

**Rulemaking Comments**

**PRM-50-104  
(77FR25375)**

DOCKETED  
USNRC

**From:** Doyle, Daniel  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 31, 2012 1:14 PM  
**To:** Rulemaking Comments  
**Cc:** Ngbea, Evangeline; Gallagher, Carol  
**Subject:** FW: Did you get your comments in?  
**Attachments:** ExpandingEPZ.pdf

July 31, 2012 (1:45 pm)  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY  
RULEMAKINGS AND  
ADJUDICATIONS STAFF

286

Please add the attached file as a comment on PRM-50-104 (77 FR 25375).

Name of commenter: Janet Chomiszak  
Affiliation: Delaware Emergency Management Agency

Dan Doyle

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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**From:** Tift, Doug  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 31, 2012 11:54 AM  
**To:** Doyle, Daniel  
**Cc:** McNamara, Nancy  
**Subject:** FW: Did you get your comments in?

Dan,

Attached are Delaware's comments regarding EPZ expansion.

Thanks,  
-Doug

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**From:** Chomiszak Janet (DEMA) [<mailto:Janet.Chomiszak@state.de.us>]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 31, 2012 11:48 AM  
**To:** McNamara, Nancy  
**Cc:** Tift, Doug  
**Subject:** RE: Did you get your comments in?

Hi, here is the pfd version I could not put it into regulation.gov

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**From:** McNamara, Nancy [<mailto:Nancy.McNamara@nrc.gov>]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 31, 2012 10:51 AM  
**To:** Chomiszak Janet (DEMA)  
**Subject:** Did you get your comments in?

Template = SECY-067

July, 2012

Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555-0001  
Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff

Re: Delaware's Comments:

The existing planning basis from NUREG-0654 for nuclear power plant emergency preparedness outlines the rationale for the 10 and 50 mile Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ's). It is our contention that this rationale is still valid and there is no reason to increase the size of the Emergency Planning Zones. We believe that the Fukushima accident indicates that even in the most severe accident scenarios the current planning basis is sufficient for ORO's to take appropriate action to protect the public. Protective actions following the accident at Fukushima were done in an incremental fashion and were expanded as required. Even with an accident that was well beyond design basis, there was sufficient time to take protective actions for the population. NUREG-0654 also states that the detailed planning that is done within the 10 mile EPZ provides a substantial base for response beyond the EPZ should this be required. This is consistent with the Fukushima experience.

Impact on ORO's:

The petitioner has requested an increase in the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) from the current 10 miles to 25 miles. Increasing the size of the EPZ's would require the expenditure of substantial resources while providing little if any additional protection for the public. The burden on ORO's would be substantial as all of the current requirements would be expanded to 25 miles. A 10 mile EPZ encompasses approximately 300 square miles. Increasing the EPZ radius to 25 miles increases the area for which detailed planning must be done by a factor of six (1900 square miles).

With an increase of the EPZ to 25 miles it is possible that the EPZ's of specific plants will impact ORO's that are not within the current 10 mile EPZ. Since ORO's are required to participate in exercises etc. with all of the plants with EPZ's impacting an ORO this could add significantly to ORO's responsibilities.

Overall increasing the plume pathway EPZ from 10 to 25 miles would require a substantial expenditure of resources to implement while providing little if any additional protection for the

public. In fact, this would divert resources from areas with potentially greater needs to plan for an event that is extremely unlikely.

Natural Disasters:

FEMA is already encouraging an all hazards approach to NPP scenarios (see REP Manual)

- The petitioner's comments do not include any mention of FEMA's role in off-site emergency planning guidance/evaluation
- The petitioner asserts that the expansion of the plume exposure pathway EPZ from a 10 mile radius to a 25 mile radius "would provide no new requirements other than expansion of the EPZ." This is an inaccurate statement. Expanding the plume EPZ from 10 to 25 miles would require not only a host of new requirements, but fundamental changes to all facets of Delaware's existing REP program, including major changes to existing plans and SOPs, alert and notification systems, transportation of special populations, exercises and training, public outreach efforts, mapping, evacuation time estimates, the KI distribution effort in the expanded area, etc.
- The petitioner requests that emergency response planning for nuclear facilities must incorporate regionally-relevant initiating and concurrent natural disasters as a regular part of emergency exercises, to assure the most effective possible emergency response in the event of a nuclear accident triggered by or complicated by a natural disaster. The scenario for Delaware's 2012 Federally-evaluated REP Exercise included/was initiated by a natural disaster (earthquake). In addition, earthquake aftershocks were injected into the scenario during various points of the exercise to stimulate play and provide realism with respect to natural events that may impact nuclear power plant operations.
- The petitioner requests that within the emergency evacuation zone full scale drills and exercises will be conducted on a biannual basis, and every other exercise and drill shall include a scenario involving an initiating or concurrent regionally-appropriate natural disaster. Delaware currently conducts internally-evaluated quarterly REP drills in conjunction with PSEG and the State of New Jersey. Additionally, Delaware takes part in a Federally-evaluated (by FEMA) exercise biennially. This is in accordance with Federal law.
- The petitioner makes some valid points regarding the storage of spent fuel. However, the utilities are forced into this situation due to inaction by various levels of government. And for our purposes, it matters not "how" the radiation/radioactive material is released... what matters to DEMA is that we can protect the health and safety of citizens, regardless of the source of any release.

Thank You