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Combined License Applicants Public Meeting

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	PUBLIC MEETING
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6	FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR MERCHANT PLANT
7	COMBINED LICENSE APPLICANTS
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9	THURSDAY
10	OCTOBER 11, 2012
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12	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
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14	The Public Meeting convened in the
15	Commissioners' Hearing Room of One White Flint North,
16	11555 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Russell Chazell,
17	Moderator, presiding.
18	NRC STAFF PRESENT:
19	RUSSELL CHAZELL, Moderator
20	FRANK AKSTULEWICZ
21	AMY CUBBAGE
22	RANI FRANOVICH
23	TOM FREDRICHS
24	ERIC OESTERLE
25	MICHAEL SPENCER

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ALSO	PRESENT:
	GARY BECKER *
	NANCY BROCKWAY
	PATRICIA CAMPBELL
	GREG GIBSON
	ELLEN GINSBERG
	PETER HASTINGS *
	SCOTT HEAD

EDWARD KEE

PAT LOFTUS *

JOHN MATTHEWS

MARK McBURNETT

PAUL MURPHY

DAVID REPKA

JEFF SIMMONS

*Present via telephone

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PROCEEDINGS

8:32 a.m.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Okay, I guess we'll go ahead and get started. I just want to say thank you to everybody for taking the time to come out to our meeting today.

Good morning and welcome to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This public meeting is a discussion of Financial Qualifications for Merchant Plant Combined License Applicants. The meeting is scheduled to begin at 8:30. We're a few minutes behind and scheduled to end at noon today.

My name is Russ Chazell. I'm a project manager in the Policy Branch of the Division of Advanced Reactors and Rulemaking in the Office of New Reactors.

And I have a few announcements before we begin. This is a Category 3 public meeting. The public is invited to participate in this meeting by providing comments and asking questions throughout the meeting. Please sign the attendance roster near the door either now or after the meeting. The roster will be part of the official agency record.

Postage-page feedback forms are next to the attendance roster. Please complete them during the meeting or take them with you to mail back later.

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1 We value your opinion and we'll use your input for improvements. And all the slides, and other meeting 2 3 handouts, the agenda, are all by the door as well. There will be a meeting summary for this meeting and all 5 the handouts will be available in ADAMS. This meeting is also attended by toll-free 6 7 audio teleconference and GoToMeeting. If there are attendees on the line, I think we can tell who you are 8 9 through the GoToMeeting process. If you hear fire alarms, please exit the building to the lobby. 10 rooms are located outside this conference room and down 11 12 the hall toward the cafeteria. I'd like to just start out by introducing 13 the people sitting at the table here. I'll start with 14 15 our Division Director, Mike Mayfield. He's the Director of the Division of Advanced Reactors and Rulemaking. 16 17 Rani Franovich and you're the Director of? MS. FRANOVICH: Actually, I'm here in place 18 19 of Ho Nieh who is the Director of the Division of Inspection and Regional Support in the Office of Nuclear 20 Reactor Regulation. 21 22 MODERATOR CHAZELL: Thank you. Anneliese? 23 MS. SIMMONS: My name is Anneliese Simmons. 24 I'm a Financial Analyst and I work for Rani.

MS. CUBBAGE: Amy Cubbage. I'm the Chief of the Policy Branch in the Office of New Reactors.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Thank you. Now let's get started by laying out the plan for today's meeting. I'll start by providing some background for today's discussion topic and then introduce our first presenter, Ms. Anneliese Simmons, one of our NRC Financial Qualification Reviewers. She will give us an overview of the current state of NRC financial qualification analyses.

Then we'll hear three outside stakeholders discuss the challenges of merchant and plant finances. After that, we'll hear from a merchant/plant COL applicant. Each of the presentations will be 15 minutes in duration. Then we'll have a short break. And after the break, we'll start our open discussion of the issue.

To give the presenters time to complete their presentations, please hold your questions until the open discussion period. When speaking, please identify yourself and your affiliation and speak loudly enough for all to hear. We have hand-held microphones available as well.

Lastly, we have a transcriptionist present so that a record of our discussion will be available for future reference.

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And I'd like to just from a logistical perspective, I'd just like to say when we do the presentations, if you want to invite other people to come down and join you at the table, the presenters, that's great. And then when you're finished with your presentation, please step away from the table and we'll have the next presenter come down. Once we're done with all the formal presentations and we get back from the break, if you want to move chairs down here or we'll still have the hand-held microphones and we'll have more of an informal roundtable at that time.

And we'll also be asking the people on the bridge line if they have comments or questions and you can talk to Jonathan through the chat function in GoToMeeting to let us know that you have something to say.

With that, I'll begin. Today's meeting is intended for the NRC to hear from the public on the issue of the ability of merchant plant COL applicants to provide the information necessary to support the NRC's finding on financial qualifications. Some interested stakeholders have expressed the opinion that it is difficult for merchant plants to secure funding before issuance of the COL. Merchant plant applicants, the argument goes, may not be able to demonstrate project viability to potential business partners without

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possessing a COL, thereby creating a chick-and-egg conundrum for merchant plant applicants. The NRC staff has decided to explore this question further and so we're having today's meeting to gather your thoughts on it.

This will be the first of other meetings.

If we feel the need to do other meetings later, we will do that.

As I said earlier, we have several presenters this morning. The biographical information I'll give you as we proceed. It came either from their presentations, was provided separately, or was found on their websites.

Our first presenter, Ms. Anneliese Simmons, is a financial qualification reviewer in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and she will tell us about the current state of NRC financial qualifications review processes and requirements.

Before we get started with Anneliese, I'll just ask if there's anything that you all would like to add before get started?

MR. MAYFIELD: Well, Russ, I think I'd just like to reiterate the point that we got -- we started today's meeting with the notion of trying to gather some insight and information from stakeholders with the idea of framing a future discussion on this topic. This was

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not expected to be the one and only meeting on this subject, but we had to start somewhere, so we wanted to start with a less formal, more open-ended dialogue to make sure we understood fully the industry's perspective, stakeholders' perspectives, on what this issue really is, how broad the scope is and from that then use that as a structure to put together other meetings on this topic, if indeed we need to go further.

So we're at this stage gathering some information to talk about internally, as well as with you, about how to go forward, if we go forward and there seem to be some misunderstanding that this was going to be the one and only discussion on this subject which we don't think will be the case. So with that, I'll turn it back to Russ and Anneliese.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Thanks, Mike.
Anneliese?

MS. SIMMONS: Thanks, Russ. I work for the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Of course, these folks are the new reactor folks and we support them in our financial qualifications reviews. I just want to thank them for organizing this meeting. I do love to talk about money, but I'm not going to take 15 minutes to do that. I'm just going to step through the NRC's financial qualifications requirements. I'm going to

leave a couple of minutes at the end so that our staff attorneys can comment or clarify any of the points that I'm making.

It's really important, of course, for the staff to hear a broad range of views on this topic. It's pretty complex and of course, as we have more merchant plants, we're realizing how complicated it is becoming.

First, if we could -- first slide. I'm going to talk about -- there's two, two, and two. There's two parts to our financial qualifications different requirements. There's two kinds of And there's two different kinds of entities. So just a brief overview, our financial qualifications requirements have two parts. The first part is found in 10 CFR 50.33 which lists the requirements to meet reasonable assurance that there will be sufficient funding for a construction permit, an operational The combined operating license refers back to license. those two requirements and the requirement to present a five-year forecast for non-electric utilities.

The second part of our requirements are found in Appendix C to Part 50. That's where you see all the details as to what the specific requirements are. I've attached a free appendix for you to take home in case you want to read through 50.33.

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Let's go to the next slide.

There are two different kinds of utilities. The NRC requirements distinguish between two different kinds of utilities in the rules. And the first one, and for many years the only one that we ever had to analyze were electric utilities. By NRC definitions, those definitions are found in 10 CFR 50.2, the key point as an electric utility has access to cost recovery.

And back in the '80s, the requirements for electric utilities were lifted somewhat for financial qualification because the rationale was that electric utilities that have access to cost recovery are under the oversight of a state public service commission. And at the time, the NRC felt that there was confidence that the rate-making authority of the state public utility commissions gave us confidence that these utilities would always have the ability to meet the costs of safe construction and safe operation.

So the requirements are slightly different for electric utilities, as I'm sure you're aware. And we'll go to the next slide which is why we're here, the non-electric utilities. We call them non-electric utilities in our requirements. Most people call them merchant plants.

Non-electric utilities are subject to a

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full financial qualifications review. So they have a more detailed set of requirements that they need to meet because they do not have access to cost recovery. And I'll go into the specifics on the next two slides.

There's two main parts to the financial qualifications review. First, is that the applicant has to demonstrate -- we have to make a finding of reasonable assurance that the applicant has assurance of obtaining the funds necessary to cover construction costs and fuel-cycle costs. Some of the more specific requirements are listed on the slides.

The main challenge we have with this component of the financial qualifications review is that most applicants today have multiple sources of funds. It's a lot easier if you just have one source of funds and it's the rate base. With multiple sources of funds, we have to review each source of funds, but we also have to review kind of the sources of funds in the aggregate. So that's a challenge for the staff.

Go to the next slide.

The second part of the financial qualifications review is a finding of reasonable assurance that the applicant will have sufficient funds or the ability to obtain funds to cover operation costs for the period of the license. Well, the period of the

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license is pretty long. So the requirement is is that we expect applicants to give us a five-year pro forma, a five-year projection of what those operating costs are.

Of course, the challenge with the non-electric utilities, the merchant plants, is that their debt service, so depending on what the construction costs are, that debt service needs to be covered by the revenue stream in their pro forma and that inter-relation is what is causing a challenge for everybody here today. Of course, we need to review the sources of funds again, and also the financial, the credit worthiness of each source of funds.

Go to the next slide.

Now to the two different kinds of entities. So the rules also distinguish between newly formed entities and established entities. So if we take a step back again, the rules have two parts, there's two different kinds of utilities and now there's different requirements depending on if you're an established entity or a newly-formed entity. Of course, the rationale is that an established entity has some sort of operational experience. They can provide historical financial information. That's more solid data for the staff to be able to make a finding. Newly-formed entities have more detailed requirements because they don't have

that operational history.

Of course, many, if not all of our applicants today fall into that category with the most specific requirements. They are non-electric utilities and newly-formed entities. And that's what we're here to talk about today.

Finally, just to wrap it up, oh, Appendix C to Part 50, very important, can't forget that, very important. That's where all the details are about what the additional requirements are for newly-formed entities and just also hashes out some of the more detailed requirements that refer back to 50.33.

And finally, of course, the caveat we can always ask for more information if we feel that we need more detailed information depending on the facts and circumstances.

I'd like to see if the staff attorneys have anything to add or comment on or if I made any mistakes or anything like that? Okay. We can always clarify anything during the conversation, but thank you for coming today and I'm looking forward to the different viewpoints. Thank you.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Thanks, Anneliese. I appreciate that very much. I'm trying to get used to these microphones here.

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All right, then we'll just move into our presenters. Again, as we said before, we'd like to limit the presentations to 15 minutes. That way we'll have plenty of time for our roundtable discussion and we'll also be able to engage the people on the bridge line. And I'd like to start first with Mr. Paul Murphy from Milbank.

Sir, you can come up and sit at the table or you can invite other people to join you, if you'd like, or you can use the hand-held microphone, however you would like to proceed.

Mr. Murphy is a senior attorney at Milbank
Tweed Hadley and McCloy, LLP in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Murphy.

MR. MURPHY: Thank you very much. I'd like to thank the NRC for giving me the opportunity to make these remarks today.

Just as a little background on our firm, not as an advertisement, but more just as background, we're not a regulatory firm. We don't practice before the NRC. We kind of stay on the transactional side of things. So we represent financial institutions, for example, we represented the Department of Energy on four of the nuclear loan guarantee applications. We're currently representing the export credit agencies and the commercial banks in the financing for the four units in

the UAE and some other things that we can't really talk about in a public forum. But essentially, we stay on the transactional side and our finance practice, both nuclear and non-nuclear, our clients oftentimes are the banks, whether they be commercial banks or expert credit agencies.

So really these remarks are sort of a reflection of what we've gleaned from those representations over the years.

You can go to the next slide, please.

Unfortunately, I have to leave at 10 o'clock, and I know there's a question and answer period later, but if anybody has questions, either as I'm going or at the end, please feel free to interrupt. I come from an Italian family, so I'm used to getting interrupted a lot. So that's not a problem.

But essentially, these are the four areas I'm going to try and go through in the allotted time, so we can go to the next stage. Just to sort of lay the foundation, again, from a banking perspective, and whether or not these projects can be financed, what I've done is provided sort of a classic list of what you would consider to be concerns from the banking community with regard to financing a nuclear power project.

I think the top four are there for a reason

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because I think when you go through these issues you'll see that those are sort of the classic set of concerns that you hear first and foremost from the financial community. The one that I would put that happens to be their fourth, but reputational risk, I think what we mean by that -- whenever you talk about a nuclear project, there's sort of a heightened sensitivity, generally, for better or for worse. But when you talk about reputational risk, what I think the banks want to see is that it's a good project, that it's using responsible It's complying with international best technology. practices. It's complying with the case international projects, equator principles, or IFC lending standards to make sure that things are being done from an environmental and social perspective.

And so I think from a banking viewpoint, when you talk about how a bank would approach a project, there's on the one side the classic set of concerns, is this a good project? Am I going to get paid back? How am I going to get paid back? But then on the other side, it's all these what you would consider to be reputational risk issues to make sure that they're being associated with a responsible project.

Next slide, please.

Similar to the concerns is sort of a list

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of the classic list of risks. From a banker's perspective again, they want to see that all these risks have been properly identified and allocated and you can be sure that they don't want to take any of them. So they're going to be looking for other people in the deal to make sure these risks have been properly addressed.

Next slide, please.

You hear the term project finance. And the next set of slides really goes into what we mean by that. And the first point is there's financing of a project and project finance. Project finance is a term of art. And really what that means is it's a non-recourse or limited-recourse structure where you have a special-purpose entity essentially developing the project with the banks lending into that SPV and then looking to the revenue stream generated by that SPV in operation to pay back the debt.

The first point is that we've never had in the history of the world a textbook project-financed nuclear power plant. And so there are reasons for that which I think inform the discussion about merchant power and how can it be financed, can it not be financed. Essentially, it's important to understand that there's a certain set of rules that go with the project finance concept and we go to the next page.

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Some of the reasons why we see that project finance hasn't seemed to work in the nuclear space, not that it can't be done, but that there's some challenges that exist, regulatory risk which is relevant to this forum right here because as we've seen with the history of the U.S. fleet that regulatory delays have been something -- regulatory changes have affected how projects are brought to market. Political risks, we've seen instances in places like Germany that have made wholesale changes in their view toward nuclear power. And so we have sort of the public-opinion component to all of this that can impact whether or not projects are viable.

The classic schedule issues of can you deliver it on time and then the budget issues of can you deliver it on budget? When you talk about project finance and nuclear because you're thinking about generally a five-year construction period, if you miss by a year and somebody has loaned you \$100,000 or \$100 million, it's not that big a deal. When someone may have loaned you \$8 billion or \$10 billion, that starts to become a really big deal. And so because of the orders of magnitude of these projects, a little bit of a miss becomes a really big problem from a financing perspective.

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Moreover, very nuclear-specific concerns in a project-finance structure, if the project goes bad the banks come in, they can take the asset. That doesn't really work in nuclear for a couple of reasons. First, if the banks take the asset, they have concrete, steel, and some stuff that you should only touch in very specific instances. And you can't operate it because you have to be licensed operator. So there's a disconnect between a bank taking over the asset and what a regulatory regime does in terms of how that asset can be operated. In a lot of places, it's a strategic asset for a country. You know, in the United States, it's a little bit different, but generally speaking in the world it's viewed as a strategic asset.

And then on top of it, it's a very specific asset. If you're doing a project financing of a toll road, if you don't like the way someone is paving the road, you terminate them, you bring in somebody else and they keep paving the road. It's not very exciting. But when you consider the NSSS market if you terminate an AREVA, if you terminate a Westinghouse, there's nobody that can really come in and finish that project because the technology is very specific. So these are sort of that when you hear, well, why doesn't project financing work it's important to understand what we're talking

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about.

Next slide, please.

So what we have in the United States is the classic utility balance sheet model where you're looking at the utility doing this traditionally in regulated markets based on the history of the utility markets of the United States where they can pass the development costs along. And in the good old days, whatever it ended up costing you just rolled it into the rate base. Now with prudency reviews, that's not so easy. We're seeing that in certain regulatory markets now.

Next slide, please.

But the reality is one of the challenges is our utilities aren't that big when you look at the size of these projects. And so here's just a snapshot of the size of our utilities. And one of the things we used to hear is that well, in Europe, the situation is different.

You can see that that's changed drastically, and so even in Europe a lot of their utilities are facing the same issues in terms of capacity. And just for fun, if you go to the next slide, you can see why can oil companies do these massive petrochemical projects and they don't seem to have a problem. They live in a different neighborhood based on

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the size of their market caps, so it's a completely different ballgame. And that's just for thinking about things.

Next slide.

So size does matter. And if you're looking at relying on the balance sheet to make this happen, one of the consequences is the burden that it places on a credit rating. And that starts to discourage utilities from going forward and doing this on a balance-sheet basis and rating agencies take a very conservative view with regard to nuclear. So it's this vicious cycle of well, if I put it on my balance sheet, then I get dinged by the rating agencies. Then my credit rating goes down. Then it costs me more money to raise elsewhere for other things I want to do and it's this vicious cycle.

And again, because of these long development periods and then 60 to perhaps 80 years of operation, it's very hard for an executive to walk into a board room and say check this out, I've got this great idea. We're going to spend billions of dollars for the next ten years. We're not going to see any money, but don't worry. Forty years from now when we're all dead, this thing is going to be making tons of money. It's not really a winning proposition for a corporate. And that's kind of the challenge that we have to deal with.

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So moving on, what do banks want to see? They want to see certainty. They want to see on time, budget, proven technology, risk allocation, government commitment, а clear and predictable regulatory process which as we've changed our regulatory process now, it is now uncertain because no one actually has really gone through it until just very recently to get the combined construction and operating license application. That's been a point of uncertainty. Hopefully, we get past that.

Where do you tie financing and licensing together? I think there are a number of answers to that. But before banks would want to fund into a project, they would want to make sure that the licenses are properly obtained. And so you start getting into when do you go for financing? When do you go for your license and these timing issues become very significant. But from a market perspective, ideally what banks would like to see if you're talking a merchant project is not selling on the spot market. You'd want to see long-term PPAs that you can look to with dedicated credit worthy off-takers that can show that the debt will be serviced at least for the term of the debt.

And so what are the challenges for nuclear?

Circling all the way back to those initial slides, right

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now we don't have such a good story on on time, on budget. Hopefully, that changes over time. But until we have a lot of data points for projects in the United States that does make it a problem. Moreover, nuclear is a price taker, it's not a price setter. And when you look at where gas prices are today, that makes it very hard to justify a new nuclear project competing with gas prices, based on current market pricing for gas and for electricity. You need something else. That's why we reference the PPA.

Next slide, please.

So this doesn't sound like a very good story, you know? It's all sort of doom and gloom perhaps, but you know I think then you have to take a step back and you say okay, well, here are the challenges for a merchant. I mean hopefully nothing that I've said is all that innovative and these are fairly recognizable ideas. But you know in a broader sense, how does nuclear fit into our energy strategy overall? Do we want to have concerns about energy security, energy diversity? Where do we put nuclear in a broader sense? Is the story on natural gas fully told? We're enjoying really low prices now, but you read stories about wells being contaminated and seismic events because of fracking. The story is not fully written on the natural gas market.

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And so do we rush all -- put our chips all on the table for one form of generation? Or do we want to have a diversified portfolio? How does this fit within our carbon goals because if we look at baseload generation needs, we look at carbon needs, conservation, renewables and natural gas is a nice combination, but you know, you can't get there from here. Nuclear has its place in this mix.

So the question is well, how do we drive things to that? And if the licensing process starts to marginalize merchant plants, we're limiting our options and I think that is the challenge in all of this is that yes, we don't have a great story from a financing perspective, but what is the consequence if we fully exploit that story to the extreme and say okay, we're just not going to go there. There may be larger consequences that have to be put into play.

And so if we take the view then that we don't want to close the door on merchant nuclear power, what should the NRC be thinking about?

And we can go to the next slide.

I think at the end of the day it starts to become sort of a project viability test. You know, if someone shows up with a license is this guy a serious player? Is this someone we should give the time of day

to? Should we invite him in for coffee? And the reality is what types of things we should consider? Is it proven technology or not? How much is first-of-a-kind and let's not abuse that term because just because a plant has never been built before doesn't mean the entire plant is first-of-a-kind. And there's a balance in all of that.

Who are the people? What kind of financial strength do they have? How much equity can they commit to this project and is it believable? What kind of contracts do they have in place? Who are the project participants? Is this someone who has never done it before, someone who has never built it before, someone who has never built it before, someone who has never operated it before? That's creating all kinds of uncertainty, not just for the regulatory review process, but the banks are going to look very dimly on those things.

And what we're trying to get to is is this feasible? What's the market feasibility study that's been done? Is there a credible financing plan that this thing has a snowball's chance in hell of ever coming to fruition? And that's kind of the test. Is there a real project? And then the question is is the NRC in a position to make those kind of economic assessments? I don't know the answer to that.

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I'm here to sort of say that I have that answer, but that becomes possibly part of the process because at the end of the day, if you can finance it is the make or break test for any of these nuclear projects. It's probably the largest challenge for projects worldwide, whether it's regulated or merchant, whether it's in the United States or elsewhere. That's sort of where the rubber hits the road on all of these is can you finance the thing, despite best intentions. that's kind of when you have this discussion about merchant power, that's what you ultimately end up with. Who are the parties? Is this a good project that might have a chance? And what we've seen is if you put together a good project, you increase the chances of actually financing it, even if it's merchant. I don't mean to say that it's impossible. It's harder to finance merchant, but not impossible.

Last slide.

I think at the end of the day for the banks, bottom line, you have to create a compelling case. They're going to look at it as an opportunity cost assessment. I have this pile of money. I can either put it in this merchant power project or I can put it in something else. Why should I put it in this nuclear project? And that's up to the sponsors to create that

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compelling story from the contract perspective, from a financing document perspective, from a financial viability perspective to convince the banks. But that can't be left for the end because you've got to attract the market. And at the end of the day, you know, I think you'll hear from some other people today, this ultimately results in a question of financing, but also of what are our larger goals from a policy perspective.

We see what was attempted to be achieved through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 with some programs. We could debate whether that was the right set of tools or not, but it was clearly an indication that the Government had to step in and do something. We're seeing it in the U.K. again right now and we'll see how that story ends up. But I think sort of the message is the market doing it on its own, right now you're probably not going to get there on a merchant plan. That doesn't mean that if we value nuclear from other perspectives that you can't through a series of tools and project structuring put together a viable project that can actually get built, financed, properly operated, be economically viable. But right now, I think with market conditions you need a little bit of help. And it doesn't mean that we throw the baby out with the bath water. It's just that one decision in isolation, if we focus on the challenges,

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you may come to one answer. When you look at other broad policy goals and considerations, you may come to a very different answer. And I think that the goal is to balance the two because of that.

So with that, I thank you for your time and attention. My contact information is here. I'm happy to answer questions.

MR. MATTHEWS: Since we're going to lose you to the roundtable, Paul, you've described a lot of high hurdles for getting banks to loan money into a project financed for a merchant plant and I agree with you, there are a lot of high hurdles. But given those hurdles and given the standards that the banks would apply which is really an extremely high standard, I mean you talk maybe even just reputational risk before banks are willing to lend money into a project like that.

In your professional opinion, if you could pull together a closing of a non-recourse project finance for a large nuclear infrastructure project to be built on a merchant basis in the United States, if you could pull that off and you had the documentation and you were prepared to close on that documentation, in your professional opinion, would there be, by virtue of accomplishing that reasonable assurance that you would have adequate funds for construction and operation?

MR. MURPHY: It becomes a function of how you structure your project because I would submit that right now unless you're getting a sovereign loan from the Russians, the real way to finance these projects and this is on a global basis is that you need export credit agency financing.

And so when you look at how you might deliver a project in the United States, we have a wonderful institution, who -- full disclosure -- is a client of ours that is ready, willing, and able to support nuclear power projects, US Ex-Im. The only asterisk to all of that is they can only finance things outside of our borders which is kind of sad when you think about it which means that then you need -- there's not a domestic equivalent right now that can do what US Ex-Im can do.

And so a sad consequence of our nuclear industry over time is we probably can't build a nuclear project based on a full U.S. supply chain, soup to nuts. But what that does then is open up, that as you bring in foreign participants that you could bring ECA financing from a JBIC, from a COFACE, somebody like that who might be willing to participate in these projects and have looked at some projects that have not gone forward. But based on our discussions with ECAs, depending on how you structure the project, there is willingness to step in

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and finance them.

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Again, you may have a specific case where you may have heard differently. I don't challenge that. I just know that ECAs are looking for ways to participate in nuclear projects, but then you get into their analysis of how am I going to get paid back? And that becomes a big issue. An ECA, despite its best intentions, might not be willing to take full merchant risk. That goes back to the PPA points. They may want to see that a certain percentage of off-take is through PPAs.

And you're shaking your head, so obviously

Paul, you're analyzing MR. MATTHEWS: whether or not I can do it. I'm asking you, in your professional opinion, if I can pull together a project finance where the banks are willing to loan the money, they're willing to close, and loan me billions of dollars to build my project, and I may have a DOE loan guarantee. I may have export credit agencies loaning money to the projects from a foreign government, but if they're willing to close and lend me money for my project on a non-recourse basis, do you think at that point that there would be reasonable assurance that I would have enough money to construct and operate the project, if the banks are willing to lend the money?

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1	MR. MURPHY: It depends on where your
2	equity is coming from and what your debt equity spread
3	is. So if you have you're not going to finance a plant
4	with 100 percent debt, so let's for the sake of argument
5	say it's 70-30 debt to equity. Then the question is who
6	is the sponsor in the deal, where is the equity coming
7	from?
8	MR. MATTHEWS: Are the banks going to be
9	willing to loan me money if I don't have equity committed
10	from rational sources?
11	MR. MURPHY: Yes, they will not be willing
12	to loan you money.
13	MR. MATTHEWS: They would not be willing.
14	So if they're willing to loan me the money, then I have
15	that problem solved, right?
16	MR. MURPHY: If you have a fully-financed
17	project, yes.
18	MR. MATTHEWS: Yes. So if I have a
19	fully-financed project and the banks are willing to
20	close, they're not going to close unless I have the
21	equity?
22	MR. MURPHY: Correct.
23	MR. MATTHEWS: Because they're not going to
24	give me the money.
25	MR. MURPHY: Because you don't have a

fully-financed project.

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MR. MATTHEWS: By definition, if I close a multi-billion dollar infrastructure project financed project, on a non-recourse basis, that means the banks have the opinion that I have enough money to construct and operate, right?

The one question MR. MURPHY: Yes. they're going to ask is if you say my project is going to cost \$100. Let's make up this silly financial argument. And you have a 70/30 or a 60/40 financing plan. And you can demonstrate okay, the 30 is here. It's dedicated from the equity. Maybe it all goes in first before you start drawing down on the debt and all that sounds good. The one remaining question that they're going to ask is if your project costs \$115 and not \$100, where is the extra \$15 coming from?

MR. MATTHEWS: Right.

MR. MURPHY: And if it's truly non-recourse and you don't have standby support from the sponsors, the banks will look very dimly on that because we're burdened with the history of the --

MR. MATTHEWS: So in that example, the banks may well require me to have \$115 secured in order to build my \$100 project.

MR. MURPHY: And then they're going to look

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for someone such as a financial advisor, not a lawyer, but a financial advisor and a technical advisor to sort of validate okay, if you have \$115 and not \$100, what's our certainty that \$115 is -- the extra \$15 is the right level of, call it, contingency or is it more?

And I think at that point everybody in the project has to be reasonable because as a lawyer, I'm trained to come up with what if examples until I go to sleep at night. But then you have to do sort of the risk-adjusted analysis.

You can always say something could go wrong, but it then becomes what's the likelihood, what's the percentage that this bad event is going to happen and how has that been built into the project? Because any series of things could go wrong. That's no different than any other project. It's just that I think because of the history of projects in the United States and heightened sensitivity for nuclear, those risks are highlighted a bit more. So the banks --

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Excuse me, just for a second. If you could identify yourself for the transcriptionist, I'd appreciate that.

MR. MATTHEWS: This is John Matthews from Morgan Lewis.

The banks are going to have -- they really

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1 have very low risk tolerance. They're going to have extremely high standards before they go to that closing. 2 3 MR. MURPHY: Yes, I mean in a perfect world, the banks might -- I don't think you're ever going to have 5 non-recourse. You may have limited recourse with some sort of a completion quaranteed by the sponsors, such 6 7 that once the money is all in and the project has been built, then there's no further recourse to the sponsors. 8 9 But to have somebody with a real balance sheet that's committed until the end, to put in whatever it takes to 10 finance it, I think is important. You know, we all make 11 12 fun of OL3 in Finland, but the reality is AREVA and Siemens stuck with it until the bitter end. It's going 13 to cost them a ton, but they stuck with it. And I think 14 that those were real balance sheets behind that deal. 15 That's probably what people are going to see. 16 17 You know, the classic developer, ten guys in a garage with an idea, isn't going to fly for nuclear. 18 19 That may work in some renewables-type spaces where people get really excited. It's not going to work for nuclear. 20 MR. MATTHEWS: It sounds like the banks are 21 going to be a lot harder on me than the NRC ever would. 22 23 MR. MURPHY: Probably. MS. SIMMONS: Paul, could I just ask you a 24 quick question for the staff and then I'll stop? I won't 25

be as long as John because I'm not a lawyer.

(Laughter.)

I just -- John's point is well taken in that of course if banks have the commitment to fund that for the staff, of course, it's a very detailed analysis we can to a certain extent rely on that. Will banks make -- they can make that commitment, conditional upon receipt of a license. Is that correct?

MR. MURPHY: Yes.

MS. SIMMONS: They don't have to -- you don't have to have the license. I mean licensing clearly is the component. It was on your slides as part of the risk. But in terms of timing couldn't the banks come up with commitment letters prior to licensing and make the actual funds available upon receipt of the license?

MR. MURPHY: The short answer is yes. The longer answer is while that will protect them in terms of the documentation to say I'm not letting any money out the door until you get X, Y, and Z, you know, construction and operating license, whatever else you want to tack on to that, it puts a little more pressure on the -- call it the pro forma analysis for the project.

So getting back to the point of is it \$100 or \$115, well, if you're already in construction, if you've already poured first concrete and you go out for

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financing, there's a little more certainty because you're already in the mix. The closer you are to first concrete, the more that they can have confidence that okay, if I'm lending for the next five years, I don't like thinking five years ahead. If I was so good at that I'd be in Las Vegas, not financing.

But the more spread you have between -- you know, if they were to go in for the start of licensing and you say well, it's 18 months of that, that's just going to create more uncertainty on the pro forma at which point I think the bank's natural reaction is to say okay, Mr. or Ms. Sponsor, you need to give me more of a commitment. That \$115, there's more of a delta around that \$115 than you're telling me and that \$115 could become \$130 rather easily, so I'm going to just ask for more in terms of the robustness of the equity commitment and that's where you end up.

MS. SIMMONS: Thanks.

MR. FREDRICHS: This is Tom Fredrichs from NRC and my question is when you talk about the regulatory process on one of your slides about a COL could be a condition precedent to financing, but you also said that does not preclude the banks from closing before the COL is issued. And I wonder if you could explain what you mean by closing and how that's different to actual

financing?

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MR. MURPHY: Sure. Think of it as -- I'll use the term closing and funding or closing and first draw. So you can have your full set of financing documents that go on for hundreds of pages that lawyers get paid for and bore to tears everybody else. But what you would do is you would basically say we have a deal. Here is the money and we will -- you have the right to start drawing down on this debt facility upon the satisfaction of these conditions. And so when you have this type of a structure, any time that the developer wants to draw, he has to certify that all these things have occurred. One of those things would be I've obtained my construction and operating license. they were to walk in and say give me my money, you would say well, do you have your COL? If not, go away and come back to me when you have it.

And so you can build in all these things. I think that it's nice for banks to be able to say they've closed, but the devil and the details is then but when can you actually start getting money out of the facility? And again, because of uncertainties, the more -- call them conditions subsequent to the closing which are then conditions precedent to the first draw that you build into the documentation, you're then creating more

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uncertainty in the deal which from actually the developer, the sponsor, owner, call him whatever you want, perspective, that uncertainty, the bankers being passive creatures that they are, will simply say I want you to put more money in the deal, because I can point to all these things that have to happen and that makes me nervous. And so it's making it probably harder for the developer to get that financing because the banks are going to be more rigorous in what they require.

MR. FREDRICHS: Just maybe one followup on the conditions that would have to be satisfied before money was to be drawn and you alluded to this in your talk. Is the NRC the right entity to decide what these conditions should be or is that more naturally the sort of thing that the investors and the financers would be best placed to decide what conditions are needed?

MR. MURPHY: Well, I think from a funding perspective, the banks are going to do that regardless. The banks are going to just as a natural matter put a lot of stock in the regulator, whether it's the NRC or the regulator in another country, because at the end of the day the expectation from the financial community is that the regulator is the adult in the room. At the end of the day, if something is going wrong the regulator will put a stop to something.

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So from a banker perspective, if they can point to a competent regulator and this is an issue for countries that are starting nuclear programs. This is an issue for FANR in our UAE project. Does FANR know what it's doing? Has it been vetted by IAEA? The answer to those by the way are yes. But that's an important part of the process for the banks because at the end of the day, they don't have a huge staff of nuclear experts resident within their institutions that feel that they can pass judgment. They want to say is this project following prudent industry practices?

And so they're going to rely on the regulator and part of that process is the licensing process and the oversight process so that they can say when people are protesting outside of their office which happens for non-nuclear projects as well, they're going to say look, you know, we are putting stock in the regulator. We believe that they're competent and if the regulator says it's okay, it's okay.

So I think that the banks rely heavily on the regulator in a financing as part of the diligence process to make sure that it is a good project, whatever we choose to define that to mean. In terms of the NRC's view on financing, I think there's two considerations. One is why do you care at all? Then the other sense is

well, with limited resources and you having to triage, well, there's an ordering of I can do this and then I go to the next thing, where should I spend my time. You know, again, there are a lot of people out there with great ideas, but only a small percentage of those ideas, whether it's nuclear or otherwise go forward.

And vetting the people that come to the table and ask for your attention at some levels would seem to make some sense just from an organizational perspective. What you throw into that basket of conditions, that's for other people to decide, but the reality is if these projects don't ultimately have financing, there is no project. So doing some sort of a pressure test, if you will, on economic or financial viability, would seem to make sense. Then it becomes a question do you have people within your institution that are able to do that. That becomes just a staffing issue and whether that's something you outsource or not becomes a second level question.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Okay, I think we need to move on to the next presenter.

MS. CUBBAGE: Russ, before we do that, since Mr. Murphy is going to be leaving, I'd like to make sure we allow an opportunity for the folks on the phone to interject at this point if they'd like to.

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1 Is there anyone on the line that would like 2 to ask any questions? 3 (No response.) Okay. 5 MR. MURPHY: Thank you. All right, our next MODERATOR CHAZELL: 6 7 speaker, Mr. Edward Kee is vice president of NERA 8 Consulting in Washington, D.C. 9 Mr. Kee. Thank you. 10 MR. KEE: Thanks, Russ. Thanks, Joanne, Anneliese, for inviting me. I apologize that these 11 12 slides were some I used a couple of weeks ago in London at the WNA conference, but I think they work for what I'm 13 going to say here. 14 I'll also say that as background, we're 15 involved with the DOE loan guarantee program looking at 16 regulatory and market risk, so some familiarity with some 17 of these projects that are going on in the U.S. 18 19 Next slide. Next slide. This slide is about how nuclear projects 20 21 differ as a general matter from non-nuclear projects. I think we all know a lot about these things. Clearly, the 22 NRC is a big player in the long development period. 23 takes a long time to get all of the licenses to start 24

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I'm not saying the NRC is to blame for

construction.

that. It's part of the process here. It's a good process in many regards, but it's a long process.

The pervasive regulation of safety is something that other kinds of projects don't have to face. And I guess I'll say a couple of things here that I guess caught my attention during your presentation, Anneliese, that the Design Certification, ESP process, COL process, seem to be all lumped together here. And I understand why, but if you think about the design certification track that's really more of a vendor thing. And vendors are going to be doing most of that. So in terms of Commission resources, rather than long-term funding, there's got to be a different view of that.

Next slide.

Nuclear projects have a fairly interesting cash flow. It would be nice if I put on the same slide the cash flow from, for example, a combined-cycle gas turbine project. But it's a fairly risky one and that's what makes project financing so difficult. Long development period during which a lot of money goes out the door. A long period of uncertain cash flow or value. Fixed O&M costs are significant. You've got prolonged outage possibilities out in the future. A year of a prolonged outage could be enough to cause a merchant project to have significant problems.

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And then you've got a long-tail liabilities and I'll stress that the fundamental economics of a nuclear project don't change because of ownership, whether it's a government plant, a regulated plant, municipal utility plant or a merchant plant.

Go to the next slide.

But we've come up with these different approaches to fund, to develop nuclear that essentially get around some of those problems. Government projects, regulated projects, which is mostly a U.S. thing, there hasn't yet been a PPA-based IPP, but that may happen maybe in the U.K.

And then we have the merchant projects which I agree with Paul totally that we haven't done one of those just yet, but there are some people talking about them. So the first one, the government model, in the U.S. context that means TVA. It means Santee Cooper. It means Oglethorpe. It means MIAG. It means CPS Energy perhaps. And I quess I'll say that we lumped that together under the electric utility context in terms of NRC financial qualifications, but I'll have to say that in an ideal world you believe that a government utility, a Santee Cooper or a Oglethorpe or a CPS Energy, would be able to do all the things you think they can do, but as a CPS Energy decision about the South Texas Project

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shows there can be some fairly abrupt changes in positions and some abrupt issues there.

And looking back in history, looking at things like the WPS projects, there's no guarantee these projects are going to get done or be fully funded. So there is some history here around government projects to say that they may not be as viable as they look.

Next slide, please.

And the investor-owned regulated utilities in the U.S. also appear to be sound, based on the NRC's rubric which again is a bit dated, perhaps. Looking back in history at all of the canceled plants, the abandoned plants at prudence hearings and disallowances, we know that that's not a guarantee.

Today, most commissions in most states have a fairly robust process to look at integrated resource planning and if you get through that process with a nuclear project, and everything goes well, you'll probably be fine, but those are some pretty big ifs.

Certainly, the Georgia and South Carolina models, the Baseload Review Act and the Georgia integrated resource planning process, fairly rigorous. Those decisions are fairly clear. The commitments are clear. Those projects are probably going to be just fine in terms of state regulatory treatment. But some other

agreements yet to fund the cost of applying for a COL, much less an irrevocable commitment to fund a nuclear project. So I'd want to take exception to the NRC's view that electric utilities have no risk.

You can skip the PPA-based slide and go right -- you are there.

Merchant nuclear projects, we decided 20 or 30 years ago to start reforming the electricity industry and have these new things called merchant power plants that are built based on market revenues. That's happened for some non-nuclear projects and it tends to work okay, although it hasn't worked perfectly.

If you will turn to the next slide -- I see this industry as having a pretty good grasp over at the far -- your right side. These markets do a pretty good job of managing dispatch of existing assets based on short-run marginal costs or bids. We tend to get that right pretty much. Short-term unit commitment, we get pretty right. Reserves, we get pretty right. But when it comes time for the short-term decisions, SRMC-based decisions to drive long-term investments, that gets to be more difficult. We bolted on capacity markets and reliability obligations and other things which kind of work, but maybe not perfectly. And to try to shoehorn

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nuclear into those things is pretty hard. When we're got a three-year for capacity option and you've got ten years to get the nuclear plant into operation, that gets to be a pretty difficult world.

I'll also say that in recent times in the U.S., we've got this issue with forced renewables. And the working of the real time dispatch and SRMC and market pricing gives rise to things like negative pricing, gives rise to reserve issues. New nuclear doesn't work very well in that. Existing nuclear has some problems, perhaps, in that even though they've got very low marginal costs and tend to be dispatched a lot of the time.

Turn the page.

As Paul said, this is really hard. We haven't done a merchant nuclear plant yet ever. Basically, getting the project risk and the long-term market risk assumed by the developer makes this really hard. And it doesn't look like it's going to be easy.

I won't go through the reasons why it's -why it's difficult, but as Russ said earlier, there's a
chicken-and-egg problem here. If you think you do have
the right economics and the right deal to make a merchant
plant go, the last thing you need is to have the NRC be
a problem or a delay or have some other added hurdles to

that project. You'd like to be able to put it all together as you go because if the NRC adds early hurdles to a merchant project, you could end up having problems, even though the project may be an economic one.

How do we help merchant nuclear? Revenue certainty is certainly something we look at. The PTCs and EPAct 2005 were a good thing and the first-come, first-served aspects tended to drive people in the door early at the NRC. In other countries, in the U.K. we're talking PPAs, CfDs, carbon floor prices and other things. We haven't seen so much of that here, but we may need it.

The development uncertainty, certainly, the NRC Part 52 process was seen as a positive thing, but it's taking a long time and costing a lot of money and so that may not be so positive as it was seen in the past. Some countries have funded the design approval. That certainly might help. The loan guarantees and I don't know if you've mentioned this, Paul, but certainly the loan guarantees as we've envisioned them so far in this country, COL is a condition precedent to closing. We haven't closed any yet, but there's one that might. And so even if you have a loan guarantee conditional commitment, there are a lot of steps to go through before you actually get funding.

And I have to say this, but it's like the

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old joke about who gets money. If you need money, you probably can't borrow it. If you don't really need it, you probably can. And certainly the Calvert Cliffs subsidy fee story kind of supports that. When the subsidy fee is so high for a merchant plant, questionable value of having loan guarantee program at all.

The next slide, and I guess I don't want to spend a lot of time on this. Certainly, you guys know a lot about these projects, but as I said, the CPS Energy pullout from the South Texas Project which I'm assuming and Anneliese, help me out with this, you would have viewed that as a half merchant and half utility project? But in fact, probably the merchant side was more viable than the politically-motivated utility side.

MS. SIMMONS: Well, now at the beginning it was a mixed project.

MR. KEE: And I guess as Paul alluded to also, what we see and if you go to the next slide, we can talk about this a bit more.

Around the world, what we see is government-owned nuclear plant vendors who are pushing forward into project development and even ownership, the Rosatom project in Turkey being the prime example. Early days for that project, but essentially you see the vendor, a government vendor who is willing to own/operate

that project, take all the risk, take all the financing as a way of pushing that equipment sale into other countries. They have access to capital as we believe. If you had a government sovereign guarantee to fund a nuclear plant, in this country it would probably be more viable than any of those other approaches, but because of the foreign-ownership rules, we may not see that here. I'm not sure that the Russians would want to build a plant here in any case, but it would be very hard for them to get into the design-approval phase.

But we see around the world this increasing trend towards vendors participating. I think the merchant projects in the U.S. have had a large participation of the vendor. This was seen as the flagship design build as a merchant project in the U.S. whether it's STP or Comanche Peak or Calvert Cliffs or some others. And so that vendor participation is something that ought to add to your financial credibility in a way that maybe it hasn't as a pure merchant plan.

That's all I have.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Thank you. Are there any questions?

MR. FREDRICHS: This is Tom Fredrichs at the NRC. You mentioned about fund-design approvals as helping merchant plants and I was wondering what a fund

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design might look like.

MR. KEE: I'm sorry, my shorthand slide lingo didn't quite come through. It's not a U.S. thing. If you're the South Korean government and you fund the design approval of the smart reactor or the APR-1400 in your country, rather than having the developer/owner of the plant do it, that can help this industry. We don't do that here necessarily. I mean the DOE did put a lot of money into the standard-design approvals here. They didn't fund the whole thing. That's what I'm talking about.

MR. FREDRICHS: Okay, thanks.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Anybody else?

Anybody on the phone bridge have a question for Mr. Kee?

Thank you, sir. I appreciate you coming.

All right, is Ms. Brockway here? Let's take a ten-minute break.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 9:35 a.m. and resumed at 9:46 a.m.)

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Okay, we're ready to go? All right, our next speaker, Ms. Nancy Brockway is owner of NBrockway and Associates in Boston and a former commissioner on the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission.

Ms. Brockway.

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MS. BROCKWAY: Thank you very much. As we're getting ready to go, I want to give my appreciation for the opportunity to speak here. I was looking around the room hoping that I would recognize some folks because I've been dealing with nuclear power for decades. There you go. But this is not my usual forum.

So today, what we're trying to figure out, as I understand it, is this question of whether financial qualifications have to be established before the COL is granted or whether you can grant a COL contingent upon something. So let's strip it back and this, of course, is what others have said already, but to put it into a context why do we require them? It's not directly in the statute, but there is a concern and it's been a concern for some decades that if a builder/operator does not have financial qualifications that they may be tempted to skimp and cut corners and the result of that may be adverse to health and safety.

Next.

Now this is a little state perspective and you probably are well aware of the feelings. It's the NRC's job under the statutes to protect health and safety. We, in the states, are very painfully aware that we are branded and I think, for example, you can look at the experience in Vermont which the legislature, I would

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have advised them not to try to do this, but they entered into a deal with the owner of -- I think it's Vermont Yankee under which the state would have some control over whether or not that plant was re-licensed or continue to operate.

Well, even though the plant owners had made that deal, they then went to court and said no, we're not bound by it. I don't know where that actually ended up, but you can see that states have a reason to be leery of any suggestion that they can do anything about health and safety. You've got to do it.

It's also no news that today merchant plants are having big problems getting financing. I think the biggest single problem is the gas prices are low. I think gas prices will go up again. I believe in the volatility of gas prices. But the result of the current relatively low prices, and the uncertainty about shale gas contributes both to the sense that well, maybe prices will go up because we won't figure out fracking. But maybe prices will continue to stay low because it will open up floodgates of natural gas and keep the prices low.

So one of the things I wanted to show on this slide was in the quotations animal spirits. I've been doing a lot of thinking about what produces booms and busts and what motivates people to be entrepreneurs and

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John Maynard Keynes is famous for saying that "in the end it's animal spirits." We might call that the entrepreneurial urge. But if you go through a bust like the one we went through in 2008, that scares off anybody who isn't shall we say psychopathically spirited. That gradually goes away as people recognize that things can come back into a norm and there will be a reason to continue to invest.

Obviously, that has an impact on investors. They get nervous for a while. It also lowers customer usage because we're in a recession and that doesn't bode well for a future stream of revenue. And financiers have always been nervous about the particular risks of any given technology and nuclear power has some very well recognized risks.

I just want to note that it's not merchant plants alone that are having this problem. It's not a function of being a merchant plant, necessarily. This is happening even with vertically-integrated utilities. And we've seen the beginnings of rate payer uneasiness in the Carolinas and Florida about their pre-approval schemes and the amount of money it's costing and whether or not anything will come out of it in the end.

So this may be quixotic now. You may decide you just blow through it as being this is the type of thing

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that happens. My goodness, Seabrook 1 got built and there were people getting arrested there. We don't have anything like that at all now.

But if the public burdens increase, there is a risk if the costs go higher; if people start rebelling against this pay now and maybe get some power out of this thing later; if there are health and safety problems; if we have another Fukushima; you can understand that there are a lot of reasons why public opinion may turn.

So we're in a situation now where finance -- by finance, I'm talking about any of the entities -- I would have said Wall Street before, but you know it's more globalized now. Any of the entities that are there to tap to provide credit, to provide equity, are saying to the owner/operators well, we're not going to pony up our money unless we have a guarantee in the form of the combined operating license point. That's it. No conditions. We want to see the license in hand before we go forward. And as part of that, they want a dedicated revenue stream. Here's where the merchant thing comes in because, of course, theoretically, vertically-integrated utilities can always sell it to their customers.

I will tell you that I have dealt with Seabrook Nuclear Power Station 1 and 2 since 1983 and

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there were many, many periods during that time when it was not at all sure that folks would get their money back if they invested in that plant and the situation got so dire, the costs got so out of whack with the benefits that when New Hampshire finally settled its Seabrook issues, when I was a commissioner we had a huge restructuring case and we finally settled the nuclear issue by selling off Seabrook which was not necessarily the most economic thing to do. But I think New Hampshire was done with decade after decade of struggling with this issue. And of course, Public Service of New Hampshire and its owner took a shave. I think it's a pretty small shave, given the scope of the enormous costs that are being borne. But it was still a shave.

I want to say if you go to the last page of my handouts -- do you have the handouts? No. You'll see that one of the things I did back a long -- just to show you that I'm not to the left of The Nation magazine, as the Cato Institute would like to say, is that along with my late colleague, Tom Austin, of the Maine Commission staff, we negotiated with John Rowe to keep Seabrook 1 alive and in effect negotiated a payment plan, a PPA. It was under regulation, but that's what it was. Now marginal costs were hugely above average costs at the time which allowed us both to have different views of the

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world and come together on a number. That may not be the case now. But just because you have vertical integration is not a lock on finance.

So my main message is pretty simple and it starts here. If those who are in this for a profit won't invest, why should the consumers guarantee cost recovery? For one thing, the profit seekers, because they have skin in the game, they know this industry very well. They know what the risks are. They can gauge likelihoods in ways that the public, I would argue, cannot. It gets fairly politicized in public. I can't imagine New Hampshire supporting a nuclear power plant right now even if that were to be the really most obvious choice for power. They just got soured on it. I wouldn't have necessarily have sold off Seabrook because at the time it was already built, but they would have none of it.

And also, note that even a decision not to put money in by a profit seeker is a choice. They are taking the risk of bearing opportunity costs and they do that knowingly and intelligently and understanding that they are making a choice. What the public sees is how the people with skin in the game vote with the dollars. So the public, except in places where there's just a tremendous political support, without reason for any

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kind of nuclear investment, says to itself well, hey, if they won't put money up, why should I? And if they don't think they can manage the risks, why do they think I can?

Now there's another issue that has come up here having to do with oh, well, gee, we're only talking about during the course of the procurement of the license and it doesn't really count because we're going to go, we're going to require financing at the time that ground is broken. And I would argue that first that's too late because some decisions will already have been made. And the issue of skimping can occur at any place along the line. So it's not a guarantee, even if you could argue that it was a ministerial act to say oh, that's the financing.

One of the things I had to do when we were on the Commission in New Hampshire we had securitization of the stranded costs. And I'm holding up my fingers to make about an inch and a half or two inches thick of paper. Every time a clause in that securitization agreement with the legislature changed, we had to read the entire thing. I think my General Counsel ended up having to wear glasses after that because the fine print makes a huge difference. And these terms are fought over. This is not a simple thing. You can't just rubber-stamp it. You can't just say well, if you have Model XY, then you're

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okay. Because there is no Model XY for one thing.

Then the other thing is from a consumer perspective, well, why not close it the other way around? Why is it that the consumer has to go first and the public has to go first and why can't we make the license contingent on the financing instead of them forcing us to make the financing contingent on the licensing?

So in a way, this comes down to a big game of chicken. Who is going to blink first? I would argue that the NRC should not blink because this is a health and safety issue. It doesn't matter what the -- the fact that President Obama wants a -- I don't know what the phrase is, but he likes nuclear power. He wants all different sources of power. The fact that some administrations have been very bullish on nuclear power, some administrations have been leery of nuclear power, it doesn't matter. It has nothing to do with energy policy.

The NRC also is not charged with making sure that people can invest in nuclear power and get a lot of money back. I mean that's fine if it happens, but that's not the charge of the NRC. The charge of the NRC is health and safety, among these other things.

I would also say that there are avenues for finding out the willingness of taxpayers to support

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things that are uncertain and many of them have been tapped, loans and loan guarantees, the whole insurance issue, and then the securitization which has been almost entirely a legislative action. In fact, I can't think of a state where a commission -- there may be one state where a commission went forward without legislative direct authority. But anyway, very, very democratic decision to impose these risks on consumers.

Now you can go and ask for more of that if you need it and if you think that energy policy requires it. Or the industry needs to be kept alive during down time or something like that. But in the end, if the folks with skin in the game will not finance without these kind of guarantees from consumers, the NRC should not either.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Thank you, ma'am. Do we have any questions for Ms. Brockway?

MR. FREDRICHS: This is Tom Fredrichs from the NRC. And I think you've pointed out some of the costs that might fall on ratepayers in these sorts of projects, but I'm wondering how that -- the consumer or the taxpayers in the context of a merchant plant where they borrow money somewhere, perhaps from some government agencies, but they make it or break it on their own performance and if it goes broke, there's no particular consumer who has to pick up the pieces. So -- or is that

maybe too simplistic point of view? So the question is the concern for the consumer and ratepayers how much does that translate into the merchant plant model where we think consumers don't pay anything unless the project is successful?

MS. BROCKWAY: That is a terrifically important question and one that unfortunately is fairly complex in a restructured electric industry. So I'm assuming that we're talking about a merchant plant that wants to build and sell into a competitive wholesale market, an RTO, an ISO, something like that, perhaps even into a competitive retail market.

And it is true that absent a long-term contract, the person who is putting up the money for the plant is basing his or her expectation of return on what the market is going to be for power in that marketplace.

One thing that I don't think we have yet wrestled to the ground in electric utility restructuring is the problem of reliability and planning. It is not necessarily that a merchant plant will be left without support if it can't make the money back in the market. And to give you a small example, there are what's called must-run plants. They're not nuclear -- well, actually, some are nuclear, but in the Northeast.

Since the FERC started to deregulate the

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wholesale market, they have had to try one scheme after another to give those plants enough support to keep running because they are in load pockets. And if they tried to get what the marginal costs of those load pockets since it wasn't priced that way, they wouldn't be able to stay alive. So they've been subsidized by ratepayers.

So I would say that it's not a clean situation if the financier takes all the risk.

I'm trying to think of another analogy, too. I may bungle this coming out, but let's say you have a chemical plant and it sells into the open market and sells at a risk. And it's regulated for health and safety. don't know that anybody argues, well, we should lower our standards on the health and safety because these poor people have to make a buck in the market and we see the market changing. In fact, this plant may go out of existence. Part of it is a view of mine of fish or cut bait. Either you really have a deregulated wholesale market where people actually do take the risk or you don't. I don't think we do. I'm dubious about whether we'll ever get there. But because of that view, I can see state and federal agencies, economic regulatory agencies, taking steps in various ways to make sure the lights stay on and as a result it's not a pure merchant play.

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MODERATOR CHAZELL: Is there anyone on the bridge line with a question?

Anneliese?

MS. SIMMONS: Hi. I'm Anneliese Simmons. Thanks for coming to speak to us. I'm glad you made it.

Just a couple of questions. You made a point that I think was an important one, that the NRC is charged with regulating health and safety. We're not an economic regulator. I think that's an important point in terms of this discussion that we maybe haven't really focused on enough. So I appreciate you making that point.

I guess my question is if we were to -- from a policy perspective, there is a perspective that our rules and regulations do disadvantage. We have a barrier to entry. We have a barrier to regulation because we have different requirements for merchant plants. But you've talked about how that might be necessary given the fact that there's always the risk of cutting corners if there's insufficient funds.

In your experience, I know you came from the utilities side of things, the regulator side of things, when states are analyzing financing over time, there have been situations where you've had financial conditions or conditional approvals over time. I know it's not quite

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the same situation, but if that type of a framework were to work for a merchant plant, what might be some of the things that we would need to consider? Is there anything we can learn from the utilities side that we can apply to the merchant side?

MS. BROCKWAY: I'll have to think about that for a sec. There are a number of piece parts in the question. I'm trying to think of the examples of the regulatory side imposing conditions. It's certainly the case that with any of these pre-approval ratepayer schemes, basically the applicants have to make a case to the Commission that it's worth putting the risk on the ratepayer because here's the risks and here's the benefits and they're going to get the benefits and they outweigh the risks.

So let me put it this way, if a state commission learns that finance has been withdrawn or is severely conditioned, it instantly worries that the plant will never get built. And in fact, that's what happened with Seabrook 1. Seabrook 1 stopped construction not because people were marching at the plant, but because Wall Street said this is ridiculous. We're not putting more money in. Actually, what the state did was negotiate a Purchase Power Agreement, what we did, and I think other states did

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something similar, too. So we took on the risk. But it was a knowing taking-on of the risk. And it was -- I think it was because legislatures don't live by the rule sunk costs are forever sunk where entrepreneurs have to do that. You can't go oh, gee, we put so much money into it, we have to keep putting more money into it. They don't think that way, but legislatures do.

What can states provide for the NRC? I guess in summation of what I started out with, it's that states do pay very close attention to what Wall Street says and if Wall Street is not in the project, that raises alarms right away that there's something fundamentally wrong with the project. Beyond that, states have such a different requirement. We have health and safety jurisdictions, except not in the case of nuclear.

MS. SIMMONS: Right.

MS. BROCKWAY: So in these other areas we would be concerned about whether or not sufficient environmental controls were put in place, whether or not corners had been cut on the construction, for example, the traffic going in and out during construction or any number of things that could affect the public adversely. But that's because that's all bound up in the same kernel. But having said that, if Wall Street steps back, then that is seen immediately as a red flag.

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MS. SIMMONS: Thanks.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: All right, thank you, ma'am. Appreciate it.

MS. BROCKWAY: Thank you.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: All right, we'll go to our final speakers this morning, Mr. Mark McBurnett, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Nuclear Officer of Nuclear Innovation North America, LLC; and Mr. John Matthews, a partner in the energy practice at Morgan Lewis and Bockius, LLP in Washington.

MR. McBURNETT: I've never seen the room from this side of the table, so it's a rare opportunity.

Good morning. It's always a pleasure to have another opportunity to meet with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and continue our efforts towards obtaining a combined license for South Texas 3 and 4.

As an introduction, I'm Mark McBurnett, the Chief Executive Officer for Nuclear Innovation North America. I brought a few others with me to the table this morning. Mr. Greg Gibson from UniStar, Jeff Simmons from Luminant. I should know him, John Matthews, he's my counsel, Morgan Lewis, and he's been pretty active in our financial qualifications review, so he's here assisting me and then Ellen Ginsberg from the Nuclear Energy Institute.

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My slides are fairly detailed. They represent really a repeat of what I've already put on the docket and we've been discussing this over a year plus with the staff. There's nothing really new in there. In fact, it reflects also the letter I sent to Bill Borchardt earlier this year, sort of instigating this dialogue. So I'm not going to spend a lot of detail on the slides. I'll spend most of my time really just from the executive summary and doing a quick sort of brief. As part of my 15 minutes, I want to give my friends at the table here a chance to speak.

I also mentioned, I haven't heard confirmation of who is actually on the phone, but a number of folks in the Small Modular Reactor community also indicated to me that they were going to be calling in today and may have some things that they would like to add at either this or at the end of the general discussion. It's keenly an issue of interest to them also.

I would like to say Nuclear Innovation North America, of course, is an entity that was created by NRG Energy and Toshiba, the two owners, to develop South Texas Project 3 and 4. The units, once constructed, will be operated by STP Nuclear Operating Company, the existing operating company that operates South Texas 1

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To date, NINA has a large investment in the project, moving forward with a COL. The technical review is largely complete. There's a few, just a handful of items that are still set to run to completion.

Clearly, our initial circumstances in the started we were moving project when we towards construction as quickly as possible, based on the current market conditions at the time. Circumstances have changed. Decisions have been made that based on current market conditions will continue to pursue the combined license and then once we have the combined license, when market conditions are appropriate for the investment, to warrant the investment, then the project would be able to attract the right investors and move forward into construction. Like I said, circumstances changed and I have absolute confidence circumstances will change again and opportunities will arise.

Looking at the overall schedule for how long, we started this project in 2006 with an initial -- when we submitted in 2007. If I look at it, add that whole time line together and say from the time you start to the time you get online with power generation, you're in the 10 to 12-year range. That's a long time in a merchant market, but by allowing us to move forward, get

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a combined license, have it ready, market conditions become ripe and we're able to move forward, we shorten that window at least by half. more like a five-year turnaround to putting power on the grid and returning money to the investors.

The background part of it, the plants are proposed to be built on a project-finance model. We've heard about that earlier today with non-recourse financing. That really means that the lenders are going to require adequate assurance of funding before the plant starts and that the funding that's funding for both construction and its adequate return in operations, they want to get repaid. So they're going to put a very rigorous standard on us for ensuring that they have everything in hand necessary to get the whole project completed and online and develop a return.

We have rigorous requirements for equity, for contingencies, working capital, decommissioning funding, debt reserves to pay the debt service and so forth. All those things have to be considered by the lenders before we ever go to financial close. And at financial close, funds will have to either -- everything will have to be paid or committed, funds in hand or really strong commitments for the loans to complete the project.

What that really tells us as we look at it

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is what we will have to endure from the lenders to have funding for this project far exceeds reasonable assurance. It's a standard that we'll have to meet that's higher than reasonable assurance that we had -- before they'll ever loan us the funds and close, to allow us to start construction.

And based on what we've proposed is to be allowed to use a license condition. It would really require that that financing close happened prior to any construction in this case that's -- the definition is in the rules, to start a construction and that that would provide reasonable assurance. That assures that the plants -- makes sure there's health and safety to the public, safety to the plant, that the -- the plant is never built if it's very financed, never meets that license condition.

Looking at NRC -- has a broad, legal authority to decide what financial qualifications are appropriate. It's not really NRC's role to decide the financial wisdom of a project. That decision is left to the economic sector. The NRC focuses on health and safety of the public and that can be ensured with a license condition such as we proposed.

There is precedent with the NRC using this license condition. It's in the same circumstance really

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for fuel facilities. It's not an untried process. We really see this as really a process policy question where the NRC needs to revise the process and the policy reflecting really the current business environment.

That's kind of my statement in a summary and I'm going to go and give each of my friends here a chance to add their little bit to it and I will just start over here on the left with Greg, just because you're on the end.

MR. GIBSON: Thank you, Mark. I'm Greg Gibson, president and CEO of Unistar. Unistar supports South Texas Project and the Nuclear Energy Institute's proposals to finance -- excuse me, to address financial qualifications issues through license conditions, consistent for NRC precedent for other non-combined licenses. However, the complexity of this issue requires a full dialogue and broad participation.

We recommend that the NRC conduct workshop on the FQ issue that includes participation by the Department of Energy and lenders and others such as credit export agencies which we heard from the first presenter. Workshop format would allow more direct interaction and active participation which we are very limited as Mark says, and I have to relinquish to our others.

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However, we do appreciate and empathize because South Texas is ahead of us in the licensing schedules. This is a very ripe matter to get additional guidance and it's very important to have it done expeditiously. Thank you.

MR. McBURNETT: Jeff?

MR. SIMMONS: I am Jeff Simmons. I'm the Director of Development for the Comanche Peak 3 and 4 Project at Luminant. Luminant also supports the STP position. We're appreciative of this forum and this opportunity to speak.

A license condition similar to that that was proposed by NRG is one way that merchant generators can demonstrate financial assurance in accordance with the regulations. And we see that the standard under 10 CFR 50.33(f) is analogous to that of 10 CFR 72.22(e) under which the Commission has held that a license condition is an appropriate tool for the use of demonstrating financial assurance.

Appendix C provides additional guidance to applicants on what additional information the staff may request in the context of an application for construction permits or combined licenses. As distinguished from more prescriptive NRC regulations, the kind and depth of information described in this guide is not intended to

be rigid and absolute requirement and in determining an applicant's financial qualification the Commission will require the minimum amount of information necessary for that purpose.

Under C.2, newly formed entities are expected to show sources of funds and describe the legal and financial relationships with those sources. If those sources and relationships can be shown at the time of application as in Luminant's case, no license condition should be necessary. If those sources and relationships are yet to be identified at the time of application, an appropriate license condition can be fashioned such that the staff's acceptance criteria can be satisfied post-issuance of a CP or a COL but prior to initiation of construction. Thank you.

MR. McBURNETT: I was going to ask if we have any of the -- I know several of my folks on the -- peers on the -- they planned to be on the phone line. I wanted to see if any of those had a comment that they wanted to make at this point?

MR. HASTINGS: Yes, this is Peter Hastings with Babcock & Wilcox. We are developing the design and license application for design certification for the B&W mPower Small Modular Reactor. Babcock & Wilcox also fully supports the industry view and the South Texas

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Small Modular Reactor vendor, we want to make it clear that this issue is not unique to South Texas. approaching an environment where we're pursuing markets that are not based on the traditional regulated model where our goals include repowering coal sites and nontraditional implementations. It seems likely that we will encounter more merchant opportunities, not less, going forward.

As we pursue carbon reduction, an increase in U.S. production for both domestic consumptions and export, we believe it's incumbent on the regulator not to either create or propagate artificial barriers to this merging market. We're working very closely with several utilities one of which is First Energy. First Energy's representative wasn't able to join us today because of a conflict, has indicated they also fully support our comments and fully supports a license condition to establish financial qualification prior to construction as long as it allows flexibility and what method is used. That concludes my remarks. Thank you.

MS. CUBBAGE: Thank you, Peter.

MR. McBURNETT: Any others on the phone? was going to ask Ellen to bring up the overall industry perspective.

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MS. GINSBERG: Thanks, Mark. And I appreciate the NRC staff's willingness to provide this opportunity to have this discussion. The industry has been discussing this among themselves and among the various participants for quite some time, so this is really as someone else said, not only ripe, but perhaps even overdue.

I think we're going to have far more detailed discussion when we get to the roundtable, so I'll hold a lot of my points until that time. But I think it's critically important that the Agency recognize that there are no real legal impediments here and this is a policy issue. The Agency is often -- it's often suggested that the Agency stands in the way of licensing. The Agency shouldn't be in a position of picking winners and lowers. The Agency should be doing what under the PGE case that the Supreme Court said it should be doing which is looking at public health and safety.

And to the extent that no plant will be built ever until the financing satisfies the Agency, I think you've satisfied your public health and safety obligation. So important from our perspective to segregate the policy issues from the raw legal issues and we think that you can solve both with very reasonable, but rigorous response here. So thank you.

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MODERATOR CHAZELL: Just a question, did you get Ms. Ginsberg's name there? You did? Okay, good.

MR. McBURNETT: The last thing I would ask,

John, if there's anything else I didn't add into all that

I needed to?

MR. MATTHEWS: I quess I would just make one point about the -- there is one significant precedent and it's the Private Fuel Storage case and it highlights two important issues, one that Jeff already made which was that the standard in that case was under Part 72 and 72.22(e), demonstrate reasonable assurance of obtaining funds for construction. The Commission in that case said this will protect the public health and safety. There were intervenors that arque the thing is they'll never be able to satisfy the condition. They're never going to be able to get the financing. They had all kinds of arguments about why the financing wasn't likely to And the Commission said well, you prove our point. If they don't get the financing, they will never construct, they'll never be a safety issue. The public health and safety is protected.

Now in that case, the Commission did point out that there were additional requirements applicable to Part 50 reactors and those requirements are

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information requirements in Appendix C and the kind of license condition that NINA has proposed, that is, requiring the closing of a project finance which we've heard today is a very high hurdle, very difficult thing The fact of the matter is when you have to accomplish. the documentation ready to close that project finance, you will have all of the detailed information regarding the sources of funds for construction that could ever have been contemplated by Appendix C. You will have much more than what was ever contemplated by Appendix C. won't be in a situation where the plant begins construction and then there is a regulatory issue about whether or not Wall Street is willing to finance unless ratepayers are willing to sign PBAs and things like that. The banks are not going to loan the money unless all that's lined up up front with contingencies beyond the cost estimate. And we've heard here that it's possible. You could go out and get financing. You could probably loan commitments before you have a COL. It's just about how much it's going to cost.

And sure, if I don't need financing, if I've got all the money in the world and I'm willing to pay whatever, I can do anything. But it puts a substantial burden on merchant applicants if you impose that requirement prior to issuing the COL. Whereas, if

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78 merchant applicants have the COL in hand, then they're in the position to go to market to pull the financing together on the most reasonable terms to get the best terms and seize the opportunity to build a plant when that opportunity is ripe. MR. McBURNETT: That's our presentation. MODERATOR CHAZELL: Okay, do we have other questions, comments?

MR. MAYFIELD: I'd like to pose one, if I could. We've been talking a lot about the license condition approach, the PFS, LES approach and the condition that you've proposed. Is this a one size fits all? We've heard from Peter Hastings, the SMR community has an interest, different interests from different utilities. So from NEI's perspective is this a one size fits all, there's some generic license condition language? Or is this a rulemaking? What's the right -assuming the Commission decided to go forward and do something, what's the right something?

MS. GINSBERG: I think this can be solved in multiple ways. I think you could create a generic license condition. I think rulemaking takes a very long time, unfortunately. It's a two-year process.

MR. MAYFIELD: Don't hang up on that one. What's the right ultimate fix we can deal with things --

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MS. GINSBERG: Sure.

MR. MAYFIELD: Assuming the Commission decided to embark on something, there are short term fixes, then there's a longer term. What's the right way to fix this?

MS. GINSBERG: I'll condition my answer along the lines that you've suggested and say assuming that we could have a very expedited rulemaking, if that's possible, I think there is a potential to address this through rulemaking. I don't know that I can give you the answer here because I haven't had time to meet with my colleagues and hammer out the language, but I think the suggestion would be in the rulemaking that the Agency has discretion. There's no question that the Agency has discretion. And so embody that in the rulemaking so that we don't have a situation where the Agency is the impediment when all other requirements are met.

MS. SIMMONS: Thanks for coming and speaking to us today.

Is it the industry's position that financial qualifications and financial distress have nothing to do with health and safety?

MR. MATTHEWS: No, I think our position is is that you can protect public health and safety with appropriate license conditions.

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MS. SIMMONS: What about this concern and it's actually experience we've had in the past. We provide a license. You obtain funding afterwards, but the funding isn't necessarily particularly strong. Is there actually guarantee -- you've said a number of times that there would be a guarantee that the plant would never be built if there were insufficient funds. But isn't it true that we have to consider the fact that the plant construction may continue in some inadequate fashion if there was insufficient financial qualifications?

MR. MATTHEWS: I think that the NRC is always dealing with this issue of financial qualifications on an on-going basis. And if you ask all of your applicants to demonstrate that there's no risk that they're ever going to have any financial problems for the 60-year or 70-year life, 10-year construction, 60-year life of a plant, it would be an impossible hurdle.

So I think what the Agency needs to do is establish a reasonable hurdle at the outset, which is the reasonable assurance requirement and then you have inspection and enforcement activity to monitor. We've had licensees of operating nuclear power plants go into bankruptcy. This Agency has never encountered a nuclear safety issue that I'm aware of that can be directly linked to those kinds of financial distress.

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MR. McBURNETT: Ellen, did you have something you wanted to add to that?

MS. GINSBERG: Anneliese, I think it's really important to recognize that the financial qualification issue is really subsidiary to everything the Agency does. So your funding is going to perhaps be an indicator, but not necessarily the determinative factor. It's your performance and the Agency has on-site resident inspectors. You have all manner of inspection activities. You've got all manner of reporting requirements.

So to the extent that there's thin, and I'm not sure I agree with that. I'll just use your term, thin financial backing, it's going to show up very quickly and the Agency is not shy about moving quickly in enforcement space, in the ROP, etcetera. So I am a little concerned that we're elevating financial qualifications above public health and safety. The Agency's real mission is carried out through not just financial qualifications, but through all of its inspection and enforcement and other analytical programs that ensure public health and safety is not only monitored, but established.

MS. SIMMONS: So do you think we have enough information though that says that financial distress has never impacted health and safety? I'm not quite certain

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that everyone would be in agreement that we would quickly see those impacts. I think the staff's concern is that that is somewhat cumulative.

MR. MATTHEWS: I think this was a question that was asked and the Agency struggled with in the mid-1990s when it was facing the specter of industry restructuring and that was a paradigm shift for this Agency. There were a lot of people within the Agency that had great concerns. There were people in the industry who said it can just never happen, nuclear plants can't be operated on a merchant basis. When California deregulated, the only plants that stayed regulated and rate based were the nuclear plants because there were people who said you just can't do it. It can never be done.

Right now, close to half of the operating plants in the United States are merchant plants. And I would challenge you to go do the analytics. Is there a correlation between safety performance that -- I'm sorry, is there a correlation in safety performance between being a merchant plant and being in cost-of-service? And I am pretty sure you'll find that there is not.

Every time this Agency has done studies on financial issues, when Ivan Selin was Chairman, he

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challenged the staff, do plants have adequate resources? Staff did studies. The conclusion was there are plants that have the lowest budgets that are in the top quartile. There are plants that have the highest O&M budgets that are in the bottom quartile in safety performance. The staff never could find a correlation between the dollars and safety performance.

And I think that the answer in the 1990s, the reason the NRC got comfortable with these merchant plants was that it has the inspection programs in place. It has the ROP. These plants were not operating in a vacuum.

MS. SIMMONS: Can I just ask one last question? It's related to the proposed license condition that has come from the industry. How would we build a license condition if you were unable to identify sources of funds, number one? Or do you suggest that the license condition be based on simply identifying sources of funds without analyzing the credit worthiness or any other analysis related to the sources of funds?

MR. MATTHEWS: Can we throw Slide 8 up on there?

And I'm not saying that there's one size fits all. We've moved to Slide 8 from the NINA presentation. I can see nobody can read it anyway.

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(Laughter.)

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I'm not suggesting that one size fits all, but NINA's proposed size here that I don't understand how anyone could take issue with it. This proposed license condition is a project finance that involves at least 50 percent of the loans coming from the United States Government. Okay?

So if this Agency doesn't trust that the Department of Energy guaranteeing a loan or the U.S. finance bank are not going to loan billions of dollars to a nuclear project without following the DOE regulations which we cite in our presentation that set standards for the project finance, we've built into this license condition credit quality terms for -- in order to close the project finance, we're going to have a requirement to have a working capital line. It will have to come from a financial institution. So when we show those documents this is our X-hundred million dollar working capital line, you'll see the documents, you'll see the financial institutions. The standard in this condition is that the financial institution has to have a minimum credit rating, above-investment-grade credit rating. That project finance is going to require either committed capital that's equity that's already been paid in or cash, I don't want to have a cash trap or committed equity from corporations that have a certain credit rating.

The credit standard we have in the condition is an investment grade credit rating. So you're going to have committed capital from -- it doesn't really matter. Why do I have to identify who it's going to be? Do you really care whether it's Chase, JPMorgan Chase or Citi that's going to be providing my working capital line? As long as they meet minimum credit standards. And can't you trust the United States Government to make sure that this project finance is going to fly? I mean especially when the United States Government is going to be standing behind billions of dollars, guaranteeing that those funds will be repaid.

MR. MAYFIELD: I think you're getting to the root and I don't want to dominate this, but I think you're getting to the root of my question about is this a one size fits all? And so you suggested a license condition, would that apply to everybody? Is it a variance that we would need to discuss? So I think -- Anneliese and I were talking just at the break. I think from the staff's perspective, there is generally a notion that we need to engage the Commission with this as a policy matter. We now have to frame that policy issue to put in front of the Commission. Just going up and

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saying oh gee, wouldn't you like to decide on this?
Well, we need to frame for the Commission what are the
questions and what are proposed remedies.

Is this the same issue for the SMR? SMRs are sort of my bailiwick. David has got the large Light Water Reactors. Is this the same issue? Is it a variant on the issue? What would be the remedy? Do we simply characterize, Anneliese, with what would be the characteristics of an appropriate license condition? So that's the dialogue that we need to start having to understand what, if anything, we would ultimately go to the Commission with.

And again, right now, my level, there's an expectation we need to put this before the Commission. What's "this"? And that's the struggle -- not struggle, that's the question we're starting to deal with. I don't think it serves anyone very well to go up with a specific proposed license condition if that's really only going to satisfy the interests of one entity.

MS. GINSBERG: Can I comment?

MR. MAYFIELD: Please.

MS. CUBBAGE: Actually, before you do, I'd just like to say this might be a good opportunity if there's others that want to join the discussion, rather than to limit it to just those at the table.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Sure, yes. I was thinking we move into the roundtable at this point. We've already had our break.

MS. CUBBAGE: You can go first.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Before we start that though I'd like to say thank you for your presentation and thanks to all of you and we'll continue to dialogue as Amy suggests, but open it up to everybody who wants to speak.

MS. CUBBAGE: We do have one.

MS. BROCKWAY: Hi, Nancy Brockway again. Several different things have been triggered by the presentation which was very thorough. One is I'd like us to recall the Davis-Besse plant where, in fact, there was almost -- there was nearly a very severe accident because of lack of financing and that was something that was documented by the NRC. And that was in 2002 or '03, I think.

I wonder whether we should put a whole lot of faith in the ratings agencies. Since 2001, there have been instance after instance after instance in which they've just gotten it wrong including the downgrading the credit worthiness of the United States. And then finally, that point about budgets on O&M is very interesting. My take from that is quite different which

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is that -- not licensure, sorry. Supervision and correction as a practice of ongoing is not going to be successful and that what you really need to do is get it set up in advance so that you're not going to have those types of problems and that the incentive for the builder and the operator is going to be to do it right. And I actually think that Wall Street helps in getting us there.

MS. CUBBAGE: Thank you.

MS. GINSBERG: I'll pick it up.

MR. REPKA: Hi, this is David Repka. I'm with Winston and Strawn. I wanted to respond a little bit to the idea that I think Anneliese Simmons introduced in the last comment or just commented on and that's really the question of the role of financial qualifications relative to the issue of will there ever be a case where a lack of funding or insufficient funding will impact safety.

I think that that's not a proposition that the financial qualifications rule needs to solve. The financial qualifications rule and the review at the time of licensing is never going to address the Davis-Besse situation and I don't think that's its role.

I think the question of whether or not there is adequate performance and whether adequate funding is

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a causal factor in performance decline is something that licensees and the NRC and its regulatory program address every single day. And it's just part of the regulatory program as I think Mr. Matthews and Ms. Ginsberg already alluded to.

And I think it's important when we look at financial qualifications review to go back and look at the whole process of the way it was set up in the 1980s and '90s with respect to electric utilities. utilities weren't exempted from financial qualification requirements. They were exempted from a detailed financial qualification review. And why was that? was because there was an assumption being made that cost of service rate regulation would assure sufficient funding, but it was only an assumption and I think at that time my recollection is and I think the paper would corroborate that, but if you go back and have rulemaking, there was a lot of discussion of will there be ever a case where a cost of service rate regulated utility would have insufficient funding. And the answer was that would be revealed in the performance and metrics. So that's really the paradigm and it's no different for the merchant generators.

What I think NINA is proposing is a license condition that would address the question of is there a

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basis out there that would give us that presumption, that assumption that this licensee is qualified, this applicant is qualified very similar to the way the cost of service rate regulation creates a presumption for an electric utility. And there's lots behind that that may vary case by case, but there's a lot of bases that would support that presumption for the merchant facility based on getting financing.

So I think what is being proposed for the merchant generators is no different in concept than what was done from a licensing perspective for the electric utilities. And from that standpoint it will never replace the continuous monitoring through the construction project. It will never replace what's required during operation of the plant. It is just one piece in the licensing puzzle. I think for that reason the license condition approach is perfectly viable and would assure public health and safety.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Ms. Ginsberg?

MS. GINSBERG: Yes, I just wanted to get back to the question of sort of one size fits all and to crispen the answer a little bit, the one size that fits all is the option of a license condition. That's the one size that fits all. The notion that you could craft a license condition here at the table or take NINA's and

necessarily place it into a paper that goes up to the Commission, I think it's premature. I think it requires a little bit more discussion.

I think that the important one size fits all also for the license condition is а set of characteristics, rather than picking Citibank versus some other entity. I don't think that's the Agency's -within the applicant's purview and I think that would be distinctly the wrong way to go. So when you ask about is there a one size fits all, is there a solution? There's distinctly a solution and the solution lies in the Agency's own discretion. The Agency has discretion to address this issue. I think exercising that discretion is absolutely right right now, everything you've heard this morning.

MR. MATTHEWS: And Ellen, I agree 100 percent with everything that you said except I would suggest that in order to give the Commission some context as to what you're talking about, NINA has proposed an example of what an adequate FQ license condition would look like, so the Commission can look at this and say well, has somebody thought through what one might look like? And if NINA's doesn't work, then please let's talk about one that does.

But I think that giving some context for

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-- and quite frankly I think NINA has sort of proposed a Rolls Royce standard and I apologize to the rest of the industry if you come second and want to do something different, but I think it is a useful example so that Commissioners and policy makers can put in context what we're really asking for.

And that was important in Private Fuel Storage. I mean Private Fuel Storage, if you recall, I think it was Private Fuel Storage or maybe Claiborne, but one of those two cases, the Commission said to the staff, you know, you've talked about contracts, but you haven't put something in writing that we can see and actually sent the staff back and said we want to see something. We want an example of what's really going to satisfy this condition.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Tom?

MR. FREDRICHS: This is Tom Fredrichs of NRC. There's actually a couple of questions. I'll ask one and have a response and then maybe ask a second one. And the first one is there have been a couple of statements. There's no correlation between budgets or safety. The NRC is supposed to look at safety and not worry about financing. To do that comes as close as you can possibly get to saying financial qualifications are not a safety concern, without actually saying that. It

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93 seems to be a position where you're saying the NRC can defer something to the future and it's not really that important, so don't worry about it. Maybe you can respond to that. MR. McBURNETT: Yes, as far as what we're proposing is using a license condition to provide the reasonable assurance that financial qualifications are met, thereby ensuring the public health and safety. That's the sequence of the process. Not trying to correlate that financing and financial qualifications are not -- cannot be -- it's in the regulations that it is to be considered. It's to be considered within the context of protecting public health and safety. What we're proposing is this is a process by which you can ensure there's reasonable assurance, we're financially qualified through use of a license condition that fits the current business needs of the industry. MODERATOR CHAZELL: If there is anybody on

the phone just feel free to jump in.

MR. FREDRICHS: Did you want to something?, Dave?

MS. LOFTUS: This is Pat Loftus. I'm the Director of Strategy for Westinghouse. I'd like to offer a few comments, if I may.

MS. CUBBAGE: Please do.

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MS. LOFTUS: First, I'd like to thank everybody for the opportunity for us to share our views. We, too, are like a number of those who have come before me to support NINA's position that a license condition with the appropriate characteristics does, in fact, satisfy the financial qualification test of reasonable assurance required for COL and it does, in fact, address the need to address the Commission's position of protecting public health and safety, while at the same time allowing flexibility to obtain the financing after a COL has been granted and by obtain that means acquire and close and fund, as it was previously described, the project, at the time when local market conditions favor nuclear energy.

I also want to reinforce the point that if the flexibility to allow the financial qualification at the time of construction for merchant plants is not allowed by process, then effectively what may occur is a de facto enabling of the Commission to shape or limit energy policy and technology options which would then be allowed to be entered into the merchant market. Those are our key points.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Thanks.

MR. BECKER: May I make comments, please?

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Go ahead.

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MR. BECKER: Hi, Gary Becker in the Licensing Group at NuScale Power. I apologize, I was a little loathe to jump in after BMW make a comment earlier, but I'd also like to, on behalf of NuScale, echo support as an SMR vendor of the proposal for meeting financial qualifications using a license condition.

We are a vendor of a very versatile and scalable SMR plant design that's especially suited to do project financing and merchant plant projects, so we recognize the importance of merchant plants as a prospective market for our emerging technology and null SMRs.

We believe that the license condition approach will ensure protection of public health and safety, but it also provides the flexibility needed for projects, merchant projects to secure the financing necessary to invest in the next generation of nuclear power.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Thank you.

MR. BECKER: Thank you very much for the opportunity to comment.

MR. REPKA: Yes, this is David Repka from Winston and Strawn again. I just wanted to respond briefly to something Mr. Fredrichs just said and maybe I'm misunderstanding it, but I certainly don't mean in

anything I suggested and I don't think anybody on behalf of the industry is suggesting that a lack of financial qualifications or a lack of financing could never be a safety issue. I don't think that's what we're saying at all.

I think what we're saying is that there is from a regulatory perspective there are different ways to address that issue and only one of which is the financial qualifications review at the time licensing. And it's that financial qualifications review that would be based on a license condition that provides reasonable assurance at that time that there is sufficient funding. Beyond that there is continuing monitoring and inspection to assure precisely that that's an area never occur which is that a lack of funding will create a safety issue and that's again is something that I think the licensees of the current operating fleet and the NRC deal with every day quite effectively.

MR. FREDRICHS: Hi, this is Tom Fredrichs, NRC, again. The other question is really more of a larger one and I think it was the Westinghouse mentioned that if the NRC does not allow -- does not issue licenses before financing is actually identified, that that might be contrary to our energy policy. This is more of a --

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kind of turning that around a little bit, I think the clear message here is that without getting a license at -- to go to the marketplace and get more funding or get funding, that puts at least some level of difficulty into your project.

The question we need to answer that I think the Commission would be very appreciative of getting an answer to is why is it the NRC's role to encourage merchant plants because we are just safety. Why should we change our regulatory program to encourage the building of merchant plants?

MS. GINSBERG: This is Ellen Ginsberg from NEI. I don't think the suggestion was that the Agency changes its regulatory program to provide anyone with an advantage or a choice. The point is not let the market do what the market is going to do, but don't put up barriers so any entrant to the market who seeks to build a plant would be able to after satisfying all of these rigorous conditions. That's all it is. In essence, it's an attempt to be neutral, I think, rather than take a position with respect to choice of generation source.

MR. MATTHEWS: Just -- I'd like to comment though. Pose the option. I can see people in the Agency saying well, why do we need this for the COL. We can complete our technical review and when you're ready and

you have the financing, then come in and we'll handle it then and then we'll just close things out. Well, let's say that takes two or three years.

I mean the technical reviewers who were prepared to go to a mandatory hearing to brief the Commission on why they signed off on areas, are they going to be available? Won't a lot of them just be reassigned other areas of the -- you end up with a whole new team of technical reviewers. Everyone is looking at everything all over again. You might as well be applying for a new license if you allow that to lapse.

We want to be able to get to the point where we spent -- NINA has spent over \$1 billion trying to get a COL. This Agency has devoted extraordinary resources to licensing STP 3 and 4. To have this issue be a barrier to the issuance of that license is -- I just -- I think a failure of government process.

MS. SIMMONS: We can't let John be the only one picking on us. So we just have to make sure that other people have an opportunity to pick on us as well. But I would just ask, you mentioned a couple of times the COL will be key in obtaining -- is an important thing to get financing, but what evidence do you have if there's a question about your project viability now that's an impediment to financing, how will the COL, after the COL,

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how will that change?

MS. GINSBERG: I can answer that question. And I think the answer is that there's a distinct distrust of the regulatory process. And it's unfortunate. I've been doing this since 1983'ish, '84'ish and I think the unfortunate issue is that there's a persistence of view, despite the Energy Policy Act and the COL Part 52, etcetera, that it's going to take too long and I'm going to put my money at risk before I get my license to operate. So don't forget, in the Carter years, we were talking about fully-built plants at 18 to 21 percent carrying costs, not yet getting their operating license. So people have a long history and a long memory there, and I think that's the real fundamental issue.

MS. GINSBERG: If that's the case then, we have a combined operating license process now which I think certainly gives more certainty to the market. If that's the case then then why doesn't our own Government, the DOE, provide funding prior to a license? They have a commitment letter and it's conditional upon obtaining licenses as I understand it. So I would agree from maybe a Wall Street perspective, there's concerns with the regulatory process that our very own Government is providing these loan guarantees has the process that --

MR. MATTHEWS: It is very typical in

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1	project finance that the lenders don't fund until they
2	know you're going to be able to build. Because the whole
3	concept of non-recourse project finance is you have a
4	special-purpose vehicle. It's this entity
5	MS. GINSBERG: Wait, that's not my
6	question. You can get a DOE loan commitment, right?
7	MR. MATTHEWS: A conditional loan
8	guarantee, but they're not funding anything.
9	MS. GINSBERG: Exactly.
10	MR. MATTHEWS: Until you have a COL in hand.
11	MS. GINSBERG: But can we not get
12	conditional can we not get any kind of letter of
13	credit? I mean you can get financing then that would be
14	conditional on the COL, just like a DOE loan guarantee,
15	right?
16	MR. MATTHEWS: A conditional DOE loan
17	guarantee is conditioned. I mean we submitted a term
18	sheet for NINA's conditional loan guarantee which was
19	very close to being executed a year and a half ago and
20	you can look in there. There are dozens of conditions
21	that have to be satisfied before it ever gets funded.
22	And among them is getting the COL, but you also have to
23	line up a lot of other things.
24	MR. FREDRICHS: I had a follow-up on my
25	other question about this, the NRC's role in encouraging

the building of merchant plants and we should be clear here that what you're asking for is a change in our regulatory program. Right now, the regulations require you to identify sources of funds or at least reasonable assurance of getting funds for construction and then you get the license. What we're talking about here is reversing the order, getting the license, then identifying the sources of funds.

And the reason for that is market conditions right now, it's tough for merchant plants. And if only had a license you cold get the financing. And in my view at least that's a way for the NRC to encourage the financing of merchant plants. My question is why is that the NRC's role when we're a safety organization? Why should the NRC be deciding this and not some other part of Government?

MS. FRANOVICH: This is the NRC, Rani Franovich from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. And I think I'd like to chime in here just to articulate that from my rather novice perspective I don't know that that has been articulated here, by our guess at this meeting.

What I have heard is that the licensing process has a conundrum and funding is a challenge, if the uncertainty associated with licensing is

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outstanding. And what I have heard being proposed is a condition on the license as a means of resolving that impediment by also providing a mechanism for the NRC to ensure that its mandate can be carried out in a manner that ensures adequate protection of public health and safety, or at least reasonable assurance for a licensing decision or a post-licensing decision, actual carrying out of the license provisions.

So I don't know that that would put us in a position of encouraging this kind of thing. It really an opportunity to use things that have been used before, conditions on the license to ensure that our interests are maintained, but does not impede the process of seeking funding and completing a construction project.

MS. CUBBAGE: I'd also like to add that I also heard in the presentations not only the issue of whether you had the COL in hand or not, but the cost of financing going up further, in advance, you need it before construction. So I think the requirements to have all of the financing in hand before the COL could impact project costs is what I heard.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: That was Amy Cubbage.

MR. OESTERLE: This is Eric Oesterle from the staff. Getting back to something that Mike was focused on and what's the right fix or what's the right

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method to fix it, is it rulemaking or license condition, and without making any presumptions about how the staff or the Commission might view the viability of either approach, I was wondering if in developing the proposed license condition if there was any consideration or discussion about the need for an exemption to the existing regulations?

MR. McBURNETT: We've certainly discussed an exemption that might be a mechanism. We are somewhat, I guess, puzzled as to why an exemption would be necessary because we think the Commission has the discretion to use the license condition and that that's an appropriate vehicle in this case. However, given that, I would also cite if the staff came back to me and said send us an exemption and that will be favorably considered, I'll submit an exemption.

MR. MATTHEWS: I think the condition can be fashioned to satisfy both the reasonable assurance requirements and the information requirements of Appendix C. When Private Fuel Storage was decided, the rule was you were supposed to have -- either have funds in hand to construct and operate, or have reasonable assurance of obtaining them. And it was a policy decision that was made by the staff that said we'll accept a license condition that says okay, when you have the

contracts in place, you can demonstrate that you have the revenue you need, then you can begin construction. That protects public health and safety. It was just simply using the existing rules and solving the problem using a license condition.

MS. GINSBERG: So going to an industry interest here, it seems to me that this one-off notion of an exemption is not the appropriate way, would not be an appropriate way for the regulator to take this issue on. I think you can, as John has said, you can fashion criteria that would be sufficient to provide the reasonable assurance of public health and safety without necessarily going to a one-off on exemptions. And think that that option would be valuable to the Agency. So it's proceduralized. So you have it. You use it. And there's no question about its viability as to any given project or applying the criteria consistently.

MR. MAYFIELD: I think if you were dealing with a single entity that had this problem, then an exemption might be a vehicle to use. As a broader issue, the Commission has told us previously don't use exemptions to get around the need to change a regulation. So if it appears to be a broader problem, I don't think an exemption is a vehicle that we would necessarily be inclined to pursue.

MS. GINSBERG: Can I also comment on the 1 rulemaking? I wasn't suggesting and I want to be clear, 2 3 I wasn't suggesting rulemaking is necessary. You posed a question and I said it could be solved with rulemaking. 5 MR. MAYFIELD: And it's one of the things that we want to try and explore, what is -- what are the 6 7 range of options that we might propose to the Commission, so it was testing whether rulemaking looks like it would 8 9 be a viable, longer-term fix. So just testing ideas. I was wonder if NRC counsel has anything, 10 11 just to put them on the spot? 12 (Laughter.) Mike, Please. 13 No. MR. SPENCER: Michael Spencer, OGC. 14 15 you mentioned the PFS example where there was a form contract that was reviewed and approved prior to the 16 17 issuance of the license. Do you think that that is something that would be necessary here, agreements with 18 funding sources, could that be done prior to license 19 issuance, setting up terms for that, whatever would be 20 necessary to ensure that the funding would be provided? 21 MR. MATTHEWS: Well, let me back up and say 22 I think I agree with the notion in Private Fuel Storage 23 that perhaps the standards for reactors ought to be a 24 little bit higher. And the way I look at the Private Fuel 25

Storage case, I mean you basically have a form contract with counterparties unknown, no credit standards. I mean literally that condition could have been satisfied by signing contracts with Joe's Trucking Company that didn't have the wherewithal to even be the credit-worthy counterpart in the contract.

What we've proposed as a license condition here centered around a project finance is, I believe, far more rigorous. And if you have U.S. Government and DOE loan guarantee rules in play, you can look at the DOE regulations implementing as DOE loan guarantee program and meet requirements there are quite rigorous. And I think you can rely on all of that.

Now to suggest that we come up with terms of the credit agreements and things like that, I mean that's a herculean task. I mean that is -- financing a multi-billion project like this you're talking about spending millions of dollars negotiating those contracts. And to try and do that with the forum right now, I just don't think would be practical and it wouldn't be realistic in terms of knowing that that's what you were going to have.

When we originally proposed a license condition, the first condition we proposed was that we would accept a license condition that says we won't begin

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construction until we close a project finance that meets all of the detail terms and conditions of the draft DOE conditional loan guarantee. That term sheet itself, that conditional loan guarantee was a document that I'm sure literally millions of dollars were spent on financial advisors and legal advisors for DOE and for NINA in order to get to the point of having those detail terms. It's a very substantial document and we submitted it. Obviously, it's proprietary.

But we would be willing to go to that level of detail and say we'll accept that license condition. Now I might not -- we might not ever be able to close a project finance with those terms, but we might get something close and then when we got to that point come in and say well, here are the deltas and we'd like a license amendment to change the condition to address the deltas. But that's something that we explored very early on with the staff.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Go ahead.

MS. CAMPBELL: Good morning. This is Patricia Campbell from GEH and I would just like to echo the industry supports the position for a license condition. But I would also like to point out that this is not a new issue.

This is really a continuation of NRC actions

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going back at least to 1997 SECY papers and SRMs. And in 2002, the NRC issued NUREG-1577, Rev 1 to address this specific issue on newly-formed entities. And if you wouldn't mind, I would just like to read a condition from the guidance itself. It says "If the reviewer determines that a license applicant does not meet these financial qualifications standards", so take that as a given. "He or she" referring to the reviewer "will either deny issuance or transfer of the OL, condition the OL, or recommend initiation of other regulatory action to mitigate financial qualification concerns."

Now this was issued for public comment and it was discussed in a SECY paper on new reactor licensing issues. So this is not a new issue. I think it's just the first impression, the first time that the merchant plant COL has actually come to fruition.

And it seems to me that the issue about a license condition has actually already been vetted through the Commission and the staff in this regulatory guidance. So I'm confused about why we're talking about can the Commission use the license condition. It seems like that's already part of the condition's guidance on this issue. So I just wanted to point that out.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Thank you. Scott?

MR. HEAD: Just one small comment on the

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exemption.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Identify yourself for the record?

MR. HEAD: Scott Head of the South Texas Project. Obviously, I agree with everything that's been said regarding we don't believe a rule change is necessary. But if that is where this would end up, we have participated in significant rule changes that were facilitated by the submittal of an exemption. The exemption was used to frame what actually has to be addressed and so for at least for a lead plant or a pilot plant, if that's where this ends up, an exemption in our case might be actually function to define what the rule change might actually take place.

So I think that you ought to keep that in might as part of the exemption because we realize the rules, if it has to be changed, it needs to work for everybody. Thank you.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: Other questions, comments? Anybody on the phone would like to chime in at this point? We still have 45 minutes. We're all done here?

Michael?

MR. SPENCER: Pat, just to respond to the point you raise. I don't think anybody is saying that

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a license condition can never be used in the financial qualifications context. It's the extent to which a license condition in the factual scenario can be used and if they can, what they would look like.

MS. SIMMONS: I promise I won't ask any more questions. It's Anneliese Simmons again. You mentioned, John, earlier, it was interesting you said that you -- it was a timing question. You said well, people are ready now who reviewed this license and they're ready to go to a hearing. Couldn't the same thing happen? We issue a COL and now you have a license. The license will be dormant for some period of time until you're ready to build, until the market recovers.

So wouldn't the NRC have a responsibility to -- would you still be qualified to build in 10 years, 12 years until gas prices change and you're able to build a nuclear power plant? Doesn't have pose a different set of difficulties because now we have someone who has the NRC stamp of approval and it might be decades before you build.

MR. McBURNETT: I will answer that. Once we have the COL, we are an NRC licensee and we retain all of the rights and responsibilities thereof and obligations to as that licensee under your regulations and oversight.

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2	is is the role of the NRC, just from a policy perspective,
3	it's a Commission type of question, not mind to respond
4	to, if we're going to expend Government resources to
5	monitor a licensee that has no plant.
6	MR. McBURNETT: You will have a licensee.
7	I would expect you would have to do some level of
8	oversight of that licensee although given that no
9	activity is happening, I would expect that oversight
10	level to be fairly minimal. It would probably be a QA
11	audit periodically, something some kind of
12	MR. MATTHEWS: And you do that right now.
13	You have licensees out there. There's a license for an
14	independent Spent Fuel Storage facility in Idaho that DOE
15	holds and that it maintains. You can look to any number
16	of examples
17	MR. McBURNETT: By the way, you charge me
18	for it.
19	MR. MAYFIELD: I was going to point that
2 0	out.
21	MODERATOR CHAZELL: Do we have anything
22	else?
23	MR. MAYFIELD: We've made a number of
24	comments this morning about public health and safety
25	being NRC's mission and I don't think there's any

MS. SIMMONS: Okay, but again, my question

disagreement from the staff. That is our mission. A previous Chairman commented in a speech that he delivered more than once that NRC's role is not to decide on the use of nuclear power. That is a public policy decision made by policy makers. Once that policy, once that decision is made, our role is to assure that it's a safe, secure, and environmentally responsible use of nuclear power. That's our role.

The financial qualification -- assuring public health and safety, assuring security, environmental responsible uses of nuclear power is a multi-legged stool. The financial qualification is an important leg of that stool. The way I have looked at this is the question before us that the staff that we need to pose to the Commission is whether the emphasis on financial qualifications is appropriate. We don't want to -- has that leg gotten too big or too small? And I think that's not a uniform opinion among the staff about whether it's too big or too small.

There are obviously different views from the industry about that role and I think that's something that we are going to have to factor in to what we do or don't say to the Commission in terms of furthering a policy decision or a revisit of previous policy decisions.

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So I think we've got to decide, we don't want to do something that puts a disproportionate burden on the Regional inspectors, on the Resident inspectors. Similarly, we don't look to have a disproportionate, either too large or too small emphasis on financial qualifications. It's a multi-legged stool. Each leg

So that's the way I've been looking at this.

I know Pat didn't like my answer. I can tell by the look
that -- Patricia and I have shared arguments a number of
times.

needs to be capable of carrying its share of the load.

But where we need to go with this is to discuss and there was the suggestion earlier that we needed some further dialogue on this. I think what we would like to do is work with the industry and I wonder if NEI would like to serve as the focal point to make sure we have framed the set of issues that we can set up a relatively near-term set of meetings more focused in nature, to talk about this, so that as the staff looks at framing a paper, presumably to the Commission, that we have, in fact, adequately addressed everyone's interests.

I always get nervous about taking these things on when it's a single entity and then we're trying to frame a policy question based on a single entity. It

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1	just never feels quite comfortable to me. So
2	Ms. Ginsberg, would you guys be so inclined?
3	MS. GINSBERG: Absolutely. So let me
4	assure you that this is of interest to the industry more
5	broadly, so it is not simply a single entity question.
6	I think it's critically important that the Agency look
7	at it from that perspective because that's a value to
8	everyone going forward. It establishes a standard. It
9	sets a consistency, etcetera.
10	In addition, we'd be happy to participate
11	in any future public meetings. Where a paper or a white
12	paper or analysis is necessary, we'd be happy to submit
13	it, give you either a set of options or our views on what
14	you should propose and then it's up to you to analyze and
15	decide on that. But we are happy to pursue this issue
16	on an expedited basis.
17	MR. MAYFIELD: I think that's become
18	abundantly clear is that this isn't a multi-year
19	activity. This is more than a couple of weeks, but it's
20	something that warrants some careful consideration. So
21	I think maybe the way for the staff to get together, put
22	together our thoughts, we'll engage you.
23	MS. GINSBERG: Absolutely.
24	MR. MAYFIELD: And then look at how to go
25	forward with this. Frank is wanting to comment.

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MR. AKSTULEWICZ: This is Frank Akstulewicz with NRC. One of the comments going forward here that we need to examine that I didn't hear much discussion about because the discussion in the room centered on the viability of a condition and what characteristics the condition should have is how that demonstration would be made, what decisions Commission itself would have to participate in and then how the public would be invited into that process to assess whether or not, in fact, the conditions were satisfied.

So I don't know that we need to solve that today, but it is something that I think we need to think about because if there is a Commission action involved what we've done is basically pushed the opportunity for the public to participate in that oversight process of financial qualification to some time later after the license is actually issued. It's a factor that we need to consider in our on-going discussion.

MR. McBURNETT: I think from our perspective it would be desirous to craft a license condition that's sufficiently ministerial that there really isn't review that happens post-COL.

MR. MATTHEWS: And I would point out the public has already had the opportunity to raise

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2	have not had any contentions raised, so the public has
3	had their opportunity to speak to this issue and no one
4	has spoken to it.
5	MR. MAYFIELD: I think Frank's point is a
6	fair one in terms of a generic consideration and that's
7	the public having an opportunity, an appropriate
8	opportunity to weigh in on these things is something we
9	always focus on. So I while the specifics here may
10	obviate that need as a more generic matter, that is
11	obviously something we're going to pay attention how that
12	works and where it fits in the licensing process.
13	MR. MATTHEWS: I would ask you to take into
14	account that in any COL proceeding if you've conducted
15	a hearing, you've given the public the opportunity to
16	come in on any one of these issues.
17	MR. MAYFIELD: We understand.
18	MR. AKSTULEWICZ: This is Frank
19	Akstulewicz again. The issue is not whether there is
20	some question about the financing. It's the opportunity
21	to demonstrate that they were compliant with whatever the
22	requirements were.
23	MR. MATTHEWS: Understood. Got it.
24	MR. MAYFIELD: Got it. Okay. Anything
25	else? I hijacked your meeting, Russ.

contentions on the financial qualifications issue.

MODERATOR CHAZELL: No problem, sir. I'd just like to thank everyone again for taking the time to come out today. I'd like to remind you that if you haven't signed in yet, please do so before you leave. There will be a meeting summary posted to ADAMS within a couple of weeks and if you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us. Thanks again for your time.

(Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the meeting was concluded.)

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