

**SEPTEMBER 20, 2012**

**SECURITY ADVISORY SA 2012-17  
SECURITY BREACH AT THE Y12 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR FACILITY**

**ADDRESSES**

All holders of and applicants for a power reactor operating license or construction permit under Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," including those that have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

All fuel fabrication and uranium enrichment facilities licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under 10 CFR Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material"; gaseous diffusion plants certified under 10 CFR Part 76, "Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants"; and uranium conversion/deconversion facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 40, "Domestic Licensing of Source Material."

All holders of and applicants for an independent spent fuel storage installation license under 10 CFR Part 72, "Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste."

All holders of and applicants for a non-power reactor operating license under 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities."

**SUBJECT**

The NRC is issuing this security advisory to assist facility managers and other security personnel responsible for protecting NRC-licensed facilities and radioactive materials in implementing detection and assessment requirements at the Protected Area (PA) or facility boundary. Recipients are encouraged to review this information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this security advisory are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

**BACKGROUND**

On July 28, 2012, without authorization, three protestors successfully breached the perimeter intrusion detection and surveillance system (PIDAS) at the Y-12 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facility. The protestors, who call themselves the "Transform Now Plowshares," traveled approximately 600 meters on foot through site property within the owner-controlled area. Once they reached the first PIDAS security barrier, a chain link fence, they began breaching activities with bolt cutters. They then pried the fence open and crawled through the opening. During this time, the protestors constantly alarmed the intrusion detection systems until they exited the PIDAS. While security forces assessed the alarming condition, the

assessment was not performed in accordance with established facility security standards. The protestors continued to use the same breaching method on the remaining chain link fence security barriers until they reached the Highly Enriched Uranium Manufacturing Facility (HEUMF).

Once inside all PIDAS security barriers, the protestors defaced an exterior wall of the HEUMF with paint and fake blood. Additionally, the protestors used a hammer to inflict superficial damage to an exterior portion of a wall. At no time was there a risk to the integrity of the HEUMF.

After breaching the PIDAS, the protestors were detained by site security and turned over to local law enforcement. During the investigation, it was discovered that the protestors had a variety of tools and items for use during the breach. These tools and items included flashlights, binoculars, red "danger" tape, backpacks, bolt cutters, hammers, spray paint, and paraphernalia related to their organization and cause.

According to the Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, DOE is committed to ensuring that the appropriate lessons from this incident are applied across its other facilities. Further security assessments at all sensitive DOE sites have been scheduled to ensure that the right security policies are in place and all nuclear material remains safe and secure. Safety and security at sites where nuclear materials are stored is of the utmost importance, and this incident was not consistent with the level of professionalism and expertise expected from security forces, Federal employees, and contractors responsible for security across DOE, the Secretary said.

## **DISCUSSION**

The applicable requirements for intrusion detection and assessment are found in 10 CFR, applicable orders, site security plans, or site contingency plans. Licensees should assure that these requirements are met at all times, allowing security forces the capability to detect and assess unauthorized persons and facilitate an effective and appropriate response. The NRC suggests that licensees review their procedures and current practices for prompt detection and assessment to ensure that they comply with applicable requirements and remain vigilant against unauthorized entry into the PA. Further, licensee security organizations should consider interfacing with facility operations in their decision-making processes.

If you have questions regarding this advisory, please direct them to the technical contact listed below.

**Backfit Analysis Statement:** This Security Advisory does not amend or impose new requirements or constitute a new regulatory staff position interpreting Commission rules and is, therefore, not a backfit under 10 CFR 50.109. Consequently, the staff did not perform a backfit analysis.

**Paperwork Reduction Act Statement:** This Security Advisory does not contain information collections and, therefore, is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. § 3501 *et seq.*).

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