

REPORT OF INTERVIEW
WITH

(b)(7)(C)

On May 7, 1999, (b)(7)(C) Professional Service Industries, Inc. (PSI), Lombard, Illinois, an NRC licensee, was telephonically interviewed at (b)(7)(C) by Special Agent (b)(7)(C) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Investigations, Region IV (RIV). This report relates, in substance the information (b)(7)(C) provided regarding deliberate failure to maintain two-man surveillance during radiography operations, deliberate failure to (b)(7)(C) and potential radiation overexposure.

Prior to the interview, reporting agent repeatedly petitioned (b)(7)(C) to be interviewed, in person, at a location of his choosing, on the record. (b)(7)(C) adamantly refused the request for an in-person interview stating that he was no longer employed in the radiography field and had previously provided all pertinent information, in his possession, to his then supervisor, (b)(7)(C) PSI, Salt Lake City, Utah. Following repeated urging, (b)(7)(C) agreed to be telephonically interviewed.

(b)(7)(C) recalled the September 14, 1998, job at Eaton Metal Products (EATON), Pocatello, Idaho. He stated that he, along with (b)(7)(C) PSI, and (b)(7)(C) had driven to Pocatello, Idaho on the afternoon of September 14, 1998. According to (b)(7)(C) the radiography was of a thick metal vessel which required 4, one hour exposures. He further added, to the best of his recollection, they were using a (b)(4) Cobalt-60 radiation source. According to (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) remained at the job site for the first two exposures and then left to return to Salt Lake City, Utah. For the third exposure, (b)(7)(C) stated that he and (b)(7)(C) set up the shot and then he told (b)(7)(C) to maintain surveillance of the area from a vantage point where (b)(7)(C) could see all boundaries of the area. Upon cranking out the source, (b)(7)(C) proceeded to the PSI truck to process the previously exposed film. Approximately 1 hour later, he (b)(7)(C) exited the truck, cranked in the source and conducted the appropriate survey. For the fourth exposure, (b)(7)(C) stated that after he and (b)(7)(C) set up the shot, (b)(7)(C) initiated his surveillance of the area while he (b)(7)(C) again entered the truck to process film. (b)(7)(C) added that by this time it was approaching (b)(7)(C) or later on (b)(7)(C) and they wanted to finish the job as soon as possible. At the conclusion of the fourth exposure, (b)(7)(C)

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Exhibit 11
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Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act.
Exemptions (b)(7)(C)
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admitted that he did not exit the truck to crank in the source as he was busy processing film and lost track of the time. He claimed he did recall hearing (b)(7)(C) knock on the door and advise him (b)(7)(C) that he (b)(7)(C) was going to lie down in the truck for a while. He continued, stating that shortly thereafter [exact time unrecalled], he exited the truck and observed several EATON employees [NFI] crossing the barricaded area. According to (b)(7)(C) he was not sure if the source was still exposed and opted to shout at the individuals to "get out of the area." He added that after approaching the EATON employees, he conducted a test with his survey meter, found the readings to be safe and told the EATON employees it was safe. (b)(7)(C) stated he then spoke to (b)(7)(C) who informed him (b)(7)(C) that he (b)(7)(C) had retracted and secured the source at the completion of the fourth shot before going to lie down in the truck. (b)(7)(C) did not recall (b)(7)(C) previously informing him of his (b)(7)(C) securing the source but admitted that his (b)(7)(C) voice was muffled while he (b)(7)(C) was in the truck and he (b)(7)(C) quite possibly did not hear him (b)(7)(C) clearly. He added that (b)(7)(C) efforts to retract and secure the source were of his own volition and not at his (b)(7)(C) direction. (b)(7)(C) stated he informed (b)(7)(C) of the incident the next day.

(b)(7)(C) acknowledged receiving radiation safety training, while with PSI, to include the requirement for two-man surveillance during the conduct of radiographic operations. He further recalled receiving training on the prohibition of allowing an

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(b)(7)(C) When queried as to why he allowed both these acts to occur, (b)(7)(C) steadfastly claimed that both acts were prompted by desire to finish the job as soon as possible. Although (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) maintained that at that time, he didn't think that allowing (b)(7)(C) to perform the surveillance and active radiographic operations, by himself, were violations.

(b)(7)(C) again cited his preoccupation with finishing the job as his rationale. He claimed he felt reasonably safe with the situation and expressed greater concern regarding violation of the two-man surveillance rule than the conduct of radioactive operations by an (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C)

admitted that although he possibly frightened the EATON employees by yelling at them to exit the area, he later verified that the source had been secured and resultantly no over-exposure occurred. Under further questioning, (b)(7)(C) adamantly maintained that this was the first time he had allowed his

(b)(7)(C) to solely perform the boundary surveillance and conduct
(b)(7)(C)

In conclusion, (b)(7)(C) was resolute in his denial that the
aforementioned violations were deliberate in nature and
maintained that the late hour and his desire to finish the job
were the factors which led the violations.

(b)(7)(C) declined to provide reporting agent with the location of
his residence although did acknowledge that he was presently
receiving mail at (b)(7)(C)

This report was prepared on May 24, 1999, from agent's notes.

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Special Agent

Office of Investigations Field Office, RIV