



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

August 23, 2013

Mr. Matthew W. Sunseri
President and Chief Executive Officer
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Post Office Box 411
Burlington, KS 66839

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE:
DEVIATION FROM FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR VOLUME
CONTROL OUTLET VALVES (TAC NO. ME9823)

Dear Mr. Sunseri:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 205 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-42 for the Wolf Creek Generating Station. The amendment consists of changes to the license in response to your application dated October 18, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated March 20, 2013.

The amendment revises Paragraph 2.C(5)(a) of the renewed facility operating license and the fire protection program as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to allow a deviation from the separation requirements of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, as documented in Appendix 9.5E of the Wolf Creek Generating Station USAR, for the volume control tank outlet valves.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "CF Lyon".

Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch IV
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-482

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 205 to NPF-42
2. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-482

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 205
License No. NPF-42

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Wolf Creek Generating Station (the facility) Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-42 filed by the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (the Corporation), dated October 18, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated March 20, 2013, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended as follows:

Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-42 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 205, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated in the license. The Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

In addition, Paragraph 2.C.(5)(a) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-42 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- (a) The Operating Corporation shall maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the SNUPPS Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Revision 17, the Wolf Creek site addendum through Revision 15, as approved in the SER through Supplement 5, Amendment No. 191, Amendment No. 193, and Amendment No. 205 subject to provisions b and c below.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days of the date of issuance. In addition, the licensee shall include the revised information in the Updated Safety Analysis Report submitted to the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e), as described in the licensee's application dated October 18, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated March 20, 2013, and evaluated in the staff's safety evaluation for this amendment.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Michael T. Markley, Chief
Plant Licensing Branch IV
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Renewed Facility
Operating License

Date of Issuance: August 23, 2013

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 205

RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-42

DOCKET NO. 50-482

Replace the following pages of the Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-42 with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Renewed Facility Operating License

REMOVE

4
5

INSERT

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5

- (5) The Operating Corporation, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and
- (6) The Operating Corporation, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.
- C. This renewed operating license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission, now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
- (1) Maximum Power Level
- The Operating Corporation is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3565 megawatts thermal (100% power) in accordance with the conditions specified herein.
- (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan
- The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 205, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated in the license. The Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
- (3) Antitrust Conditions
- Kansas Gas & Electric Company and Kansas City Power & Light Company shall comply with the antitrust conditions delineated in Appendix C to this license.
- (4) Environmental Qualification (Section 3.11, SSER #4, Section 3.11, SSER #5)*
- Deleted per Amendment No. 141.

*The parenthetical notation following the title of many license conditions denotes the section of the supporting Safety Evaluation Report and/or its supplements wherein the license condition is discussed.

- (5) Fire Protection (Section 9.5.1, SER, Section 9.5.1.8, SSER #5)
- (a) The Operating Corporation shall maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the SNUPPs Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Revision 17, the Wolf Creek site addendum through Revision 15, as approved in the SER through Supplement 5, Amendment No. 191, Amendment No. 193, and Amendment No. 205 subject to provisions b and c below.
- (b) The licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
- (c) Deleted.
- (6) Qualification of Personnel (Section 13.1.2, SSER #5, Section 18, SSER #1)
- Deleted per Amendment No. 141.
- (7) NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Conditions (Section 22, SER)
- Deleted per Amendment No. 141.
- (8) Post-Fuel-Loading Initial Test Program (Section 14, SER Section 14, SSER #5)
- Deleted per Amendment No. 141.
- (9) Inservice Inspection Program (Sections 5.2.4 and 6.6, SER)
- Deleted per Amendment No. 141.
- (10) Emergency Planning
- Deleted per Amendment No. 141.
- (11) Steam Generator Tube Rupture (Section 15.4.4, SSER #5)
- Deleted per Amendment No. 141.
- (12) LOCA Reanalysis (Section 15.3.7, SSER #5)
- Deleted per Amendment No. 141.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 205 TO

RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-42

WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-482

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated October 18, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12299A312), as supplemented by letter dated March 20, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13100A359), Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (the licensee) requested changes to the license for Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS). The supplemental letter dated March 20, 2013, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the *Federal Register* on December 11, 2012 (77 FR 73692).

The proposed changes would revise Paragraph 2.C(5)(a) of the renewed facility operating license and the fire protection program as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to allow a deviation from the separation requirements of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, as documented in Appendix 9.5E of the WCGS USAR, for the volume control tank (VCT) outlet valves (BGLCV0112B and BGLCV0112C).

The defense-in-depth measures of the WCGS Fire Protection Program (FPP), fire protection features, and the low combustible loading in Fire Area A-8, provide reasonable assurance that at least one VCT outlet valve will respond to a close signal from the control room following a fire in Fire Area A-8.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The regulations in 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire Protection," paragraph (a)(1) state, in part, that

Each holder of an operating license issued under this part or a combined license issued under part 52 of this chapter must have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part.

The regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, apply to licensed nuclear power electric generating stations that were operating prior to January 1, 1979. Since WCGS was licensed after January 1, 1979, WCNOG is not required to meet Appendix R. However, for Fire Area A-8, the licensee committed to meeting the requirements of Section III.G.2.b, Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area in its approved FPP, per License Condition 2.C(5)(a) and Appendix 9.5E of the WCGS USAR. Therefore, the WCGS FPP must provide the established level of protection as intended by Section III.G.2.b for this fire area.

The licensee is seeking approval from the Commission, pursuant to License Condition 2.C(5)(a), to make changes to the approved FPP as described in the WCGS USAR. Specifically, the licensee is seeking a deviation from its commitment to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b for Fire Area A-8, as documented in Appendix 9.5E of the WCGS USAR. This deviation applies to the VCT outlet valves BGLCV0112B and BGLCV0112C, which lack 20 feet of separation and automatic fire suppression. A license amendment request in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90 is the appropriate process to request a deviation from the WCNOG's commitment to the separation requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Area Description

Amendment No. 193 dated March 9, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110530183), and the licensee's application dated October 18, 2012, provided information about Fire Area A-8 is in the Auxiliary Building, 2000 foot elevation. Fire Area A-8 includes the following: corridors, filter, valve and demineralizer compartments, Sampling Room, Boron Meter and R.C. Activity Monitor Room, Volume Control Tank Room, Containment Spray Additive Tank Area, Seal Water Heat Exchanger Room, and Exit Vestibule.

Fire Area A-8 has interior wall and structural components that are constructed of steel, reinforced concrete, and other noncombustible materials. Interior wall and floors surfaces are generally painted concrete masonry units or coated concrete. These paints and coatings have been considered in the fire hazards analysis.

Fire Area A-8 is separated from adjoining fire areas by 3-hour rated barriers. The VCT outlet valves are separated by approximately 2 feet (ft) and are located in room 1318, which is within Fire Area A-8. Room 1318 is 20-ft long, 9-ft high, 23-ft 6 inches wide and is separated to the north and south by 3-hour fire-rated barriers. The floor and ceiling of this room are also 3-hour fire-rated barriers. The east and west walls are made of reinforced concrete construction but are not 3-hour fire rated because unprotected openings exist in these walls.

A normally locked, woven wire gate is installed at the entrance to room 1318. This is the only unprotected opening in the east wall of room 1318. The northern most VCT outlet valve (BGLCV0112B) is located approximately 12 ft west of the door opening. Both the VCT valve

compartment and the VCT room are administratively controlled as a transient combustible-free zone with strict permitting requirements for unattended storage of transient combustibles. The locked gate, as well as the administrative controls, limits the possibility of unauthorized storage of combustibles in rooms 1313 and 1318.

3.2 Defense-In-Depth Review

The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is preserved following a fire event by extending the concept of defense-in-depth to:

- 1) Prevent fires from starting;
- 2) Detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur; and
- 3) Provide protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.

3.2.1 Fire Hazard and Ignition Sources

Fire hazards within Fire Area A-8 consist of electrical cables and equipment. The most significant electrical fire hazard in the area is 480 Volt Alternating Current (VAC) load center PG19, which is located approximately 55 ft south of the room 1318 door opening. The licensee stated in its application that fixed combustible loading in room 1318 is negligible based on site calculation XX-X-004, "Combustible Fire Loading For Each Room in the Various Fire Areas at WCNOG," Revision 4. Administrative controls for room 1318 ensure only new cartridges for the Chemical Volume Control System filters, in quantities required for immediate use will be brought into this area and the containers are removed after they are emptied.

The closest significant ignition source within 20 ft of the room 1318 door opening is a 480 VAC lighting transformer (XQA22) that is mounted on the east wall of corridor 1320. The transformer is located approximately 9 ft off the floor and is approximately 16 ft from the room 1318 door opening. The licensee stated that, when applying the guidance from Appendix F of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process," neither VCT outlet valve is within the zone of influence for this potential ignition source.

The licensee stated that there are cable trays located in the hallway to the east of room 1318 and contain thermoset cable rated to Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)-383-1974, "Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." The licensee stated that rated cables reduce the potential for fire ignition and propagation. The licensee assumed that self-ignited cable fires are implausible for thermoset cables rated based on information from NUREG/CR-6850, "EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities," September 2005 (Volumes 1 and 2 at ADAMS Accession Nos. ML052580075 and ML052580118, respectively).

3.2.2 Fire Detection System

The licensee stated that Fire Area A-8 is provided with a partial smoke detection system. Detectors are not provided in rooms within Fire Area A-8 with little or no combustible loading and no safe shutdown circuits or equipment. Room 1318 is provided with two smoke detectors. The detectors annunciate to the continuously staffed control room. These detectors were not part of the original design but were added in 2008 to enhance the fire protection defense-in-depth in room 1318.

3.2.3 Fire Suppression System

The WCGS USAR Section 9.5.1.2.2, "Component Description," states that the power-block fire protection system is designed in compliance with the requirements of the American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) and the National Fire Codes of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Codes and standards considered in the design of the fire protection system are listed in USAR Table 9.5.1-1. The applicable NFPA suppression codes from the table are NFPA 13-1973, 1975, 1976, and 1991 for sprinkler systems. An automatic pre-action sprinkler system protects adjacent rooms of Fire Area A-8 containing concentrations of cables in trays. This includes the hallway east of room 1318 as well as the west and north hallways. However, there are no sprinkler heads in room 1318.

The licensee stated that portable fire extinguishers and fire hose stations are provided throughout the plant for manual firefighting efforts. These were installed as required by the WCGS USAR Section 3.1, "Conformance with NRC General Design Criterion," Criterion 3 - Fire Protection. The licensee stated that a qualified five-member fire brigade is available to investigate and respond to fire events.

3.2.4 Preservation of Safe Shutdown Capability

In its letter dated March 20, 2013, the licensee stated that the postulated scenario that requires a license amendment request for a fire in room 1318 in Fire Area A-8 that damages both in series VCT isolation valves and prevents them from closing automatically or manually from the control room. The same fire is also postulated to affect makeup to the VCT. With an emergency core cooling system (ECCS) centrifugal charging pump running and injecting into the reactor coolant system (RCS), this scenario causes the VCT to drain. Since the valves are in series, closing one valve will prevent hydrogen from the VCT from entering the pump suction and will prevent damage to the pump. With one valve closed, the ECCS can take suction from an alternative source without drawing hydrogen from the VCT.

As discussed on page 12 of 15 of its letter dated March 20, 2013, the licensee determined that a fire within room 1318 will not cause a loss of normal letdown flow. Therefore, the VCT is not expected to drain and hydrogen is not expected to enter the ECCS centrifugal charging pump suction.

In the event that the VCT does drain, or there is a spurious low level signal from VCT level transmitter BGLT0112, either valve (BGLCV112B or BGLCV112C) will be available to close automatically or plant procedures direct operators to manually close these valves. Valve

BNLCV112D (refueling water storage tank (RWST) to charging header valve) is independent of the fire area and will be available to align the RWST to the ECCS system.

In the event the VCT outlet valves fail to close and makeup to the VCT is lost, plant procedures direct operators to stop the operating ECCS centrifugal charging pump, line up centrifugal charging pump suction from the RWST, stop the reactor makeup water pumps, and isolate the hydrogen supply to the VCT. These actions prevent hydrogen gas binding of the operating centrifugal charging pump in cases where the VCT cannot be isolated.

Based on the above discussion, the licensee concluded that a postulated fire in room 1318 will have no adverse impact on the post-fire safe shutdown (PFSSD) capability.

The licensee determined that loss of offsite power is not credible for a fire in room 1318. The licensee's Calculation XX-E-013, "Post-Fire Safe Shutdown (PFSSD) Analysis," Appendix 2, provided a loss of offsite power evaluation for fires outside the control room. The licensee stated that its review of cable routing data shows that none of the Train 'A' onsite and offsite power cables run in room 1318. Therefore, the licensee concluded that a fire in room 1318 will not cause a loss of either Train 'A' or Train 'B' offsite or onsite power.

Upon indication of a fire in Fire Area A-8, the licensee stated that control room operators will enter procedure OFN KC-016, "Fire Response." Attachment B2 of OFN KC-016 provides a list of possible fire-induced failures and mitigating operator actions in the event of a fire in Fire Area A-8. Operators will take the actions discussed above to prevent failure of the ECCS system.

The licensee stated that the power and control cables for VCT outlet valves are run in rigid steel conduit in room 1318. The conduits are run in opposite directions from the valves; therefore, the valves are closer to each other than any point on the conduits.

There are no operator manual actions (local actions outside of the control room, in response to a fire) to close the VCT outlet valves in the event of a fire in Fire Area A-8, as the outlet valves are located in the fire area of concern. The licensee proposes to demonstrate and credit through defense-in-depth the ability to close one of the two VCT outlet valves from the control room.

Normal letdown provides makeup to the VCT from RCS Loop 3 crossover leg. A fire in room 1318 will not cause a loss of letdown to the VCT. Cables associated with the various valves in the letdown flowpath are not run in room 1318. The only scheduled cables in room 1318 are those associated with the VCT outlet valves and VCT level transmitter BGLT0112.

A high water level in the VCT causes letdown to divert to the recycle holdup tank (RHUT). For this function, the water level is sensed by level transmitter BGLT0149, which is located outside of room 1318. Level transmitter BGLT0112 does not provide the signal for this function. Therefore, a fire in room 1318 will not cause the letdown flow to divert to the RHUT.

VCT level transmitter BGLT0112 monitors VCT level and initiates the refueling water sequence on low level in the VCT. This causes VCT outlet valve BGLCV0112B to close and RWST to charging header valve BNLCV0112D to open. This is the preferred lineup for PFSSD.

Based on the information provided by the licensee in the above discussion, the NRC staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that a fire in room 1318 will not affect normal letdown. Separation between the VCT outlet valves is sufficient to assure that one will close automatically or manually from the control room.

3.3 Deviations for Fire Area A-8

In the license amendment request for Amendment No. 193, the licensee stated a deviation was granted to WCGS FPP for Fire Area A-8 to allow the removal of the high/low pressure interface designation from the pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves. Amendment No. 193 addresses the interface designation of the pressurizer PORVs from the high/low pressure interface to the non-high/low pressure interface. Cables associated with the Train 'A' pressurizer PORV and associated block valve are run in Fire Area A-8. Therefore, Fire Area A-8 is included in the areas affected by Amendment No. 193. The NRC staff's conclusions in Section 3.3 of the safety evaluation for Amendment No. 193 states, in part, that

The removal of the PORVs and block valves as high/low pressure interface components is a reduction in the PFSSD analysis methodology contained in WCNOG's PFSSD analysis. However, the defense-in-depth measures provide reasonable assurance that a fire that does occur will be limited in severity and that there is reasonable assurance that safe shutdown can be achieved.

In its letter dated March 20, 2013, the licensee identified all other deviations granted for Fire Area A-8 and provided a technical justification that demonstrated that the current application will not affect the conclusion of any prior deviation granted for Fire Area A-8. In addition, the licensee stated that there are two equipment hatches in Fire Area A-8 for which deviations were granted. NUREG-0881, Supplement No. 5, "Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1," March 1985, Section 9.5.1.4, "Fire Protection for Specific Areas," states, in part,

The auxiliary building is provided with two sets of equipment hatchways in the northern and southern ends of the auxiliary building corridors. A monorail hoist serves each set of hatchways to allow equipment to be moved from one location to another. The nearest equipment hatch is located approximately 30 feet horizontally from the room 1318 door. Steel hatch covers and automatic sprinkler water curtains are provided for each hatchway at elevations 2000 ft, 2026 ft, and 2047 ft to separate the corridor fire areas. Because of the low fuel loading and configuration of equipment in these areas, the WCNOG staff finds that the water curtains and steel covers provide a level of safety equivalent to the technical requirements of Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.

The licensee concluded that this application is not affected by the previously approved deviations in Fire Area A-8. The NRC staff agrees that this application is not affected by the previously approved deviations in Fire Area A-8, since the approved deviations are on different components with no common functions.

3.4 Conclusion of Technical Evaluation

The proposed application adversely affects the licensee's ability to safely shutdown WCGS, since it does not meet the criteria in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. However, based on its review of the information provided by the licensee, the NRC staff concludes that the fire protection features in Fire Area A-8, as well as the low combustible loading in Fire Area A-8, provides reasonable assurance that, in the unlikely event that the VCT experiences a loss of level during a fire in room 1318, at least one of VCT outlet valves (BGLCV0112B or BGLCV0112C) will respond to a control room close signal following a fire in the area.

3.5 Changes to License Condition

The current License Condition 2.C(5)(a) states that:

The Operating Corporation shall maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the SNUPPS Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Revision 17, the Wolf Creek site addendum through Revision 15, as approved in the SER through Supplement 5, Amendment No. 191, and Amendment No. 193 subject to provisions b and c below.

The revised License Condition 2.C(5)(a) states that:

(a) The Operating Corporation shall maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the SNUPPS Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Revision 17, the Wolf Creek site addendum through Revision 15, as approved in the SER through Supplement 5, Amendment No. 191, Amendment No. 193, and Amendment No. xxx subject to provisions b and c below.

The change reflects the approved fire protection program based on the issuance of the license amendment approving the proposed change. The amendment number will be reflected in the license condition upon the issuance of the amendment.

The licensee will revise its response to Section III.G in USAR Table 9.5E-1 (Sheet 7) by adding the following statement:

In Fire Area A-8, the volume control tank outlet valves (BGLCV0112B and BGLCV0112C) and circuits are not separated in accordance with Section III.G.2. However, the fire protection features provided in Fire Area A-8 as well as the low fixed combustible loading provides reasonable assurance that at least one valve will respond to a control room close signal following a fire in the area.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Kansas State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the *Federal Register* on December 11, 2012 (77 FR 73692). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: B. Litkett, NRR/DRA/AFPB

Date: August 23, 2013

August 23, 2013

Mr. Matthew W. Sunseri
President and Chief Executive Officer
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Post Office Box 411
Burlington, KS 66839

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE:
DEVIATION FROM FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR VOLUME
CONTROL OUTLET VALVES (TAC NO. ME9823)

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A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,
/ra/
Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch IV
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-482

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ADAMS Accession No. ML 13197A210

***via memo dated**

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