



Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
2807 W County Road 75
Monticello, MN 55362

July 23, 2013

L-MT-13-067
10 CFR 50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Docket 50-263
Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-22

LER 2013-002 "Essential Bus Transfer during 2R Transformer Testing"

A Licensee Event Report (LER) for this occurrence is attached.

Summary of Commitments

This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Mark A. Schimmel For MNS'.

Mark A. Schimmel
Site Vice-President, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Northern States Power Company-Minnesota

Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Project Manager, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, USNRC
Resident Inspector, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, USNRC

1. FACILITY NAME: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
 2. DOCKET NUMBER: 05000 - 263
 3. PAGE: 1 OF 3

4. TITLE: Essential Bus Transfer During 2R Transformer Testing

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
05	24	13	2013 - 002 - 00			7	23	2013	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

9. OPERATING MODE: 5

10. POWER LEVEL: 0%

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

NAME: Carrie Fosaaen, Licensing Engineer
 TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code): 763-295-1357

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
A	EB	BKR	G080	Y	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE: MONTH: N/A, DAY: N/A, YEAR: N/A

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On May 24, 2013, during performance of 4kV load testing on the new 2R-Transformer, operations was unable to observe red light indication for a 4 kV breaker either locally or in the Control Room following closure of the breaker. The lack of red light indication with the breaker closed is indication that the breaker will not be able to be tripped electrically, thus rendering all breaker protective trips and remote tripping from the Control Room unavailable. This resulted in the operators taking procedurally directed action to trip the breaker manually using the mechanical trip button, leading to the Essential Bus transfer. At the time, all credited safety systems were lined up to Division 2-4kV Essential Bus which was not affected by the event, as a defense-in-depth measure.

The apparent cause of the event was damage to a 4kV breaker which was the result of inadequate protection of the breaker during temporary storage.

A spare breaker was successfully tested and installed. Other breakers in temporary storage were inspected for potential damage. The long term corrective action is to revise the operations manual to provide additional guidance regarding the appropriate storage of breakers and to specify items requiring inspection prior to installation into switchgear cubicles.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET

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		2013	- 002	- 00	

NARRATIVE

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On May 24, 2013, prior to the event, the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) was in Mode 5 at approximately 0% power. Operations was performing 4kV load testing on the new 2R Transformer when they were unable to observe red-light indication for a 4kV breaker [BRK] either in the control room or locally. Lack of red-light indication with the breaker closed indicates that the breaker cannot be electrically tripped. Operators took action to trip the breaker manually using the mechanical trip button as directed by procedures. As a result, at 0334 MNGP experienced a loss of power to the Bus-15 (Division 1-4kV Essential Bus) [BU] which initiated an Essential Bus Transfer of Bus-15 and automatic start of 12-Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) [DG]. 11-EDG was in pull-to-lock as directed by the test plan and therefore did not start. At the time, all credited safety systems were lined up to Bus-16 (Division 2-4kV Essential Bus) which was not affected by the event, as a defense-in-depth measure. Bus-15 was automatically re-powered from the 1AR-Reserve Transformer [XFMR] as designed. During the event all systems responded as expected to the Essential Bus Transfer.

EVENT ANALYSIS

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) System Actuation for the valid actuation of the 12-EDG. This event was not considered a safety system functional failure.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

Bus-15 automatically transferred to the 1AR-Reserve Transformer and 12-EDG auto started but did not load as expected due to the availability of normal off-site power to Bus-16. All safety systems credited with decay heat removal were aligned to Bus-16 during the event which was not affected. During the evolution all critical safety functions remained available and responded as expected to the Essential Bus Transfer.

CAUSE

During the MNGP refueling outage, extensive modifications to the electrical distribution system were performed which resulted in the need to remove five normally installed circuit breakers from the Lower 4kV Room. The number of breakers that required temporary storage exceeded normal storage capacity in the 4kV rooms; the remaining breakers were stored outside the 4kV rooms out of the path of travel and with foreign material exclusion covers. Troubleshooting immediately following the event determined the cause of the lack of red light indication was a damaged secondary disconnect pin. The damage misaligned the pin so that it could not make contact with the secondary disconnect rail.

The apparent cause of the damage to the breaker, which ultimately resulted in an Essential Bus transfer, was inadequate protection provided for the breaker during temporary storage.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

A spare breaker was successfully tested and installed. Other breakers in temporary storage were inspected for potential damage. The long term corrective action is to revise the operations manual to provide additional guidance regarding the appropriate storage of breakers and to specify items requiring inspection prior to installation into switchgear cubicles.

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NARRATIVE

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

There were no previous similar licensee event reports in the past three years.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Energy industry identification system (EIIS) codes are identified in the text within brackets [xx].