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To: Leeds, NRR

AUTHOR: Tom Gurdziel

AFFILIATION:

ADDRESSEE: Chairman Resource

SUBJECT: Concerns NRC Bulletin 2012-01 - Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System

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Mercke, OEDO

ACTION: Appropriate

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From: Tom Gurdziel [tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com]
Sent: Monday, July 30, 2012 11:00 PM
To: CHAIRMAN Resource
Cc: hillsc@INPO.org; Bridget.Frymire@dps.ny.gov; 'Vanags, Uldis'; Screnci, Diane; 'Newal Agnihotri'; 'Tom Henry'
Subject: NRC Bulletin 2012-01: Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System

Hello,

I tried to read this bulletin this evening but my electrical background is not sufficient to understand the significance of either a "high impedance ground fault" or how a plant can meet existing electrical requirements and still not know it has no voltage on one phase.

In any event, I want to say that, when I was on an operating shift, it was my understanding that all nuclear plants needed two sources of off site AC power supply and they were NOT to be combined (as was apparently the case at Byron). So maybe, instead of asking everybody to see if they are doing what they had agreed to do many years ago, we should see if they are doing what needs to be done now.

And, let me make this final point. If 2 out of 2 logic does not provide the necessary protection, (and I think I do understand that it did not at Byron), Then, instead of accepting it, why don't we challenge it by asking, wouldn't 1 out of 2 logic be safer?

Thank you,

Tom Gurdziel