



Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC
Nuclear Fuel
Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility
5801 Bluff Road
Hopkins, South Carolina 29061
USA

Attn: Document Control Desk
Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and
Transportation
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Direct tel: (803) 647-1793
Direct fax: (803) 695-4164
e-mail: pressom@westinghouse.com
Your ref: Docket No. 71-9239
Our ref: LTR-LCPT-13-4

January 22, 2013

SUBJECT: Event Report - Docket 71-9239, Certificate of Compliance USA/9239/AF

Dear Mr. Mark Lombard:

A written report is hereby submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 71.95. The written report is for an instance in which conditions of approval in the Certificate of Compliance No. 9239 for the Model Nos. MCC-3, MCC-4, and MCC-5 Packages were not observed in making a shipment.

(1) Abstract / Background

The Modified Core Component (MCC) series of packagings are used to transport low-enriched uranium fuel assemblies (up to two assemblies per package) for light water power reactor cores. The package classification is to be Fissile Class I.

The stabilizer bars within this package are used to secure the support frame of the MCC when fuel is being loaded into or unloaded from the package. When not in use, these stabilizer bars are to be lowered within the package, and properly fastened to keep them from moving during transport.

The Certificate of Compliance 9239, Revision 17, specifies condition 10 (a) as follows:

- 10 (a) Each package shall be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the "Routine Shipping Container Utilization Summary Operating Procedures," in Chapter 7 of the application;

Chapter 7 Section 7.6.14 of the MCC application specifies as follows:

- 7.6 Fuel Assembly Loading
...
7.6.14 Release stabilizing bars and lock into storage position.

This information is provided pursuant to 10 CFR 71.95 (c) (1).

*** Electronically approved records are authenticated in the Electronic Document Management System.**

(2) Narrative of the Event

MCC packages are used to transport low-enriched fuel assemblies from Westinghouse fuel fabrication facilities to the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, a light water power reactor.

On the day of September 18th, 2012, Operators at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant were receiving several fuel shipments, which had been sent from Westinghouse. As part of the receipt inspection, two separate MCC packages in consecutive shipments (M299 and M284) were found to have had improperly secured stabilizer bars within them. In each case, there was a ball lock pin which was attached, but had not been properly inserted into the mating holes.

When the packages were returned to the Westinghouse facility, the ball lock pins were examined, and found to be operationally functional.

While this did not present a hazard to the fuel assemblies contained within these two packages (with the clamping frames in place within the package, a loose stabilizer bar would not contact the fuel assembly), it nonetheless violates Section 7.6.14 of the Safety Analysis Report, which is described above in Section (1) of this notification.

This information is provided pursuant to 10 CFR 71.95 (c) (2).

(3) Assessment of Safety Consequences and Implications of the Event

The loaded packages were returned to Westinghouse, were the packages and fuel assemblies had to be evaluated. No exposure to contamination occurred, and no damage to the fuel assemblies was found.

This information is provided pursuant to 10 CFR 71.95 (c) (3).

(4) Corrective Actions

This incident was captured in the Westinghouse corrective action program as Issue #12-317-C017.

In addition, Field Anomaly Reports were issued for the two packages to evaluate the possible consequences of the event. These are captured in the Westinghouse corrective action program as Issues #12-268-C011 and #12-271-C012. In both cases the fuel was found to be unharmed, and the stabilizer bar ball lock pins were found to be properly functional.

Issue #12-317-C017 has been investigated, and the packing checklist has been revised to specifically call out the ball lock pins during package loading.

Additionally, the department of Licensing, Compliance and Package Technology has been further integrated within the Westinghouse corrective action process, providing an earlier notice of possible transport compliance instances. This has been captured in Issue #13-021-C009.

This information is provided pursuant to 10 CFR 71.95 (c) (4).

(5) Extent of Condition

Two (2) separate MCC packages in consecutive shipments were found to share the same issue of improperly secured stabilizer bars.

A review of previous issues related to the MCC found one similar incident in September of 2010. This instance was captured under Issues #10-222-C001, and #10-218-C004. These issues resulted in a review of the procedures with transport operators.

This information is provided pursuant to 10 CFR 71.95 (c) (5).

(6) Contact

Please contact Matthew Presson at (803) 647-1793 for any additional information about this event.

This information is provided pursuant to 10 CFR 71.95 (c) (6).

(7) Extent of Exposure to Radiation

No individuals were exposed to radiation due to this issue.

This information is provided pursuant to 10 CFR 71.95 (c) (7).

Sincerely,

** Electronically approved*

Matthew R. Presson
Licensing, Compliance and Package Technology
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, LLC

cc
Wes Stillwell, Director, Nuclear Fuel Transport
Mark Rosser, Manager, Environment, Health, and Safety
Dave Precht, Plant Manager, Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility