

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7012

June 18, 2013

Ms. Rebecca Schmidt  
Director  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Ms. Schmidt:

Enclosed is a letter I have received from Mr. Alfredo Hannenberg.

I would appreciate your reviewing this situation and providing answers to my constituent's concern. Please send your reply directly to the constituent and send a copy of your response to me.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

My best wishes to you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Harry Reid". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

HARRY REID  
United States Senator

HR:kt

# Correspondence Snapshot for Activity #12555912

Created By ccadmin on 6/5/2013 12:11:00 AM  
Modified By SamanthaS on 6/18/2013 12:02:00 PM

## INCOMING

**received by** ccadmin  
**received date** 6/5/2013  
**in type** EML  
**assigned staff** SamanthaS  
**interest code** ENGY  
**reference #**  
**owner** ccadmin  
**file location**

## CONSTITUENT INFORMATION

**Hannenberg, Alfredo (1285610)**  
6150 Echo Cave Avenue  
Las Vegas, NV 89131-2501  
(702) 515-0326  
ajhannenberg@informativepeople.com

## description

### message

I recall post-2011 Japan tsunami hearings were held to review challenges and recommended changes to our nuclear power plants, to mitigate any possible serious storm damage to America's nuclear reactors.

Given the rising levels of the Missouri and Mississippi rivers, timed with the upcoming hurricane season, I'm concerned that reactors like the Fort Calhoun could be threatened from two fronts: Heavy flooding north of Nebraska, with a possible hurricane raising river levels to the south (extending flood-stage conditions to the north, as the river cannot drain fast enough to the south). Could this dual-threat result in river level rise above the plant's barrier walls?

Was the above referenced scenario covered by the NRC? I realize they were under considerable pressure to release recommended improvements back in 2011. Unfortunately, as you must have seen in your years in Washington, expedited remedial action to address a complex problem does not necessarily render thorough investigation and effective, comprehensive action.

Taking a nuclear plant off-line doesn't in itself eliminate the problem, as on-site operating generators must provide the power to operate the plant. If the generators are compromised, or fail, due to water incursion onto the site, we could have a disaster on our hands, that would have severe regional and national consequences.

I appreciate any response back to me, via the email address provided. Note we do not answer our home phone, as we get too many marketing calls.

## OUTGOING

**group code** NUCLEAR  
**out type** Email  
**response type** Quick  
**letter code** INFORM\_BUCK

**due date** 8/28/2013  
**response date**  
**closed date**

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