

DRAFT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

REGARDING SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 AND 2

DELETION OF CONDITION FOR INOPERABLE CAACS/CREACS ISOLATION DAMPERS

DOCKET NUMBERS: 50-272 AND 50-311 (TAC NOS. ME9095 AND ME9096)

By letter dated July 17, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated January 28, 2013, PSEG submitted a license amendment request for Salem Generating Station Units 1 and 2, ¹ to revise Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.6.1 (Unit 1) and 3/4.7.6 (Unit 2), "Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System," by removing the separate action for securing an inoperable Control Area Air Conditioning System (CAACS) and Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (CREACS) isolation damper in the closed position and entering the actions for an inoperable control room envelope (CRE) boundary. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has reviewed the information submitted by the licensee, and based on this review, determined the following information is required to complete the evaluation.

Containment and Ventilation Branch (SCVB) Request for Additional Information:

Salem Unit 1 TS 6.18, "Control Room Envelope Habitability Program," and Unit 2 TS 6.17, "Control Room Envelope Habitability Program," address "Elements a through Element f," regarding control room habitability following a radiological event, hazardous release, or a smoke challenge.

PSEG stated in Section 4.0 of Attachment 1, to the submittal dated July 17, 2012, that the current actions for an inoperable control room boundary would allow the implementation of mitigating actions that ensure the CRE boundary is able to meet the limits of the radiological, smoke and chemical hazards analyses. Performance of these actions in lieu of isolating an inoperable CAACS/CREACS damper in the closed position would allow the performance of preventative maintenance and avoid the unnecessary shutdown of the Salem Units when actions can be implemented that ensure the plant operates within the bounds of the radiological, smoke and chemical hazards analyses.

PSEG also stated that for preventative maintenance activities that require the inoperability of the CAACS/CREACS isolation dampers, the mitigating actions would be developed and reviewed prior to implementation, to ensure the mitigating actions maintain operation of the plant within the limits of the radiological, smoke and chemical hazards analyses.

The staff requests the PSEG to provide clarification for the following:

SCVB RAI 1: What is the fail position of the isolation damper(s) under loss of air or loss of power?

¹ Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession Nos. ML12199A426 and ML13028A268.

SCVB RAI 2: Under the circumstances the isolation damper(s) are inoperable due to preventive maintenance, what compensatory measures will be taken to make sure that the control room boundary is maintained?

SCVB RAI 3: Please describe what mitigating actions and any compensatory measures that would be developed and reviewed prior to implementation to maintain operation of the plant within the limits of the radiological, smoke and chemical hazards analyses during inoperability of the CAACS/CREACS isolation dampers.

SCVB RAI 4: Also, clarify that these mitigating actions conform to Salem Unit 1 TS 6.18, "Control Room Envelope Habitability Program" and Unit 2 TS 6.17, "Control Room Envelope Habitability Program."