Counterfeit, Fraudulent, And Suspect Items (CFSI)

> 4<sup>th</sup> Public Meeting Post-SECY 11-0154 February 13, 2013

#### **Public Meeting**



Construction Assessment & Enforcement Branch (CAEB)

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### **Cyber Security Supply Chain**

•NSIR oversees cyber security policy, guidance, and licensing activities for NRC licensees.

•When the source of cyber threats can be attributed to elements in the supply chain a collaborative effort between NRO and NSIR is necessary to address cyber threats.

- Ongoing Activities
  - Inspection Implementation
  - Guidance documents

# Upcoming CFSI Proposed Category 3 Meetings

<u>Commissioner Hearing Room</u> Wednesday, March 20, 2013 1:00 – 5:00pm Monday, April 22, 2013 from 1:00 – 5:00pm

<u>Two White Flint Room T10A01</u> Wednesday, May 29 2013 from1:00 – 5:00pm Wednesday, June 26, 2013 from 1:00 – 5:00pm Wednesday, July 31, 2013 from 1:00 – 5:00pm



## NUREG/BR-0500 "Safety Culture Policy Statement" June 2011 (ML11165A021)

"This policy statement applies to ...holders of quality assurance program approvals, vendors and suppliers of safety-related components..."

Problem Identification and Resolution

Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance.

#### Questioning Attitude

Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate action.

#### DEFINITION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE

Nuclear safery culture is the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safery over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment.

#### TRAITS OF A POSITIVE NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE

Experience has shown that certain personal and organizational traits are present in a positive safety culture. The following are traits of a positive safety

 Leadership Safety Values and Actions—Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors.

Problem Identification and Resolution—Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance.

Personal Accountability—All individuals take personal responsibility for safety.

 Work Processes—The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is maintained.

 Continuous Learning—Opportunities to learn about ways to ensure safety are sought out and implemented.

Environment for Raising Concerns—A safetyconscious work environment is maintained where personnel feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination.

 Effective Safety Communication—Communication: maintain a focus on safety.

Respectful Work Environment—Trust and resp permeate the organization.

Questioning Attitude—Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate action.

There may be additional irraits not included here ibas are also important in a positive safery culture. These mains were not developed for inspection purposes.



NRC MISSION

The mission of the NRC is to license and regulate the Nation's civilian use of

byproduct, source, and special nuclear

materials in order to protect public health and safety, promote the common defense

www.nrc.gov www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement,

safety-culture.html

and security, and protect the envir

SAFETY CULTURE Policy Statement



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		(INFORMATION) ML112200150	
	October 28, 2011	SECY-11-0154	
	FOR:	The Commissioners	
	FROM:	R. W. Borchardt Executive Director for Operations	
	SUBJECT:	AN AGENCYWIDE APPROACH TO COUNTERFEIT, FRAUDULENT, AND SUSPECT ITEMS	
	PURPOSE:		
	strategies to detect a	ne Commission of the staff's plans to identify and implement proactive and prevent the intrusion of counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items nt, components, systems, and structures regulated by the U.S. Nuclear sion (NRC).	
	SUMMARY:		
	and evaluate CFSI p the staff's assessme	the Commission with the staff's agencywide strategy and plan to monitor otentially impacting NRC-regulated activities. The paper also documents nt of the current regulations, guidance, and licensee procurement d with preventing the intrusion of CFSI into NRC regulated activities.	
	The staff assembled	an internal task force comprised of representatives from the various offices	


The staff assembled an internal task force comprised of representatives from the various offices potentially affected by the CFSI issue. As part of this effort four working groups were formed to assess activities and potential vulnerabilities in its specific area including reviewing best practices from several external sources, from the commercial nuclear industry, other heavy industry business sectors, and Federal agencies and law enforcement organizations. The staff also interacted with representatives from the Nuclear Procurement Issues Committee (NUPIC) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in developing this paper.

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### SECY 11-0154 CFSI Response Shift Reactive → Proactive




TIME

6



### **Basic Nuclear Supply Models**



### SECY-11-0154 Overview of Actions to Address CFSI



### **19 Planned Actions**

### (opportunities to enhance CFSI processes)

Five implementation categories to consolidate similar issues

- Industry process enhancements and best practices
- Regulatory guidance
- Communication
- Training
- Industry oversight for detecting & preventing CFSI

### **CFSI Implementation**



- 1. Industry process enhancements & best practices
  - (11) voluntary initiatives (In-prog)
  - Possible Generic Communications (In-prog)
- 2. Regulatory guidance
  - Addition of CFSI to Part 21 guidance (In-prog)
  - Endorse Voluntary Initiatives ECD 2013
  - Proposed CFSI Rulemaking to 10 CFR 50 ← Post -Effectiveness Review)

#### 3. Communication

- Expand OpE/ConE program for CFSI Complete

  - CFSI Technical Review Group (TRG) ← Complete
- Public meetings monthly, 1<sup>st</sup> on Feb. 13, 13
- Add CFSI to CAP programs (Industry Voluntary Initiative (IVI))
- - GIDEP (In-prog)
  - Centralized clearinghouse/database (IVIs)
- NEA Nonconforming /CFSI Task Group (NRC Chair) ← Complete
- IAEA IRS & (CNS) Convention on Nuclear Safety ← Complete 1<sup>st</sup> in 2013



## **CFSI Implementation Overview**

- 4. Training
  - CFSI awareness into Allegations training module **Complete**

  - Provided CFSI Awareness to NRC staff (Region I: In-prog)

  - Formal Inspector training module in development **← ECD 2013**

#### 5. Industry oversight for detecting & preventing CFSI

- NRC inspections
  - Vendor inspections (in-Prog) ECD 2013
  - ➢ Licensee procurement, ROP/cROP (pilots) ← ECD 2013
  - Suppliers of CDAs (sample population) Cyber (In-prog)
- Licensee audits of suppliers ← (In-prog)
  - Manufacturers
  - Dedicating entities
  - Supplier-to-supplier audits
  - CFSI added to VIPP Complete



### **Voluntary CFSI Initiatives**

- 1) Develop a plan for implementing "proactive" CFSI strategies
- 2) Develop a method for sharing CFSI Information, including issues identified during receipt inspection and during commercial grade dedication
- 3) Develop an industry accepted practice for using the corrective action program and nonconformance programs for entering CFSI related to <u>safety related</u> components
- 4) Develop an industry accepted practice for using the corrective action program to enter <u>non-safety related</u> CFSI into the corrective action program
- 5) Establish an industry CFSI database



### **Voluntary CFSI Initiatives**

- 6) Incorporate industry best practices for quarantining CFSI items and removing them from the supply chain without returning them to the supplier
- 7) Incorporate industry best practices for identifying and informing the industry of CFSI trends
- 8) Incorporate industry best practices for enhancing commercial-grade dedication, and receipt inspection practices to account for CFSI
- 9) Incorporate industry best practices for product authentication of complex items that will provide additional assurance for preventing CFSI
- 10) Incorporate industry best practices for using batch sampling with authentication testing
- 11) Incorporate industry best practices for the use of standardized anti-CFSI language in procurement documents

### **Plan for Going Forward**

Prioritize the (11) Industry Voluntary Initiatives:

- Highest net gain to prevent CFSI
- Ready for implementation

Develop Plans for Highest Priority Items:

- Include Estimated Completion Dates (ECDs)
- Include any requests for support resources
- Schedule Monthly (Category 3) Public Meetings
  - Working sessions to fully develop highest priority items
  - Including focus topic discussions & general CFSI discussions

Implementation Commitment:

- Plan submittal to staff
- Staff endorsement
- Industry commitment
- Change Management

#### NRC Effectiveness Reviews:

- Determine characteristics of "effective" and sample population
- Develop a schedule to perform the reviews
- Issue Temporary Instruction (internal)
- Assess the results of the reviews & formulate SECY



#### ← Complete

### **Current CFSI Highlights**



- **2012** Jan The Construction Industry Institute (CII) approves additional funding to continue researching counterfeit materials inn the construction industry (RT-307)
  - Nov INPO Event Report IER-4-12-86, "Counterfeit Parts and Equipment Vulnerability" issued w/action statement: "Plants are expected to consider corrective actions provided in this document and to develop applicable corrective actions."
  - Dec Pentas Controls DOJ press release
- 2013 Jan Two South Korean plants shut down due to CFSI
  - Jan IAEA adds CFSI to Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) Annual reports
  - Jan IN-2012-22, "Counterfeit, Fraudulent, Suspect Items Training Offerings" issued
  - Feb NRC reinstitutes public meetings specifically to address CFSI with industry
  - Perform SECY-11-0154 Effectiveness Reviews
- **2014** 2014 ASME NQA-1 discussing adding CFSI language to the 2014 Addenda (Part II, Requirements)
  - SECY-11-0154 Effectiveness Review conclusions to NRC Commissioners



### **CFSI Resources** *at <u>www.nrc.gov</u>*

1.	SECY-11-0154: "An Agency Wide Approach to Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items"	ML112200150
2.	"Staff Review of Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items (CFSI)"	ML112130293
3.	GL 91-05: "Licensee Commercial-Grade Procurement and Dedication Programs (Generic Letter)	ML9104030126
4.	GL 89-02: "Actions to Improve the Detection of Counterfeit and Fraudulently Marked Products (Generic Letter)	ML8903160296
5.	IN 2012-22: "Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items (CFSI) Training Offerings" (Information Notice)	ML12137A248
6.	Table 1 to IN 2012-22, "Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items (CFSI) Training Offerings"	ML12318A216
7.	IN 2008-04: "Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants" (Information Notice)	ML093620098
8.	IN 1989-70 S1: "Possible Indications of Misrepresented Vendor Products – Supplement 1" (Information Notice)	ML9004200525
9.	IN 1989-70: "Possible Indications of Misrepresented Vendor Products" (Information Notice)	ML8910040381

## Acronyms

CDA	Critical Digital Asset	Cyber
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations	USG
CFSI	Counterfeit, Fraudulent, Suspect Item	NRC
ConE	Construction Experience Program	NRC
cROP	Construction Reactor Oversight Program	NRC
FSME	Federal & State Materials & Environmental Programs	NRC
GIDEP	Government Industry Data Exchange Program	USG
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency	INT
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Plant Operators	Industry
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights	USG
IRS	Incident Reporting System	IAEA
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute	Industry
NIAC	Nuclear Industry Assessment Committee	Industry
NMSS	Nuclear Material Safety & Safeguards	NRC
NUPIC	Nuclear Procurement Issues Committee	Industry
OPe	Operating Experience Program	NRC
RG	Regulatory Guide	USG
ROP	Reactor Oversight Program	NRC
SECY	Written issues papers the staff submits to the Commission	NRC





## **QUESTIONS ?**

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