STATUS OF NRC ACTIVITIES OF POTENTIAL INTEREST TO OM MAIN COMMITTEE

Tony McMurtray, Chief
Component Performance & Testing Branch (EPTB)
Division of Engineering
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

ASME OM Code Committee Meeting on December 5-7, 2012, at Clearwater Beach, FL

10 CFR 50.55a Rulemaking

10 CFR 50.55a was amended by the last rulemaking, to incorporate by reference the 2005 and 2006 Addendas of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code, the 2005 Addenda through 2008 Addenda of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code Section XI, and 2004 Edition through 2008 Addenda of the ASME B&PV Code Section III.

In the spring of 2011, the NRC started the next rulemaking to incorporate the 2009 Edition of the ASME OM with 2011 Addenda and the 2009 Addenda and 2010 Edition with 2011 Addenda of ASME B&PV Code Section III and XI into 10 CFR 50.55a. This proposed rulemaking is currently scheduled to be published for public comment in the first calendar quarter of 2013 and issued in early 2014.

Regulatory Guide (RG) Update – OM Code Case Acceptability

The NRC staff has completed its review of the new and revised code cases published in the 2003 Addenda through the 2006 Addenda of the ASME OM. The proposed rulemaking and RGs (Revision 1 of RG 1.192, Revision 36 of RG 1.184, and Revision 17 of RG 1.147) for the code cases published in the 2003 Addenda through the 2006 Addenda of the ASME OM and the Section III and XI code cases listed in Supplements 1 through 10 to the 2007 B&PV Code are scheduled to be published for public comment in January 2013. This proposed rulemaking will contain revisions to the structure and numbering of 10 CFR 50.55a, as required by the Office of the Federal Register, and also proposed paragraph and subparagraph headings.

Based on concerns raised by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), three new conditions are being added by the NRC for usage of OMN-3, “Requirements for Safety Significance Categorization of Components Using Risk Insights for Inservice Testing of LWR Power Plants,” in draft RG 1.192, Revision 1. Comments may be provided on these additional conditions for usage of OMN-3, during the public comment period.

The NRC staff has also completed a review of the new and revised code cases published in the 2009 Edition and 2011 Addenda of the ASME OM. The proposed rulemaking and RGs for these code cases will be issued following the incorporation of the 2009 Edition and 2011 Addenda of the ASME OM into 10 CFR 50.55a. Beginning with Revision 1 of RG 1.192, code cases will be numbered as the code case is described in the OM Code. Each code case in Revision 1 of RG 1.192 will be identified by the number assigned by the OM Code and the applicable edition or addendum of the OM Code.

ENCLOSURE

Temporary Instruction (TI) Inspection Procedure (TI 2515/189) for Snubbers

NRC expects that licensees not meeting the 10 CFR 50.55a regulations should have completed all actions noted in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2010-06 and also described in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 2010-01, by June 1, 2012.

The EPTB staff developed a draft Temporary Instruction (TI) Inspection Procedure (TI 2515/189) to review the compliance of licensees' snubber programs with the 10 CFR 50.55a and ASME Code requirements. The NRC plans to issue the TI in the next couple months.

Draft NUREG-1482, Revision 2, "Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants," "Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves and Inservice Examination and Testing of Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers)"

Draft NUREG-1482, Revision 2 was issued for public comment in August 2011 and the public comment period ended on December 20, 2011. Based on public comments, NUREG-1482, Revision 2 will maintain the same structure and section numbers as Revision 1 for the inservice testing (IST) of pumps and valves. All newly added sections will have new section numbers. NUREG-1482, Revision 2 will have a new Appendix A, which contains information describing snubber inservice examination and testing programs. The NRC staff prepared responses to all of the public comments received during the last comment period and incorporated most of these comments into Revision 2. The NRC is planning to issue NUREG-1482, Revision 2 in the spring of 2013.

RIS 2012-10 and EGM 12-001 – NRC Position on Application of Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 to ASME OM Code Inservice Tests that are not part of the TS SRs

On February 24, 2012, the NRC issued EGM 12-001, "Dispositioning Noncompliance with Administrative Controls Technical Specifications Programmatic Requirements that Extend Test Frequencies and Allow Performance of Missed Tests," to allow enforcement discretion and provide guidance to licensees prior to the issuance of a long term solution for addressing frequencies and frequency extensions for inservice testing (IST) intervals. The EGM also addresses the use of SR 3.0.3 for missed TS surveillances and inservice tests. The enforcement discretion made available by this EGM for inservice tests performed under 10 CFR 50.55a (f), not related to TS SRs, permits licensees to apply the provisions of the TS SR frequencies and TS SR 3.0.2 but not the provisions of TS SR 3.0.3. On August 23, 2012, the NRC issued RIS 2012-10, "NRC Staff Position on Applying Surveillance Requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 to Administrative Controls Program Tests." This RIS reemphasized and clarified the information contained in EGM 12-001.

On March 5, 2012, the ASME Board on Nuclear Codes and Standards approved Code Case OMN-20, "Inservice Testing Frequency," which addressed inservice testing frequency and allowable testing grace periods for ASME OM Code IST requirements. For missed inservice tests (i.e. tests not performed within the required testing frequency), in lieu of TS SR 3.0.3, licensees should use the guidance in RIS 2005-20, Revision 1, "Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Determinations and Functionality

Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety,"" and perform an appropriate operability evaluation or functionality assessment, as needed.

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 1, Red Inspection Finding

During the reviews of the Performance Deficiencies associated with the BFN1 Red Inspection finding, the NRC identified concerns with the clarity of the requirements in Sections ISTC 4.1 and ISTC 4.2.3 of the ASME OM Code, 1995 Edition with the 1996 and 1997 Addenda. Issues were also identified with the corresponding requirements in Sections ISTC-3700 and ISTC-3530 in later editions and addenda of the ASME OM Code. These sections involve verification of remote valve position indication and obturator movement. The NRC noted that the ISTC 4.1, ISTC 4.2.3, ISTC-3700 and ISTC-3530 requirements were not sufficiently clear to verify that valve operation is accurately indicated. The NRC also determined that there was a need to address issues associated with the intent and requirements in ISTC 4.1, ISTC 4.2.3, ISTC-3700, and ISTC-3530 through either a revision to the ASME OM Code or establishment of new or revised NRC requirements.

A member of the EPTB staff, on the ASME O&M Subgroup on ISTA/ISTC, presented several recommended changes at the August 2011 ASME OM meeting, to clarify the requirements in ASME OM, Subsection ISTC, for obturator movement verification. These changes and clarifications include:

- Separate the concepts of position indication testing and exercise testing (i.e., position indication testing verifies accuracy of light indication; exercise testing verifies obturator movement) and clarify that obturator position/movement verification is required for all valves as part of the exercise test; and
- Clarify obturator movement verification requirements for the various check valve exercise test methods

At the December 2011 ASME OM meeting, the ISTA/ISTC subgroup formed a task group to address the code change recommendations. The ISTA/ISTC subgroup members discussed and debated these changes at the July 2012 meeting and the proposed code changes are now out to the various valve-related subgroups for review and comment through the formal balloting process. Following this ballot, EPTB staff will assess the actions by the various subgroups and determine the need for any further regulatory guidance.

Information Notice (IN) 2012-14, describing deficiencies related to the BFN1 motor-operated valve (MOV) failure, was issued on July 24, 2012. The scope of the IN focuses on the following issues:

- The MOV should have been in the Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 scope
- Augmented testing of the MOV did not have acceptance criteria as required by Criterion V of Appendix B in 10 CRF Part 50
- The ASME OM Code was not clear
- There was an inadequate application of industry test data

Follow-up to Generic Letter (GL) 96-05 Periodic Verification of MOVs

RIS 2011-13, "Follow Up to Generic Letter 96-05 for Evaluation of Class D Valves Under Joint Owners Group Motor-Operated Valve Periodic Verification Program," was issued on January 6, 2012. This RIS provides guidance for addressing periodic verification programs for valves not covered by the Joint Owners Group (JOG) MOV Periodic Verification (PV) program. Most plants committed to implement the final PV program recommendations by September 25, 2012.

The EPTB staff is developing inspection guidance to review the evaluation of Class D valves and associated MOV PV programs. This inspection guidance should be available for public comment in early 2013, prior to issuance of the guidance.

Licensing and Inspection of Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors under 10 CFR 50.69

NRC Inspection Procedure ((IP) 37060, "10 CFR 50.69 Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components Inspection," was issued on September 14, 2011. The IP draws in part from the ASME developed Part 29 (Standard), "Alternative Treatment Requirements for Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC)-3 Pumps and Valves," as well as from insights gained through a review of the South Texas Project 50.69-like treatment program. The nuclear industry and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) provided additional comments on IP 37060 to the NRC, during public meetings held in the summer of 2012. The NRC incorporated many of these comments into a revision to IP 37060, which is scheduled to be issued by the end of 2012.

In August 2012, Southern Nuclear submitted a license amendment application requesting to implement 10 CFR 50.69 at Vogle Units 1 and 2. Following the NRC review of this application, lessons learned will be used to revise the associated industry guidance and Regulatory Guide 1.201, Guidelines for Categorizing Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Power Plants According to Their Safety Significance." The NRC staff recognizes the need for an effective, stable and predictable regulatory climate for the implementation of 10 CFR 50.69.

NRC Activities Associated with the Follow-up to the Events at the Japanese Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Plant After the March 11, 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami

In response to the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power plant, the NRC chartered a Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) to review processes and regulations and to determine if additional improvements should be made to the regulatory system governing nuclear power plants and to make recommendations to the Commission regarding policy direction. In examining the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident for insights for reactors in the United States, the NTTF addressed protecting against accidents resulting from natural phenomena, mitigating the consequences of such accidents, and ensuring emergency preparedness.

In SECY-11-0137 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11269A204), the NRC staff provided the Commission with the proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations. As a result of the staff's prioritization and assessment process, the NTTF recommendations were prioritized into three tiers.

Tier 1 activities are those actions that should be resolved without unnecessary delay. They consist of the actions noted above from SECY-11-0124 with the addition of the following items:

- Inclusion of Mark II containments in the recommendations for reliable hardened vents
- Implementation of spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation

Tier 2 activities consisted of the NTTF recommendations which could not be initiated in the near term due to the need for further technical assessment and alignment, dependence on Tier 1 issues, or availability of critical skill sets. However, these actions do not require long-term study. These actions included:

- SFP makeup capability
- Emergency preparedness (EP) regulatory actions

Tier 3 activities consisted of the NTTF recommendations that require further NRC staff study to support a regulatory action, have as associated shorter-term actions that needs to be completed to inform the longer-term action, are dependent on the availability of critical skill sets, or are dependent on the resolution of the "Clarify the Regulatory Framework" recommendation from the NTTF Report (SECY-11-0093). The Tier 3 actions include the following items:

- Ten-year confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards
- Potential enhancements to the capability to prevent and mitigate seismically-induced fires and floods
- Reliable hardened vents for other containment designs
- Hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings
- EP enhancements for station blackout (SBO) and multiunit events
- Enhanced ERDS capability
- Additional EP topics for prolonged SBO and multiunit events
- EP topics for decision-making, radiation monitoring, and public education
- Reactor Oversight Process modifications to reflect the recommended defense-in-depth framework
- Staff training on severe accidents and resident inspector training on severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs)

In this paper (SECY-11-0137), the NRC staff also identified a number of additional issues with a nexus to the Fukushima accident that warrant further consideration and potential prioritization, but were not identified in the NTTF recommendations. These issues include:

- Filtration of containment vents
- Instrumentation for seismic monitoring
- Basis for emergency planning zone size
- Prestaging of potassium iodide beyond 10 miles
- Transfer of spent fuel to dry cask storage
- Loss of ultimate heat sink

On December 15, 2011, the Commission issued a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-11-0137 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113490055) approving the staff's recommended three-tiered prioritization of the NTTF recommendations.

On February 17, 2012, the NRC staff proposed orders and requests for information (RFIs) to the Commission in SECY-12-0025, "Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons Learned From Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12039A103). SECY-12-0025 also discussed the disposition of recommendations from the Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as well as the six additional recommendations identified after the NTTF report was issued, that the NRC staff determined may also warrant additional action.

Regulatory Actions Taken

To ensure the NRC made well-informed decisions on the Tier 1 regulatory actions, the NRC staff conducted over a dozen public meetings with stakeholders to better understand the public's point of view, as well as the industry's views on the NRC's proposed actions. The staff also solicited comments from members of the public so they could provide input on the NRC's resolution of the Tier 1 recommendations. The NRC staff considered this input when developing the orders and the request for information.

By letter dated December 16, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11353A008), the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the policy organization for the nuclear industry, presented its plans to respond to Fukushima-like events. The industry developed a concept of a diverse and flexible mitigation capability called "FLEX." The NRC staff envisions that many elements of FLEX may satisfy the requirements of the order to mitigate challenges to key safety functions resulting from beyond-design-basis natural phenomena hazards.

Orders

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued three immediately effective orders. The first two orders were issued to all power reactor licensees, including holders of construction permits and combined operating licenses (COLs). The third order was issued to licensees operating boiling water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II containment designs. The following is a summary of each of the orders:

1. Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events." Licensees are ordered to develop strategies to mitigate the effects of beyond-design-basis natural phenomena that address both multiunit events and reasonable protection of equipment identified to implement such strategies.

   This order requires development of strategies to deal with beyond-design-basis external events resulting in simultaneous loss of all alternating current (ac) power and loss of normal access to the ultimate heat sink. To address the potential for more widespread effects of beyond-design-basis external events, this order requires licensees to have increased capabilities to implement multiple strategies concurrently at multiple units on a site. The strategies shall be developed to add multiple ways to maintain or restore core cooling, containment and SFP cooling capabilities in order to

improve the defense in depth of licensed nuclear power reactors. The order also requires that the equipment needed to implement the strategies be reasonably protected.

2. Order EA -12-51, Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation. Licensees are ordered to install enhanced, reliable SFP instrumentation.

3. Order EA-12-050, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents." Licensees with boiling water reactor (BWR) Mark I and Mark II containments are ordered to have reliable, hardened vents.

Licensees are required, by February 28, 2013, to submit to the Commission an integrated plan, including a description of how compliance with the orders will be achieved. After reviewing the licensee submittals, the NRC plans to issue facility-specific orders, as necessary, imposing license conditions that address the requirements of the orders. Each licensee will be required to achieve full compliance within two refueling outages after submittal of its integrated plan, or by December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) Documents supporting Tier 1 Orders

In August 2012, the NRC staff issued three ISGs supporting the Tier 1 Orders.

- JLD-ISG-2012-01 was issued to support nuclear power reactor applicants and licensees with the identification of measures needed to comply with requirements to mitigate challenges to key safety functions, as identified in Order EA-12-049. This ISG endorses, with clarifications, the methodologies described in the industry guidance document, NEI 12-06, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide," Revision 0. This ISG also provides an acceptable approach for satisfying the requirements in EA-12-049. The INPO document, AP 913, "Equipment Reliability Process," is referenced in NEI 12-06 for maintenance and testing of FLEX equipment. Holders of operating licenses or COLs for nuclear power reactors issued under 10 CFR Part 50 or Part 52 may use other methods for satisfying these requirements. The NRC staff will review these methods and determine their acceptability on a case-by-case basis.

- JLD-ISG-2012-02 was issued to support compliance with Order EA-12-050. This ISG provides technical detail on the new containment vents that must be installed and guidance on operational considerations for using the vents during accidents.

- JLD-ISG-12-03 was issued to support compliance with Order EA-12-051. This ISG endorses, with exceptions and clarifications, the methodologies described in the industry guidance document, NEI 12-02, "Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, "To Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,"" Revision 1, dated August 24, 2012.

Requests for Information (RFIs)

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued requests for information to power reactor licensees pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), which requires a written response. The request for information covered seismic and flooding issues and EP enhancements:

Seismic and Flooding RFIs

- Reevaluate seismic and flooding hazards at each site using present-day information, guidance, and methodologies.[1]
- Perform seismic and flooding walkdowns to identify and address plant-specific degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions.

The NRC will evaluate each licensee's response to the request for information and take additional regulatory action, if necessary.

Given that new information has been developed on natural phenomena hazards since the licensing basis of currently operating plants was established, the NRC found it necessary to confirm the adequacy of the hazard assumptions for U.S. plants, and their ability to protect against them. These hazards include earthquakes, local intense precipitation, floods of streams and rivers, storm surges, seiches, tsunamis, and dam failures.

All nuclear power plants have completed the seismic and flooding walkdowns required by the RFI request and the results are required to be submitted to the NRC by November 30, 2012. So far there have not been any major seismic or flooding issues identified by the licensees. The NRC staff is continuing to evaluate the results of these walkdowns.

On November 16, 2012, the NRC issued the final ISG document, JLD-ISG-12-04, 'Interim Staff Guidance on Performing a Seismic Margin Assessment in Response to the March 2012 Request for Information Letter, 'regarding seismic margins analysis (SMA). The SMA ISG provides guidance to licensees of an acceptable method for evaluating the implications of a revised seismic hazard for their facility. The staff's ISG has been issued in support of the development of the NEI peer review guidance within the Screening, Prioritization, and Implementation Details (SPID) document, which will provide a broader approach for licensees to follow when performing their seismic reevaluations. The SMA ISG will be referenced in the SPID. The staff is currently reviewing the SPID guidance document in support of the overall schedule of licensee seismic reevaluations.

Plants in the central and eastern United States are to perform seismic reevaluations by September 2013 and the four operating plants in the western United States are to perform the seismic reevaluations by March 2015.

[1] Pursuant to Sections 161.c and 182.a of the Atomic Energy Act, holders of construction permits will be required to respond to this portion of the information request.

On September 28, 2012, the NRC issued draft JLD-ISG-12-05, "Draft Interim Staff Guidance for Performing the Integrated Assessment for External Flooding," regarding guidance for facilities for which an integrated assessment for flooding is requested (i.e. those sites for which the current design basis flood hazard does not bound the reevaluated hazard for all potential flood mechanisms). For COL holders under 10 CFR Part 52, the issues in NTTF Recommendation 2.1 and 2.3 regarding seismic and flooding reevaluations and walkdowns are resolved and thus this ISG is not applicable. The public comment period for this ISG closed on October 28, 2012. The final guide is pending.

On October 26, 2012, the NRC issued draft ISG, JLD-ISG-12-06, "Draft Interim Staff Guidance for Performing a Tsunami, Surge, or Seiche Hazard Assessment," for public comment. This ISG provides licensees with methods that are acceptable to the NRC for performing tsunami, surge, or seiche hazard assessments for nuclear power plants. The public comment period for this ISG closed on November 26, 2012.

Emergency Preparedness RFIs

- Assess current communication systems and equipment under conditions of onsite and offsite damage and prolonged SBO.[2]
- Perform a staffing study to determine the number and qualifications of staff required to fill all necessary positions to respond to a multiunit event.[2]

Staff from the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, and Division of Operating Reactor Licensing in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation have worked together to develop a schedule for the review of the submittals and issuance of the safety evaluations (SEs) for all licensees by May 31, 2013. The staff will review the licensees' submittals in a phased approach, either by region or complexity of review, and will support the issuance of many of the SEs well before the May 31, 2013 completion date.

Status of Other NTTF Recommendations and Additional Issues

SECY-11-0137 included two Tier 1 recommendations that were not addressed by the orders or the request for information. One was a recommendation to enhance SBO mitigation capability, and the other was to strengthen and integrate onsite emergency response procedures, training, and exercises. Both of these recommendations remain Tier 1 priority issues and are being actively implemented through the NRC's rulemaking process. The NRC expects to complete the SBO rule in 2014 and the emergency response enhancements rule in 2016.

The NRC will address Tier 2 recommendations consistent with the milestone schedule set forth in SECY-11-0137.

Filtered Containment Vents

An ACRS letter dated, November 8, 2012, was sent to the NRC Commission reflecting the ACRS consideration of the NRC staff's proposal and recommendations concerning

[2] Holders of construction permits and combined licenses will be required to respond to this portion of the information request.

filtered vents to mitigate the offsite contamination and economic consequences of a release during a severe accident. The NRC Staff proposed four options regarding filtered vents, recommending Option 3, to install filtered vent systems on BWR Mark I and Mark II containments. The ACRS recommended implementation of Option 4, a more general, performance-based requirement that allows licensees to improve protection of nuclear power plants from radiation release during an accident. The NRC Commissioners will be receiving the staff proposal and recommendations before the end of November 2012.

NTTF Recommendation 1

The NTTF recommended establishing a logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense-in-depth and risk considerations to encompass beyond-design-basis events and their oversight through the following steps:

- Draft a Commission policy statement that articulates a risk-informed defense-in-depth framework that includes extended design-basis requirements in the NRC's regulations as essential elements for ensuring adequate protection.
- Initiate rulemaking to implement a risk-informed, defense-in-depth framework consistent with the above recommended Commission policy statement.
- Modify the Regulatory Analysis Guidelines to more effectively implement the defense-in-depth philosophy in balance with the current emphasis on risk-based guidelines.
- Evaluate the insights from the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) and the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) efforts as summarized in NUREG-1560, "Individual Plant Examination Program: Perspectives on Reactor Safety and Plant Performance," issued December 1997, and NUREG-1742, "Perspectives Gained from the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Program," issued April 2002, to identify potential generic regulations or plant-specific regulatory requirements.

The NRC staff has engaged stakeholders to help develop a regulatory framework to meet these recommendations. The staff is developing recommendations for the Commission which range from no change, to more extensive changes to extend regulatory coverage to beyond-design-basis events and requiring probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for external events. The Commission is expected to choose a course of action in February 2013.

Staff Project Plans for Tier 3 Items

NRC staff prepared plans to address each of the Tier 3 recommendations. These were included in the Commission paper dated July 13, 2012 (SECY-12-0095), where proposed project plans for implementing the Tier 3 recommendations were submitted for feedback. Additionally, several other items have been identified which have a nexus to Fukushima and have been placed in the Tier 3 process. The NRC has established a process to assess additional issues as they are identified, applying the same three-tiered prioritization process

used for the NTTF recommendations. Besides the additional issues identified in SECY-11-0137, the ACRS recommended further consideration and prioritization of reactor and containment instrumentation.

Each of the Tier 3 project plans discussed in SECY-12-0095 are unique, but all are intended to provide a roadmap for what actions or study the NRC should complete to be able to make an informed decision regarding whether to pursue further regulatory action or to conclude that the current regulatory approach is sufficient.

Fukushima Accident Studies

A committee of the National Academy of Sciences is conducting a Congressionally-mandated study of the lessons-learned from the Fukushima accident. A report to the NRC is expected to be delivered in April 2014. The report will focus on the causes of the accident and lessons for nuclear plant safety.

ASME-Related Generic Communications

ASME-related generic communications issued by (or in the process of being issued by) the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Office of New Reactors (NRO) since the last report (July 2012) to the OM Standards Committee are listed below:

Bulletins (BLs)

None

Generic Letters (GLs)

None

Information Notices (INs)

IN 2012-17 (09/06/2012):	Inappropriate Use of Certified Material Test Report Yield Stress and Age-Hardened Concrete Compressive Strength in Design Calculations
IN 2012-16 (08/29/2012):	Preconditioning of Pressure Switches Before Surveillance Testing
IN 2012-15 (08/09/2012):	Use of Seal Cap Enclosures to Mitigate Leakage from Joints that Use A-286 Bolts
IN 2012-14 (07/24/2012):	Motor-Operated Valve Inoperable Due to Stem-Disc Separation
IN 2012-12 (07/24/2012):	HVAC Design Control Issues Challenge Safety System Function
IN 2012-07 (07/17/2012):	Tube-to-Tube Contact Resulting in Wear in Once-Through Steam Generators

Regulatory Issue Summaries (RISs)

RIS 2012-10 (08/23/2012):	NRC Staff Position on Applying Surveillance Requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 to Administrative Controls Program Tests
RIS 2012-08 (07/16/2012):	Developing Inservice Testing and Inservice Inspection Programs Under 10 CFR Part 52

The full text of any of these NRC generic communications can be accessed by visiting the NRC's public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/index.html.