

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

WITH

(b)(7)(C)

On May 5, 1999, (b)(7)(C) Professional Service Industries, Inc. (PSI), Lombard, Illinois, an NRC licensee, was interviewed in Salt Lake City, Utah, by Special Agent (b)(7)(C) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Investigations, Region IV (RIV). This report relates, in substance, the information (b)(7)(C) provided regarding the deliberate failure to maintain two-man surveillance during radiography operations, deliberate failure to (b)(7)(C) and potential radiation overexposure.

(b)(7)(C) advised that PSI had contracted with Eaton Metal Products (EATON), Pocatello, Idaho to perform radiography on several 2 1/2 inch thick metal vessels. According to (b)(7)(C) on the afternoon of September 14, 1998, he (b)(7)(C) along with (b)(7)(C) PSI, and (b)(7)(C) PSI, drove to the EATON job site in Pocatello, Idaho. (b)(7)(C) recalled he helped set up the boundary around the work area and remained there for the first two of four 1 hour exposures. According to (b)(7)(C) during the first two exposures, PSI followed the two-man surveillance requirement and ensured the presence of a certified radiographer whenever the source was exposed. At approximately 12:00 PM on September 14, 1998, he returned to Salt Lake City, Utah.

(b)(7)(C) stated that on the morning of September 15, 1998, he received a phone call from (b)(7)(C) EATON, advising him that several EATON employees [NFI] had crossed an unsupervised radiation boundary line. Additionally, (b)(7)(C) advised he was informed that one of the PSI employees [NFI] was observed sleeping in the cab of the PSI truck and that the EATON employees had possibly been subjected to an overexposure of radiation.

(b)(7)(C) offered that during subsequent conversations with (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) acknowledged sleeping in the truck but only after advising (b)(7)(C) he was going to do so. (b)(7)(C) acknowledged that he was in the truck processing film during the conduct of the third and fourth exposures thus allowing (b)(7)(C) to surveil the boundary and conduct active radiographic operations alone. As to the possible overexposure, (b)(7)(C) admitted that based on the information he received from (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) he determined that the duration of the barricade entry by the EATON employees was less than one

Case No. 4-1999-016

Exhibit 9  
Page 1 of 2

Information in this record was deleted in  
accordance with the Freedom of Information Act.  
Exemptions: (b)(7)(C)  
FOIA/PA 2013-0113-

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minute. Based on the location of the Cobalt 60 source, in relation to the point of trespass of the boundary, (b)(7)(C) estimated the EATON employees received less than 1 mr. He further advised that on September 17, 1998, he sent a letter (Exhibit ) to Chris SMITH, Corporate RSO, PSI, with an information copy to (b)(7)(C) informing him of the incident and his evaluation of the event. (b)(7)(C) claimed he (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) adding that he had not experienced any previous problems with (b)(7)(C) or (b)(7)(C) during the course of their employment with PSI. According to (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C) He provided reporting agent with (b)(7)(C) last know address and telephone number.

(b)(7)(C) described (b)(7)(C) as an average hand who would probably always remain an (b)(7)(C)

This report was prepared on May 25, 1999, from agent's notes.

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C) Special Agent  
Office of Investigations Field Office, RIV