

To: Leeds, NRR
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From: CHAIRMAN Resource
To: [Remsburg, Kristy](#); [Mike, Linda](#); [Lewis, Antoinette](#)
Subject: FW: Fukushima 9-27-2012 meeting (on NRC video) comments
Date: Tuesday, October 09, 2012 8:37:57 AM

From: Tom Gurdziel [mailto:tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com]
Sent: Friday, October 05, 2012 11:44 PM
To: CHAIRMAN Resource
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Subject: Fukushima 9-27-2012 meeting (on NRC video) comments

Hello,

I just listened to the part of the video recorded meeting on hardened vents/filters. (This was approximately 1:01 to 1:30 of the meeting.) I don't think that all the NRC people understood the gracefully presented information by the Constellation person (at about 1:29), that, if the primary containment failed, (which means the core and or core debris was not able to be cooled), then the hardened vent would not work AND that would mean that the filter would be useless. (Her words were not that direct.)

I did appreciate an NRC person pointing out the need for urgency in these matters (at about 1:17).

And somebody, (at 1:20), did obliquely mention "capacity issues" of present hardened vents.

As I see it, the design basis of the presently installed hardened vents is inadequate for station blackout accidents and was proven to be so at Fukushima Daiichi at Unit 1 and at Unit 2 and at Unit 3 and, maybe, even at Unit 4. You, (the NRC), first need to change the hardened vent design basis to be able to carry actual accident flows. Only then would it be realistic to consider filter design (in my opinion).

Additionally, I found the sound to be quite garbled. An example would be the sound at 1:12:27.

Thank you,

Tom Gurdziel

TEMPLATE: EDO-001

ERLOS: EDO-01