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November 29, 2012

Docket No.:

SOUTHERN ZOMPANY

NL-12-2383

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

50-424

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2012-005-00 Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is voluntarily submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report. This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Doug McKinney at (205) 992-5982.

Respectfully submitted,

7.5. Tyran

T. E. Tynan

Vice President - Vogtle

TET/GWG

Enclosure: Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2012-005-00

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company

Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO

Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer

Mr. B. L. Ivey, Vice President - Regulatory Affairs

Mr. B. J. Adams, Vice President - Fleet Operations

Mr. M. J. Ajluni, Nuclear Licensing Director

Mr. D. A. Jackson, Vogtle OE Coordinator

RType: CVC7000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Mr. V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator

Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Senior Project Manager - Vogtle

Mr. L. M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector - Vogtle

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Plant – Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2012-005-00 Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure

Enclosure

Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2012-005-00

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NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) **CONTINUATION SHEET** 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 2 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 1 05000 424 OF 3

2012

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NARRATIVE

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is being voluntarily submitted.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of discovery the unit was in Mode 1. Other than described herein, there was no other inoperable equipment that contributed to the event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

Vogtle Unit 1 experienced a mismatch in secondary steam flow during power ascension from 2% to 10% reactor power (Mode 2 to Mode 1). The control room operators confirmed the mismatch by observing divergence in reactor coolant system loop differential temperatures, secondary steam pressures, and secondary steam flows between loops one and four and loops two and three. At this time, the reactor was manually shutdown. Subsequent investigation determined the outboard main steam isolation valve on loops two and three were indicating open in the Main Control Room when, in fact, the valves were closed.

Control room main steam isolation valve (MSIV) handswitch position indication showed 1HV-3016B (loop 2 outboard) and 1HV-3026B (loop 3 outboard) MSIVs open, which was not supported by corresponding loop steam line pressure indications. Implementation of a trouble shooting plan determined 1HV-3016B (loop 2 outboard) and 1HV-3026B (loop 3 outboard) were closed with control room handswitches indicating open. Follow up ultrasonic testing (UT) identified stem length discrepancies on both 1HV-3016B and 1HV-3026B. Following valve disassembly, it was identified the valve stems were sheared above the T-head.

Westinghouse representatives were consulted and conveyed to the site the material used for the MSIV stems, ASME SA564 Gr. 630 condition H1075, is susceptible to embrittlement when exposed to temperatures above 500°F. Metallurgy analysis was performed on the sheared stems validating that thermal embrittlement was the failure mechanism. The failure analysis concluded the stem fracture was a sudden failure which occurred during the opening of the valves. UT and visual inspections were performed on the remaining (6) MSIV stems for Unit 1 with no significant stem fractures detected.

NRC FORM 366A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTINUATION SHEET									
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NARRATIVE

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

Main steam isolation valve stem thermal embrittlement due to long term exposure to temperatures greater than 500 degrees.

E. SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The MSIV systems isolate steam flow from the secondary side of the steam generators following a high energy line break thus terminating flow from the unaffected steam generators. The failure mode results in closure of the affected MSIV thereby performing the required safety function.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTION

The valve stems for the affected MSIVs were replaced. Long range corrective actions are to replace the valves stems on all MSIVs on both units with a material resistant to thermal embrittlement at temperatures within the normal system operating range.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1) Failed Components:

Rockwell International A-290 Main Steam Isolation Valve Actuator

2) Previous Similar Events:

None

- 3) Energy Industry Identification System Code: [SB] Main / Reheat Steam
- 4) Other Systems Affected: None
- 5) Commitment Information: This report does not create any new permanent licensing commitments.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company Nuclear Licensing COMPANY Form Southern Nuclear Operating Company NL-006-F03 Version 1.0 Page 1 of 6

NL Letter Number: NL-12-2383 Subject: LER 2012005, MSIV Failure RLE / Extension: G. Gunn 8.695.3596 Due Date (if applicable): 12/4/2012

SECTION I - CORRESPONDENCE SCREENING (to be completed by RLE)						
l.1.	I.1. Does this letter affect the FSAR or any other License Basis Documents? If YES, complete 1.1.a. If unsure, obtain peer review from 10 CFR 50.59 qualified individual.					
I.1.a Has Section III been completed to update each document? T YES T NO						
1.2.	1.2. Does this letter require posting per 10 CFR 19? If YES, ensure posting after submittal.					
1.3.	B. Does this letter contain Safeguards Information? If YES, do NOT scan to SNC Intranet. Enter Special Handling Instructions below and review with the AA.					
1.4.	.4. Does this letter contain information to be withheld from public disclosure (e.g., Proprietary or Non-Safeguards Security-Related Information)? If YES, do NOT scan to SNC Intranet. If Proprietary, include appropriate affidavit. Enter Special Handling Instructions below and review with the AA.					
1.5.	Does this letter contain sensitive, limited access or distribution items? If YES, enter Special Handling Instructions below and review with the AA.	Г	12			
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SOUTHERN COMPANY Energy to Serve Your World

Nuclear Licensing Form

Licensing Action and Concurrence

Southern Nuclear Operating Company

NL-006-F03 Version 1.0 Page 4 of 6

SECTION IV – FINAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL

(Mark "NA" for signatures that are not required, including individual signing letter)	(-)	~ /
NL Manager or Supervisor:	Date: _	12/3/	1
NL Director:	Date: _	12/3/17	2
FNP Vice President: N/A			
HNP Vice President: N/A	Date: _		
VEGP Vice President: N/A	Date: _		
Vice President: N/A Engineering	Date: _		_
Vice President: N/A Fleet Operations	Date: _		
Executive Vice President: N/A	_ Date: _		
IV.1. Does this letter contain Commitments? If YES, complete 1.a and 1.b.		Г	I
IV.1.a Has the NL Principal Licensing Engineer been notified?	□ NO		
IV.1.b Has Section III been completed for each Commitment?	□ NO		
RLE Final Review:		12/3/	12
Admin (date and distribution): Apply		12/31	12
& all report date (form as date draws wither to wee BDM 12/8/1	147)	