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May 10, 2013

NL-13-082

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: Report on Inoperable Core Exit Thermocouple
Indian Point Unit Number 3
Docket No. 50-286
License No. DPR-64

Dear Sir or Madam:

The purpose of this letter is to submit a report pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.7. Two channels of Core Exit Thermocouples (CET), each channel consisting of two CETs in the same train, are required by TS 3.3.3 [Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation], Table 3.3.3-1, for each reactor quadrant. Each reactor quadrant is considered a separate function. CET H-8 and CET N-2 are in reactor quadrant II, and are required to satisfy the Train A function of Post Accident Monitoring. CET H-8 was declared inoperable on March 27, 2013, after discovering it was reading approximately 40 degrees F higher than the rest of the Thermocouples. TS 3.3.3 Condition A was entered (One or more functions with one required channels inoperable) with a 30 day completion time to restore one channel to operable status. On April 26, 2013, at 16:23 hours, the 30 day allowed outage time for CET H-8 expired. TS 3.3.3 Condition B was entered requiring a special report to the NRC in 14 days pursuant to TS 5.6.7. This report is to outline the alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the repairs and schedule for restoring the instrument to operable status.

- Alternate method of monitoring

Quadrant 2 Train B has two operable qualified CETs to provide continued monitoring. Quadrant 2 Train A has additional non qualified operable CETs, that can operate with CET N-2 to provide the same function (indications for unit stabilization, cool down and channel check capability), although not qualified to equipment qualification standards.

- Cause

The failure of CET H-8 was recorded in the Indian Point Corrective Action Program (CAP) as condition report CR-IP3-2013-02122.

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Troubleshooting and evaluation of the failure has identified that an electrical fault is present between a connection panel inside the Containment Building and outside the Containment Building in the junction box located in the Electrical Tunnel. However, the precise nature of the fault is not determinate at this time.

- Plans and schedule for restoring

Troubleshooting under WO 346241 identified an alternative means of monitoring CET H-8. A modification will be issued to use existing qualified cables and connections to implement an alternate configuration under WO 346241. These changes will allow declaring CET H-8 operable. The modification is estimated to be completed by May 31, 2013.

There are no new commitments being made in this submittal.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me.

Sincerely,



RW/cbr

cc: Mr. Douglas Pickett, Senior Project Manager, NRC NRR
Mr. William M. Dean, Regional Administrator, NRC Region I
NRC Senior Resident Inspectors Office
Mr. Francis J. Murray, Jr., President and CEO, NYSERDA
Mrs. Bridget Frymire, New York State Dept. of Public Service