

Boyer, Rachel

TO: LEADS, NRR

From: CHAIRMAN Resource
Sent: Monday, January 14, 2013 8:09 AM
To: Remsburg, Kristy; Lewis, Antoinette; Mike, Linda
Subject: FW: 1-9-2013 Briefing on Venting Systems for Mk I & Mk II Containments

Cy: merzke, CBDO

From: Tom Gurdziel [<mailto:tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com>]
Sent: Friday, January 11, 2013 10:37 PM
To: CHAIRMAN Resource
Cc: Casto, Chuck; Uldis Vanags; Bridget Frymire; newal; thenry; T Holden; Jill Lyon; jicc; JLD_Public Resource; ESTRONSKI@aol.com; Screnci, Diane; Mitlyng, Viktoria
Subject: 1-9-2013 Briefing on Venting Systems for Mk I & Mk II Containments

Hello,

I just listened to the first 1 hour and 49 minutes of this briefing. (I presently do not either support or oppose the idea of a filtered vent because I feel that the presently installed Mk I vent requirements are inadequate and need to be changed first.)

Anyway, I want to say that it appeared to me that the entire 5 person commission brought their A game with them. Their questions were perceptive and entirely appropriate.

I do want to mention a few things.

It appeared to me that about two of the presenters were unaware of the fact that actual Mk I containments, (Nine Mile Point Unit I anyway), have big valves and piping to serve as vacuum breakers that actually are designed to allow reactor building atmosphere, (air), into the primary containment. It appears to me that this fact would conflict with some of their statements.

Scrubbing may not work in all containment bypass conditions. However, I believe it was implied that it might by one presenter. (The problem here is the apparent industry use of the words "containment bypass" to refer to an intentional venting, (I think). However, think of this. The gasket under the drywell dome fails. Containment is bypassed and the exiting gasses do not even leave the reactor building. There is no scrubbing now.)

I think it was about 1 hr and 12 min when David Lochbaum pointed out that, if you had the water to cool the reactor, you wouldn't need to be spraying the primary containment. His question was, so where did all this water (and pump power) suddenly come from?

Then at about 1 hr and 18 min the talk turned to: would operators actually vent containment? We heard some good testimonials. Now here is the problem. (Note that I held a full (unrestricted) SRO and, in those days, you didn't get the SRO unless you passed every RO test and qualified for a full, unrestricted, RO first, which I did.) How can the NRC expect that, in complicated situations, licensed operators will do their jobs when, recently at Entergy/Palisades, an operator refused to continue his (or her?) assignment at the controls of an operating reactor and DID NOT GET FIRED. And, taking what they must have considered appropriate action, the NRC went through ADR and got a promise from them to do a safety culture study. So, here is the problem: if the NRC doesn't expect operators to do their jobs in even uncomplicated situations, does it make sense to conclude that all those that remain should be relied on in complicated conditions?

Somewhere here David Lochbaum made another excellent point when he said that continuing control of primary containment pressure would require continuing operable instrumentation and powered valves.

TEMPLATE: SEU-07

LEADS: SEU-01

Thank you,

Tom Gurdziel

I hope to get to the rest of the video presentation in the next couple of days or so.