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Title: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board

Natural Resources Defense Council

RE: Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2

Docket Number: 05000247

Location: teleconference

Date: Thursday, June 14, 2012

Edited by Douglas Pickett

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB)
5	PRESENTATION
6	ВУ
7	NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.
8	+ + + +
9	THURSDAY
10	JUNE 14, 2012
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12	The conference call was held, John Lubinski,
13	Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, presiding.
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15	PETITIONER: NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
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17	PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS
18	JOHN LUBINSKI, Deputy Director
19	Division of Inspection and Regional Support
20	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
21	DOUGLAS PICKETT, Petition Manager for 2.206 petition
22	
23	CHRISTOPHER HAIR, Office of General Counsel
24	
25	NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF
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12	JORDAN WEAVER, Natural Resources Defense Council
13	THOMAS COCHRAN
14	MARK LEYSE, Consultant
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16	ON BEHALF OF THE LICENSEE
17	STEVE PRUSSMAN, Entergy
18	BILL DENNIS, Entergy
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	10:03 a.m.
3	MR. WEAVER: All right. So, my name is
4	Jordan Weaver. I'm with the National Resources Defense
5	Council. And I just wanted to quickly thank the NRC for
6	providing us with the opportunity to speak with the
7	Petition Review Board this morning regarding our
8	petition.
9	MR. PICKETT: Mr. Weaver, if I could
10	interrupt you, we have a script we want to run through
11	first.
12	MR. WEAVER: Sure, no problem.
13	MR. PICKETT: And then we will open the
14	floor for you in a few moments.
15	MR. WEAVER: Sounds great. Sorry about
16	that.
17	MR. PICKETT: No problem. Good morning.
18	My name is Doug Pickett. I'd like to welcome everybody
19	here. I am the Indian Point Project Manager. We are
20	here today to allow the petitioner, Mr. Jordan Weaver,
21	of the National Resources Defense Council, assisted by
22	Mr. Mark Leyse. The Petition Review Board also referred
23	to as PRB -

MR. WEAVER [LUBINSKI]: If we could ask, when people are not speaking, if they could put their

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phone on mute.

MR. PICKETT: Okay, we'll start again. I'd like to thank everybody for attending this meeting. My name is Doug Pickett, and I am the Indian Point Project Manager. We are here today to allow the petitioner, Mr. Jordan Weaver, of the National Resources Defense Council, assisted by Mr. Mark Leyse, to address the Petition Review Board, also referred to as the PRB, regarding the 2.206 petition dated April 16, 2012.

I am the Petition Manager for the petition.

The PRB chairman is Mr. John Lubinski. As part of the PRB's review of this petition, Jordan Weaver has requested this opportunity to address the PRB. This meeting is scheduled from 10 to 11 a.m. eastern time. The meeting is being recorded by the NRC Operations Center, and will be transcribed by a court reporter. The transcript will become a supplement to the petition. The transcript will also be made publicly available.

I'd like to open this meeting with introductions. As we go around the room here in headquarters, please be sure to clearly state your name, your position, and the office that you work for within the NRC, for the record. I'll start with myself, Douglas Pickett. I'm the Indian Point Project Manager in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, and I'm also the

1	Petition Manager.
2	MR. SALLMAN: My name is Ahsan Sallman. I
3	am the [a] Reactor Systems Engineer in the Containment
4	and Ventilation Branch, in the Office of Nuclear Reactor
5	Regulations.
6	MR. HAIR: I'm Christopher Hair from the
7	Office of General Council.
8	MS. RUSSELL: Andrea Russell, 2.206
9	Coordinator for the NRC.
10	CHAIR LUBINSKI: John Lubinski. I'm the
11	Deputy Director of the Division of Inspection and
12	Regional Support, and I will serve as the chair for this
13	petition review board.
14	MR. PICKETT: We've completed the
15	introductions of the NRC Headquarters. At this time,
16	are there any NRC participants from Headquarters on the
17	phone?
18	MR. FARZAM: Yes, this is Farhad Farzam.
19	I'm a Senior Structural Engineer, Mechanical and Civil
20	Engineering Branch, Office of Nuclear Reactor
21	Regulations.
22	MR. PICKETT: Are there any NRC
23	participants from the regional office on the phone?
24	MR. DOERFLEIN: Yes, this is Larry
25	Doerflein I'm Chief Engineering Branch 2 in NRC

1 Region 1. MR. BICKETT: And this is Brice Bickett, NRC Region 1, Senior Project Engineer for Branch 2. 3 MR. PICKETT: Are there any 5 representatives for the licensee on the phone? MR. PRUSSMAN: Steve Prussman, Entergy. 6 MR. DENNIS: Bill Dennis, Entergy. 8 MR. PICKETT: Mr. Weaver, would you please 9 introduce yourself, and anyone assisting you, for the record? 10 MR. WEAVER: Yes, my name is Jordan Weaver. 11 12 I am a Nuclear Program Scientist at the Natural Resources Defense Council. And with me, I have Dr. Tom Cochran, 13 who is also a scientist at the Natural Resources Defense 14 15 Council. And I believe also on the line is Mark Leyse, who I'll let introduce himself. 16 17 MR. LEYSE: Sure. Mark Leyse. MR. PICKETT: All right, thank you. 18 19 not required for members of the public to introduce themselves for this call. However, if there are any 20 members of the public on the phone that wish to do so at 21 this time, please state your name for the record. 22 hearing then will go on. 23 I'd like to emphasize that we each need to 24

speak clearly and loudly, to make sure that the court

reporter can accurately transcribe this meeting. If you do have something that you would like to say, please first state your name for the record.

For those dialing in to the meeting, please remember to mute your phones to minimize any background noise or distractions. If you do not have a mute button, this can be done by pressing the keys *6. To unmute, press *6 keys again. Thank you.

At this time, I'll turn it over to the PRB Chairman, John Lubinski.

CHAIR LUBINSKI: Good morning. Welcome to this meeting regarding the 2.206 petition submitted by Mr. Weaver of the National Resources Defense Council. I'd like to first share some background on our process. Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process - the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition the NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRC-issued license, or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staff's guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition

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requests is in Management Directive 8.1[8.11], which is publicly available.

The purpose of today's meeting is to give the petitioner an opportunity to provide additional explanation or support for the petition before the Petition Review Board's initial consideration and recommendation.

This meeting is not a hearing, not [nor] is it an opportunity for the petitioner to question or examine the PRB on the merits or the issues presented in the petitioner request. No decisions regarding the merits of the petition will be made at this meeting.

Following this meeting, the Petition Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations. The outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed with the petitioner.

The Petition Review Board typically consists of a Chairman, usually a manager at the senior executive service level at the NRC. It has a Petition Manager and a PRB Coordinator. Other members of the Board are determined by the NRC staff based on the content of the information in the petition request. At this time, I would like to introduce the Board.

I am John Lubinski, the Petition Review Board Chairman. Doug Pickett is the Petition Manager

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for the petition under discussion today. Andrea Russell is the office's PRB Coordinator.

Our technical staff includes: Ahsan Sallman of NRR's Containment and Ventilation Branch, Farhad Farzam from NRR's Mechanical and Civil Engineering Branch, and Brice Bickett and Larry Doerflein from NRC's Region 1 Office. We also obtain advice from our Office of General Counsel, represented today by Chris Hair.

As described in our process, the NRC staff may ask clarifying questions in order to better understand the petitioner's presentation, and to reach a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject the petitioner's requests for review under the 2.206 process.

I would like to summarize the scope of the petition under consideration, and the NRC activities to date. On April 16, 2012, Mr. Weaver submitted to the NRC a petition, prepared by Mr. Leyse, acting as a consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council, under 2.206, regarding the use of passive autocatalytic recombiners, hereafter referred to as PARs, at the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2.

In this petition, Mr. Leyse requests that the NRC order the licensee of Indian Point Unit 2 to remove the PAR system from the reactor containment,

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because the PAR system could have unintended ignitions in the event of a severe accident which, in turn, could cause a hydrogen detonation and ultimate failure of the reactor containment structure.

basis for request, As the this the petitioner describes the PAR system as simple devices consisting of catalyst surfaces arranged open-ended enclosure. In the presence of hydrogen, a catalytic reaction occurs spontaneously with oxygen at the catalyst surface. PARs do not need external power or operator action to function, and once installed, they cannot be stopped or turned off by control room operators following an accident.

The petitioner does not question the use of the PAR system during the design basis accident. However, the petitioner believes that the nearby Ramapo seismic zone could create a seismic event that exceeds the Indian Point design, thus inducing a severe reactor accident.

Once a severe reactor accident occurs, the petitioner believes that the PAR system will be overwhelmed by local concentrations of hydrogen gas, and effectively become ignition sources leading to the hydrogen detonation as described above.

Next, I'll talk about NRC activities to

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date. On April 17, 2012, the petition manager contacted the petitioner to discuss the 10 CFR 2.206 process, and to offer the petitioner an opportunity to address the PRB by phone or in person. The petitioner requested to address the PRB by phone prior to its initial meeting to make the initial recommendation to accept or reject the petition for review.

As a reminder for the phone participants, please identify yourself if you make any remarks, as this will help us in the preparation of the meeting transcript that will be made publicly available. Thank you. At this point, Mr. Weaver, I would like to turn the meeting over to you and Mr. Leyse, to provide any information you believe the PRB should consider as part of this petition.

MR. WEAVER: Thank you. And I want to thank, generally, the NRC for providing us with the opportunity to speak today. So, just a little background, for over a year now, NRDC's nuclear program has become increasing involved with the assessment of reactor safety, especially as it pertains to severe accident mitigation, and the plans of associated safety systems.

We believe this petition highlights the vulnerability in the passive autocatalytic recombiner system, or PAR system, currently installed in Indian

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thoroughly, and sites[cites] numerous studies that have 2 3 analyzed the behavior of PAR systems in a range of environments and scenarios. 5 And of a particular concern, is that which 6 is the result of a design basis accident or severe 7 accident, and how the transition into this environment plays the risk of the PAR system, being its ability to 8 9 mitigate any possible quantities of hydrogen produced. 10 NRC [NRDC] consultant Mark Leyse is a 11 principal researcher and author of this petition, and so 12 at this time, I will turn it over to Mr. Leyse to provide the remainder of our comments. And if there are any 13 questions, either now or at the end, I'm more than happy 14 15 to answer them. Thank you. CHAIR LUBINSKI: Okay, thank you, 16 Mr. 17 Weaver. Mr. Leyse? MR. LEYSE: Sorry, Mark Leyse speaking. I 18 forgot that I was on mute there. Sorry about that. 19 can hear me now? 20 CHAIR LUBINSKI: Yes, we can, thank you. 21 Okay, great, thanks. 22 MR. LEYSE: Okay. First, I'd like to cover some of the points that have been 23 made in the petition. On pages six and seven, there is 24 information about the fact that passive autocatalytic 25

Point Unit 2. The petition describes the problem

1 recombiners, which I will now call PARs, would operate automatically. 2 You covered this in your introduction, but 3 just to reiterate, they would commence operation when 5 there was enough hydrogen and oxygen available, and then there would be a reaction on their catalytic surfaces, 6 7 and they would commence operation without operator action. And so, Unit Number 2 operators would not be 8 9 able to turn PARs off, or stop PARs from operating. 10 Now, Unit 3, as is mentioned in the 11 petition, has electrical-powered thermal recombiners. 12 So, that is not a problem with the Unit Number 3. Okay, now on page 10 of the petition, there is a quote from -13 CHAIR LUBINSKI: Excuse me, Mr. Leyse? 14 15 MR. LEYSE: Yes? CHAIR LUBINSKI: Would you like us to ask 16 17 questions along the way, or -MR. LEYSE: Feel free to, please. 18 CHAIR LUBINSKI: Okay, can you just clarify 19 please, for me, when you say that it is not an issue for 20 Unit 3, your position on why it's not? 21 Oh, of course. 22 MR. LEYSE: Basically, Unit 3 has two electrically-powered thermal hydrogen 23 recombiners. It's a different type of recombiner than 24 the passive autocatalytic recombiners that are in Unit 25

2. And so, the thermal hydrogen recombiners that are in Unit 3, which actually used to be in Unit 2, operators would be able to control the operation of those two electrically-powered thermal hydrogen recombiners, of course if they were functioning properly.

But, the important thing is that if they weren't functioning properly, they wouldn't even be able to be actuated, and that's the problem that we have, is with the PAR system that's in Unit 2, it does not need any electrical power, so it's something that cannot be shut off if a detonable concentration of hydrogen were to build up in Unit 2's containment. So, that's the problem we have with that.

CHAIR LUBINSKI: Thank you for that clarification.

MR. LEYSE: You're welcome. Okay, just to continue, I'm just going through and highlighting certain things in the petition. On page 10 of the petition, there's a quote from an OECD Nuclear Energy Agency report from 2000. It states that quote, "A rapid initial hydrogen source occurs in practically all severe accident scenarios, because of the large chemical heat release of the zirconium steam reaction, that it causes a fast self-accelerating temperature excursion, which initially large surfaces and masses of reaction partners

are available."

So, basically, in the event of a severe accident also, if there were a scenario in which there was the reflooding of an overheated core, up to 300 kilograms of hydrogen could be produced in 1 minute, and that's information from a Nuclear Engineering and Design paper from 2003. That's on page 10.

And also on page 10, it states that the hydrogen removal capacity for each PAR unit is several grams per second of hydrogen. So clearly, Unit 2's two PAR units would not be able to handle the quantity of hydrogen that could be produced in a severe accident, within a time frame that would prevent the buildup of hydrogen to concentrations at which there could be either a deflagration or detonation.

They would be completely overwhelmed by the quantity of hydrogen produced in a severe accident. So, that's something that, you know, clearly they could help in a design-basis accident, but in a severe accident, they're not going to be effective. So, that's one of the main points that we're making.

And then, pages 14 to 16 of the petition, there's information about the fact that PARs have had unintended ignitions in three different experimental investigations. On page 15, there's a quote from a

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Nuclear Engineering and Design paper from 2004, which states that during the operation of PARs, "at a hydrogen concentration of 4 percent volume, maximum temperatures reach the ignition limits, which according to reports is in region of about 560 degrees Celsius, or 1,040 degrees Fahrenheit. Any further increase in the inlet hydrogen concentration would lead to catalyst temperatures above the ignition limit, and hence increase the risk of an unintended ignition."

And on pages 16 and 17 of the petition, there are quotes from recent reports that have discussed the fact that PARs behave like igniters in elevated concentrations. So, that would be the type of concentrations one would expect to have in the event of a severe accident.

On pages 18 and 19 of the petition, there is information about the fact that, "An unintended ignition of a PAR unit could cause a hydrogen detonation, in the event of a severe accident." That's a quote from a Nuclear Engineering and Design paper from 2003.

Clearly, safety issues regarding igniters pertain to PARs, because PARs would be likely to have unintended ignitions, and behave like igniters in the event of a severe accident.

On pages 19 to 21 of the petition, there are

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quotes from recent reports that have questioned the safety of using igniters to mitigate hydrogen at certain times in some severe accident scenarios, or without having conducted a thorough safety analysis with computer codes.

So, basically, that's the highlights of some of the things - information that is in the petition, and the reason why NRDC has submitted this petition requested that the two passive autocatalytic recombiners be removed from Unit number 2.

And now, I'd like to make a suggestion for Entergy, and in this, I'm going to reiterate some of the information I said in answering your question earlier. Basically, if Entergy would really like to have two hydrogen recombiner units at Indian Point Unit number 2, to handle the quantity of hydrogen that would be produced in a design-basis accident, NRDC has no objection to that.

We would - I should say, NRDC, again I am a consultant for them - So, NRDC would recommend that Entergy replace Indian Point Unit 2's two passive autocatalytic recombiners with two electrically powered thermal hydrogen recombiners, which is the type of recombiners that are currently in Indian Point Unit 3, and used to be in Unit 2.

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In the event of a severe accident, operators would be able to control the operation of the two electrically powered thermal hydrogen recombiners, if they were functioning properly. But, the main thing is, if they were not functioning properly, they would not be able to be actuated, which obviously, the PARs would turn on once a high enough concentration of hydrogen developed, and they would not be able to be shut off.

So, operators would be able to turn off electrically powered thermal hydrogen recombiners if an accident transitioned into a severe accident, in which there would be higher hydrogen concentrations. This is important, because thermal hydrogen recombiners are also prone to ignitions in the elevated hydrogen concentrations which would occur in severe accidents.

On this issue, a Sandia National Laboratories report, the title is Light Water Reactor Hydrogen Manual states that thermal recombiners, "Use is limited to containment atmospheres, that are not within the flammability limits," and that, "Thermal recombiners could be an ignition source for a flammable mixture in the containment."

Additionally, in a 2011 IAEA report, this is the title: Mitigation of Hydrogen Hazards in Severe Accidents in Nuclear Power Plants states, "Below a

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hydrogen concentration of about 4 percent, thermal recombiners may be used to reduce the hydrogen concentration. Above this value, they can act as igniters. Hence, their use is then only allowed if ignition is allowed. Care is needed in using thermal recombiners, as they may be damaged by the burn, and cause radioactive releases."

It is clear that Entergy should not use the two electrically powered thermal hydrogen recombiners in the Unit 3 containment in the event of a severe accident. I'm kind of going a bit off topic now, but just real quickly. The same would apply, of course, if Entergy did indeed decide to put those units back into Indian Point Unit 2's containment.

But, it's clear that the NRC needs to regulate severe accident training, so that plant operators would be instructed to not run thermal hydrogen recombiners in the event of a severe accident.

So, again, I just want to reiterate, if Entergy really wants to have two hydrogen recombiners at Indian Point Unit 2 to handle the quantity of hydrogen that would be produced in a design-basis accident, NRDC would recommend that Entergy replace Unit 2's two passive autocatalytic recombiners with two electrically powered thermal hydrogen recombiners, because operators would

not be able to control the operation of passive autocatalytic recombiners in a severe accident. And as covered in the petition, they are prone to ignitions which could, in turn, cause a detonation. Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any more questions that you may have.

CHAIR LUBINSKI: Thank you, Mr. Leyse. Again, this is John Lubinski. And I'm going to start with a couple questions here from NRC Headquarters, and then go around the table here, and go around to all the NRC folks to ask any clarifying questions.

Either Mr. Weaver, or Mr. Leyse, on page 5 of your petition, you state why you believe this is applicable to Indian Point Unit 2. You have clarified why it's not applicable to Indian Point Unit 3. Can I ask you to clarify why you believe this is applicable to Indian Point Unit 2, and not other nuclear power plants that may use PARs?

MR. LEYSE: First, this is Mark Leyse speaking. I would first like to give Jordan Weaver the opportunity to answer this if he would like. Otherwise, I'd be happy to answer that question.

MR. WEAVER: At the moment we don't have the necessary information to kind of make that judgment with regard to other plants. The issue was brought to us by

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1 Mr. Leyse that there was kind of a disparity between the two units. 2 And so, the installation of PARs at the 3 level which they're currently installed, which is only 5 two units, implies that this would only be able to handle the hydrogen during a design-basis accident, as Mr. Leyse 6 7 pointed out. 8 So, as to where it would apply to other 9 plants, if there are indeed other plants that employ the 10 use of passive autocatalytic recombiners in such a small number that they're only qualified for a design-basis 11 12 accident, and the other mitigating measures don't apply, that they would be able to handle the hydrogen produced 13 in a severe accident, then I suppose I could be possible 14 15 that it would apply to that plant. But, at this moment, we didn't have the information to make that judgement. 16 17 CHAIR LUBINSKI: Thank you, Mr. Weaver. LEYSE: Mark Leyse speaking. 18 Are 19 there other plants that you could list that have PAR units that are licensed by the NRC? 20 CHAIR LUBINSKI: You're asking 21 that 22 question of us? 23 MR. LEYSE: Yes. CHAIR LUBINSKI: And that's where I'm 24 asking for a clarification from the standpoint of, this 25

is our initial review, and looking at the scope of your petition, you've made specific reasons why you felt it was specific to Indian Point Unit 2.

So, I'm just asking for that clarification, of whether you're asking it just because that's the only plant you have knowledge of, of having PARs, or are you saying that any plant that has PARs, this would have the same - because when I read page five, I read it to be plant specific because of the population around Indian Point, as well as the seismic zone around Indian Point.

MR. LEYSE: Right, that is definitely - it is definitely plant specific for those reasons, because of the location of Indian Point, and also the high population density. So, there are many unique aspects of Indian Point.

I just want to point out that the PARs that were placed in Unit Number 2, were placed there in, I believe, in the late `90s, and maybe even in 2000, but I believe it was the late `90s. And in 2003, the NRC, they got rid of the regulation that would require a pressurized water reactor containment to have recombiner units.

So, most pressurized water reactor containments that still have hydrogen recombiners, have the electrically powered thermal hydrogen recombiners.

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They have the older type of system installed, just as Unit 3 still has.

So, I think because, I know for a fact that Unit Number 2 was the first American plant, or first plant licensed by the NRC to have PAR units installed. And so - and even before 2003, there was information available to licensees that they were going to most likely stop requiring hydrogen recombiners to be in containment buildings.

So, there - it is quite possible that Unit Number 2 is actually the only containment building by a plant that is licensed by the NRC that has PAR units. Now, it's also possible that there could be other plants that have it, but as I say, the regulation was - it was revoked in 2003, and prior to that, there was information available that they were not going to require hydrogen recombiner units anymore.

So, that - if indeed Unit Number 2 is the only plant that has PAR units, that certainly think that's plant specific. If not, if you want to say unit specific, since Unit 3 does [not] have the PAR units.

CHAIR LUBINSKI: Thank you, Mr. Leyse, appreciate it. What I'd like to do now, is go around the room here at Headquarters, to see if anyone here in the room has additional questions.

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MR. PICKETT: This is Doug Pickett. Leyse, I'd like to say the Board here is not aware of other plants with PAR systems. Are you aware of any plants in the country that have the PAR system, other than Indian Point 2? MR. LEYSE: No, I am not. And as I just said, it's possible that there are none besides Unit Number 2, for the reasons I just gave. MR. PICKETT: Thank you. LUBINSKI: Did you have other CHAIR questions, Doug? MR. PICKETT: I quess I just wanted to clarify your statements about the design-basis accident versus severe accident. Reading the petition, it came across to me that you did not have concerns about the design-basis accident, which we (inaudible 10:36:02). I wanted to clarify that. MR. LEYSE: Okay, Mark Leyse, I'll answer Yes, I believe that just - there is information, I think it's in the petition, regarding the quantity of hydrogen that would be produced in the event of a design-basis accident, and that is the - yes, on page 8, there is information about the quantity or the generation

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And that is from .001 to .05 of a kilogram per

rate of hydrogen that could be produced in a design-basis

accident.

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second.

So, that is a - the type of generation rate that a PAR unit, which has the capacity of several grams per second, could handle. So, we're talking about a situation where the PAR unit, it's a very reasonable device for handling the type of hydrogen generation that could occur in a design-basis accident.

However, we do have some additional information that just says that there can be some other - you know, it's a very complex issue, and that is also discussed on page eight and nine of the petition.

So, that's why we have made the - NRDC has made the recommendation of replacing the PAR units that are in Indian Point Unit 2, with thermal hydrogen recombiners, because recombiners can be an effective tool for removing hydrogen in a design-basis accident.

Or just to clarify, we're talking about just two units. So, it's not -

MR. WEAVER: If I could just interrupt really quickly. This is Jordan Weaver at NRDC. It's not necessarily that we don't have some concerns with how, you know, a PAR system or a thermal recombiner system could handle hydrogen produced during a design-basis accident, that would all depend on, you know, a case by case basis.

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1	But, as far as this petition goes, we didn't
2	actually speak to that problem. So, we are more
3	concerned, and this petition addresses the issue, of the
4	transition from a design-basis accident to a severe
5	accident, in terms of the amount of hydrogen produced.
6	So, it's just the inability to be able to
7	selectively use a mitigation system when you enter an
8	environment in which it is no longer applicable. So, and
9	that is what this petition speaks to, not necessarily how
10	it handles in operations for which it is likely qualified
11	how. That doesn't really concern us that much, because
12	there is reason enough to believe that they would operate
13	correctly in a design-basis accident.
14	CHAIR LUBINSKI: Thank you, both Mr. Leyse
15	and Mr. Weaver. There are no more questions here at the
16	Headquarters office where we're calling in from. I want
17	to turn next to Headquarters staff that are on the line.
18	Farhad, do you have any questions?
19	MR. FARZAM: No, John, I don't.
20	CHAIR LUBINSKI: Okay, thank you. Let me
21	turn to our regional staff. Brice and Larry, do you guys
22	have any questions?
23	MR. BICKETT: No, John, we don't.
24	CHAIR LUBINSKI: Thank you. I'd like to
25	now turn to the licensee. We have a couple licensee

representatives on the phone. Do you have any questions at this point?

MR. PRUSSMAN: This is Steve Prussman.

No, I don't.

CHAIR LUBINSKI: Okay. As Doug mentioned earlier, members of the public were allowed to call into the meeting, and did not have to identify themselves. Are there any members of the public right now, that would like to provide any comments regarding the petitions, or ask questions about the 2.206 petition process?

Okay. As hearing none, I assume there is either no one from the public on the line, or they chose not to ask any questions.

As stated at the opening of the meeting, the purpose of this meeting is not to provide an opportunity for the petitioner or the public to question or examine the Petition Review Board regarding the merits of this petition request. But, we did want to give members of the public and the licensee an opportunity to ask any questions.

Mr. Weaver and Mr. Leyse, I'd like to thank you for taking the time to provide the NRC staff with clarifying information on the petition you have submitted. Before we close, does the court reporter need any additional information for the meeting

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1 transcript? MR. WEAVER: We have a quick question, I apologize for - this is Jordan Weaver. 3 really quickly. MR. COCHRAN: And Mr. Cochran. 5 recognize this isn't the proper time to ask the Review Board, whether they could comment on the petition, but 6 I would like to ask whether any of the technical staff 7 or anybody at Entergy, in light of wherever they stand 8 9 with regard to the review of the petition, if they are 10 knowledgeable of any errors in the petition? Errors of fact? 11 12 CHAIR LUBINSKI: Mr. Cochran, thank you. As you said, the purpose of this Board today was for the 13 petitioners to present any additional information to the 14 NRC, and for us to ask clarifying questions. 15 licensee and any member of the public is allowed to 16 participate in this call, and ask questions of the Review 17 Board. With respect to the licensee being on the call, 18 19 it's up to you if you want to respond to any of the questions from the petitions. 20 21

MR. PRUSSMAN: We have no response.

CHAIR LUBINSKI: Okay, thank you.

MR. PRUSSMAN: Steve Prussman.

CHAIR LUBINSKI: Thank you, Mr. Prussman. I don't believe I got a confirmation from the Okay.

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1	court reporter. Does the court reporter need any
2	additional information for the meeting transcript?
3	COURT REPORTER: If I could get a copy of
4	the service list, that would be great.
5	CHAIR LUBINSKI: Service list? Okay.
6	Andrea Russell will put that together for you, thank you.
7	Okay, with that, this meeting is concluded, and we will
8	be terminating the phone connection. Thank you all.
9	Have a great day.
10	(Whereupon, the meeting concluded at 10:43
11	a.m.)
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