

To: Leeds, NRR
Ref. G20120172

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Cys: EDO
DEDMRT
DEDR
DEDCM
AO
R1
OGC
Mensen
Baric
Russell
Pelton
Scott
Merelle

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I/ We wish to co-petition with Citizens' Environmental Coalition, the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear in their March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

- Nuclear Reactors of the GE Mark I design have very small containment structures, and as a result cannot contain radiation in the event of a severe accident. Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactors demonstrated this problem in 2011.
- The NRC requested that all Mark I reactors install hardened vents to allow the release of gases and pressure build up, in order to prevent an explosion.
- The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "preexisting" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.
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- Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a "vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I/ We request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

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Thank you,

Bernice Marrero
Signature

9/15/12
Date

Name (print): Bernice Marrero

Address: 2450 Van Vranken Ave apt F6

City/State/ Zip Schickly N.Y. 12308

Email: berniceange1@aol.com

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Executive Director for Operations
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Signature

9/14/2012

Date

Name (print): ROBERT COHEO

Address: P.O. Box 90

City/State/ Zip SHUSHAN, N.Y. - 12873

Email: _____

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Thank you,

Caitlin Andreone
Signature

9/15/12
Date

Name (print): Caitlin Andreone

Address: 207 Hunt Rd

City/State/ Zip Westerlo, NY 12

Email: edwardcullenlv94@yahoo.com

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Thank you,

James Meister
Signature

9/15/12
Date

Name (print): James Meister

Address: 28 Thoroughbred Lane

City/State/ Zip Albany, NY 12205

Email: bluepocket@aol.com

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
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Thank you,


Signature

9/15/2012
Date

Name (print): Doug Greiner

Address: 2027 Signe Ave.

City/State/Zip Sebring FL 33870

Email: dsrebray@yahoo.com

Remember JAPAN

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Signature

9-15-12
Date

Name (print): Robert Saravo

Address: 279 S. Main Ave

City/State/ Zip Albany NY

Email: dsaravo@yahoo.com

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
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Thank you,


Signature

9/15/11
Date

Name (print): John A. Houghtaling Sr.

Address: 1171 Lynds-Athens Rd

City/State/ Zip Athens, New York 13015

Email: _____

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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
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Signature

9/15/12

Date

Name (print): Scott Barnes

Address: 236 Thornberry Ln

City/State/ Zip Rensselaer, NY 12144

Email: scott_r.barnes@yahoo.com

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Thank you,

Michael Corey

Signature

9/15/12

Date

Name (print): Michael Corey

Address: 151 2nd Ave @ Bau

City/State/ Zip Glensville, NY

Email: mcorey@albany.edu