



**Spent Fuel Transportation Risk
Assessment (SFTRA)
Draft NUREG Rev. 2.3**

Overview for NMSS Director and
ACRS staff
2/29/2012

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Purpose of Briefing

- Overview of SFTRA and related activities
 - Project and review teams
 - Purpose and goals
 - Basic Methodology
 - Improvements relative to previous studies
 - Structure and format
 - A few key results
 - Findings and conclusions
 - Schedule
 - Challenges

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SFTRA Project and Review Teams

- Sandia National Laboratory [J5546; \$1.8M; 9/06-9/12]
 - Doug Ammerman – principal investigator and author
 - Carlos Lopez – thermal
 - Ruth Weiner – RADTRAN
- SFST's SFTRA Review Team
 - Gordon Bjorkman – structural
 - Chris Bajwa – thermal and overall message
 - Bob Einziger – fuels, source term
 - Anita Gray – health physics
- Oak Ridge External Peer Review Team [J5645; \$125K; 9/10-9/12]
 - Matt Feldman
 - Cecil Parks
 - Other technical staff
- SNL responses to ORNL comments incorporated in Rev 2.3
- SFTRA Review Team members concur in publication of Rev. 2.3

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SFTRA Purpose and goals

- Continuing review
 - FEIS (NUREG-0170, 1977)
 - "Modal Study" (NUREG/CR-4829, 1987)
 - Reexamination of Spent Shipment Risk Estimates (NUREG/CR-6672, 2000)
- NRC's safety mission
 - Considering public comment, provide updated basis for conclusion that NRC's regulations applicable to spent fuel transportation provide adequate public health and safety
- Outreach responsibilities
 - Reassure public regarding spent fuel shipments
 - Basic message: Risks are low, so safety is high
 - Improve public understanding and acceptance of spent fuel shipments
- Update benchmark for environmental assessments
- Potential shipments
 - Significant issue when study began (2006) – much less so now (post Yucca Mtn shutdown)
 - Nevertheless applicable to future shipments
- SFTRA is not
 - Driven by any external requirement or commitment
 - An EIS or major federal action
 - Required for any licensing action
 - A regulatory proposal

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SFTRA Basic Methodology

- Perform finite element analysis of cask response to impact and thermal accident conditions
- Use DOT "event trees" to estimate probabilities of accident conditions
- Use RADTRAN to calculate routine doses and accident dose risks for representative truck and rail shipments
- Approach similar to that in NUREG-0170 and NUREG/CR-6672

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SFTRA improvements over previous NRC spent fuel risk studies

- New rail and truck event trees
- RADTRAN new Version 6:
 - Elevated releases
 - New loss of shielding analysis
- Updated population data (2000 Census; trying to revise to 2010 Census pending TRAGIS update)
- Updated traffic density and accident data for truck and rail
- Hi-fidelity HI-STAR 100 and NAC-STC cask finite element models, including impact limiters
- Direct loaded fuel and welded inner canister fuel
- More precise structural (e.g., bolt model) and thermal (e.g., 3-D) analyses
 - better estimate of cask-to-environment release fractions

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SFTRA Report Structure and Format


- Audience
 - Public, media, industry, states, elected officials, federal agencies
- Graded structure and content
 - MD 3.7 and NUREG-0650
- Executive Summary and Public Summary [All audiences]
- Main body text [informed public, states, science media]
- Appendices [industry, other federal agencies]
- Electronic and printed versions of Final SFTRA
NUREG planned (latter may be limited)

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SFTRA Results: Routine conditions

Collective doses from background and from Maine Yankee to ORNL truck shipments of spent nuclear fuel (person-Sv).




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SFTRA Results: Accident conditions

Accident collective dose risks from release and loss of gamma shielding (LOS) accidents. The LOS bars are not to scale.



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SFTRA Findings

- The collective dose risks from routine transportation are vanishingly small. **These doses are about four to five orders of magnitude less than collective background radiation dose.**
- The routes selected for this study adequately represent the routes for spent nuclear fuel transport, and there was relatively little variation in the risks per kilometer over these routes.
- **Radioactive material would not be released in an accident if the fuel is contained in an inner welded canister inside the cask.**
- Only rail casks without inner welded canisters would release radioactive material, and only then in exceptionally severe accidents.
- If there were an accident during a spent fuel shipment, there is only about one in a billion chance the accident would result in a release of radioactive material.
- **If there were a release of radioactive material in a spent fuel shipment accident, the dose to the maximum exposed individual would be non-fatal.**

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SFTRA Current Schedule

Milestone	Date
1. Submit Rev 2.3 to publications for NRC edit	2/15/2012 (completed)
2. Publications returns edited copy	3/15/2012
3. Publish for comment in Fed Reg	4/15/2012
4. Public comments due	6/15/2012
5. Sandia response to public comments (Rev 3.0)	7/15/2012
6. ACRS subcommittee review	9/5/2012
7. Sandia delivers final Draft NUREG (Rev. 4.0)	9/30/2012 (contract expires)
8. NRC publishes Final NUREG	By 12/31/2012

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SFTRA Challenges

- External:
 - Possible post-Fukushima public apprehension over nuclear activities
 - Policy-based opposition by certain environmental groups
- Internal:
 - Extent/response effort for public comments may exceed that planned
 - Placeholder to update population data to 2010 Census
 - Sandia contract expires 9/30/2012

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