

July 26, 2012 NND-12-0389

ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3 Combined License Nos. NPF-93 and NPF-94 Docket Nos. 52-027 and 52-028

Subject: Reporting of 10 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests, and Experiments and 10

CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII Departures

Reference: 1. Letter from Ronald B. Clary (SCE&G) to Document Control Desk

(NRC), January 30, 2012 Update of Combined License Application

Departure Report

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2), VCSNS Units 2 and 3 is required to submit a report to the NRC containing a brief description of any changes, tests or experiments made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(c), including a summary of the evaluation of each. This 10 CFR 50.59 report is for the period beginning January 30, 2012 and ending July 24, 2012. During that period there were no changes, tests or experiments made pursuant to paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 50.59.

Additionally, as required by paragraphs X.B.1 and X.B.3.b of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52, this submittal contains a report of all plant-specific departures made in this reporting period. The 10 CFR 52 Appendix D Departure Report is provided in Enclosure 1 to this letter and covers the period beginning in January 30, 2012 and ending July 24, 2012.

Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Alfred M. Paglia by telephone at (803) 941-9876, or by email at <a href="mailto:apaglia@scana.com">apaglia@scana.com</a>.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 26 day of July , 2012.

Ronald A. Jones Vice President

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**New Nuclear Operations** 

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## JIG/RAJ/jg

Enclosure 1: V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3 Departure Report: January 30, 2012 through July 24, 2012

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## V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3 Departure Report January 30, 2012 through July 24, 2012

SCE&G Evaluation	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-002	Design finalization of structural modules, including the containment internal structures, identified that for many locations overlay plates, embedments, or back up structures are needed to satisfy criteria for the attachment of the supports and similar attachments to the liner plates of the steel plate concrete filled composite structures.  The design of the CA01, CA02, CA05, and CA20 structural modules is changed to use ASTM A572 steel for liner plates in lieu of ASTM A36 steel. The higher strength liner plates will permit attachments at some locations without overlay plates. The portions of the module that use Duplex steel plates for corrosion resistance are not changed. The design of the spacing of the shear studs is changed to a 6 inch by 6 inch spacing for ASTM A572 liner plates. The requirements of American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) N690-1994 continue to apply to the attachment design with the higher strength plates.  The geometric configuration of the containment internals and walls in the Auxiliary Building are not changed.	This activity changes plate material for containment internal modules and modules in the auxiliary building. The change in the module design and resultant change in shear stud spacing satisfy the requirements and acceptance criteria in AISC N-690-1994 and DCD, Section 3.8.3.1.3 as did the original design. The geometric configuration, thickness, and strength of these structures are not adversely affected. There is no change in the design, analysis, or operation of the RCS or other plant systems.  Based on the 10 CFR 50.59/10 CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII screening of this change, prior NRC approval of the change is not required.

SCE&G Evaluation	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-004	DCD Subsection 9.3.5.2.2 is being corrected to present the plant design and be consistent with DCD Subsection 9.3.5.1.2. The DCD contradicts itself in that Subsection 9.3.5.2.2 incorrectly states that each sump is fitted with a vent connection to exhaust potential sump gases into the Radiologically Controlled Area Ventilation System (VAS) exhaust system. The VAS is a ventilation system in the Auxiliary and Annex Buildings. The liquid radwaste system (WLS), as described in DCD Subsection 9.3.5.1.2 accurately described the venting as the radioactive sump vents are directed	The plant equipment and design intent and philosophy have not changed. A contradiction in the DCD has been eliminated regarding a generalized statement about the WLS and WRS sump vents' repository. The AP1000 was designed with the correct vent philosophy provided in DCD Subsection 9.3.5.1.2, so there is no impact on SSCs. The plant design has not changed, but the DCD is being clarified regarding a generalized statement about the nonsafety-related WLS and WRS sump venting.
	to the ventilation system exhaust ducts serving the areas where the sump is located and that the containment sump vents directly to the containment. This activity corrects the Radioactive Waste Drain System (WRS) sump venting described in the DCD in that the containment sump is vented to containment rather than the VAS.	There is no affect on structural analysis and the rewording in the DCD does not impact the Aircraft Impact Assessment. The change does not impact security barriers or radiation, protection and shielding safety analyses, nor does the change affect any procedure, method of evaluation, or test and experiment. The physical design of the sump vents has not changed, so there is no impact on ex-vessel severe accident consequences, containment venting and containment integrity. The VAS supply and exhaust ducts that ventilate the middle annulus are not affected by this departure and continue to be designed to be isolated for holdup and deposition of containment radioactive releases during a severe accident as discussed in the AP1000 Probabilistic Risk Assessment. A 10 CFR 50.59/10 CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined that no prior NRC approval is required.

SCE&G Evaluation	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-005	Design details and descriptions, as stated in DCD Revision 19,	The removal of the design and fabrication details does not
	contained implied and stated fabrication and construction details	adversely affect the containment vessel and containment air
	including weld seams, course elevations, plate geometry, and	baffle design functions. It does not affect the method of
	attachments for the containment air baffle for the Containment	performing or controlling design functions, nor does it have an
	Vessel. DCD Tier 2 Sections 3.8.2.1.1, 3.8.2.6, and 3.8.4.1.3, and	effect on an evaluation for demonstrating that intended design
	DCD Figures 3.8.2-1 Sheet 1 and 3.8.4·1 Sheet 1 are revised to	functions will be accomplished. It removes detailed DCD
	remove details regarding the fabrication and erection of the	information that is inconsistent with design and fabrication
	Containment Vessel. These details and figures are not intended to	details.
	show required design and fabrication details. These changes are	
	necessary to ensure that the DCD description is consistent with	The removal of fabrication and construction details does not
	actual design and fabrication methods.	impact the design function of any SCC. The pressure retention and
		structural integrity function of the containment vessel is not
	Design details and descriptions, included in DCD Revision 19,	adversely affected. The containment air baffle design function of
	provide fabrication and construction details (e.g., size and number	providing for an air flow path for the passive containment cooling
	of panels and detail design of supports and attachment) for the	system is not adversely affected. The containment vessel design
	Containment air baffle and are unnecessary detail in the DCD. DCD	function to remove sufficient energy from the containment to
	Tier 2 Section 3.8.4.1.3 and DCD Figure 3.8.4-1 Sheet 1 are revised	prevent the containment from exceeding its design pressure
	to remove details regarding the fabrication and construction of	following postulated design basis accidents is not adversely
	the containment air baffle. These details and figures are not	affected. The facility is not being adversely changed by this
	intended to show required design and fabrication details. These	activity. A 10 CFR 50.59/10 CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII review
	details are inconsistent with the design finalization of the baffle	determined that no prior NRC approval is required.
	and the fabrication details of the baffle, baffle panels, and	
	supports.	

SCE&G Evaluation	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-006	This activity is being made to enhance the functionality of	By enhancing the functionality of the containment sump level
	containment sump level instrumentation post-Safe Shutdown	instrumentation post-SSE, the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
	Earthquake (SSE). Prior to this change, there was an inconsistency	leakage detection function is unchanged. There is no affect on
	between the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) leak	structural analysis and no impact on the Aircraft Impact
	detection functionality and seismic classification and the DCD	Assessment. Additionally, enhancing the functionality of the
	design requirements. Specifically, the containment sump module	containment sump level instrumentation post-SSE does not
	(KQ11), three containment sump level instruments (WLS-LT-034,	impact security barriers or radiation, protection and shielding
	WLS-LT-035, WLS-LT-036), and Primary Sampling System (PSS)	safety analyses. These changes do not affect any procedure,
	radiation particulate monitoring instruments require	method of evaluation or test and experiment. RCPB leakage
	modifications to comply with the current licensing commitments	detection instrumentation is not credited in the ex-vessel severe
	regarding plant operation post-SSE.	accident assessment. A 10 CFR 50.59/10 CFR 52 Appendix D
	Containment cump level menitoring through the containment	Section VIII review determined that no prior NRC approval is
	Containment sump level monitoring, through the containment sump level instruments, is clarified to be the primary method of	required.
	RCPB leakage detection in containment after an SSE. It provides	
	conformance to position 6 of Regulatory Guide 1.45, although	
	using different technology than envisioned in that guidance (sump	
	level rather than airborne radioactivity). The containment sump	
	level instruments indication in the main control room display	
	remains non-seismic; however, SC-I local readout of the	
	instruments is provided outside of containment and is qualified to	
	be operable post-SSE.	
	The Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity Monitor 18F	
	particulate monitor remains seismic Category I, but the remaining	
	tubing is not seismically qualified. This leakage detection system	
	can be reasonably expected to remain functional following seismic	
	events of lesser severity than the SSE; however, no special	
	qualification program is used to assure operability under such	
	conditions and no credit is taken for its functionality. It is clarified	
	that the Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity Monitor is not	
	the instrument used to provide RCPB leakage detection following	
	seismic events that do not require plant shutdown in conformance	
	to the intent of position 6 of Regulatory Guide 1.45; conformance	
	to this position is provided by the containment sump level via the	
	seismic Category I Containment Sump Level Monitoring system.	

SCE&G Evaluation	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-008	This activity updates admixtures used in the production of	By allowing the use of admixture types B, C, and F and preventing
LCL-12-000	concrete structures and modules described in the DCD.	the use of type D and vinsol, the concrete's design function is
	Admixtures are used to obtain certain concrete characteristics	unchanged. The use of Self-Consolidating Concrete has no affect
	that would not be obtainable with a plain mix. The types of	on structural analysis and the admixtures do not impact the
	concrete admixtures are being revised to account for technology	Aircraft Impact Assessment. There is no adverse impact on
	improvements that will allow for the production of conventional	concrete parameters such as strength, density, and durability.
	concrete and Self- Consolidating Concrete (SCC). Type B, C and F	Additionally, these admixtures do not impact security barriers or
	admixtures are added, Type D and vinsol admixtures are removed	radiation, protection and shielding safety analyses. These changes
	and Type A admixture use is clarified in the DCD. These changes	do not affect any procedure, method of evaluation, or test and
	are consistent with ASTM C494, ACI 349, and ACI 237R.	experiment. The changes do not have an impact on ex-vessel
	are consistent with ASTW C434, ACI 343, and ACI 237K.	severe accident consequences and do not impact core concrete
		interactions or containment pressurization due to core concrete
		interactions of contaminant pressure attornate to core concrete
		review determined that no prior NRC approval is required.
LCE-12-016	The principal construction code of the WGS Gas Cooler is	This change involves modifying DCD Tier 2 Table 3.2-3 to
LCE-12-010	categorized as ASME VIII/TEMA in DCD Rev. 19 Tier 2 Table 3.2-3.	accurately reflect the principal construction code of the WGS Gas
	As a result of a previous design change, the WGS Gas Cooler was	Cooler. The design function of the WGS remains unchanged and
	changed from a shell and tube heat exchanger to an off-the-shelf,	the quality and construction/quality standards are not adversely
	dual tube coil heat exchanger. When this design change was	affected. Therefore, this change does not adversely impact the
	incorporated into the DCD, Tier 2 Table 3.2-3 was not updated to	design function of the WGS. This change does not affect any
	reflect the principal construction code of the new heat exchanger.	procedure, method of evaluation, or test and experiment. This
	The correct principal construction code for the new heat	activity does not impact a design feature credited in the ex-vessel
	exchanger is "Manufacturer Std."	severe accident assessment.
	exchanger is manufacturer std.	severe accident assessment.
		A 10 CFR 50.59/10 CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII review
		determined that no prior NRC approval is required.
LCE-12-022	This departure makes changes in the turbine building to the El.	Implementing these changes has no adverse effect on structural
	82'-9" basemat area, concrete base pads, general layout	analysis. The changes do not impact security barriers or radiation,
	arrangement, and various plant-specific DCD text changes for	protection and shielding safety analyses, nor does the change
	consistency with the Condensate Polishing System (CPS) resin	affect any procedure, method of evaluation, or test and
	rinse effluent design function. The turbine building El. 82'-9"	experiment. There is no impact to ex-vessel severe accident
	basemat area is expanded north of column line 18 and south of	consequences, containment venting, and containment integrity.
	column line 13.1. The concrete base pads that support structural	The design functions of the turbine building and its structures,
	columns 14, 15, 16, and 17 are lowered from El. 100'-0" to El. 90'-	systems, and components as described in the plant-specific DCD
	0", and a ditch has been created in the middle of the base pad for	or UFSAR continue to be met. A 10 CFR 50.59/10 CFR 52 Appendix
	column 17. Stairwell S09 is removed, a new material handling	D Section VIII review determined that no prior NRC approval is

SCE&G Evaluation	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
	elevator is added, and stairwell S11 is relocated to the Northeast corner of El. 82'-9". Various DCD text changes are made to account for CPS resin rinse effluent being discharged to the turbine building sumps, and an additional pump is added to each sump to account for the additional volume and prevent overflowing.	required.
LCE-12-023	Detailed figures were provided in DCD Revision 19. This activity substitutes 46 DCD piping & instrumentation diagrams with simplified schematics such that all required information is maintained. It has been verified that the simplified figures together with associated DCD and FSAR text continue to provide sufficient understanding of design bases, safety analyses and facility operation. There is no change to the system design described in the DCD figures or supporting analysis. The actual system piping and instrumentation diagrams are not altered by this activity. This is a change to the level of detail documented in the DCD. The figure simplification effort removes extraneous detail from DCD figures.	There is no design function related to replacing existing DCD figures with simplified figures. This simplification effort does not impact the design function of any SSC. The actual system piping and instrumentation diagrams are not altered by this activity. This activity only simplifies DCD figures; no new design changes are proposed. The facility is not being changed by this activity. A 10 CFR 50.59/10 CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII review determined that no prior NRC approval is required.

SCE&G Evaluation	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-024	Update and clarify requirements for structural steel fabrication in	The fabrication specification for structural steel, the DCD, and
	structural steel fabrication and erection specifications APP-SS01-	Governing Codes & Standards documents need clarification of the
	Z0-001 Revision 2 and APP-SS01-Z0-002 Revision 2. The changes	versions of codes and standards used for fabrication and
	apply to seismic Category I seismic Category II and non-seismic	installation of civil/structural commodities and structures. The
	(see DCD Section 3.2.1). APP-GW-G1X-001, the Governing Codes &	codes and standards specified in the DCD and APP-GW-G1X-001
	Standards Document is updated to be consistent with the changes	and the daughter standards and specifications cited in these top
	in the steel fabrication specification and the DCD.	level codes and standards can provide multiple versions of the
		standards and specifications for fabrication. The changes to the
	DCD Sections 3.8.3.2 and 3.8.4.2 are updated to remove codes	fabrication specifications and the DCD clarify the standards and
	and standards that are referenced in the top level (parent)	specifications to use.
	structural design codes. These are ACI-349-01, or AISC-N690-1994.	
	The codes and standards removed are related to welding	As a result of advances in industry standard practices and material
	procedures and concrete specifications. DCD Sections 3.8.3.2 and	manufacture, more recent versions of the standards and
	3.8.4.2 are updated to remove the revisions or dates for standards	specifications should be specified for the purposes of fabrication
	and specifications related to the detailing, placement, and	and construction.
	specification of concrete. These standards and specifications do	Clarification of the requirements for fabrication and construction
,	not include design or analysis requirements. Reference to the NCIC weld acceptance criteria is removed from DCD Sections	Clarification of the requirements for fabrication and construction of steel structures does not change the design, analysis, or
	3.8.3.2 and 3.8.4.2 since it is referenced by the top level codes.	configuration of the AP1000 Seismic Category I and Seismic
	The top level structural design codes (ACI-349-01 and AISC N-690-	Category II structures. There is no adverse effect on the design
	1994) are identified as Tier 2* information in these DCD sections	function of these structures. The clarification of the requirements
	and are not changed.	for fabrication and construction of steel structures has no impact
	and the net shanges.	on the procedures used to operate and control the AP1000 plant.
	Construction and fabrication requirements for seismic Category II	The clarification of the requirements for fabrication and
	structures are removed from DCD Section 3.7.2 since this section	construction of steel structures has no impact on the design,
	is about seismic analysis and not construction requirements. The	analysis, and acceptance criteria for the AP1000 structures. The
	seismic interaction between seismic Category I and seismic	clarification of the requirements for fabrication and construction
	Category II structures are covered in Section 3.7.2.8 and are not	of steel structures does not require testing or an experiment. The
	changed.	clarification of the requirements for fabrication and construction
		of steel structures does not alter the response of systems,
		structure, and components in the AP1000 to an ex-vessel severe
		accident. A 10 CFR 50.59/10 CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII review
		determined that no prior NRC approval is required.

SCE&G Evaluation	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-025	To complete integration of the FSAR and DCD, editorial changes are required to be made to the Plant-Specific DCD to ensure that the document continues to read consistently.	This activity is editorial, but does involve changes to information in the Plant-Specific DCD. Because of the editorial nature of the activity, no changes are being made to any descriptions of design functions, procedures, methodologies, tests, or experiments. Therefore, because this does not change any technical information, the change is determined to not require prior NRC approval in accordance with 10 CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII.

SCE&G Evaluation	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-026	The change activity clarifies requirements and commitments in the licensing basis for concrete and structural steel used in the nuclear Island structures. The information clarified includes test age of concrete, conformance with ACI standards, aggregate testing, use of air entraining admixtures, incorporation of waterstops, and ASTM specification tabulated.	The clarification of requirements and commitments in the licensing basis for concrete and structural steel used in the nuclear island structures will not have an adverse impact on the strength of the nuclear island structures or the response of the structure to internal and external loads, including seismic loads. The nuclear island structures, with the clarification of requirements and commitments in the licensing basis, remains in compliance with ACI-349. The clarification of requirements and commitments in the licensing basis has no impact on design, analysis, or operation of safety related systems and components. The clarification of requirements and commitments in the licensing basis has no impact on plant operating procedures or on the control of the reactions in the core. The clarification of requirements and commitments in the licensing basis has no impact on the finite element analysis methods used to analyze the nuclear island structures. The analysis of the reactor coolant system and core to normal operation and postulated accident conditions is not impacted by the clarification of requirements and commitments in the licensing basis. The clarification of requirements and commitments in the licensing basis for concrete and structural steel used in the nuclear island structures does not alter the assumptions or results of the ex-vessel severe accident assessment.  The clarification of the requirements and commitments in the licensing basis for concrete and structural steel used in the nuclear Island structures does not result in modification, addition to, or removal of a structure, system, or component (SSC) such that a design function is adversely affected, has no impact on plant
		operating procedures or on the control of the reactions in the core design function, does not result in an adverse change to a method of evaluation or use of an alternate method of evaluation, does not represent a tests or experiments outside the reference bounds of the design basis, and does not alter the assumptions or results of the ex-vessel severe accident assessment.

SCE&G Evaluation	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-027	This activity removes unused acronyms from the Plant-Specific	As this change does not involve a change to any underlying
	DCD Table 1.1-1. The table contains approximately 17 acronyms	technical information and is solely a change to the UFSAR List of
	which are identified in the table but which are unused throughout	Acronyms, the activity does not adversely impact any design
	the Plant-Specific DCD and FSAR.	function or procedure, change a methodology, involve a test or
		experiment, or affect any EVSA feature. Because of this, the
		evaluation determined prior NRC approval was not required.
LCE-12-029	The change activity clarifies and revises details of the description	The revision of the reinforcement arrangement in the licensing
	of the basemat reinforcement design in the licensing basis for the	basis for the nuclear island basemat will not have an adverse
	nuclear island basemat. The information clarified addresses	impact on the strength of the nuclear island structures or the
	inconsistencies internal to a DCD figure and inconsistencies with	response of the structure to internal and external loads, including
	the concrete dimensions. The rearrangement of the	seismic loads. The nuclear island structures, with the change of
	reinforcements is consistent with the design finalization.	reinforcement arrangement, remains in compliance with ACI-349.
		The ACI-349 requirements and criteria for the reinforcement
		provided to resist tension, flexure, and shear loads are satisfied
		with the revised arrangement. The clarification of requirements of
		the reinforcement design in the licensing basis and revision of
		reinforcement arrangement for the nuclear island basemat has no
		impact on design, analysis, or operation of safety related systems
		and components. The clarification of requirements and
		commitments in the licensing basis and revision of reinforcement
		arrangement has no impact on plant operating procedures or on
		the control of the reactions in the core. The clarification of the
		reinforcement design in the licensing basis and revision of
		reinforcement arrangement for the nuclear island basemat has no
		impact on the finite element analysis methods used to analyze the
		nuclear island structures. The analysis of the reactor coolant
		system and core to normal operation and postulated accident
		conditions is not impacted by the clarification of the
		reinforcement design in the licensing basis and revision of details
		for the nuclear island basemat. The clarification of the
		reinforcement design in the licensing basis and revision of
		reinforcement arrangement for the nuclear island basemat does
		not alter the assumptions or results of the ex-vessel severe
		accident assessment.

SCE&G Evaluation	Activity Description	Summary of Evaluation
LCE-12-030	The departure adds three vent (V114, V115A, V115B) and two	Within the licensing basis, the departure adds some additional
	drain (V116A, V116B) lines to DCD Tier 2 Figure 9.1-6 for the Spent	details (i.e., vents and drains) to the Tier 2 figures for the SFS and
	Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFS), and a Normal Residual Heat	RNS, and the new RNS drain line valve is added to three Tier 2
	Removal System (RNS) drain line (V065) to Tier 2 Tables 3.2-3,	tables. The new vents and drains are added to allow for
	3.11-1 and 31.6-3 and Tier 2 Figure 5.4-7.	maintenance and system fill prior to system operation. The vents
		and drains are closed and capped during system operation, and
	As part of the design finalization process, vents and drains are	thus, no system design function is adversely affected. No
	provided for the RNS and SFS. The vents and drains are placed on	procedure, method of control, test or experiment is involved. The
	their associated system engineering drawing, added to the	changes do not affect a defense-in-depth (Le., beyond design
	associated DCD Tier 2 SFS and RNS figures, and the (new) RNS	basis) function. A 10 CFR 50.59/10 CFR 52 Appendix D Section VIII
	drain line is added to three Tier 2 tables.	review determined that no prior NRC approval is required.