change to match the evaluated activity.	This change to correct the UFSAR figure was evaluated and determined that the activity did not adversely impact a design function, procedure or method of control which affects the performance of a design function, a test or experiment, a method of evaluation, or a design feature credited in the ex-vessel severe accident assessment. This departure does not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined no prior NRC approval is required.

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LCE-13-005	APP-FSAR-GLN-158	A change to the design spacing of the shear reinforcement in the concrete under the sump of the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building was made. The reinforcement and concrete design continues to satisfy ACI 349 Code requirements. UFSAR Figure 3.8.5-7 Sheet 7 is revised to conform to the change in the design spacing.	The subject change does not result in modification, addition to, or removal of a structure, system, or component (SSC) such that a design function is adversely affected, has no impact on plant operating procedures or on the control of the reactions in the core design function, does not result in an adverse change to a method of evaluation or use of an alternate method of evaluation, does not represent tests or experiments outside the reference bounds of the design basis, and does not alter the assumptions or results of the ex-vessel severe accident assessment. This departure does not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined no prior NRC approval is required.

SCE&G Identifier	Originating Document	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-13-006	APP-FSAR-GLN-082	Turbine Building Bracing and Building Code Change Changes that are being made to the AP1000 Building Structural Design: • The turbine building main area bracing design is changed to allow the use of Special Concentrically Braced Frames (SCBF) and Eccentrically Braced Frames (EBF). • The design code for the turbine building main area structure is being changed from UBC-97 to IBC-06, with supporting codes AISC 341-05, AISC 360-05 and ASCE 7-05. • The annex building (non-seismic) structure design code and supporting codes are also changed, since it uses SCBF bracing. Associated Tier 1 Departure Requiring an Exemption: • Revise design description to state that the non-seismic portion of the turbine building is designed with a combination of concentrically and eccentrically braced framing -Tier 1 and COL Appendix C, Section 3.3. Tier 2 Departure: • Added Codes to UFSAR Table 1.1-1 (Sheet2 of 4), Section 3.2.6, Section 3.3.4, Section 3.7.6 • Clarified applicable codes In UFSAR Section 1.2.1.6.1, Section 3.2.2.6, Section 3.7.2, Section 3.3.2.3, Section 19.55.3.3, Section 19.58.2.1. • Revised earthquake factors, modified response modification factor and added references to UFSAR Section 3.7.2.8.3 The primary purpose for using SCBF In addition to EBF is because the AISC EBF requirement for out-of-plane lateral support cannot be achieved in all areas of the turbine building main area due to geometric and space limitations. The Building Code Is changed for the turbine building main area and non-seismic portion of the annex building, to support the bracing configuration used in each location.	This request was submitted to the NRC as LAR 13-03. This change has been reviewed and approved by the NRC as License Amendment Number 7, dated 7/1/2013.

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LCE-13-012	APP-FSAR-GLN-093	The changes to the SWS are as follows: (1) the SWS backflush flow line L067 is rerouted from the site specific portion of the Waste Water System (WWS) to the Turbine Building (TB) sump, (2) ·several lines routings are changed from above grade to below grade, (3) a dashed line is added around the cooling tower fan assemblies on plant-specific DCD Figure 9.2.1-1 to indicate that it is a vendor supplied package, (4) an interface flag for the compressed air system for the SWS cooling tower basin bubbler level indicator is added to plant-specific DCD Figure 9.2.1-1, (5) vibration and gearbox oil level indication is added to the cooling tower fans to trip the fans on excessive vibration and alert the operator on too low or too high levels of oil in the fan motor gearbox, (6) sections of the backflush line (including L068, part of L067 and valves V082A and V082B) and the blowdown line (including L095, L094 and part of L093) outside the TB are removed from the P&ID (Note: this change revises the transition between the Standard Plant and the plant specific portion of the SWS), (7) descriptions of the routing for the strainer backflush and the blowdown lines on the P&ID are revised to make them more generic to accommodate all potential plant sites, and (8) a portion of the makeup line to the cooling tower basins (line LOOS) is changed from at grade level to below grade level.	None of the changes adversely impacts the design function of any Structure, System or Component (SSC) described in the UFSAR, including the Service Water System. There is no impact to any fire area. There is no impact on the Aircraft Impact Assessment. There is no adverse impact on any procedure, method of control, analysis method or test and experiment. The changes do not have an adverse impact on ex-vessel severe accident consequences. This departure does not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined no prior NRC approval is required.

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LCE-13-013	APP-FSAR-GLN-179	This activity changes Tier 2* and associated Tier 2 requirements for development of headed reinforcement in the licensing basis to alternative requirements. The requirements for development of headed reinforcement are changed to authorize use of provisions within ACI 318-11, Section 12.6. These requirements are incorporated in to UFSAR Section 3.8 as an alternative to requirements in ACI 349-01. The design details for shear reinforcement in critical sections for auxiliary building walls specified in Appendix 3H are revised to conform to these requirements. The shear reinforcement used in these walls may also be shear ties with alternating 90 degree and 135 degree hooks. The thickness and geometry of the auxiliary building walls is not changed.	This request was submitted to the NRC as LAR 13-11. This change has been reviewed and approved by the NRC as License Amendment Number 5, dated 6/6/2013.

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LCE-13-014	APP-FSAR-GLN-185	Review of the Auxiliary Building layout determined that two of the three Liquid Radioactive Waste System (WLS) Waste Monitor Tanks were not located in the Auxiliary Building as cited in Appendix 1A or Section 3.4.1.2.2.2 of the UFSAR. Specifically, the tanks were cited as being located at elevation 1 00'-0", but are located at elevations 92'-6" and 107'-2.	Changing the location of the Waste Monitor Tanks in the Auxiliary Building does not result in a modification, addition to, or removal of a structure, system, or component (SSC) such that a design function is adversely affected, has no impact on plant operating procedures or a method of control that adversely affects a design function, does not result in an adverse change to a method of evaluation or use of an alternate method of evaluation, does not represent tests or experiments outside the reference bounds of the design basis, and does not alter the assumptions or results of the ex-vessel severe accident assessment. This departure does not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined no prior NRC approval is required.

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LCE-13-015	APP-FSAR-GLN-139	Leak chases related to the IRWST, the Refueling Cavity, and the Fuel Transfer Tube are located inside containment and drain to two collection pots. This allows the leakage from these components to be identified and quantified. Drainage and overflow lines from the collection pots are routed to the Containment Sump. The drainage of the leak chase system is depicted on the change to Figure 11.2-2, Sheet 1 of 8. Tier 2 Departure: Tier 2 Figure 11.2-2, Sheet 1 of 8 is being changed to include a navigation flag to the Containment Sump labeled "LEAK CHASE POTS WLS-010".	This change provides leak chase collection piping and instrumentation inside containment associated with the In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST), the Refueling Cavity, and the Fuel Transfer Tube, and is shown on Figure 11.2-2, Sheet 1 of 8 by identifying the drainage of the system to the containment sump. This change helps to ensure the integrity of the components/systems/structures. There is no change to the design function of the affected components/systems/structures. The change(s) did not require a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information or Technical Specifications. The leak chase collection piping and instrumentation inside containment associated with the IRWST, the Refueling Cavity, and the Fuel Transfer Tube does not adversely affect any design function, involve a procedure or method of control that affects the performance of a design function, involve a method of evaluation in the plant-specific DCD or Updated FSAR, involve a test or experiment, nor a design feature credited in the ex-vessel severe accident assessment. This departure does not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined no prior NRC approval is required.

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LCE-13-017	N/A	This change corrects an error in UFSAR Section 14.2.10.1.6. The range of subsections referenced in UFSAR Section 14.2.10.1.6 under "Performance Criteria" only goes up to 14.2.10.1.20. The currently referenced subsection 14.2.10.23 does not exist.	This is an editorial change. A typographical error in the referenced UFSAR section needs to be corrected. In UFSAR Section 14.2.10.1.6, under "Performance Criteria", the reference subsection 14.2.10.1.23 should be changed to 14.2.10.1.20. The range of subsections referenced in Section 14.2.10.1.6 under "Performance Criteria" only goes up to 14.2.10.1.20. The referenced subsection 14.2.10.23 does not exist. The change is identified as a change to UFSAR Ch 14 information. This departure does not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined no prior NRC approval is required.

SCE&G Identifier	Originating Document	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-13-019	APP-FSAR-GLN-064	The Chemical Volume Control System (CVS) non-safety related changes are as follows: • An additional CVS flow transmitter (CVS-JE-FT157B) is provided for the low-flow range to monitor and control the two CVS Makeup Pumps' (CVS-MP-01A/B) discharge flow control valve (CVS-PL-V157) with a measurement accuracy of ±3%. This low-flow transmitter is calibrated for a 60 to 0 gpm flow range for plant operator chemical addition control down to 20 gpm. • The existing CVS flow transmitter (CVS-JE-FT157) is renumbered (CVS-JE-FT157A) for the high-flow range monitoring and control, both transmitters are monitoring the existing orifice flow element (CVS-JE-FE-157). This high-flow transmitter is calibrated for a 175 to 0 gpm flow range for plant operator control nominally around 100 gpm. • Provide augmented, integrated high and low-flow control logic for the single discharge flow control valve (CVS-PL-157). Tier 2 Departure: • Add new low-flow transmitter (FT157B) and renumber the existing high-flow transmitter to be FT157A, both monitoring in parallel the existing orifice flow element on Figure 9.3.6-1 (sheet 2). The primary purpose for adding the additional low-flow transmitter is to provide the engineering desired design instrumentation channel accuracy of ±3% for monitoring and control of the Makeup Pumps' discharge flow throughout the expected 20 gpm to 100 gpm operational range. The existing instrumentation can monitor and control the discharge flow control valve; however, the channel accuracy was not desirable for the lower 30% of the calibrated range of 0 gpm to 175 gpm, when using an orifice flow element. Therefore, an additional low-flow transmitter with 0 gpm to 60 gpm calibrated range was added to provide the desired channel accuracy when separately calibrated for the lower portion of the expected operational range.	The design functions, to provide " ... RCS inventory control and makeup .. . and auxiliary pressurizer spray ," are unchanged with the addition of a low-flow instrument monitor and control to the CVS Makeup Pumps discharge flow control valve (CVS-PL-V157). The CVS safety functions are not affected, nor are the Investment Protection D-RAP identified reliability improvements. This change, to add an instrument to address an engineering desired design flow measurement accuracy of ±3% of the operational range, results in a common control system dual range control configuration and was determined to not adversely affect the non-safety related design functions as described in the UFSAR. The change does not adversely affect the procedures or method of control of a design function as described in the UFSAR. The operational procedures for performance or the method of control represent common control system operations that are routinely addressed in operator training and procedures. There is automatic switching of flow control channels, which maintains consistent and accurate indication and control of the flow while not requiring any additional operator actions. This change provides consistent measurement accuracy throughout the operational range, which includes low-flow operational conditions. The change does not involve a method of evaluation for establishing design bases or in the safety analyses. The change does not involve a test or experiment. The departure does not represent a change to a design feature credited in the ex-vessel severe accident assessment. The UFSAR Tier 2 Appendix 198 analysis is not affected because CVS is not relied on in the analysis. This departure does not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined no prior NRC approval is required.

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LCE-13-021	APP-FSAR-GLN-207	This activity updates the licensing basis to reflect that a later revision of Regulatory Guide 1.54 (Rev. 2) is applied for use on AP1000 Containment Vessel (CV). The current AP1000 licensing basis references Revision 1 of this Regulatory Guide. This change is made in Tier 2 Table 1.9-1, Tier 2 Appendix 1A and Tier 2 Section 6.1.2.1.6. Additionally, in Appendix 1A the ASTM standards referenced as criteria within RG 1.54 are updated to reflect the current revisions and versions utilized in AP1000 safety-related coating design documents.	Overall, the changes from RG Rev. 1 to Rev. 2 for CV coatings did not adversely change or add technical requirements that affect the actual coating, to the previous requirements and guidance endorsed by NRC for protective coatings usage as identified in RG 1.54, Revision 1. Revision 2 of RG 1.54 is utilized for containment vessel coatings to provide clarification and expansion of the ASTM standards. The change in the licensing basis from referencing Rev. 1 of RG 1.54 to referencing Rev. 2 of RG 1.54 for CV coatings does not adversely affect any design function, change a procedure or method of control that adversely affects a design function, result in an adverse change to a method of evaluation, involve a test or experiment that is outside the bounds of the design basis as described in the licensing document, or adversely affect any design feature credited in the ex-vessel severe accident assessment. The change does not affect the ability of the licensee to utilize Rev. 1 of the RG for operational and programmatic aspects of CV coatings. The change to the licensing basis does not invalidate any safety determinations made by the NRC in the FSER pertaining to RG 1.54, Rev. 1 as a safety determination basis on protective coatings. This departure does not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined no prior NRC approval is required.

SCE&G Identifier	Originating Document	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-13-022	APP-FSAR-GLN-079	Turbine Building I&C Cabinet Layout. This activity changes the use of room 20503 from electrical equipment room to control system cabinet room 4, identifies the locations of three new air conditioned cabinet rooms and of the non-safety related DCS cabinet layouts within these three rooms in the non-safety related turbine building. The three air conditioned cabinet rooms are necessary to house the DCS cabinets in a suitable temperature and humidity environment within the turbine building. The layouts of the DCS cabinets assure adequate space is available within the three cabinet rooms. This change corrects typographical errors and removes extraneous information in the non-Tier 2* background information of a Turbine Building Fire Area drawing. It also corrects the fire zone name. Additionally, this change corrects typographical/font inconsistencies in the radiation zone drawings.	The turbine building has no safety-related design function. By adding the three new cabinet rooms in the non-safety related turbine building, its intended function to house the main turbine generator and the power conversion cycle equipment and auxiliaries is unchanged. The three new cabinet rooms are designed to the same code requirements as the turbine building. The addition of the three new air conditioned cabinet rooms is within the structural analysis of the turbine building and does not impact the Aircraft Impact Assessment (AIA). Additionally, these new cabinet rooms do not impact security barriers or radiation and shielding safety analyses. The editorial typographical and naming corrections do not impact security barriers, radiation and shielding safety analyses, or the AIA. The addition of walls to create a temperate space to locate control cabinetry is entirely inside of an existing Turbine Building fire area and does not involve the addition of a new fire area. It does not involve a change that relocates a fire area boundary fire barrier or reduction in the fire resistance rating of a fire area boundary fire barrier. It does not affect the location of a fire zone boundary inside the fire area. These changes do not affect any procedure, method of evaluation, or test and experiment. The changes do not have an impact on ex-vessel severe accident consequences. This departure does not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined no prior NRC approval is required.

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LCE-13-023	APP-FSAR-GLN-156	The design of the WLS containment sump pumps was changed from the type requiring mechanical seals and permanent lubricated bearings to a sealless canned motor pump which is cooled and lubricated by the process pumped fluid. The elimination of pump seals and permanent lubrication should result in improved pump availability and reliability relative to the current pump design due to reduced maintenance and repair requirements.	This change does not adversely affect any of the design functions of the WLS to process, or store for processing, radioactively contaminated liquid wastes. The change does not adversely affect the function of the WLS containment sump pumps to discharge the radioactive liquids that collect in the containment sump to the waste holdup tank for further processing by the WLS. Key pump performance requirements, such as pump flow rate, power rating, and net positive suction head (NPSH) are not affected by this change. Instrumentation that signals the pump to start and stop on high and low sump water level is unaffected by this change. Preoperational testing of the WLS, as described in UFSAR Subsection 14.2.9.3 is unchanged by this activity. The change does not adversely affect the design function of any SSC described in the UFSAR. There is no affect on any fire area. There is no affect on the Aircraft Impact Assessment. There is no change to any procedure, method of control, analysis method or test or experiment. The change does not affect the ex-vessel severe accident consequences, physical security plans or emergency plans. This departure does not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined no prior NRC approval is required.

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LCE-13-024	APP-FSAR-GLN-173	WLS Containment Sump Subsystem Changes This change involves an update of the liquid radwaste system (WLS) containment sump pump parameters to reflect the current design. The following corrections to the UFSAR result: (1) revises the volume of water between pump-outs of the containment sump from the 160 gallons stated in Table 11.2-4 to 60 gallons and (2) revises the pumping time for the containment sump pumps from the approximately 3 minutes stated in Subsection 9.3.5.1.2 to approximately 1 minute. Also, an editorial change is made to Subsection 1.2.1.4.2 to accurately reflect that the containment sump pumps are part of the liquid radwaste system instead of the radioactive waste drain system.	With the changes identified for this activity, the WLS containment sump subsystem continues to meet its design function and provide a robust leakage detection system. The UFSAR change stating that the containment sump pumps are part of the liquid radwaste system instead of the radioactive waste drain system is an editorial change to accurately reflect the system that includes the containment sump pumps and is not a physical design change. Consequently, this activity does not involve a test or experiment not described in the UFSAR or modification or addition that adversely affects: 1) a design function of an SSC described in the UFSAR, 2) a method of performing or controlling the design function as described in the UFSAR, or 3) an evaluation for demonstrating that the intended design function will be accomplished. There is no modification, addition to, or removal of a SSC such that a design function described in the UFSAR is adversely affected. There is no affect on a design feature credited in the severe accident assessment in the UFSAR. Further, this activity has no adverse effect on the frequency or consequences of accidents or malfunction of an SSC important to safety. There is no adverse impact on any fission product barrier design basis limit, and there is no failure of an SSC leading to a different result than previously analyzed. Consequently, this change has no impact on ex-vessel severe accident likelihood or consequences. This departure does not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined no prior NRC approval is required.

SCE&G Identifier	Originating Document	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-13-027	APP-FSAR-GLN-213	Nuclear Island Coating Clarifications This activity makes the following changes for Service Level II coatings in the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) outside containment: 1) removes the specific coatings to be applied on the carbon steel and concrete surfaces and replaces them with more generic requirements requiring that coatings be decontaminable in those areas likely to be exposed to radioactive contamination, 2) replaces identification of specific areas of the RCA outside containment needing to be coated with more generic requirements, which are that the areas requiring coating are those subject to frequent personnel access and to liquid spray, splash, spillage, or immersion, and 3) removes the requirement for radiation testing of these coatings. These changes provide more flexibility in specifying coating systems and areas to be coated in the RCA outside of containment. The radiation testing requirement is removed because it is not needed based on industry experience.	This change affects the Service Level II coatings used in the RCA outside containment. These coatings do not provide any functions related to plant safety, because their failure does not prevent functioning of any engineered safety feature. This change replacing specific coatings and identifying specific areas of the RCA to be coated with more generic requirements allows incorporation of coatings which industry experience has shown to be decontaminable in those areas of the plant which industry experience has shown needs to be coated. The change to remove the radiation resistance testing is made, because the coatings within the RCA are typically not exposed to radiation levels that would impact their performance. Because these changes are only to coatings descriptions outside containment, there is no effect on the GSI-191 evaluations relative to the potential for suction strainer plugging for post-accident recirculation systems, which are located inside containment. The activity does not involve a Tier 2*, Technical Specifications or plant-specific Tier 1 information (including ITAAC) change, does not adversely affect any design function, involve a procedure or method of control that affects the performance of a design function, involve a method of evaluation in the UFSAR, involve a test or experiment, nor a design feature credited in the ex-vessel severe accident assessment. The 10 CFR 50.59/10 CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined that no prior NRC approval is required.

SCE&G Identifier	Originating Document	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-13-028	132177-S-C-000010 / APP-GW-GEE-4341	The design pressure of the Circulating Water System (CWS) expansion joints at the main condenser for VC Summer Units 2&3 is changed from 100 psig to 90 psig. The CWS expansion joints exist at the connection between the CWS piping and the condenser water box in order to allow for movement of the condenser due to condenser being supported on springs. The VC Summer Units 2&3 UFSAR Section 10.4.5.2.2 includes the expansion joints in a statement that the piping outside of the condenser portions has a design pressure of 100 psig. APP-GW-GEE-4341 was processed and approved to justify the design pressure of 90 psig for the CWS expansion joints as well as add a statement to the VC Summer Units 2&3 UFSAR that states "The design pressure for the expansion joints within the turbine building is 90 psig.	The subject change to the CWS expansion joints design pressure was evaluated and determined that the activity did not adversely impact a design function, procedure or method of control which affects the performance of a design function, a test or experiment, a method of evaluation, or a design feature credited in the ex-vessel severe accident assessment. This departure does not involve a change to Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications. A 10 CFR 50.59 / 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined no prior NRC approval is required.