

NEI 13-02

Guidance to Implement EA-13-109

June 13, 2013



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Operator Doses, Source Term for Vent,
Deflagration/Detonation

Key Topic Items for Discussion

1. With steam flow hydrogen concentration is not sufficient to support deflagration/detonation
 - NRC Report
 - GE SIL

Key Topics for Discussion (Cont'd)

2. All actions related to Order EA-12-050 and Generic Letter 89-016 will be superseded by new Order EA-13-109
 - EA-12-050 rescinded by EA-13-109
 - GL 89-016 requirements are enveloped by Order EA-13-109

Key Topics for Discussion (Cont'd)

3. Use of All Available Equipment

- “Portable equipment” can utilize equipment provided through FLEX program (does not change the scope of FLEX to severe accident).
- Use of equipment must consider environmental conditions in EA-13-109

Key Topics for Discussion (Cont'd)

4. The 6 month update of Phase 1 OIP and Phase 2 OIP will be issued in December 2014
 - Duplicative details to be submitted at same time with same people. Resource limitation.
 - Recommend optional use of single document

Key Topics for Discussion (Cont'd)

5. Temperature and Pressure limits are per the evaluations and procedure limits within the plant containment envelope
 - Wetwell should be bounded by the pressure and temperature for conditions TBD
 - Drywell should be bounded by the pressure and temperature for conditions TBD

Key Topics for Discussion (Cont'd)

6. Key Assumptions

- UHS available for make-up; pumps can be restored
- Robust installed electrical and mechanical equipment remain available, except installed AC power source
- Others TBD