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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
5	(ACRS)
6	PLANT OPERATIONS AND FIRE PROTECTION SUBCOMMITTEE
7	+ + + +
8	WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2013
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10	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
11	The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear
12	Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room
13	T2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 1:00 p.m., Gordon
14	Skillman, Chairman, presiding.
15	COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
16	GORDON R. SKILLMAN, Chairman
17	J. SAM ARMIJO, Member
18	MICHAEL CORRADINI, Member
19	DENNIS C. BLEY, Member
20	CHARLES H. BROWN, JR. Member
21	HAROLD B. RAY, Member
22	MICHAEL T. RYAN, Member
23	STEPHEN P. SCHULTZ, Member
24	WILLIAM J. SHACK, Member
25	JOHN W. STETKAR, Member

1	NRC STAFF PRESENT:
2	MARK BANKS, Designated Federal Official
3	SHANA HELTON
4	SHER BAHADUR
5	ROBERT BEALL
6	CHRIS COWDREY
7	HOWARD BENOWITZ
8	GEORGE LAPINSKY *
9	JACK McHALE
10	TIM REED
11	UNDINE SHOOP
12	MICHAEL WASEM
13	
14	* Present via telephone
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PROCEEDINGS

1:07 p.m.

CHAIR SKILLMAN: Good afternoon. The meeting will now come to order. This is a meeting of the Plant Operations and Fire Protection Subcommittee.

I'm Dick Skillman, Chairman of the Plant Operations and Fire Protection Subcommittee. The ACRS members in attendance are Steve Schultz, Charlie Brown, Dennis Bley, Sam Armijo, John Stetkar, Bill Shack, Harold Ray. Mark Banks of the ACRS staff is the Designated Federal Official for this meeting.

The Subcommittee will review the staff's action on Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 8 rulemaking. Of particular interest to the Subcommittee will be the draft regulatory basis. We will hear presentations from the NRC staff regarding this matter.

We have not received written comments or requests for time to make oral statements from members of the public regarding today's meeting. The entire meeting will be open to public attendance. The Subcommittee will gather information, analyze relevant issues and facts, and formulate proposed positions and actions, as appropriate, for deliberation by the Committee.

The rules for participation in today's meeting have been announced as part of the notice of this meeting previously published in the Federal Register. A transcript of this meeting is being kept and will be made available, as stated in the Federal Register notice. Therefore, I request that participants in this meeting use the microphones located throughout the meeting room when addressing the Subcommittee. The participants are requested to please identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they can be readily heard.

We will now proceed with the meeting, and I call upon Dr. Sher Bahadur to begin the presentation.

MR. BAHADUR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon. I'm Sher Bahadur, Deputy Director of the Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Today's topic, as Mr. Chairman said, is the rulemaking efforts in response to the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 8, which specifically deals with on-site emergency response capabilities. In the past, we have discussed several NTTF recommendations with the Subcommittee and the Committee, but this is the first time the staff will be presenting to you its work on Recommendation 8.

Today, as Mr. Chairman mentioned, the staff will discuss the weakness in the NRC's regulation in the areas of Severe Accident Management Guidelines, supporting procedures, and related So the presentation will be more like the regulatory basis that has been developed for the rulemaking, which will also include four options to improve the regulatory framework for the on-site emergency response capabilities.

As you may be aware, the reg basis that the staff has developed has been published for public comment, and the public comment period will be over February 22. Last week, we had a public meeting, and the object of the meeting was, if there was any question that the staff would answer for the public's benefit, then we would have done so in last week's meeting.

The recommendation on the on-site emergency response capability interacts with a number of NTTF recommendations, including Recommendation 4, which is the Station Blackout Mitigation Strategies rulemaking; Recommendation 7, which is the spent fuel pool instrumentation; Recommendation 9, which is the staffing and communications; and, lastly, Recommendation 10, which is the command and control

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1 structures and the qualifications for beyond design You will see in the staff presentation the 2 3 approach that we are taking to incorporate those 4 recommendations, as well, into for Recommendation 8. 5 Now, today's presentation is the first one among several other meetings that we plan to have with 6 7 the ACRS Subcommittee and the Committee. This being 8 the reg basis, we will come to you when a proposed 9 rule is drafted. And then, finally, again, we'll come 10 to you when a final rule is drafted and the package is ready to go to the Committee. 11 At this time, I'd like to recognize that 12 this is a joint effort of a working group, a working 13 14 group that has members from various offices, including 15 NRO; of course, NRR being the driving force; NSIR; Admin; OGC; and OIS. 16 17 So at this time, I'd like to introduce the project manager for Recommendation 8, Bob Beall. 18 19 Beall is in my staff in the Division of Policy and Rulemaking, and he's going to make the presentation, 20 along with other team members. So, Bob, why don't you 21 take it --22 Thank you, Sher. 23 MR. BEALL: 24 As Sher said, my name is Bob Beall. I'm

a project manager in the Rulemaking Branch, and

1 today's presentation will be given by two people. Myself, I'll be going over the rulemaking and the 2 3 scheduling for Recommendation 8. And Chris? 4 MR. COWDREY: Chris Cowdrey from NRR 5 Operator Licensing. I'm the technical lead for Recommendation 8. 6 7 MR. BEALL: And Chris will be going over the details of the draft regulatory basis. On slide 8 two, I'd like to go over first some background of 9 10 Recommendation 8. CHAIR SKILLMAN: If I could hold for a 11 Member Mike Ryan with the ACRS has joined us. 12 minute. 13 Thank you. 14 MR. BEALL: Okay. Thank you. From the Near-Term Task Force recommendation, the Commission 15 issued an SRM directing the staff, as part of 16 17 Recommendation 8, to strengthen and integrate the emergency operating procedures; the Severe Accident 18 19 Management Guidelines, or SAMGs; and the Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines, or EDMGs. 20 As part of that, they also directed us, as 21 step, to issue an advanced notice of 22 first proposed rulemaking, or ANPR. The NRC staff and the 23 24 working group of Recommendation 8 did that on April

We had a 60-day comment period, and,

18th, 2012.

during that comment period, we received 18 comments on the ANPR.

Also during last year and early this year, we've had a number of public meetings to collect the public feedback on our proposed regulatory actions, questions on the ANPR or the draft regulatory basis. We've had public meetings on February 15th, May 23rd, and November 7th of 2012, and just six days ago we had one on January 31st. That was the one on the draft regulatory basis.

Our current status for Recommendation 8 is that we have the draft regulatory basis out for public comment currently. It was issued on January 8th of this year and is out for a 45-day comment period. draft regulatory basis comment period will end on February 22nd. As of this morning, we have not received any public comments, but we still have a few more weeks left so, hopefully, we'll get some good from the industry and comments any interested stakeholders.

Once we get those comments back, we will review the comments and incorporate those into the regulatory basis, which we're expected to issue out in May of 2013.

CHAIR SKILLMAN: Bob, you just used the

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word "stakeholders." 1 MR. BEALL: Yes, sir. 2 Would you give us your 3 CHAIR SKILLMAN: 4 thoughts about how broadly that term is to be applied? 5 MR. BEALL: Well, of course, the industry has been to all our public meetings and the various 6 7 PWR and BWR Owners Groups. And we've also had a few 8 NGOs, at least for the ANPR part. When they had a 9 public meeting for that, they were there. So, so far, that's been the interested parties that have been to 10 our meetings, and we also had a few comments on the 11 ANPR from NGOs, also. So this hasn't been just 12 industry giving us feedback on the Recommendation 8 13 14 process. 15 Have there been any CHAIR SKILLMAN: 16 participants from local municipality authorities, state authorities? 17 MR. BEALL: Not from states, no. We did 18 19 have a couple utilities, Exelon and things like that, on the ANPR. And TVA was at our January 31st public 20 They were there for that, and so was UniStar 21 was there, if I remember right. 22 CHAIR SKILLMAN: So utilities but not 23 24 necessarily the municipalities around the plants that

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those utilities own --

1	MR. BEALL: Oh, you mean the governmental
2	entities?
3	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Yes.
4	MR. BEALL: No, sir. As I recollect, no,
5	sir.
6	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Thank you.
7	MEMBER STETKAR: Did you get INPO
8	attendance at those meetings?
9	MR. BEALL: No, I don't think INPO was
10	MEMBER STETKAR: Or whatever the I
11	always forget the acronyms. The licensed plant
12	operators have kind of a
13	MR. MCHALE: No, they have not
14	participated directly in our meetings.
15	MEMBER STETKAR: They're coming in through
16	
17	MR. MCHALE: They've been to Commission
18	meetings on the broader response but not focused on
19	this. However, they have been I'm Jack McHale, by
20	the way, the Chief of the Operator Licensing Branch in
21	NRR. So I've provided the PROS group with the ANPR
22	and the draft reg basis but have not received
23	response.
24	MEMBER STETKAR: Oh, okay. Thanks.
25	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Thank you.

1 MR. BEALL: Great. The next slide, I want 2 to talk about what we're doing next after the draft regulatory basis has been finalized. 3 Our next 4 rulemaking step is that we're planning to issue the proposed rule in the fourth quarter of 2014. 5 currently plan on a 75-day comment period for that. 6 7 As with the ANPR and the draft regulatory basis, we 8 will have a public meeting to answer any questions the 9 public may have. And then we plan on issuing the 10 final rule in the third quarter of 2016. back before this committee at least two more times: 11 the proposed rule and the final packages we presented 12 to the ACRS. And, of course, we will issue any new or 13 14 revised guides documents when we issue the proposed rule and the counter rule. And also those documents 15 16 will come to the ACRS, also. 17 The next part, we talk about the actual draft regulatory basis. So I'll turn it over now to 18 19 Chris. MR. COWDREY: Good afternoon. Thanks for 20 the opportunity to talk about the Recommendation 8 21 draft regulatory basis this afternoon. 22 As you may the Recommendation 8 effort has four main 23 24 components to address licensees' on-site emergency

response capabilities.

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Those four major components

SAMGs; command and control organization; training 2 3 plans; and full-scale exercises for severe accidents. 4 So we'll talk about each one of those 5 aspects of Recommendation 8 individually as we go through the presentation. 6 And then we'll move on to 7 talk about the options that our working 8 considered for closing the gaps on some of 9 regulations in the area of on-site emergency response 10 capabilities, talk about some preliminary language that we developed and included in the draft 11 regulatory basis to spur some comments from the 12 outside stakeholders, our current thoughts on the 13 14 direction of Recommendation 8, and then talk interactions with some of the other Near-Term Task 15 Force recommendations and how Recommendation 8 will 16 17 relate with those recommendations. That's the point when we talk 18 MEMBER RAY: 19 about 10.2? MR. COWDREY: That is the point when we'll 20 talk about 10.2; that's correct. 21 Chris, as I read through 22 MEMBER STETKAR: this, your fourth sub-bullet under the third bullet 23 24 there is a little bit more gray, but it very carefully always speaks of EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs, as if that's 25

are procedures and quidelines, which include the

the universe. Now, the fourth sub-bullet says other emergency procedures, but it says spent fuel shutdown. As you're aware, the ACRS has written letters saying that we recommend that the fire response procedures also be included in this universe. I've not seen those words stated anywhere. What's the current plan regarding the fire procedures? Because they are of the same ilk as the current versions of the SAMGs. They kind of hang out there. They're different from plant to plant. Operators get into really difficult situations in terms of priorities and conflicting guidance or parallel guidance. And, yet, you know, this current effort seems to be silent in that regard.

MR. COWDREY: Right. Recommendation 8 asked us to take a look at developing some regulations for a comprehensive strategy for severe accident mitigation and specifically talk to those procedures which you mentioned, the EOPs, the SAMGs, the EDMGs, and what we're including as the FLEX guidelines due to the industry's response to the mitigating strategies. So taking a look at those sets of procedures, the EOPs, the SAMGs, the FLEX procedures are symptom-based procedures that functionally address restoring safety functions. And in that way, they kind of naturally fit together into an integrated framework.

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1 So we're trying to maintain that focus on 2 the procedures and guidelines that go to that end: 3 mitigating severe accident and mitigating core damage. 4 And mу personal opinion, the firefighting 5 strategies are kind of a different approach to a different problem in terms of --6 7 MEMBER STETKAR: I'm not talking about 8 putting out a fire, I'm talking about controlling the 9 plant during a fire. 10 MEMBER BLEY: And the fire procedures that are used in the control room. And if you don't think 11 power is important to protecting the core, you've got 12 to instruct me a little bit on that. And, lastly, 13 14 there's been one, and maybe two, depending on how you 15 look at it, fire events where, in fact, the interplay of these procedures and what it did to operations in 16 the control room had substantial difficulties. 17 So I don't quite get the distinction you're making. 18 19 MR. COWDREY: Well, the way I look at it and the perspective I have is that fires are just one 20 of many things that can take away equipment they use 21 to satisfy safety functions. 22 Fires can take away your equipment, so can flooding, so can a terrorist attack, 23 24 so can a loss of power out in the switchyard. The one thing that has a 25 MEMBER BLEY:

procedure in the control room that generally breaks a guy loose to do that and run it separate from the rest, and sometimes loading up the fire team takes people away from the operating staff, too. So I don't quite see it that way.

MEMBER STETKAR: And, Chris, when you say the fire takes it away, in some cases the procedures instruct the operators to actively go out and take away some of the things that they might need, which is different than the fire taking it away.

MR. COWDREY: This is, at least with our current plan, how the conflicts that might come up between procedures in the control room with fires, although I have a difficult time really coming up with an example of that. The command and control strategy will be an essential part of Recommendation 8. that command and control strategy will be setting up the organization in a way that ensures that they are make decisions. You can't predict capable to everything that a fire is going to do. You can't prescribe a list of actions to work into an integrated framework of procedures that will address possible fire that could ever occur. So what's really important is having a command and control organization to make those decisions, up establish set

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priorities, and, if there is a conflict with a fire procedure telling operators to de-energize an entire train of equipment, then that decision can be made by the command and control organization to --

MEMBER STETKAR: I'm sorry. Isn't it
better not to place the command and control people in
that position in the middle of a fire? Isn't it
better to have the guidance kind of worked out
beforehand? What you're saying is, well, we'll leave
it up to the people who are making the decisions
because they're really smart; and, if there are
conflicts, which you said, between the procedures,
we'll let the really smart people make the decision in
the midst of the fire.

MR. COWDREY: I think the command and control organization is going to need to be prepared to take actions to restore safety functions when one set of equipment is going away. If there's a fire in a room, whether or not you take away the equipment yourself, you might as well count on it going away and start shifting your strategies to address the accident, you know.

MEMBER STETKAR: I guess I just don't really understand the push back that we're hearing from the staff about why --

CHAIR SKILLMAN: Chris, if I could, let me step in just for a second. Both of the gentlemen that spoke are ex-operators, as am I. And there are others around this table. And I think, in many cases, people would rather have a small leak than have a fire in a plant because you know where that small leak is going to take you. Not that you want one, but, if you had a choice, you'd rather have a small leak and bring the plant down quietly and safely than have a fire that has a mind of its own.

I think what you're hearing ACRS telling you is, if you're going to talk about transitions, there needs to be an individual bullet for fire procedures because they really have a mind of their own and they really need to be woven into transitions because they are so peculiar. They're different than having an intruder. They're different than a security event, similar but different. And the reason is because they can take out equipment very quietly, and you may not know it's gone; or when you deploy your firefighting teams you deplete your reserves in your control room, and those individuals may go out and, on purpose, remove equipment that you need for what could be the emergency SAMG.

So I think what you're hearing us say is

we would like to see the fire procedures on a standalone line as part of your attack on Recommendation 8. The fire procedures are different, and they need to be considered.

MEMBER STETKAR: Chris, I think what you're hearing, and Dick said it, especially the second half of what he said, I'll grant you don't know what equipment the fire is going to take out, much as if you had a steam leak in the plant you don't know what instrumentation the steam might affect. So a symptom-based set of procedures for basic plant functions should address all of those types of issues. And I'll grant you can't and probably shouldn't, certainly shouldn't try to write procedures issue specific.

However, there are strategies that are developed in the current fire procedures at many plants, active intervention strategies that instruct people to actively go out and de-energize equipment for example or realign systems because of some predetermined vision of what is a safe shutdown pathway. And those are the issues, for example, in my personal opinion, that need this type of coordination because, on the one hand, you may have one person sitting in the control room looking at functions following a set

of quidelines and procedures and, on the other hand, another person in the control room instructing people to go turn off things. And sometimes when you turn off things, they don't come back. And that's the larger concern, at least from my own personal perspective, in terms of integrating the quidance. Not so much, you know, firefighting in a particular location or trying to anticipate what might be damaged by the fire because that is a very specific issue, but integrating plant response guidance terms of instructions to actively and, in particular, things off or and turn intervene reconfigure systems because of a predefined notion of what is the safe response to this particular fire. And that's the part where I think it does dovetail into this.

MEMBER BLEY: I'll try another piece to that. The place that, for me, it fits is, you know, for alarms and things, you have alarm response procedures and you have other sorts of procedures that call on the operators, but they can usually put those aside while they're doing the emergency procedures. But a fire won't let you do that. And a fire, predictively or depending on how it's organized at the plant, takes one of the board operators away from the

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activity for some amount of time, and that, in itself, organizationally, can cause a problem. And there are a few fire events you can look at to see what that leads to. The way these are used in the context of the other procedures worked out ahead is the place, for me, that's most important. Enough said by me.

CHAIR SKILLMAN: Members, any more comments? Chris, please proceed. Thank you.

MR. COWDREY: So as we talked about, in the procedure integration, we want to make sure we establish regulations for a comprehensive strategy for severe accident mitigation. So procedures that we're looking at so far for establishing those transitions and ensuring there's no dead-end for operation TSC staff when they're working through procedures and guidelines during a severe accident. Those procedures that we've looked at so far are the EOPs, SAMGs, the EDMGs, the FLEX guidelines. Spent fuel emergency procedures are being developed into the SAMGs by the industry, and then we also worked in those emergency procedures for when EOPs are no longer applicable, those shutdown modes, low modes, and cool-down modes.

CHAIR SKILLMAN: Let me ask you a brief question. I'm on your page nine of your regulatory basis. It's your paragraph 3.4. And you identify the

1 EOPs, the SAMGs, and the EDMGs, but the final sentence on that page is, "All four sets of procedures will be 2 3 relied upon by operators and engineers responding to 4 an event similar to that at Fukushima Dai-ichi." How did you get to four from three? What are the four 5 items that you were anticipating? 6 7 MR. COWDREY: The fourth item is 8 anticipating the FLEX guidelines. I'll take a look at 9 that paragraph and see --10 CHAIR SKILLMAN: Okay, thank you. MR. COWDREY: So, as I mentioned, these 11 sets of procedures have all been developed through 12 various initiatives. So those various initiatives 13 14 developed different types of procedures, so no one has 15 ever gone through and taken a comprehensive overall look at ensuring there's an integrated framework and 16 17 integrated strategy for an accident mitigation as it progresses past design basis assumptions. 18 19 that's the initial Recommendation 8. We'll go ahead and go to our next 20 slide and where it specifically talked about the SAMGs 21 and what is being done with SAMGs to ensure they're 22 enhanced and integrated under that structure. 23 24 As you know, there's no current regulatory

requirement for SAMGs.

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They exist as a result of an

1	industry initiative that was initiated back in the
2	early 90s. So we've got two steps to take with the
3	SAMGs and Recommendation 8. First is to establish a
4	regulatory requirement for the SAMGs, and the second
5	is to upgrade and enhance the SAMGs to ensure that
6	lessons learned from Fukushima and other industry
7	research are incorporated into the SAMGs going
8	forward.
9	MEMBER BLEY: Have you delved into them
10	much, or you're just getting organized to
11	MR. COWDREY: Well, the process that we're
12	using, that's being used to upgrade the SAMGs is EPRI
13	develops the technical basis report, so that was
14	developed originally back in the early 90s and it was
15	used by the Owners Groups to develop their generic
16	SAMGs off of that. So EPRI has gone through and done
17	their first revision to the TBR, and that's very
18	recently been
19	MEMBER BLEY: Is that published, or is
20	that still
21	MR. COWDREY: Very recently published.
22	The second
23	MR. BEALL: Yes, it is out for public
24	comment, public availability, and then we have it in,
25	apparently, too, on our web sites.

1	MEMBER BLEY: The thing I wanted to ask
2	you, if you're done looking at it, is when this idea
3	of first began, they really were, the first versions
4	were guidelines, suggested strategies, things to think
5	about, things to work with the vendor and others and
6	figure out what to do next. They seem, my opinion,
7	the ones I've looked at recently seem to have evolved
8	into something much more akin to procedures, and I
9	wonder if that's your impression of them.
LO	MR. BEALL: Are you talking about the TBRs
L1	or the generic SAMGs?
L2	MEMBER BLEY: The SAMGs, the individual
L3	SAMGs at plants which look a lot like the generic
L4	SAMGs, from what I've seen.
L5	MR. COWDREY: You're asking if they are
L6	procedures
L7	MEMBER BLEY: Yes. To me, they're
L8	beginning to look more like procedures.
L9	MR. COWDREY: More like a continuous use
20	procedure.
21	MEMBER BLEY: Yes.
22	MR. COWDREY: They haven't developed the
23	next revision of the SAMGs yet, but TBRs
24	MEMBER BLEY: I mean the ones that are out
25	there right now based on the old guidelines.

MR. COWDREY: Based on the old guidelines,

I think, you know, there's an up-front diagnosis

that's fairly proceduralized, fairly step by step.

But for the rest, I think that, generally, high-level

guidelines and kind of the high-level actions that go

to address restoring safety functions --

MEMBER BLEY: Maybe we'll hear from industry at some later meeting. You know, my memory of when all this started, the idea of the quidelines was then to have the broader expertise outside of the control room, including links to vendors and others available to really come up on the fly with ways to deal with a very unusual situation. If they really are evolving into procedures, my question, ought they not be in the control room? Why are they outside the Some of the EOPs now have links that control room? shoot you to the SAMGs. I'm just curious about that and what you guys think or if you've gotten far enough to even be thinking about that. I know it hasn't been the NRC's job to look at these up until now.

MR. COWDREY: There's different approaches through the different technologies for how the SAMGs are implemented and who's making the decisions. That's all going to be part of the process of evaluating as we go through . . .

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MR. MCHALE: And I guess I could add I think the goal of where we understand the Owners Groups are going is to the Pressurized Water Reactors, to standardize among the vendor types there and the boilers. And then, eventually, the next generation would be a common approach that would be the same for all of it. So it's an evolutionary process. The first thing was the technical basis report and then to develop the generic SAMGs for the reactor types. So I think we're pretty early in that process to know what that final, what the final state looks like, but the goal eventually is to have it a fairly common approach for everyone.

MR. BEALL: We'll have a much better idea of that process. Like Jack said, the TBRs are done. They're working currently on the generic SAMGs per reactor type. And so when we get to the proposal stage, which will be next year, we'll have a better idea. The industry will come back to us in a meeting and show us what the generic SAMGs look like. They've already asked us that, said that they were going to do that. And so then we can take that information and incorporate that in our proposal.

MR. MCHALE: Our understanding initially, in May of 2011, when we did the Temporary Instruction

inspection, and I think one of the conclusions was that all the plants had SAMGs, but the different levels of procedural controls and how they were being trained, there was a lot of variety in there. I think the conclusions were that everyone had them or thought they could implement them, but there was a lot more variability, and part of the goal of this is to take that out and make it more of a standard approach for everyone.

MEMBER STETKAR: But -- and I know the Owners Groups, but you mentioned the BWRs and the PWRs are now trying to consolidate things. And some of the stuff I've read, and I've not studied the SAMGs so I don't know specifics, but some of the stuff I've read anecdotally seems to indicate that there is somewhat of a different philosophy. And what Dennis was talking about that some, I don't know whether it's all boilers but at least some boilers the SAMGs are in the control room. The shift supervisor, indeed, is in charge of the SAMGs, whereas in the PWRs it seems to be more the TSC --

MR. MCHALE: That's vendor type --

MEMBER STETKAR: Now, the question that I have is you mentioned eventually the goal is to get things more consistent. What's -- is that goal part

1	of this effort? The thing I'm thinking about is take
2	a site, for example, that has a boiler and a
3	Pressurized Water Reactor under the same organization
4	on the same site. I could name one. Let's call it
5	Salem and Hope Creek, for example. If there are
6	different philosophies in terms of this command and
7	control for that site, it seems that that ought to be
8	addressed now. So I'm hoping you're nodding. I'm
9	hoping that that's part of this
10	MR. MCHALE: Yes, yes, that's
11	MEMBER STETKAR: organization have that
12	sort of discrepancy.
13	MR. BEALL: It's actually mentioned in the
14	reg basis about different vendor types on the same
15	site.
16	MEMBER STETKAR: Is it? Okay. I
17	understand. Thanks.
18	MR. MCHALE: And that should happen within
19	the time frame of this
20	MEMBER STETKAR: Of this, yes. So it's
21	not something that's getting kicked down the street.
22	MR. MCHALE: Aligning the vendor groups is
23	this year and so
24	MEMBER STETKAR: Well, I understood that
25	aligning all of the Pressurized Water Reactor people

1	under the same sort of umbrella
2	MR. MCHALE: So the next step would be
3	within the time
4	MR. COWDREY: All right. So we've
5	discussed the process which we're using to enhance the
6	SAMGs.
7	MEMBER RAY: One thing. The third bullet
8	I've been pondering. What is meant by that? No prior
9	approval of licensee-specific guidance.
10	MR. COWDREY: We're not going to be asking
11	the licensees to send in their integrated procedures,
12	entire set of integrated procedures for our approval.
13	The intent that we have is to take a look at the SAMG,
14	generic SAMG guidelines, and evaluate them and endorse
15	them, as appropriate, through some type of regulatory
16	guidance, whether it be a reg guide or a letter,
17	something to that effect, along with any industry
18	guidance that's developed by NEI or the industry,
19	again, take a look at that and, where appropriate,
20	endorse portions of that in our reg guide or whatever
21	document we end up using. So that's the plan going
22	forward to ensure that procedures
23	MEMBER RAY: The word prior means prior to
24	implementing?
25	MR. COWDREY: Right.
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MEMBER RAY: And is this inspectible? I understand --

MR. COWDREY: Sure is.

MEMBER RAY: -- the intent is that it be, but I'm just wondering, if somebody changes it, what does that mean? They have to submit it out -- I'm at a loss to distinguish between how this is treated in INE world from existing operating procedures, if at all.

I don't think that it MR. MCHALE: probably would be treated a whole lot -- I mean, licensees, for their current EOPs, they control them with their change process and, you know, inspections and we look at those activities and And if there are issues, you know, compare the bases. it could result in a finding order. But I think that would be the same here. The regulatory guidance would be to follow the industry quidelines. Also, each station is going to have its procedural control activities that they need to follow, so we would inspect to see that they're following their own procedures and that their procedures align with the established industry guidelines. But what we would not expect is that the NRC would review in detail the entire set of SAMGs for each individual plant and

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MEMBER RAY: But, again, I'm trying to figure out, is this statement here different than for EOPs? Is there prior approval of licensee-specific EOP?

No, but I think maybe, to MR. MCHALE: step back, historically, I think, the EOPs came after the Three Mile Island accident, and there was, think, at least to our understanding, there was a little bit more direct NRC approval of EOPs for each station. This follows more along the lines of, right now, like the EDMGs, which came out of the B.5.b. There's a regulatory requirement that you have them, but we did not necessarily review and approve each one of those prior to being developed. So I think this model is a little bit more aligned with the treatment of that, you know, the beyond design basis for the B.5.b issues, if you will. And as opposed to the --

MEMBER RAY: Okay. Well, I was just trying to figure out what the heck this statement was meant to say, as opposed to when you say, no, I'm not going to do something, it's like there's an expectation, well, normally, I would do it, but, no, I'm not going to do it. What's the "it?"

MR. MCHALE: The "it" is we did not expect

1 that we would approve each individual site's SAMGs as part of this. And I think it was stated because that 2 question came up, so this is on there to answer that 3 4 question. 5 MEMBER BLEY: I quess I just can't imagine everybody thinking you would do what you said you're 6 7 not going to do. I mean, you don't really -- do you 8 approve the EOPs now? 9 MR. MCHALE: No, no. 10 MEMBER BLEY: I didn't think so. I mean, they commit to do them before they operate. 11 It's a license commitment 12 MEMBER STETKAR: in the tech specs that they've got to have --13 14 MEMBER BLEY: And you inspect to make sure 15 they've got them, but you don't approve them. MR. MCHALE: But I think there was some 16 17 internal discussions even here about what degree of prior approval, if any, would there be for SAMGs 18 19 because, right now, it's a totally voluntary industry initiative and, okay, now we're going to make it 20 regulatory. Well, this is a preemptive answer to, 21 okay, so you're going to change it to a regulation, 22 what degree of oversight approval --23 24 MEMBER BLEY: So this is really saying you're going to do with this combined set what you 25

1	currently do with EOPs?
2	MR. MCHALE: Yes. And yes.
3	MEMBER RAY: All right. It's a mysterious
4	statement, but I guess we understand it.
5	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Let's proceed, please.
6	MS. SHOOP: Hi. This is Undine Shoop.
7	I'm the Chief of the Health Physics and Human Factors
8	Branch. Actually, after TMI, we sent inspection teams
9	of human factors engineers out to the sites to look at
10	their procedures. So we did not ask them to submit
11	them for review and approval, but we did actually go
12	out and do an on-site inspection. So that's why this
13	isn't
14	MEMBER STETKAR: Did you do that for each
15	site, every site?
16	MS. SHOOP: It's my understanding that we
17	did.
18	MEMBER RAY: Well, I don't consider that
19	to have been prior approval, but maybe that's what you
20	would call it. I was there at the time, so I
21	understand it.
22	MS. SHOOP: I don't consider that to be
23	prior approval, but that's why we wanted to put that
24	in there, so people would understand that we were not
25	planning to do what we did after Three Mile Island.
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1 MEMBER RAY: Maybe it best to say -- I don't know. Okay. 2 MEMBER BLEY: I thought I understood. 3 I'm 4 not sure I do anymore. 5 CHAIR SKILLMAN: I will say that, if you 6 were at the site at that time period that the lady just spoke of, it surely felt like that was some form 7 8 of approval. And I think it's fair to say the 9 emergency plan is approved. And when the emergency 10 plan is approved, the EALs are thereby approved. is the contract between the operator, the NRC, and the 11 community. And the procedures are embedded in the 12 13 EALs. So --14 MEMBER RAY: Wait a minute. That's way 15 too confusing, Dick. What I'm trying to say is 16 CHAIR SKILLMAN: 17 that there is an issue of tacit approval in the current emergency planning construct. 18 19 MEMBER RAY: All right, then. I don't buy the idea of tacit approval, but let's accept it for 20 Is this not going to have tacit approval 21 in that sense? 22 CHAIR SKILLMAN: If the SAMGs are 23 24 identified beyond the general emergency, no. But if the SAMGs are included as part of the EALs, an action 25

1 out of the EAL, I think there is some form of NRC 2 approval. I do. 3 MEMBER RAY: Okay. I disagree. We don't 4 -- go ahead, though. I can't make sense out of that. 5 All right. MEMBER SCHULTZ: In the fourth bullet, the 6 7 term potential NRC endorsement, what's the basis for phrasing it that way, given that we're working toward 8 9 the determination of the regulatory basis? Is it that 10 we don't know exactly what the standards are going to be; therefore, we're calling it potential, something 11 that might be done? 12 13 MR. COWDREY: That's correct. We're going 14 to take a look at the Owners Groups' guidelines as 15 We're still discussing how we'll go they come in. 16 about endorsing them, what avenue to take. 17 intention right now is to take a look at those Owners Groups' generic SAMGs and endorse them through some 18 19 type of regulatory guidance. MEMBER STETKAR: Have you -- and it's okay 20 Have you received any indications from the 21 Owners Groups that they would prefer that avenue, that 22 they get an NRC formal endorsement of their guidance? 23 24 Is initiative coming from that direction, or are you just in a discussion phase? 25

1 MR. MCHALE: We're in the discussion 2 In fact, we're working on setting up our next public meeting to get exactly to that issue 3 4 MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks. 5 MR. MCHALE: -- and find out what the appropriate form of regulatory endorsement . . . 6 7 CHAIR SKILLMAN: Please let the record 8 show that Mike Corradini has joined us. Please 9 proceed. John? 10 MEMBER STETKAR: No, that's fine. CHAIR SKILLMAN: Go ahead. 11 Okay. 12 MR. COWDREY: So once the improvements to the SAMGs have been conducted, we'll 13 14 have the opportunity to perform follow-on inspections to ensure SAMGs adhere to the standards that were 15 16 developed by the Owners Groups and adhere to their own 17 site-specific standards, take a look at that overall integration and make sure there is no dead ends, that 18 19 the transitions between procedures are satisfactory, and then take a look at the training plans and full-20 scale exercises interpret full-scale 21 and the exercises. 22 MEMBER RAY: Is there any thought about 23 24 capability of the simulator to support these exercises, or is that not --25

1 MR. COWDREY: I'd like to defer that We've got a specific bullet on that --2 3 MEMBER RAY: Sure, sure. 4 MR. COWDREY: Taking a look at the second 5 major aspect of Recommendation 8, the command and control strategy, the ability of the organization to 6 7 manage our severe accident ability, communicate and 8 respond to changes and make decisions. We'd like to 9 see a fully-defined and documented command and control 10 structure, and that consists of many different things: roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and 11 ensure that all jobs have personnel identified to 12 perform them; lines of communication are established 13 14 to ensure everybody knows who they report to; some 15 kind of a central decision-making authority for a multi-unit site. So that talks about what we were 16 17 talking about earlier. If there's any fleet-level interaction 18 19 that's planned by a specific licensee, there should be some clearly-defined roles there, if they're relying 20 on fleet resources. And then --21 Can you expand on that a 22 MEMBER BLEY: little, what you mean by fleet? 23 24 MR. COWDREY: If there's any decisionmaking that's going to be done at the fleet level, if 25

1	there's going to be a fleet person for a multi-unit
2	site or something like that, that would obviously need
3	to be worked in. It's going to be fairly, you know,
4	this command and control structure is going to be
5	fairly different from site to site due to the various
6	designs and the various sites, the way they're set up
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8	MEMBER BLEY: And by fleet, it would be
9	perhaps all the sites within a single
10	MR. MCHALE: Corporate office. Corporate
11	office, local site.
12	MEMBER BLEY: Okay. That's what I
13	thought.
14	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Let me ask you a
15	question, please. The way the recommendation is
16	written from the NTTF document, under 8.1 is specify
17	clear command and control strategies for their
18	implementation. Now, your first bullet is structure.
19	Would you explain the difference between strategy and
20	structure?
21	MR. COWDREY: Command and control
22	structure, just specifically how the organization will
23	align themselves for a severe accident
24	CHAIR SKILLMAN: And where do you talk
25	about strategy?

1	MR. COWDREY: I could say structure and
2	strategy, yes.
3	CHAIR SKILLMAN: I certainly do not agree
4	with that.
5	MR. COWDREY: Okay.
6	CHAIR SKILLMAN: A strategy is
7	MR. COWDREY: No, I understand
8	CHAIR SKILLMAN: how you approach the
9	events that are coming at you. The structure is the
10	organization for decision-making
11	MR. COWDREY: to the absence of the
12	word strategy. So, certainly, that needs to be part
13	of it.
14	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Will there be more in
15	your presentation about strategy?
16	MR. COWDREY: You know, all we're prepared
17	to discuss right now is what I've discussed on command
18	and control organization.
19	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Is that something, is
20	that something
21	MR. COWDREY: It's something that
22	CHAIR SKILLMAN: to a future meeting?
23	MR. COWDREY: The SAMG guidelines that are
24	being developed are discussed in command and control
25	and where the decision-making is going to be made in

their generic SAMGs. So we will evaluate that. I understand that, within the PWR world, there's various ways of approaching command and control, whether a decision is made in the control room or the TSC. All of that will be ironed out as we work through the process of improving the SAMGs.

MR. BEALL: This is a draft regulatory basis. When we get to the proposed rule phase, a lot of those issues about structure versus strategy will have to be fleshed out and put into the proposed rulemaking language at the time. So a lot of those things, the details that you're talking about, will be presented to this committee at that time.

CHAIR SKILLMAN: So I hear you say in the future we'll talk about it.

MR. BEALL: Yes, sir.

MR. BENOWITZ: Also, one other thing, if I may. Howard Benowitz with OGC. I'm also part of the working group. And I don't have the SRM in front of us, but the working group received its direction not from NTTF but from the Commission. And I believe, and sorry I don't have the language in front of me, but I know in some of the recommendations the language that was in the SRM was not exactly the same as what was in the task force report and recommendation. So

I don't know, since I don't have the language in front 1 of me, I don't know if that explains the difference, 2 3 but it might be something if we can pull up that 4 language. 5 CHAIR SKILLMAN: Yes, could we pull it up and look at it and find out? 6 7 MR. MCHALE: I have it here. For the SRM, 8 it says that, again, recommend as a near-term action: 9 undertake regulatory action to resolve Near-Term Task 10 Force Recommendations 8.1 through 8.4. It says issue an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to engage 11 stakeholders and rulemaking activities associated with 12 the methodology for integration of on-site emergency 13 14 processes, procedures, training, and response And then the second bullet is interact 15 exercises. with stakeholders to inform the modification of EOP 16 17 generic technical guidelines, to include guidance for SAMGs and EDMGs in an integrated manner and to clarify 18 19 command and control issues, as appropriate. 20 CHAIR SKILLMAN: Different still. 21 Different still. 22 MR. MCHALE: Okay, thank you. 23 CHAIR SKILLMAN: Please 24 proceed. The final aspect that we're, 25 MR. COWDREY:

1 at least initially, talking about for command and 2 control is the FLEX mobilization. It's going to 3 require а significant amount of logistics 4 coordination, so we'd like to see that outlined in the 5 command and control structure. earlier, 6 As spoke about we're 7 attempting to identify where the ultimate decisionmaking authority should lie for severe accidents and 8 clearly identify that individual an give consideration 9 to those sites that have multi-unit and various 10 technology multi-unit units. So take that into 11 account, to develop some kind of regulations or 12 requirements for qualifications for that individual. 13 14 So we're still in the process of determining what their qualification level should be, and we'll talk 15 16 more about that qualification later in the training 17 session. MEMBER SCHULTZ: Is that what various 18 19 technologies means? 20 MR. COWDREY: That's what various technologies --21 MEMBER SCHULTZ: Different types of, 22 potentially, types of reactors, multiple units, and so 23 forth? 24 Yes, sir. 25 MR. MCHALE:

1	MEMBER SCHULTZ: Okay.
2	MEMBER STETKAR: And, in principle, this
3	also applies to new plants coming online, so Vogtle
4	for example.
5	MR. COWDREY: Yes, yes, because you apply
6	for this.
7	MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks.
8	MR. COWDREY: And, finally, we'd like to
9	see a standardized approach to these command and
10	control structures, to the extent possible, to ensure
11	that outside organizations have the ability to match
12	up their capabilities to something that's familiar to
13	them from site to site. So to the extent possible,
14	obviously, it will be different from site to site, but
15	terminology, big-picture structures should be somewhat
16	standardized.
17	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Would you say more,
18	please, on outside organizations, what you mean by
19	that?
20	MR. COWDREY: The NRC, the state and local
21	organizations, so that they understand from plant to
22	plant FEMA. You know, if everybody is using the same
23	terminology, they understand who the decision-makers
24	are and who they need to interact with.
25	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Okay. Should we

conclude, when you, in your first bullet, clearly define and document a command and control structure, that also includes decision-makers off-site from state and local? Is that what you mean?

MR. COWDREY: For this particular

Recommendation 8 effort, obviously, we're focused on on-site emergency response capabilities. So our aspect of the command and control piece is for the on-site and specifically the accident mitigation piece.

Now, those are the decision-makers for mitigating the accident, preventing core damage.

CHAIR SKILLMAN: Thank you.

Is it expected that you MEMBER BROWN: would have other, in combating some particular that other utilities might contribute situation, and doesn't that really bid to resources, direction that you'd like to have the approaches or at least the strategies to be pretty much aligned with so not just the terminology. each other, realizing that plants are different, but at least the approaches to doing things. This is the last bullet on the list almost. That almost sounded hopeful, as opposed to really being pushed.

MR. COWDREY: We're still working through the specifics of it. Certainly, if there's two sites

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that are planning on providing support for each other in severe accidents, their command and control structure should work together. And it's a discussion we've had ongoing throughout the entire effort so far is what the standardization of that will look like. It's still in the middle of the development phase and discussing exactly how that's going to work.

MR. MCHALE: If I could just add one thing. You had mentioned utilities and mutual assistance. I know that the industry is moving towards these regional support centers, so that does make this an important element there because that support center could reach out to large geographic areas of a country. So it's something I think that needs to be pushed as part of this because having that somewhat common framework will support those resources, as well.

MEMBER BROWN: Okay, thank you.

MR. COWDREY: Okay. Next slide. All right. So any time you have a major industry event, that leads to lessons learned, and those lessons learned translate to new training requirements. So the third major aspect of Recommendation 8 is the training and qualifications piece to severe accidents. Our approach is to take a look at the systems approach

to training of Rule 50.120 and add programs personnel relied upon for implementing those severe accident strategies: emergency directors, TSC directors, maintenance personnel. They already have their own 50.120 rule, but I'm sure that and abilities are worked into their knowledges training plans and ensure that you've identified all the job tasks that will be required to be performed to combat a severe accident and develop knowledge and abilities and training objectives off of those job task requirements.

And then develop, as we talked about earlier, develop the qualifications for the ultimate decision-maker. Should that person have an SRO license? Should that person have a certification? On a multi-unit site with different vendor types, do you have a license on one and a certification on another? Those types of questions we're still looking for some industry opinions on. We've discussed it internally and have various opinions, so we're still in the process of deciding what that qualification should look like.

We're taking a look at the operator licensing initial qualification training, taking a look at Part 55 and the preliminary language to expand

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1	some of the requirements to include severe accident,
2	understanding of the severe accident procedures so
3	that SRO and RO written examinations and job
4	performance measures can be implemented on severe
5	accidents, so KAs can be developed, knowledge and
6	abilities can be developed out of a next look at the
7	KA catalogs, and then develop JPMs and written
8	examination questions off of those for licensed
9	operators.
10	Now, we've stated throughout the process
11	that we maintain that EOPs should remain the primary
12	focus of the operator licensing programs
13	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Excuse me. Please
14	finish.
15	MR. COWDREY: We would hate to lose the
16	ability to address a steam generator tube rupture
17	because we've spent too much time training on severe
18	accidents. So the focus, again, we think should
19	remain primarily for operator licensing in the EOPs.
20	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Your second bullet,
21	please. That term "ultimate decision-making
22	authority" seems to carry substantial gravity in this
23	discussion, and so far your discussion has been about
24	basically on-site for the owner team responding to the
25	event at hand. But it seems to me when you use the

when the staff uses the term "ultimate decision-making authority," you have transition over into the people that actually accept the recommendation from the owner to implement that recommendation because your emergency response organization simply provides a recommendation. do not implement the recommendation. They can take care of the issues at hand on site, but when they go to the PAR the decision belongs with either the state or the local authorities.

So when the plant is driven to a severe accident situation beyond design basis, whether you've moved into EDMGs or you're in SAMGs, you're probably at a general emergency. So you've gone as far as you're going to go in your EOPs, and a PAR has been made within 15 minutes if the organization is doing what it's supposed to do. Who then is the ultimate decision-making authority?

MR. COWDREY: Let me just be more specific about the ultimate decision-making authority for the purposes of Recommendation 8. That is the decision-making authority for the on-site activities, the activities designed to mitigate the accident and prevent or mitigate core damage. That's what Recommendation 8 is. There's Recommendation 9 and 10

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1	that will focus on the EP program. We're attempting
2	to maintain some functional separation between the
3	two, although we understand that some of the same
4	people will be doing those functions. But the
5	ultimate decision-making authority for the purposes of
6	accident mitigation is something we need to define,
7	and it does not necessarily have to do with the EP
8	plan. So who's going to make that decision to vent
9	the containment? Who's going to make that decision to
10	inject some water? Those types of decisions are who
11	we're talking about here.
12	So, obviously, there's some relationships
13	with Recommendation 9 and Recommendation 10 that we
14	need to continue to work through. But to be more
15	specific, we're talking about accident mitigation
16	decision-making.
17	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Okay, thank you.
18	MEMBER RAY: You made the comment about
19	what should have priority for training.
20	MR. COWDREY: I'm sorry?
21	MEMBER RAY: You made a comment about what
22	needs to continue to have a priority for training
23	time, EOPs or
24	MR. COWDREY: Right.
25	MEMBER RAY: That implies to me that there
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would be no increase in the pool of people who are
engaged in training and operating the plant,
basically. In other words, if there's only so much
time in a day and you can only spend so much time on
training because you've got to spend time on watch and
do the other things that you have to do, so we can't
afford to give too much emphasis to beyond design
basis mitigation because that would just take away
from the time that we need to spend on, a limited, a
very limited time we have to spend on training on
operating the plant.
How is this tension developed? I don't
see how you can give any time, frankly, to SAMGs
I've done this a long time in my life without
increasing the resource pool.
MR. COWDREY: When you're discussing the
resource pool, you mean additional operators?
MEMBER RAY: Licensed operators and
training staff.
MR. MCHALE: That may very well be the
case that
MEMBER RAY: Well, but, I mean, if we
start off with the proposition that we really don't
have time to spend on SAMGs without taking away from
EOPs, and you certainly don't want to do that

MR. COWDREY: I think there's, and I've
been through I was a licensed operator. I know
that every time that there's an event in the industry
we're going to train on it. So the re-qual program
and other training programs are obviously going to
need to add some additional training capacity.
There's little question of that. There's some up-
front work to be done to develop a training plan, but
the Recommendation 8 was clear as far as what, you
know, it doesn't say you don't have to train on severe
accidents, so we have to come up with a requirement
for training on severe accidents. The impact on the
licensees, we have a slide to discuss that later on in
the presentation. We understand it's going to be,
there's going to be an impact in terms of the training
programs. There's a separate recommendation to
evaluate staffing at the plant, so that's something we
need to interact with going forward.
MEMBER RAY: All right. That's fine. It
sounded like maybe we were committed already to not
having that kind of an impact. And, frankly, I don't
see how the heck you do this without putting more
resources into the operator staffing and training.

off of the sound bite there. If EOPs are a primary

MR. MCHALE: Maybe, again, we're operating

focus, I think what we're -- rather than saying we're precluding that this is going to take more resources and staff and training, I think that's probably part of it, but I think the real message here is that we don't want to do harm to the years of, you know, we have a lot of operating experience and training experience and training years invested currently-licensed operators that gives very good confidence that they know how to handle design basis And we just don't want to do something that dilutes that focus that we lose the performance that we've established over time.

MEMBER RAY: Yes, without question. But I'm just observing, and I guess that's what the purpose of this meeting is, that you're not going to get there without, therefore, having some increase in the staffing requirements. And I know for certainty that the industry is of the view that, you know, we're out of resources.

MR. COWDREY: If I implied in any way with that last bullet that we were expecting this to go through without any additional training resources, that was not my intention.

MEMBER RAY: Okay. I'm not just talking about training resources, you understand. I'm talking

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1	about staffing.
2	MR. COWDREY: Right.
3	MR. MCHALE: And Recommendation 9 staffing
4	study is
5	MEMBER RAY: Okay, all right.
6	MR. MCHALE: to get at that specific
7	point.
8	MR. WASEM: I'm Mike Wasem. I'm also a
9	member of the working group. To clarify, some of the
10	discussions that we've had at our meetings goes down
11	two paths. And one is the licensed operators and what
12	they do and what their piece in the SAMG part of it
13	is. So looking at that, we thought that we needed the
14	tie to the knowledge and abilities catalog to allow
15	that to be tested on exams. We also recognize that
16	there's going to be some increased training and
17	qualification for these decision-makers. So those are
18	the discussions that we had. Also, what kind of
19	training is going to be required for them and what
20	type of qualifications? Can we talk about whether
21	these people have license? Do we make them active
22	license, which, again, would cut into their required
23	licensed operator training time?
24	So we're looking at both issues. The
25	licensed operators in the daily running of the plant

1	need to know something about the SAMGs and whether we
2	transfer from EOPs and SAMGs and that type of thing.
3	So we have to cover that with the regulation. We're
4	also looking at what kind of training is going to be
5	required of the decision-makers.
6	MEMBER RAY: Well, we'll talk about that,
7	too, but not today I guess. Thank you.
8	MEMBER CORRADINI: Can I ask a different
9	question, just to follow up Harold, so I understand?
10	So you said you were an SRO. So what, in your
11	training now, what is the logic in the training
12	regimen to decide what to do for emergency operating
13	procedures? How is it done now? How might it change
14	given that you're going to start auditing?
15	MR. COWDREY: Now that we're going to
16	start piloting?
17	MEMBER CORRADINI: Well, that you're going
18	to look at, they're currently training on SAMGs, to
19	some extent; isn't that
20	MR. COWDREY: TI-184 determined that
21	training is being conducted at all sites. This is
22	very inconsistent as far as what's being conducted,
23	the depths at which it's being conducted, what type of
24	tabletop discussions or exercises are being done.
25	It's very inconsistent throughout the industry, and I

think one major point is, you know, this isn't just
licensed operators, obviously. This is everybody from
the TSC staff down to the mechanical maintenance
technicians who are out running hoses. So it's
training throughout the entire organization. So using
the systems approach to training and taking a look at
every job task that needs to be done, going through
the procedures, understanding every job task that
needs to be done to work the integrated procedure path
and identifying training requirements off of that,
developing training objectives and training
MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. That's fine.
But I guess you started with something maybe I
assumed, and that's not true. So right now, in
certain units around the country, there is training on
the SAMGs now?
MR. COWDREY: Most have training programs
on the SAMGs.
MEMBER CORRADINI: Has NRC just informally
observed what it is now compared to what
MR. COWDREY: Yes. Through TI-184, which
is a temporary inspection, we went out after Fukushima
and took a look at SAMGs, procedures, training
programs, exercises.
MR. MCHALE: And I think, just to clarify,

you know, we are very intensive on the Part 55 operator licensing and our initial exams. And, typically, you know, those are design basis based. And, typically, we'll go through the licensing process, and then the newly-licensed operators are trained by their utility on SAMGs. It's not part of the current Part 55 scope.

So they're trained and very EOP driven and they're examined by the NRC on that. And then, typically, after that initial license exam is when they are receiving the SAMG training that the utility is developing. You know, as Chris mentioned, there's a lot of variability in what that training is like.

MEMBER CORRADINI: So let me ask the question differently, and then you'll see -- because it kind of comes with, I think Harold asked earlier, so if I'm in Iowa at some plant and I'm worried about station blackout due to some sort of external event, I would train differently than if I'm in Florida or New England. So I'm assuming already now in the training the local site and what it might be challenged with are already in the training; is that correct?

MR. COWDREY: I don't know what we looked that specifically into it on --

MEMBER CORRADINI: Certainly, if I'm training, other than the fact that I have to worry about special events, so I'm assuming now there's training on ATWS, now there's training on station blackouts, etcetera. And the overlay now from Fukushima, at least the simple lesson learned is I have external events that could be extreme, those are probably site dependent. I'm curious already now if there's training based on site location on those external events.

MR. COWDREY: As I said, I don't think TI184 took a look to that detail, and I certainly don't
have the perspective on that.

MEMBER CORRADINI: All right.

MEMBER STETKAR: Let me ask you one other

-- this is a subcommittee meeting. We can be a little

more freeform here. I'm a dinosaur, you know. I used

to be an SRO, but it was before you were born. You

obviously have more recent experience. One of the

things that gnaws at me a bit here is the notion of

the structure where you're characterizing licensed

operators in the control room. There's some gray area

between them and the decision-maker, and, because

those folks, the licensed operators in the control

room, only have to know that I need to push this

1	button to start that pump, they're the implementer, I
2	take direction blindly from those decision-makers
3	because I've not been trained. They're really smart
4	people, and they understand what's going on. See,
5	that was the philosophy back in the 70s when I was
6	trained to be an SRO. I'm just a poor licensed
7	reactor operator. I've had a high school education.
8	I've passed my licensed operator exam. I was taught
9	the six-factor formula. I don't need to know all
10	about this nuclear physics stuff. I don't even have
11	to know how to boil water because other smart people
12	have written the procedures and the guidance. They
13	tell me what to do. All I need to know is what button
14	to push.
15	Are we subtly getting into that situation
16	again in the regime of severe accidents? Because
17	having those guys who push the button kind of
18	understand the fundamental basis of what might be
19	going on so that they can question that really smart
20	guy could be important.
21	MR. COWDREY: Where I came from, the
22	decisions were made in the control room in the SAMG
23	space.
24	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.

MR. COWDREY: There's an internal

discussion going on as far as what the ultimate decision-maker, what type of qualifications that individual should have as far as site-specific technology understanding. The discussion is ongoing, and, you know, in my personal opinion, as a licensed operator, if I'm told by someone to do something at any time that I don't think is right, there's a path to go through to express your opinion that it's not the right path to take.

MEMBER STETKAR: Good. But, I mean, as part of that, you need to have some confidence as a licensed operator that you have enough understanding of the situation to question that authority, that you're not being an impediment to solving the problem. And without that knowledge, you know, there's a disincentive to question.

MR. COWDREY: No, I think that licensed operators will be a big part of the response to severe accident.

SCHULTZ: Are the elements MEMBER associated qualification with the and associated with the decision-makers in the first is relegated bullet there, that 10.2. to Recommendation 10.2, command and control? And the reason I'm asking is that you have systematic approach

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to training there, and, to me, it's elevated. That is to say, it's now being applied to emergency directors and TSC directors, and I think that is an elevation of the systematic approach to training.

My comment would be we ought not to forget that systematic approach to training includes an evaluation piece, as well as a definition of knowledge and skills required and so forth. And we've used, in that assessment approach for those positions, drills and exercises, and I would hope that, in moving forward, we're going to do something more than that in evaluating the training that they have, as well as the credentials that they have for their positions.

MR. COWDREY: In the area of conducting exercises?

MEMBER SCHULTZ: No, beyond the exercises, that the evaluation of the training will, in fact, other methodologies will be used in that training evaluation besides the drills and exercises or in addition to the drills and exercises.

MR. MCHALE: Because, again, like you said, to apply the last element of the systems approach is the evaluation and feedback to the training. So if this becomes part of the regulation that requires that approach, then it would imply the

1 evaluation. And I don't think we've worked out the details of what that --2 3 MEMBER SCHULTZ: But you have it in the 4 process. That's what I wanted to be sure. Thank you. 5 MEMBER BLEY: I'm going to back up just a I'm not trying to stay here until midnight. 6 7 I think Jack said, but I'm not sure who. But I think 8 I heard in that discussion of staffing that staffing 9 was going to be considered as part of Recommendation 10 And if that's what I heard, then I thought Recommendation 9 was sort of narrow on prolonged SBO. 11 the way I heard it, there's really a more 12 generalized look at staffing that will be going on 13 14 there. And if that's the case, how are we making sure 15 that the linkage between the work you're doing and 16 that work is really tied together? Because you 17 haven't started to think about that quite yet, and it will certainly affect what goes on under that more 18 19 general look at staffing. Well, as part of the overall 20 MR. BEALL: JLD all the different 21 the way we handle recommendations, the project managers do talk to each 22 I personally attend some of the JLD staff 23 24 meetings and hear the updates from the 25 recommendations. And so, that way, and I hear my

status of Recommendation 8 also. So we are in 1 communications with each other. You know, we try to 2 3 sure we understand what the other project 4 managers are doing under the various recommendations. 5 MEMBER BLEY: And what the interfaces are 6 7 MR. BEALL: Exactly right; yes, sir. In addition to that -- this 8 MS. HELTON: 9 is Shana Helton. I'm the Chief of the Rulemaking 10 Branch in NRR. Recommendation 9 has many different right staff is looking at 11 subparts, and now 12 Recommendation 9, 10, and 11, which parts of those might be considered in a longer-term effort. 13 14 that's all, you know, anything that involves a 15 rulemaking is in our branch, actually; so it will be 16 quite easy for Bob and his team to interface with those other efforts. 17 That said, there are other pieces of 9 18 19 that are kind of pulled out, and I think now they're being considered for another Tier 2 type of activity. 20 But as Bob alluded, we do try to keep in touch with 21 each other and coordinate those activities. 22 Later on in the presentation, Bob and 23 24 Chris are going to go through all the linkages that

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we've identified so far --

1 MEMBER BLEY: Oh, good. Okay. MS. HELTON: -- other NTTF 2 3 recommendations, and that certainly is something that 4 we're trying to make sure that we have a good handle 5 on because things are not set at the NTTF. The 6 lessons learned report was a starting point. 7 then, there have been several Commission papers and Commission direction. We've been active with 8 9 stakeholders. We've gotten a lot of feedbacks from 10 Congress even. So it's an evolving landscape, and it is a large effort to coordinate, and we're trying to 11 stay on top of that. 12 Okay, thanks. 13 MEMBER BLEY: Because we've 14 been concerned about the linkages among these things, 15 too. CHAIR SKILLMAN: Let's proceed, please. 16 17 MR. COWDREY: All right. The final aspect of Recommendation 8, the exercise aspect. And we need 18 19 to be able to observe the licensees demonstrate their proficiency in responding to a severe accident. 20 when we say exercises, we're talking very generally. 21 We want to make sure we don't --22 I mean, specifically talking about the biennial exercises. 23

We're specifically talking about the quarterly drills.

This is going to be a separate, as I mentioned

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earlier, we're going to have a functional separation between the EP and the accident mitigation. So this will be a separate requirement for an exercise that could be addressed by expanding the biennial exercise or could be addressed by expanding the quarterly drills, or a separate exercise could be conducted. We anticipate most licensees will probably choose to expand a quarterly drill to meet the severe accident requirements.

MEMBER BLEY: Is watching over this or inspecting this fall strictly on the residents, and is all of this stuff going on here going to, what's that going to do to the load on the residents? Who's looking at that?

MR. COWDREY: I think we're, you know, very early on in the process here of the draft regulatory basis stuff. We've done initial discussions on the impact of the NRC for this regulation, but I don't think we've decided at that much detail as far as who's going to conduct the inspections. Certainly, we'll have an aspect of the resident and some aspect of operations, operator licensing, something to that effect.

MR. BEALL: There is a Recommendation 12.2 that talks about training the resident inspectors in

the regions also on the improvements that we do for the SAMGs on severe accident procedures. So we're working with that project manager also.

MEMBER RAY: Well, if the drills, as asked earlier, involve off-site agencies, I don't see how you can possibly do it because, you know, they always want to get it done quickly, escalate immediately to a general emergency, because they're mostly focused on evacuation, that kind of stuff. They don't want the plant to be sitting there messing around with things that don't have any off-site consequences while they twiddle their thumbs hour after hour.

MR. COWDREY: Which is specifically why we want to make sure it's a separate requirement to ensure it doesn't have to be done during the biennial exercise. However it works from there, as long as we're getting an opportunity to observe licensees, implement their severe accident management guidelines and FLEX procedures, then we're meeting the goal of Recommendation 8.

So some discussion that we've had throughout the process so far is, you know, whether or not a full-scale exercise or some type of tabletop discussion is appropriate. It's our opinion that, you know, a tabletop exercise is just not going to get at

many of those sub-bullets you see there, observing the command and control, observing communications, those types of things. So really a full-scale exercise is what's needed to effectively demonstrate proficiency in this area.

We lined up, in the preliminary ruling, we lined up the periodicity of this drill to kind of near the periodicity of the EP rule for the purposes of ensuring, you know, that option is there to conduct these exercises in conjunction with the EP quarterly drills or exercises.

And, finally, to the point that earlier, simulator use during Our expectation was to see that the exercises. simulator is utilized, to the extent possible, within the current capabilities. We should be able to adjust parameters, as necessary, to exercise the SAMGs to ensure that operators and TSC staff are required to make decisions within the SAMGs. So to that extent possible, the simulator should be used to do that. What we don't anticipate at this time is requiring that licensees develop a core melt scenario into their simulators to specifically simulate a severe accident and a core damage in place.

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1	discussion is on simulator fidelity. Obviously, if
2	additional requirements come out for new
3	instrumentation in the control room, then the new
4	instrumentation needs to be in the simulator. There's
5	no change to simulator fidelity for severe accidents.
6	If there's a FLEX capability to hook up a portable
7	diesel-driven pump and feed generators, well, that
8	capability should be able to be simulated in the
9	simulator.
10	So just to summarize, our intent is to
11	ensure that licensees use the simulator to its current
12	fullest extent possible when conducting these
13	exercises.
14	MEMBER CORRADINI: So I want to repeat
15	what you said at the end there so I get it right. So
16	you don't want the simulators to have an add-on for
17	severe accidents?
18	MR. COWDREY: No.
19	MEMBER CORRADINI: So you will simulate
20	source terms and associated damage states how?
21	MR. COWDREY: That's still to be worked
22	out, but an instructor or cues to the operators and
23	TSC staff, those types of things that are used to
24	force and simulate, force personnel to evaluate their
25	situation within the procedures and make a decision,

make those transition points that were lined up earlier in the integrated strategy, making sure we're exercising those aspects to the overall strategy. So it does not necessarily build in the core melt scenario into the simulator to have the simulator respond to that level of detail.

MEMBER CORRADINI: That part I understand.

I guess I want to understand, so there's already a protocol used for things that the simulator can't do?

MR. COWDREY: Yes.

MEMBER CORRADINI: And that is you will say a certain region of the auxiliary building or whatever has certain temperatures or certain radiation levels that they have to then deal with from a procedural standpoint?

MR. COWDREY: Right.

CHAIR SKILLMAN: Would you please explain the acceptability of eight years versus two? Why wouldn't an exercise similar to the current biennials that, in some cases, go into SAMG territory be more appropriate than waiting eight? I'm thinking eight years, you could have individuals go through training, participate in the plant, and leave and never really understand how to take that plant into a protection mode for a very severe accident. It seems to me that

eight years is just too long.

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MR. COWDREY: There's been a lot of internal discussion on, you know, the length in between these exercises. It's certainly still open for further discussion. The intent now is just to keep at least, in our current place in the rulemaking process the intent is to keep it somewhere within that eight-year cycle. So if we do it twice within that eight-year cycle, great. If once, we've got to come up with some kind of a justification for how often to it. We haven't nailed down that exact do justification yet. We need to discuss that. do want to do is make sure we don't do it so often that it's impacting the training organization and the EP organization, setting up the drills to a point where you're doing it every two years. But maybe something in between; I'm not sure. As I mentioned, this was just the initial discussion point. started at the eight-year cycle.

MEMBER BLEY: These are exercises, in my opinion, to test the system and make sure the system has all the things you need to make it work. They aren't training. I mean, even if you did them every two years, they're not training because most of the people won't be there.

MR. MCHALE: If I can add to the training point, one of the things that we talked about was the re-qualification for licensed operators. And if we add this to the scope of that within Part 55, which is part of this, more job performance measure, limited task, perhaps a subject or written exam. So there would be training and examination evaluation on these topics, maybe just not in the large full-scale setting. So the intent would not to be to train someone and have them have to think about it for eight years until the next drill.

CHAIR SKILLMAN: What is in my mind is the benefit of quarterlies that might be surgical, where it's an all-hands, it's after hours, and you only focus on one piece. But in the course of the year, the entire organization has been brought to the intellectual front of an accident several times. Then the biennial is once every two years, where you exercise state, county, local, and your full ERO. But it seems to me that there's room in that scenario for there to be challenges to the SAMGs to where you're keeping the organization on its toes.

MR. BEALL: Our initial thoughts, though, were to, with the recent EP rule that came out, that set up a whole different cycle for eight years. That

was all new, and it stipulated different types of 1 2 drills and exercises. So you wanted to utilize the 3 regulations already out there that talks about an 4 eight-year cycle for doing drills and exercises, so we 5 wanted to just use the current regulations that were just recently put out and add this to one of the, as 6 7 another one of the drills and exercises. 8 MR. COWDREY: And I think if you want to 9 draw a parallel, you take a look at the 50.54(hh)(2) 10 requirement within the current EP rule. That's once every cycle, so every eight years you're 11 once So it's really no different exercising those EDMGs. 12 How often do you exercise for a once in however 13 14 often event? You know, it's still something we're trying to figure out, and we'll have those discussions 15 16 with the industry and have those discussions 17 internally and come up with the right answer. Well, very commonly, your CHAIR SKILLMAN: 18 19 planning an exercise takes you to a general. that should be only one time in a plant life, so that 20 is really the front end of your SAMG. 21 Ladies and gentlemen, let me go around the 22 Any comments, at this point? 23 table. 24 I would like to propose a ten-minute break

until ten minutes to three on that clock to give

everybody a chance to get maybe something to drink and walk out in the hallway if they wish, and let's come back in ten minutes.

(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the record at 2:34 p.m. and went back on the record at 2:47 p.m.)

CHAIR SKILLMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, let's come back to work. Bob, back to you, please.

MR. BEALL: Okay. Our next part, Chris is going to go over the rulemaking options that we have in the draft reg basis. Chris?

MR. COWDREY: Okay. So we considered several options on developing a way for Recommendation 8 in terms of how to go about, how to best go about establishing new requirements in the area of severe accident mitigation and on-site emergency response. just to summarize the four options that considered: a new rule, a new regulatory requirement address procedures, command and control, exercises, and then take a look at that 50.120 to amend the current framework covering training. Other just options were, basically, several different combinations of a new requirement and additional quidance documents or just quidance documents. the end, we decided that option number one, a new rule

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1 for procedures in command and control, new 2 requirement specific for exercises severe 3 accidents, and then amending the training requirement 4 to add personnel to the 50.120 SAT rule. 5 MEMBER RAY: I spent a good bit of time 6 trying to parse the differences between these things. 7 I don't know, I consider myself an amateur lawyer, but I'll be damned if I can understand the differences 8 between these things, what the difference between --9 10 MR. COWDREY: The option two would be a completely all-encompassing that 11 new rule has everything needed for Recommendation 8. 12 It has the command and control, the procedures, and the training, 13 14 just all new training requirements in the rules, not 15 having the training requirement in the 50.120, just 16 having a new training requirement in a new 50.54 (ii) (1) training on SAMGs. We decided we'd utilize the 17 current framework, utilize the current process for 18 19 staff-based training, and add our positions to that list. 20 MEMBER SHACK: That's slicing it pretty 21 thin. 22 MEMBER RAY: I don't want to take up your 23 24 time, but, man, oh, man, like I said, I went through

this and I could not figure out.

1	MR. MCHALE: One is put new requirements
2	next to where they already exist in the regulations,
3	and option two is write one big new rule that's a one-
4	stop-shop for all this. So you're right. It's all
5	regulation, it's just a matter of packaging.
6	MR. COWDREY: And we did look at options
7	where there was no regulation, just using additional
8	regulatory guidance.
9	MEMBER RAY: Yes, that I could figure out
LO	Okay, thanks.
L1	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Please proceed. Let's
L2	go.
L3	MR. COWDREY: Okay. So the Appendix
L4	Charlie of the draft reg basis has some very high-
L5	level, very preliminary ruling which kind of
L6	illustrates our thoughts at this point, as far as what
L7	the future of rule language could look like. It takes
L8	a look at 10 CFR 50.54 to add that new requirement for
L9	the integrated strategy and procedures for severe
20	accidents and then the command and control structure
21	for implementing those procedures.
22	The second bullet talks about the 50.120
23	rule, which we've talked about often here today, and,

rule and adding personnel for severe accidents. The

three Part 55 rules are basically setting up the regulations to allow operator licensing staff to develop KAs for operator licensing examinations and JPMs, written examinations of JPMs.

And the final is not a typo. It's just that we do not, at this time, know where that drill and exercise requirement is going to go. There's been internal discussions on where that belongs, whether it belongs in the current framework or a separate requirement. So that discussion is ongoing, but there will be exercise requirement for new So we put this in the draft reg basis to accidents. some discussion from external kind of encourage stakeholders on what our current approach is going to Any questions on this? be.

Next slide. So as we mentioned earlier, this Recommendation 8 has a lot of brothers and sisters in the Near-Term Task Force recommendation, specifically 4, 7.1, 9, 10, the Tier 3 activity for accident monitoring instrumentation. All of these efforts need to be closely coordinated through the process that Bob talked about earlier: ensuring that we're participating in each other's meetings and understand the direction that these different recommendations are taking, looking for any conflicts

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1 that are coming up in the guidance that's being developed through the various initiatives, determining 2 3 where links between initiatives can be strengthened. 4 And as we've discussed earlier, there's some of these 5 recommendations, specifically 10.2, that has overlap between what we're doing in Recommendation 8. 6 7 So next slide. So Recommendation 10. 8 Basically, the EP long-term actions. Recommendation 9, as Shana mentioned earlier, has some aspects to 9 10 what EP is doing now and some parts of 9 have been transitioned or are being transitioned into a later 11 But those are the up-front actions, and 12 Recommendation 13 10 is the long-term EPprogram 14 evaluations. 15 Specifically, we want to look at 10.2 16 because there is some overlap there between 10.2 and 17 Recommendation 8. So go ahead and go to the next slide. 18 19 So you say you're going to MEMBER RAY: look at it, but are you going to talk about it anymore 20 21 now, or are we done? Yes, the next slide. 22 MR. MCHALE: COWDREY: The next slide. 23 MR. 24 Recommendation 10.2 specifically is titled "Command and Control Structure and Qualifications for Beyond 25

Design Basis Events." So, obviously, there's some overlap there between 10.2 and what we're doing in Recommendation 8.

So 10.2, if you read it and read the accompanying SECY paper, 12-0095, you get understanding that it kind of talks about both aspects of command and control, both the accident mitigation aspect and the EP organization aspect. So we're focused, obviously, on the accident mitigation piece and the on-site decisions to be made to prevent or mitigate core damage. And within that command and control strategy, we obviously have to identify the decision-making authority. mentioned in 10.2. We'll identify the ultimate decision-making authority for the purposes of accident mitigation.

MEMBER BLEY: Has there been any consideration of actually bringing that into what you guys are doing?

MR. COWDREY: I think there has been some discussion on that, but I think, as I mentioned, we want to maintain some functional separation between the EP and the accident mitigation functions. And 10.2 has aspects of both. So what we can do is address the on-site, the accident mitigation portions

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of 10.2, and that leaves the rest to be taken care of as a long-term action by the EP staff.

MEMBER RAY: That's very significant what you just said because that's not what I had read up until now.

MEMBER STETKAR: That's right. There's a quote in what we were given that says, quote, "The NRC anticipates that the guidance contained in NTTF Recommendation 10.2 would be addressed in its entirety within the rulemaking process associated with NTTF Recommendation 8." I was pretty happy to read that. I'm not hearing that today.

MR. COWDREY: No, that's correct. And I think the further we looked into it after we developed the draft reg basis, the further we looked into it, took a look at that SECY paper, re-read the Near-Term Task Force report, we realized there's elements of the EP -- because it was talking, when you look at just the terminology for the recommendation, it says command and control strategy for severe accidents, ultimate decision-making authority, qualifications for emergency directors, and use of licensed operators; and we're doing those four things. But what we're not doing is how is the organization interacting with FEMA. What is FEMA going to do? How are we

interacting with state and local governments? 1 Those parts which are in the SECY paper in more detail are 2 3 aspects that we're not addressing in Recommendation 8 4 so --5 MEMBER BLEY: Is somebody working on that 6 one now? 7 MR. COWDREY: That's a Tier 3 activity. 8 MR. BEALL: A Tier 3 item, so it's a long-9 term activity. 10 MEMBER BLEY: So when we get there, the parts that you worked on, it won't be addressed again? 11 Well, that's to be determined 12 MR. BEALL: because we have to take this, if you start working on 13 14 some of the aspects of 10.2, we have to take that to 15 the JLD Steering Committee and recommend that we take 16 on these certain aspects of this recommendation into 17 Recommendation 8. And then, in a way, we recently did something similar this when we incorporated 18 to 19 Recommendation 7.2 to 7.4, I think it was, That was presented to the JLD 20 Recommendation 4. Steering Committee and then presented as part of a 21 six-month update to the Commission that this was going 22 to happen, that these aspects of Recommendation 7 will 23 24 be part of now Recommendation 4. And if we decided to

incorporate some of 10.2, we would follow the same

1	sequence.
2	MEMBER RAY: Okay. Go ahead.
3	MEMBER BLEY: Well, I'm a little confused
4	in that your draft regulatory basis recommendation, I
5	would assume, got circulated around all the staff and
6	was approved on the way up, which seems like it should
7	have covered that process you're just talking about.
8	MR. BEALL: Well, that was a recent
9	decision to try to incorporate Recommendation
10	7.2 to 7.4 into Recommendation 4, but, being a draft
11	regulatory basis, it only goes to a certain level
12	inside the NRR. And so, in fact, it didn't go in
13	front of the JLD Steering Committee . It will the
14	final draft will go.
15	MR. MCHALE: But that statement in the
16	draft regulatory basis, had we had to do that again,
17	we would not have said exactly those words.
18	MEMBER BLEY: But you'd say something like
19	on the slide.
20	MR. MCHALE: Exactly. Right. That's
21	correct. That's a little too simplistic.
22	MEMBER RAY: Separate out in 10.2 the
23	parts that have to do with accident mitigation from
24	anything that has to do with off-site or emergency

planning. Forget about that because, at the end of

1	the day, that's going to be somewhat like what has
2	happened before. What's different here potentially,
3	and I don't see how you don't incorporate it into
4	Recommendation 8, is the ultimate decision authority
5	on accident mitigation. So have you got authority,
6	and are you going to incorporate that part of 10.2 in
7	Recommendation 8?
8	MR. COWDREY: Certainly. Everything we
9	talked about earlier we talked about
10	MEMBER RAY: Okay. Because I keep hearing
11	10.2 being talked about as if it was a hole that's in
12	Tier 3, and we're not going to touch it until hell
13	freezes over probably.
14	MR. BEALL: We are going to address those
15	aspects that I spoke about earlier. So some of those
16	aspects are contained in 10.2, so part of 10.2 will be
17	addressed by 10.2, by Recommendation 8.
18	MEMBER RAY: You don't need any new
19	approval to do that?
20	MR. COWDREY: When we take the draft
21	regulatory basis to the JLD Steering Committee, if
22	that's our decision to go ahead and incorporate that,
23	then we will present that to the JLD Steering
24	Committee as a recommendation that we take those
25	certain aspects of 10.2 and incorporate them into

1 Recommendation 8. 2 Because it's not going to be MEMBER RAY: 3 difficult for people to accept whatever you want when 4 it comes to who talks to FEMA and that kind of stuff. The real issue is who decides which direction we're 5 going in a severe accident ultimately. 6 7 MR. COWDREY: And I don't see how we could 8 address Recommendation 8 without answering 9 question. I agree. 10 MEMBER RAY: So it's not necessarily 11 MR. COWDREY: We're answering the 12 taking parts out of 10.2. question that Recommendation 8 told us to answer. 13 MEMBER RAY: Okay. But like everybody 14 15 else here, we've been reading very carefully what's 16 said about 10.2, and we each have different take 17 aways, but what you're telling us is that, what's important, in my mind, is what you're saying you're 18 19 going to incorporate from 10.2 into 8, which is who is 20 ultimate decision-maker when it. t.he comes t.o mitigation and what are the qualifications of those --21 If the JLD Steering Committee 22 MR. BEALL: agrees with us, that decision then, yes, we 23 24 incorporate that into Recommendation 8.

MEMBER RAY:

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Because I'm pretty sure we'd

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	MR.	COWDREY:	We're	answering	that
question.					

MR. BEALL: We're answering that question. He's right.

MR. COWDREY: We're answering that question one way or another because you don't develop a requirement for a command and control strategy --

MEMBER RAY: It's going to have an impact.

MR. COWDREY: -- that doesn't have that in

it.

MEMBER RAY: It's that impact that I want to make sure we understand and are prepared to withstand the pushback when it comes because it's going to come.

This is Tim Reed from NRR. MR. REED: station blackout the lead for the mitigation strategies rulemaking. Bob was mentioning a little bit of a combination of some of the NTTF. And in the case of Recommendation 4, both 4.1 and 4.2, as well as all of 7, they're being consolidated or we're actually requesting consolidation in the COM-SECY. So in this case, we went through the steering committee and we're going all the way to the Commission and asking for to consolidate and actually revise approval

1	schedule accordingly with COM-SECY-13-0002. That case
2	is pretty high profile. Obviously, that's a pretty
3	big order and rulemaking, as this committee is well
4	aware. So in some cases, we go all the way to the
5	top. In addition to notifying them in the status
6	papers, we're actually requesting approval in that
7	case. So I just want to make sure people were aware
8	of that.
9	MR. COWDREY: In my opinion, there's
10	redundancy between Recommendation 8 and portions of
11	10.2. We are doing Recommendation 8, so it will be
12	addressing those
13	MEMBER RAY: Okay. But because 10.2 says
14	what it does, I know people who believe that the
15	question of who within licensee organizations and the
16	so-called element decision-maker has been put in Tier
17	3. I know that. And if that's not true, you better
	3. I mow chae. That II chae s not cracy you sector
18	be clear about it.
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	be clear about it.
19	be clear about it. MR. COWDREY: And I think the draft
19	be clear about it. MR. COWDREY: And I think the draft regulations is clear about it, and I think, if that's
19 20 21	be clear about it. MR. COWDREY: And I think the draft regulations is clear about it, and I think, if that's true, we should hear from the industry on the

got to be, 24 by 7, somebody has got to be --

MR. COWDREY: The industry responded to the ANPR question that specifically talked about that, as well. It provided a response, and it even specifically talked about potential requirements in terms of SRO certification or an SRO license. They were very general about it, but I know they're thinking about it. And, certainly, it's clear, I think, in the draft reg basis, as well. So there should be no surprise.

MEMBER RAY: But like I say, because 10.2 is talked about as a Tier 3 item and it does explicitly include what it does, it's reasonable for people to think, oh, well, that's for another day.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ COWDREY: We'll take a look at any potential for clearing that out.

MEMBER RAY: Okay.

MEMBER BROWN: I want to make sure I understand the response to your question. Somebody started to say we will address command and control or ultimate decision authority, but we have to take that before the Joint Lessons Learned. He said we've got to -- Bill? Okay. I thought I had the right name, but I want to make sure. He stated that we had to go and get that agreement to move that or put it into Recommendation 8, and then you segued into, Chris

1	talked about, you know, we intend to address that
2	anyway. You don't have to go to the JLD, the Joint
3	Lessons Learned Directorate, in order to get agreement
4	to come up with what severe accident mitigation, who's
5	got charge. And I think that's what
6	MR. BEALL: Well, that's part of
7	Recommendation 8 also for on-site. So we're going to
8	address it either way, but if we want to formally say
9	that this also addresses 10.2
10	MEMBER BROWN: I'm not interested in 10
11	point I'm interested in Recommendation 8, severe
12	accident mitigation. Somebody is in charge. Somebody
13	makes decisions, and I just want to make sure there
14	wasn't going to be a deferral because of something
15	else.
16	MEMBER RAY: Charlie, I'm just telling
17	you, because of the language in 10.2, unless you say
18	something clearer about it, it's going to get stuck in
19	Tier 3. That's what I'm concerned about.
20	MEMBER BROWN: Yes, I understand that, and
21	that's why I was worried about a little bit of a
22	MEMBER RAY: Because people have been
23	going back and forth on this, and I think they're
24	talking past each other, and that's all I'm trying to
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1	MR. MCHALE: And recognizing that 10.2
2	has, you know, the mention of FEMA and the broader
3	implications which
4	MEMBER RAY: Yes, who cares about that?
5	MR. MCHALE: that's a Tier 3, but we
6	can't answer the mail on Recommendation 8 without
7	talking about that issue
8	MEMBER RAY: Okay. That's fine.
9	MR. MCHALE: because it says command
10	and control and
11	MEMBER RAY: You're on the record. I'll
12	flip back to it later.
13	MR. BEALL: So like in the command and
14	control back on slide seven, that's a lot of what's,
15	it looks a lot like 10.2.
16	MEMBER SHACK: But you're talking about
17	getting credit for 10.2 for these activities. You
18	know, that's a different ball game. As far as doing
19	this for task eight, you're here.
20	MR. BEALL: Right. Yes, sir.
21	MEMBER RAY: I'm just urging them to be
22	more clear about it because people can read it the
23	other way, which is, no, it's in 10.2, and that's in
24	Tier 3.
25	MEMBER SHACK: Well, they're attempting to

1	formally solve the problem.
2	MEMBER RAY: We'll see.
3	MEMBER STETKAR: Well, the stuff that was
4	in writing was pretty clear.
5	CHAIR SKILLMAN: I'm now more confused
6	than I was because when I asked you, Chris, about off-
7	site, you said, no, this is all about managing on-
8	site.
9	MR. COWDREY: That's absolutely still the
10	case.
11	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Okay. So when you asked
12	Harold, when you answered Harold about 10.2, it seems
13	to me that you were answering only in the context of
14	ultimate decision-making for the on-site activities
15	MR. COWDREY: That's correct.
16	CHAIR SKILLMAN: only.
17	MR. COWDREY: That's correct.
18	CHAIR SKILLMAN: And what Harold is
19	talking about is this world of off-site.
20	MEMBER RAY: No. No, I'm dismissing off-
21	site. I don't care about off-site.
22	MEMBER STETKAR: What happens off-site in
23	the sense of FEMA, state and local
24	CHAIR SKILLMAN: I'm concerned about state
25	and local. FEMA
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1	MEMBER RAY: No, that's emergency planning
2	stuff. I'm talking about accident mitigation and who
3	has the authority to do an irreversible mitigation
4	action on-site.
5	MEMBER STETKAR: You're worried about
6	somebody sitting in Chicago making a decision for a
7	plant in Texas.
8	MEMBER RAY: Or in Tokyo or Fukushima,
9	yes.
10	MR. COWDREY: And that's what we're
11	concerned.
12	MEMBER RAY: Yes.
13	MR. COWDREY: So for purposes of accident
14	mitigation, we're going to address the ultimate
15	decision
16	MEMBER RAY: It's on the record.
17	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Now, where do we talk
18	about the effectiveness of the on-site plan to the
19	off-site agencies? Because that is part of success
20	for SAMGs. The off-site has to respond.
21	MR. COWDREY: That would be part of the EP
22	plan and, therefore, would be addressed via
23	Recommendation 10.
24	CHAIR SKILLMAN: So 10.2 is really not
25	part of that?
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1 MR. COWDREY: 10.2 would be part of 10, which would address that. 2 3 MR. MCHALE: And it's currently a Tier 3. MR. COWDREY: Tier 3. 4 5 MEMBER RAY: And I understand that, and that's okay from where I --6 CHAIR SKILLMAN: And that is the "S" in 7 8 your some aspects on that slide? I think that that's 9 what you're saying. 10 MR. BEALL: Second bullet is some aspects 11 of some -- correct. CHAIR SKILLMAN: I'm good. Okay. 12 Let's 13 proceed. 14 MR. COWDREY: All right. So the impact on 15 Obviously, a significant amount of up-16 front work needs to be done to upgrade the plant's 17 specific SAMGs, develop all the FLEX quidelines, ensure the overall strategy is all put together and 18 19 there's no dead ends in the overall strategic approach to severe accident mitigation. Define the plant 20 command and control structure, develop the exercise 21 and training requirements, develop the scenarios for 22 implement 23 exercises, those training programs, 24 implement the exercises. And we've got, through our

ANPR, an industry-wide cost estimate of 16 million for

1 procedural upgrades and 17 and three-quarter million for training program implementation. So, obviously, 2 3 all of this work will require some additional manpower 4 and some additional knowledge that some sites will 5 have to add. 6 We want. to meet our qoals for 7 Recommendation 8 but have the ruling, which should be 8 implemented smoothly, so we want feedback from the 9 industry on anything here that is going to be a 10 conflict with current regulations or any issues they see with implementation up-front. That's the purpose 11 of putting this in the draft reg basis where it, 12 normally, at least in history, did not happen. 13 14 don't know what else to say other than, yes, there 15 will be additional training classes that will need to 16 be developed by the licensees. 17 CHAIR SKILLMAN: Thank you. All right. MR. COWDREY: So that's the end of that 18 19 We're certainly interested in hearing presentation. any other questions you might have. 20 CHAIR SKILLMAN: Chris, Bob, Jack, thank 21 22 you very much. Let's go around the table here. Charlie Brown, any comments? 23 Comments? 24 MEMBER BROWN: Other than what I said before and supporting Harold's comments, no. 25

1	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Okay. Steve Schultz?
2	MEMBER SCHULTZ: I have no further
3	comments. Thank you.
4	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Thank you. Dennis Bley?
5	MEMBER BLEY: Nothing really to add, other
6	than I'm really pleased to see this work moving ahead.
7	I think it's crucial, crucial work. This is really a
8	big deal. It's going to be tough work, I think, to
9	get it all the way through.
10	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Thank you. Sam?
11	MEMBER ARMIJO: No.
12	CHAIR SKILLMAN: John?
13	MEMBER STETKAR: Nothing.
14	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Mike?
15	MEMBER RYAN: Nothing.
16	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Harold?
17	MEMBER RAY: I would just say I was asked
18	early on after the Near-Term Task Force
19	recommendations came out what I thought was most
20	important, and I said this because I think it was
21	most, one of the most important lessons learned, not
22	the only one for sure and, perhaps, not the most but
23	one of the most important lessons learned out of
24	Fukushima. But I think its implementation is going to
25	be very difficult, and that's why I think being very

1	clear about the direction that is being taken is
2	important.
3	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Thank you. Bill?
4	MEMBER SHACK: No comments.
5	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Mike?
6	MEMBER CORRADINI: No comments.
7	CHAIR SKILLMAN: I understand we have some
8	people on a bridgeline. Let's give opportunity to
9	hear what they might have.
10	MR. LAPINSKY: This is George Lapinsky
11	from NRR, Human Factors.
12	CHAIR SKILLMAN: Say again, please.
13	MR. LAPINSKY: George Lapinksy from NRR,
14	Human Factors.
15	CHAIR SKILLMAN: George, good afternoon.
16	Please go ahead.
17	MR. LAPINSKY: I have no additional
18	comments. I've taken down a lot of notes. We need to
19	clear up language and make it more understandable, but
20	I think the presentations went very well. No more
21	comments. Thank you.
22	CHAIR SKILLMAN: George, thank you very
23	much.
24	MR. BEALL: George is one of my workgroup
25	members.
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1 CHAIR SKILLMAN: Say again, please. George is one of my working 2 MR. BEALL: 3 group members. 4 CHAIR SKILLMAN: Understand, Bob. Thank 5 you. Is there anybody else on the bridgeline, please? I thank 6 Hearing none, we can close the bridgeline. 7 you very much for a very important presentation today. 8 I echo Harold's comments. When the Fukushima event 9 began to be understood, my greatest concern was who was making the decisions, what was the interaction 10 between the site and the home office. And some of us 11 have felt that very same tension when in the middle of 12 Who really is able to make the decision? 13 14 What are the qualifications of those who are making 15 those decisions? How thorough is the plan that allows 16 those decisions to be made? What are the consequences 17 of someone who is making the decision or who feels that he or she has the authority to make the decision 18 19 makes the decision but might not have the authority to do so? And I think these will all come out as you 20 refine what you have been working on here. 21 thank you very much for a 22 So Ι comprehensive presentation on a very important NTTF 23 24 recommendation. Thank you. We appreciate the 25 MR. BEALL: Thank you.

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1	time.				
2		CHAIR SKILLMAN: With that, the meeting is			
3	adjourned.				
4		(Whereupon, the foregoing matter was			
5		concluded at 3:14 p.m.)			
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NTTF Recommendation 8 Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities

February 6, 2013



Background

- Commission direction:
 - Strengthen and integrate emergency operating procedures (EOPs), severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs), and extensive damage mitigation guidelines (EDMGs).
- The NRC published the Recommendation 8
 Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
 (ANPR) on April 18, 2012
 - 18 comments received on the ANPR
- NRC staff has held public meetings on February 15, 2012, May 23, 2012, November 7, 2012 and January 31, 2013, to obtain public feedback on the proposed regulatory process and schedule.



Recommendation 8 Status

- The NRC published the Recommendation 8 draft Regulatory Basis on January 8, 2013.
 - 45 day comment period.
- The draft Regulatory Basis comment period ends February 22, 2013.
 - No comments have been received so far.
- The NRC staff expects to issue the final Regulatory Basis in May, 2013.



Next Steps

- The next rulemaking steps will be:
 - Issue the Proposed Rule in 4th quarter of 2014.
 - 75 day comment period.
 - Public meeting will be held during the comment period.
 - Issue the Final Rule in 3rd quarter of 2016.
 - The Proposed and Final Rule packages will be presented to the ACRS.
- Any new or revised guidance documents will be issued at the same time as the proposed and final rules.



Regulatory Basis Procedure Integration

- Comprehensive strategy for severe accident mitigation
- Integrated framework for procedures and guidelines
- Transitions between procedures clearly identified
 - EOPs
 - SAMGs
 - EDMGs and FLEX Guidelines
 - Other emergency procedures (Spent Fuel, Shutdown)
- Improvement and integration of emergency procedures for shutdown and cooled-down modes of operation



Regulatory Basis Requirements for SAMGs

- Regulatory requirement for SAMGs
- Generic SAMG upgrades by EPRI and owners groups
- No prior approval of licensee-specific guidelines
- Potential NRC endorsement of owners groups standards and other industry guidance documents where appropriate
- NRC inspections areas:
 - SAMGs adherence to owners groups standards and plant-specific format guidance
 - Accident mitigating procedure integration
 - Training plans and full-scale exercises



Regulatory Basis Command and Control

- Clearly defined and documented Command and Control structure
 - Roles and responsibilities
 - Lines of communication
 - Multi-unit site considerations
 - Fleet level interaction
 - FLEX mobilization
- Ultimate decision making authority for severe accidents
 - Clearly identified decision maker for severe accident mitigation
 - Consideration given to sites with various technologies
 - Qualification requirements
- Standardized approach to allow outside organizations to align capabilities



Regulatory Basis Training and Qualifications

- Systems approach to training (SAT) programs for personnel relied upon to implement strategies
 - Emergency Directors
 - TSC directors
 - TSC staff
 - Maintenance and support personnel
- Qualifications for the ultimate decision making authority
 - Senior reactor operator (SRO) license (active, previous)
 - SRO Certification
 - Plant or technology specific
- Operator licensing initial and requalification training
- EOPs remain primary focus of operator licensing programs



Regulatory Basis Exercises

- Demonstrate proficiency in response to severe accident scenarios
- Full-scale exercises designed to evaluate and improve the following:
 - Procedures and guidelines
 - Command and control
 - Communications
 - Personnel knowledge and abilities
- Table-top exercises insufficient for this evaluation
- Periodicity not to exceed eight years
- Simulator fidelity and utilization



Regulatory Basis Rulemaking Options

- Option 1: New regulatory requirements to address procedures, command and control, and exercises; amend current regulatory framework covering training
- Option 2: New onsite emergency response capability rule that includes all requirements for procedures, command and control, training, and exercises
- Option 3: New regulatory guidance documents and generic communications with corresponding industry commitments
- Option 4: New procedures rule; guidance documents and industry commitments to address command and control structure and a training and exercise program



Regulatory Basis Preliminary Rulemaking Language

- 10 CFR 50.54 Conditions of licenses
- 10 CFR 50.120 Training and qualification of nuclear power plant personnel
- 10 CFR 55.41 Written examination: Operators
- 10 CFR 55.43 Written examination: Senior operators
- 10 CFR 55.45 Operating Tests
- 10 CFR 50.XX Drill and exercise requirements



Regulatory Basis Other NTTF Recommendations

- NTTF Recommendation 4 Station Blackout (SBO) and Mitigating Strategies Rulemaking
- NTTF Recommendation 7.1 Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
- NTTF Recommendation 9 Emergency Plan Regulations for SBO and Multiunit Events
- NTTF Recommendation 10 Additional EP Topics for Prolonged SBO and Multiunit Events (long-term evaluation)
- NTTF Tier 3 Activity (Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Recommendation 2) – Accident Monitoring Instrumentation



Regulatory Basis NTTF Recommendation 10

- NTTF Recommendation 10.1 Protective Equipment Requirements for Emergency Responders
- NTTF Recommendation 10.2 Command and Control Structure and Qualifications for Beyond Design Basis Events
- NTTF Recommendation 10.3 Evaluation of ERDS



Regulatory Basis NTTF Recommendation 10.2

- NTTF Recommendation 10.2 Command and Control Structure and Qualifications for Beyond Design Basis Events
 - Command and control for accident mitigation and EP organization
 - Identification of ultimate decision making authority
 - Qualifications for Emergency Directors
 - Use of licensed operators in the TSC



Regulatory Basis NTTF Recommendation 10.2

- Functional separation between EP function and accident mitigation function
- Some aspects of the NTTF Recommendation 10.2 are focused on the accident mitigation function
- Command and Control aspect of NTTF
 Recommendation 8 will address these aspects
- NTTF Recommendations 10.1,10.3 and EP aspects of 10.2 will require further evaluation by EP staff



Regulatory Basis Impact on Licensees

- Upgrade plant-specific SAMGs
- Develop plant-specific supporting guidelines
- Ensure overall strategy is integrated, coherent, and comprehensive
- Define plant-specific command and control structure
- Develop additional training and exercise requirements
- Develop realistic, full-scale exercise scenarios
- Implement training programs and exercise plans
- Industry-wide cost estimates:
 - \$16 Million for procedure upgrades
 - \$17.75 Million for training program implementation



NTTF Recommendation 8

Questions

AGENDA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

PLANT OPERATIONS AND FIRE PROTECTION SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING

Rulemaking Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 8: Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities

ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND February 6, 2013

Cognizant Staff Engineer/DFO: Mark L. Banks

Email: mark.banks@nrc.gov
Phone #: (301) 415-3718

Topics	Presenters	Time
Opening Remarks	Dick Skillman, ACRS	1:00 pm – 1:05 pm
Introduction	Dr. Sher Bahadur, NRR	1:05 pm – 1:10 pm
Recommendation 8 Rulemaking Overview	Robert Beall, NRR	1:10 pm – 2:00 pm
Draft Regulatory Basis Overview	Chris Cowdrey, NRR	2:00 pm – 2:50 pm
Subcommittee Discussion	Dick Skillman, ACRS	2:50 pm – 3:30 pm
Adjourn	Dick Skillman, ACRS	3:30 pm

NOTE:

- During the meeting, 301-415-7360 should be used to contact anyone in the ACRS Office.
- Presentation time should not exceed 50 percent of the total time allocated for a given item. The remaining 50 percent of the time is reserved for discussion.
- Fifty (50) hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the Designated Federal Official 30 minutes before the meeting.
- One (1) electronic copy of each presentation should be emailed to the Designated Federal Official 1 day before the meeting. If an electronic copy cannot be provided within this timeframe, presenters should provide the Designated Federal Official with a CD containing each presentation at least 30 minutes before the meeting.