



# **Filtering Strategies for BWR Mark I and Mark II Containments Rulemaking**

June 13, 2013

# Acronyms

- AC – Alternating Current
- ACRS – Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
- ATWS – Anticipated Transient Without Scram
- AOP – Abnormal Operating Procedures
- BWR – Boiling Water Reactor
- CD – Core Damage
- CFR – Code of Federal Regulations
- DC – Direct Current
- DF – Decontamination Factor
- EDMG – Extreme Damage Mitigating Guidelines
- ELAP – Extended Loss of AC Power
- EOP – Emergency Operating Procedures
- LCF – Latent Cancer Fatalities
- LMT – Liner Melt-Through

# Acronyms

- MACCS – MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System
- MSL – Main Steam Line
- NTE – Not To Exceed
- PRA – Probabilistic Risk Assessment
- RCIC – Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
- RCS – Reactor Coolant System
- RPV – Reactor Pressure Vessel
- SAMG – Severe Accident Management Guidelines
- SOARCA – State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses
- SRM – Staff Requirements Memorandum
- SRV – Safety Relief Valve
- STSBO – Short-term Station Blackout
- VB – Vessel Breach

# Agenda

- Process and schedule
- Scope
- Performance based requirements
- Accident scenarios
- Mitigation actions
- Alternatives
- Uncertainties
- Testing to reduce uncertainties
- Next Steps

## **Process and Schedule**

- Rulemaking Working Group formed
- SRM-SECY-12-0157 directed:
  - Technical basis due March 19, 2014
  - Proposed rule due March 19, 2015
  - Final rule due March 19, 2017
- Engage Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and stakeholders
- Provide policy issues to Commission

# Detailed Schedule (Technical Basis)

Draft Technical Basis  
(ACRS Briefing)



Public Comment Period



Final Technical Basis  
(ACRS Briefing)

## **NRC Process for Draft Technical Basis**

Feedback and resolution on topics discussed at this meeting

Develop Event Tree Probabilities

Perform Accident Sequences and Accident Progression Analysis (MELCOR)

Perform Offsite Consequences Analysis (MACCS)

# Scope

- Containments
  - BWR Mark I and Mark II Containments
- Performance based regulation
  - NUREG 1860



# Performance Based Requirements

- 3 Tiers for Performance Based Requirements
  - Performance Goal
  - Performance Objective
  - Performance Measure

## Performance Goal

- Prevent the release of significant amounts of radioactive material following the dominant severe accident sequences through filtering strategies with dry well filtration and severe accident management
  - Based on SRM-SECY-12-0157

# Performance Objectives

- Reduce the conditional failure probability of Mark I and Mark II containments:
  - For containment failure from liner melt-through; and
  - For severe accident over-pressure/over-temperature conditions
- Provide adequate decontamination of controlled (venting) and uncontrolled (diffuse) fission product releases
- Remove heat from core debris in the reactor vessel and in the primary containment
- Vent hydrogen from primary containment and away from onsite buildings and structures

# Performance Measures


NRC	Rationale	Industry	Rationale
Integrated radionuclide release over xx hours NTE yy% of core inventory	Top level performance measure - Relatable to person-rem metric and offsite cost metric used in regulatory analysis - Relatable to health risk (prompt fatalities, LCF)		
Decontamination factor (DF) of 10 <sup>N</sup> or more	Second level performance measure - Relatable to integrated radionuclide release		
Adequate and reliable water injection into RPV and/or containment	Possible performance goal - Maintain RPV integrity - Prevent vessel failure - Minimize radionuclide release from RPV - Prevent dry well liner melt-through - Control dry well temperature	Adequate and reliable water injection into RPV and/or containment	Possible performance goal - Relatable to RPV integrity - Relatable to containment integrity - Relatable to controlled dry well temperature - In-containment filtration of radionuclides
Controlled venting	Possible performance goal - Prevent containment failure and radionuclide releases - Prevent hydrogen releases to reactor building	Controlled venting	Possible performance goal - Relatable to containment integrity - Relatable to controlled dry well temperature - Suppression pool filtration
		Capability of external filter	Possible performance goal - Further reduce radionuclide releases
		Operator training	Possible performance goal - Reliable utilization and operation of EOPs, SAMGs, and FLEX

# Accident Scenarios

- Focus on risk-significant sequences
  - Informed by Fukushima
  - Built on SOARCA and earlier PRA studies
  - Commission Guidance
- Base-case: Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP)
  - Include SRV failures, induced MSL creep rupture, vessel breach, seal failures, etc.
- Additional scenarios of low probability & high consequence events
  - Loss of containment heat removal, etc.
  - ATWS will not be included

# Example Event Tree

Result from Level 1 PRA	FLEX prevents core damage	Containment venting	Offsite power recovered before VB	FLEX Plus Prevents VB	Offsite power recovered before LMT	FLEX Plus Prevents LMT
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# Mitigation Actions

- Mitigation actions:
  - RCIC
  - SAMG/EOP/EDMG/AOP
  - RPV depressurization by operator (some cases)
  - Core and dry well spray (10 CFR 50.54(hh) and FLEX)
  - Containment venting
- Determinations needed for:
  - Timing of RCIC
  - Size and timing of dry well spray
  - Timing of venting
- Sensitivities required

# Alternatives

- Question: How to handle containment flooding in Base Case vs. Alternatives?
  - What is assumed for base case vs. alternatives?
  - Should some enhanced capability of containment flood be handled as a stand-alone alternative?
  - What would the enhanced capability be? What if just adding a filter? What if employing water management?



## **Alternative 1 – Base Case**

- Mark I – ELAP + severe accident capable wet well vent + severe accident dry well vent + some containment flood?
- Mark II – ELAP + severe accident capable wet well vent + severe accident dry well vent + some containment flood?
- Sensitivity: plant-specific probability of wet well bypass and cost to fix

## Alternative 2

- Add engineered filter (24 hours of passive operation) to dry well and/or wet well vent line + some enhanced containment flood?
- Costs: construction and installation of equipment, training, testing, and guidance document development
  - Costs of different filters, dry well only option
  - Available industry cost estimates requested

## Alternative 3

- Plant-specific filtering strategies
  - Water management for decontamination and venting
    - Full enhanced containment flood included by definition of water management?
- Costs: PRA, testing, training, construction and installation of equipment, development of guidance documents
  - Available industry cost estimates requested

# Uncertainties

- Human Factors/Performance
- Level 2, Level 3 PRA
  - NUREG/CR-7155 (Draft)
- Suppression pool/core debris pool DF
- Dry well spray debris coverage/cooling and DF
- Other decontamination processes
- Instruments
- Engineered filter performance
- Upper dry well temperature rise and the impact on penetration leakage and head flange leakage

# Testing to Reduce Uncertainties

- Dry well spray DF performance in actual containment – integrated testing
- Engineered filter performance
  - Determine applicability/coverage of vendor test data
  - Identify any additional testing needed

## Info needed from licensees

- Purpose: Ensure staff has information critical to providing the Commission with a high quality technical basis for filtering strategies rulemaking as directed in SRM-SECY-12-0157
- Consequences of not getting the information: Staff will not be able to (1) give credit for spray and pool decontamination factors in filtering strategies, or (2) determine acceptability of any generic models proposed by industry.
- Scope: Mark I and Mark II BWRs (31 plants, 19 sites)
- Level of detail – suitable for MELCOR/MAAP modeling, include drawings when possible

# Info needed from licensees

- Dry well spray header configuration and nozzle data – e.g., locations, size, nozzle design, etc.
- Wet well spray header configuration and nozzle data
- Mark I suppression pool wet well (suppression pool) configuration – e.g., key penetration elevations, volume, etc.
- Mark II wet well (suppression pool) configuration - e.g., key penetration elevations, volume, etc.
- Mark I dry well floor configuration, including pedestal area
- Mark II dry well (diaphragm) floor configuration, including pedestal area (drawings recv'd and under review)
- Primary system relief valve data, including any relief directly to the dry well
- Dry well head seal configuration and design data
- Configuration of dry well spray interferences (equipment between the spray header and the dry well floor that affects fall height, droplet shape)
- RCIC plants – turbine/pump performance specifications

## **Next Steps/Takeaways**

- **Begin developing Draft Technical Basis**
- **Next public meeting(s)**
- **Expected deliverables and due dates**