



January 23, 2013

NG-13-0020  
10 CFR 50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Duane Arnold Energy Center  
Docket 50-331  
Renewed Op. License No. DPR-49

Licensee Event Report #2012-005-00

Please find attached the subject report submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This letter makes no new commitments or changes to any existing commitments.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard L. Anderson" followed by "(for)" in parentheses.

Richard L. Anderson  
Vice President, Duane Arnold Energy Center  
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

<b>1. FACILITY NAME</b> Duane Arnold Energy Center	<b>2. DOCKET NUMBER</b> 05000331	<b>3. PAGE</b> 1 OF 3
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**4. TITLE**  
Secondary Containment Damper Inoperable, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
11	24	12	2012	005	0	01	23	13	N/A	05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									N/A	05000

<b>9. OPERATING MODE</b> 4	<b>11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §:</b> (Check all that apply)									
<b>10. POWER LEVEL</b> 0%	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(x)		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(a)(4)		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(a)(5)		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	VOLUNTARY LER			

**12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER**

NAME Robert J. Murrell, Engineering Analyst	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (319) 851-7900
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**13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT**

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

<b>14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<b>15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE</b>	MONTH 03	DAY 15	YEAR 13
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**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On November 24, 2012, with the reactor shutdown for a planned refueling outage, Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 3.6.4.1-01B, which demonstrates the ability of the 'B' Standby Gas Treatment System to maintain secondary containment under calm wind conditions, failed to achieve a 0.25 inches water gauge (wg) vacuum at a normal SBGT flow rate of 3800 cubic feet per minute (cfm). Subsequent investigations revealed that secondary containment isolation damper 1VAD017B1 was partially open. Further troubleshooting confirmed that maintenance performed on June 21, 2012 caused the damper to remain partially open. In order to comply with the Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO), 1VAD017A1 was de-energized in the closed position. With the affected flow path isolated, the 'B' SBGT train was able to achieve the required 0.25 in. wg vacuum. Since 1VAD017B1 was inoperable from June 21, 2012 to November 24, 2012, it violated its TS LCO action statement 3.6.4.2.A.1 which requires an inoperable flow path be isolated within 8 hours of inoperability. Therefore, this event resulted in a condition prohibited by TS. A root cause evaluation is being performed to determine the cause and corrective actions for this event and a supplemental report is expected to be issued by February 21, 2013.

The safety significance of this event was minimized by the fact that the 'A' damper in the flow path containing 1VAD017B1 was fully operable during the time in question and testing results show that SBGT was capable of achieving 0.25 in. wg vacuum with 1VAD017A1 closed.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME Duane Arnold Energy Center	2. DOCKET 05000 - 331	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE 2 OF 3
		YEAR 2012	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 005	REV NO. 0	

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

**I. Description of Event:**

On November 24, 2012, with the reactor shutdown for a planned refueling outage, Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 3.6.4.1-01B, which demonstrates the ability of the 'B' Standby Gas Treatment System to maintain secondary containment under calm wind conditions, failed to achieve a 0.25 inches water gauge (wg) vacuum at a normal SBGT flow rate of 3800 cubic feet per minute (cfm). Subsequent investigations revealed that secondary containment isolation damper 1VAD017B1 was partially open. Further troubleshooting confirmed that maintenance performed on June 21, 2012 caused the damper to remain partially open. In order to comply with the Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO), 1VAD017A1 was de-energized in the closed position. With the affected flow path isolated, the 'B' SBGT train was able to achieve the required 0.25 in. wg vacuum. Since 1VAD017B1 was inoperable from June 21, 2012 to November 24, 2012, it violated its TS LCO action statement 3.6.4.2.A.1 which requires an inoperable flow path be isolated within 8 hours of inoperability. Therefore, this event resulted in a condition prohibited by TS. A root cause evaluation is being performed to determine the cause and corrective actions for this event and a supplemental report is expected to be issued by February 21, 2013.

There were no other structures, systems or components inoperable at the start of this event that contributed to the event.

**II. Assessment of Safety Consequences:**

During the period when 1VAD017B1 was not capable of fully closing, TS 3.6.4.2 Condition A should have been entered. While it affected the ability of the 'B' side of secondary containment to maintain the required vacuum of 0.25 inches, secondary containment was able to achieve the required vacuum at the maximum SBGT air flow of 4000 cfm when the penetration was closed. The penetrations redundant damper, 1VAD017A1, was able to perform its function which would have prevented an unfiltered ground level release. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is very low.

This event did not result in a safety system functional failure.

**III. Cause of Event:**

A root cause evaluation is currently being conducted. Once the evaluation is complete, a supplemental report will be issued containing the root cause of this event.

**IV. Corrective Actions:**

On November 24, 2012, the affected flow path was isolated when the inoperable damper was de-energized in the closed position.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
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		YEAR 2012	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 005	REV NO. 0	

**NARRATIVE** (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

A root cause evaluation is currently being conducted. Once the evaluation is complete, a supplemental report will be issued containing the corrective actions for this event.

**V. Additional Information:**

Previous Similar Occurrences:

A review of License Event Reports from the past 5 years identified one similar occurrence of secondary containment being affected by an inoperable damper. This event is documented in LER 2012-003, Secondary Containment Damper Failures.

EIIS System and Component Codes:

NH - Reactor Containment Building.

Reporting Requirements:

This event is being reported as an Operation or Condition Prohibited by TS, 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).