

Hernandez, Pete

From: Hernandez, Pete
Sent: Tuesday, January 03, 2012 1:11 PM
To: Mahoney, Michael; CuadradoDeJesus, Samuel
Subject: q&as assignments for Davis Besse
Attachments: Divying up the QA's.docx

Hey guys, hoping that you can help me answer some of the questions that are in the attached document. The last 2 pages have the questions re: license renewal that the region is anticipating and since I have little experience with that, hoping yall can help.

Thanks,

Pete

From: Sanchez Santiago, Elba
Sent: Tuesday, January 03, 2012 1:01 PM
To: Hernandez, Pete
Subject: FW: q&as assignments

From: Mitlyng, Viktoria
Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2011 1:58 PM
To: Hills, David; Neurauter, James; Cameron, Jamnes; Smagacz, Phillip; Briley, Thomas; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Chandrathil, Prema; West, Steven; Reynolds, Steven; Zimmerman, Jacob; Sanchez Santiago, Elba; Barker, Allan; Logaras, Harral; OBrien, Kenneth; Pederson, Cynthia; Uhle, Jennifer; Hiland, Patrick; Steffes, Jakob; Rutkowski, John
Subject: q&as assignments

Attached are the Q&As - public, non-public, and additional questions for the public meeting. We "assigned" them to DB team members based on this morning's discussion. Please make adjustments to the assignments as necessary.

-Vika

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Q&AS FOR JANUARY 5 DABIS-BESSE PUBLIC MEETING

Cindy

Public meeting Q&As

How can we trust the NRC to do its job when the commissioner' infighting is embarrassingly all over the news? Instead of focusing on safety, they can't even get along to do their jobs, especially when there are so many questions about nuclear power after Japan?

How can you sit here and tell us you are not affected by that childish, unprofessional behavior? How can you tell me it's not distracting you from doing your job?

Do you have any association with FE employees outside of work?

The State of Ohio determined there is a cancer cluster near Davis-Besse caused by the plant's terrible operation. They have lied to you guys and to us before. How do you know they are telling you about all their poisonous emissions?

I heard they were releasing tritium into our water. Do you know about that?

Isn't NRC conducting some sort of cancer study?

Have any of you ever worked at the plant or for the plant outside of regulatory work?

Why don't you provide us copies of your CVs? How do we know you are even qualified to do your jobs?

Look at your resident inspector. He looks 15. How can you entrust someone so young with daily oversight of a nuclear plant, especially a plant with such terrible history?

Ken

Q10. What is a CAL? What does it do?

RW

A10. CAL stands for Confirmatory Action Letter. It is a letter issued to the utility to confirm an agreement to take certain actions in response to a certain issue. The NRC uses CALs to alleviate concerns about health and safety, safeguards, or the environment.

Q11. What happens if they don't follow the CAL?

A11. The NRC expects utilities to adhere to any obligations or commitments contained in a CAL, but the CAL does not constitute a legal requirement. The NRC does require the utility to contact the NRC if the utility determines that it cannot meet any of the conditions contained in the CAL or if the utility intends to change any of the commitments, so that the NRC may determine if the utility's proposed actions are acceptable. If the utility does not fulfill the commitments made through a CAL, the NRC can take additional actions, including but not limited to, issuing an order requiring the utility take all actions necessary to maintain the safety of the plant.

Q12. How long is it good for?

A12. A CAL remains open and in effect until the utility has fulfilled all the commitments made through the CAL and until the NRC has reviewed the completion of activities and is satisfied with the results. The NRC will document the closure of the CAL typically through a letter to the utility or in an NRC inspection report.

Q26. Why does there appear to be a large crack in the picture released on the public website? (Dave will be the primary but in case you need to respond)

A26. What is visible from the picture is the result of the hydrodemolition method (material removal using high pressure water), which likely enlarged the crack to appear wider than the cracking confirmed by core bores directly above that section. The existing cracks, as confirmed by core bores, were in general less than 0.01 inches in width.

From the Internal Comm Plan-non-public Q&A's

Does NRC have regulatory requirements on the condition of the shield building from the safety perspective?

Yes, the Shield Building is a safety related structure. The licensee is required to maintain the quality of this structure in a condition that ensures it will be able to fulfill its safety function. The shield building was designed to withstand the impact of earthquakes, tornadoes and external objects.

Public Meeting Q&AS

KEN/JAMNES:

FENOC provided shoddy information, if not outright lies to placate their stakeholders, to the public. How come the NRC did nothing about it?

Kucinich said FE has been mischaracterizing the information about the cracks. Is that true? Is NRC going to look at how FE has been misleading the public in their statements?

Kucinich also said that NRC “adopted and repeated” FE’s statements on the cracks. How did the NRC describe the cracks to the public?

How come NRC issued a report that said, “the licensee identified indications of potential fracture lines in various sections of the opening in the non-structural, architectural concrete of the shield building” but offered no updates when that information became outdated and other cracks in other areas were found? It sounds like you were trying, along with FNOG, to minimize the significance of the cracks.

The picture on NRC website shows a clearly visible wide and long cracks. How can you say it was “hairline” or “tight?”

Congressman Kucinich requested the NRC hold a hearing before the plants restarts. How come the NRC is holding a meeting over a month after the plant restarted?

This tells me the NRC places no value on public input and didn’t want to face tough questions before restart. Is that the case?

Why did the NRC cancel the meeting scheduled for December 15?

Why did you schedule this public meeting the first week after the holidays? You know that a lot of people will be on vacation and won’t be able to attend. Are you purposefully trying to make it impossible for people to come?

We asked you to hold this meeting in Toledo. Did you decide to hold it here to allow FENOC to stack it with their workers? Look around this room; we are the only people who aren’t from the plant.

What is the NRC going to do with the comments provided by the public during this meeting?

What if a member of the public had a safety concern the NRC had not considered and the plant restarted without NRC being aware of this issue?

Dave

Q1. How did NRC inspectors reach the conclusion that the shield building is safe?

A1. The NRC put together a team of about ten specialists from the NRC Midwestern office in Illinois and the NRC Headquarters office in Maryland to provide a thorough and independent review of FENOC's testing of the cracks, their methodology, calculations and analyses to determine the impact of the cracks on the building's ability to perform its safety function.

To make a conclusion about the safety of the shield building, the NRC team:

- monitored the licensee's activities at the plant as they were identifying the extent and nature of the cracks

- examined the licensee's methodology for assessing the impact of the cracks on the shield building

- made sure the samples taken from the building were sufficient to indicate the extent and the severity of the cracks in the building as a whole

- reviewed the calculations and the assumptions on the shield building's ability to withstand stresses it would be under during normal operation and during events such as tornadoes and earthquakes.

- continued to ask questions about the specifics of the licensee's calculations; challenged their assumptions; requested additional information; and made sure the calculations demonstrated that the shield building has sufficient structural strength to fulfill its safety function

Q2. What is laminar cracking?

A2. Laminar cracking is cracking of material, including concrete, in which there is a separation of layers, or planes. In this case, the inspectors were examining cracking along the outermost layer of rebar and concrete.

Q3. What tools did FENOC use to examine the building for cracks?

A3. FENOC performed various activities to understand the extent and characteristics of the cracks including impulse response mapping and core bores.

Q4. What is impulse response mapping?

A4. Impulse response mapping is a test performed from the outside surface of a building or structure to obtain an indication of the internal conditions of the structure and typically can identify cracking. The inspection involves striking the region of interest with a hammer like instrument which emits a vibration in the structure. The response from the structural region is received through a receptor. Based on the differences in the response between regions, the condition of the interior of the structure can be obtained. This is a non-destructive method of examining the interior of the structure. Non-destructive means there is no physical change or damage to the structure being examined.

Q5. What are core bores? How were they analyzed and by whom?

A5. Core bores are a sample in the form of a cylinder taken from the shield building in order to examine the condition of the cracks. The utility engaged a contractor to retrieve these samples and sent them out to be examined. The NRC reviewed the analysis performed making sure the utility addressed its questions and concerns. Additional tests will be performed as a part of the utility's root cause analysis.

Q6. Did FENOC look at the entire building? If not, how much of the building did they examine? Why is that sufficient?

A6. FENOC performed tests in certain locations of the building. As a result, FENOC had to make conservative assumptions regarding the extent of cracking in their technical analysis that bounded the possible worse case condition. The NRC reviewed in detail the utility's extent of examinations to ensure an adequate sample was taken. Questions and concerns were communicated to the utility and answers were provided to the NRC such that the NRC was satisfied that the extent of the sampling and analysis was sufficient to ensure the shield building will meet its safety functions.

Q7. Did FENOC have a methodology for their approach to determine the extent of cracking? What's the NRC's review of this methodology?

A7. NRC reviewed FENOC's method for determining the extent of cracking. The NRC also examined how the findings were incorporated into the utility's analyses to ensure the extent of cracking was adequately addressed and the safety functions of the shield building could still be met.

Q8. Does the NRC have any outstanding questions and/ concerns?

A8. The NRC concluded that the shield building could meet its safety functions. NRC staff continues to evaluate whether the shield building, in its current condition, conforms to design code requirements identified in the plant's licensing basis. The NRC will pursue the resolution of this issue through its inspection activities.

Q9. When did the NRC receive the utility's analysis? How long did it take the NRC to review the utility's analysis?

A9. The utility performed various analyses to address the cracks identified in the shield building and provided them to the NRC for review. Soon after receiving them, the NRC reviewed the information from the utility requesting clarifications or additional information as necessary. The NRC took the time necessary to conduct a thorough review of the utility's analyses and ensured the shield building can meet its safety functions prior to the plant restarting.

Q14. How could you let the plant restart without having the root cause, without having an understanding of what caused these cracks?

A14. The NRC has reasonable assurance that the shield building can fulfill its safety function. NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter documenting the licensee's commitments to:

- Monitor the extent and the size of the cracks before and during the next refueling outage to ensure that the extent of cracking and condition of cracking assumed in the analyses remain valid

- Submit a root cause evaluation by February 28, 2012.

- Develop a long-term monitoring program that will effectively monitor the cracks in the shield building going forward after the root causes of the cracking are understood.

NRC will closely monitor these actions.

Q15. Can the cracks get worse? How quickly can they get worse? Can you guarantee they won't get worse?

A15. The NRC has commitments from the company to monitor the cracks in the shield building to detect changes in the conditions of the cracks. Additionally, the root cause analysis will provide a clearer picture of what caused these cracks and what actions need to be taken to adequately monitor them long-term.

Q16. What is the NRC going to do if the root cause is not completed to NRC's satisfaction?

A16. The NRC will review the utility's root cause analysis and ensure it is thorough and complete. If the NRC identifies any concerns they will engage the utility and ensure that the utility will take appropriate actions to address the issue.

Q17. How many plants with the same shield building design are there in the country? How many of them have had an opening cut in the shield building?

A17. There are a total of six sites with nine units in the country with a shield building design similar to Davis-Besse's. Of these nine units, five units have had an opening cut in the shield building. None identified cracking similar to that seen at Davis Besse. The plants with a similar shield building design to Davis-Besse are St. Lucie Units 1 and 2, Waterford Unit 3, Prairie Island Units 1 and 2, Kewaunee Unit 1, Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 and Watts Bar Unit 1. Cuts have occurred in Davis-Besse, Sequoyah Unit 1, St. Lucie Units 1 and 2, and Watts Bar Unit 1.

Q18. Have there been plants with the same design and issues?

A18. The NRC has not identified similar issues in plants with a shield building design similar to Davis-Besse's.

Q19. Is this a generic issue? Has the NRC informed other plants with the same shield building design of this situation?

A19. The NRC will review this issue for generic implications upon receiving FENOC's root cause analysis. If the NRC identifies implications for other plants with similar shield building designs, the NRC will take actions to address this.

Q21. Are the dead loads from the structural elements properly considered in the design analysis of the building?

A21. The dead load is the weight that has to be supported by a structure. The NRC has reviewed the original design calculation for this building. The dead loads were considered in the original calculation, and they were also considered in the analyses that incorporate the cracking. The NRC did not identify any concerns related to it.

Q22. What type of cement was used in the architectural concrete?

A22. The cement used in the architectural concrete was the same as that used in the structural portion.

Q23. If the concrete/cement in the shield building is the same as that in the “architectural concrete” elements and all have the same age and environmental exposure history, would numerous cracks identified in one suggest comparable conditions in the other? If not, why not?

A23. The concrete referred to as the “architectural” concrete is additional concrete incorporated into the design for aesthetic reasons. While not credited in the design for structural strength purposes, this concrete was part of the same pour and has the same material as the 2 ½ foot thick main structural shell of the building. Cracking has been identified primarily in the architectural regions and in some isolated areas of the structural region, specifically near the main stream line penetration and the dome of the shield building. Cracking can be of structural concern in the architectural and structural regions depending on how close cracks are to the outer layer of structural rebar. The core bores and impulse mapping performed by FENOC to determine the extent of the cracking in the shield building demonstrated that only certain regions of the building had cracks. None of the cracks found to date penetrate deeper than the outer layer of rebar in the shield building. NRC staff concluded that the impulse response mapping and core bores performed by FENOC provide a representative sample of the overall condition of the shield building. However, in order to provide an additional safety margin, FENOC structural analysis assumed a greater degree of cracking than was found during the testing of the shield building. FENOC has committed to providing a root cause analysis of shield building cracking to the NRC by February 28. This analysis will enhance the current understanding of extent of the cracking and areas prone to this phenomenon. The NRC will review the results of FENOC’s root cause and ensure necessary actions are taken to address the findings.

Q24. Are the cracks found at Davis-Besse visible?

A24. No. A visible crack can be identified by visual examination of the concrete surface. The cracks at Davis-Besse are non-visible; they do not penetrate to the concrete surface area and cannot be identified by visual examination of this surface.

Q25. What code or standard applies to the shield building structure?

A25. ACI 307-69, Specification for the Design and Construction of Reinforced Concrete
ACI 318-63, Building Code Requirement for Reinforced Concrete
ASME Code, Section III, 1968
These codes are part of the licensee’s Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

Q26. Why does there appear to be a large crack in the picture released on the public website?

A26. What is visible from the picture is the result of the hydrodemolition method (material removal using high pressure water), which likely enlarged the crack to appear wider than the

cracking confirmed by core bores directly above that section. The existing cracks, as confirmed by core bores, were in general less than 0.01 inches in width.

Q27. Can the shield building still take a hit from a flying object during a tornado? What about an earthquake?

A27. Yes. The shield building is designed to provide environmental protection of the containment vessel from adverse weather conditions including flying objects generated by tornados. The NRC has concluded that the licensee has provided reasonable assurance that the shield building can fulfill its intended safety function in its current condition.

Q28. How can a building with cracks still stand strong and function?

A28. The licensee provided the NRC with analysis and calculations that appropriately incorporated the effects of the cracking to show that the shield building can maintain its structural integrity with the existing cracks. The NRC staff reviewed this analysis and concluded that the licensee provided reasonable assurance that the shield building is capable of performing its safety function.

Q29. How many cracks are there in total?

A29. The cracking was identified by areas/regions and not by number of cracks. The NRC reviewed the extent of testing on the shield building done by the utility and concluded that an adequate amount of testing and samples were obtained in order to support the company's conclusion regarding the condition of the shield building.

Q30. What happens if a piece of the shield building crashes into the steel containment vessel building? Have you analyzed for this scenario?

A30. The reinforced concrete shield building and steel containment vessel were built to perform their safety functions in the event of natural phenomena such as tornados and earthquakes. Based on our evaluation of the licensee's extent of condition and technical analysis of the Davis-Besse shield building cracking, the NRC staff concluded that the licensee has provided reasonable assurance that the shield building is capable of performing its safety functions, and, therefore, that the shield building will protect the steel containment vessel.

Q32. How does the NRC plan to inspect the shield building? What does the inspection procedure call for?

A32. The NRC will inspect the company's implementation of shield building monitoring commitments documented in the Confirmatory Action Letter; review the licensee's root cause of the shield building cracking and the long-term monitoring program to determine if the shield

building can continue to perform its safety functions. In addition, the license renewal inspection team is continuing to evaluate this issue and will take all necessary actions to ensure the licensee addresses any concerns they may have prior to Davis-Besse entering their period of extended operation.

Q33. What inspections of the shield building has the NRC conducted in the past at Davis-Besse before this incident?

A33. The Davis-Besse shield building has been previously cut through for the first head replacement in 2002. The 2002 cut was located inside the original construction opening, while the 2011 cut is a larger area that includes sections outside the original construction opening. The NRC performed an inspection of those activities and ensured the shield building was returned to its original design and was able to meet its design function. The utility has also performed visual inspections of the outer surface of the shield building. These inspections were reviewed by NRC inspectors as a part of the 2011 head replacement activities.

Q34. Does the NRC have a requirement for what type of concrete must be used for these types of building?

A34. The shield building was designed and constructed in accordance with NRC and industry code requirements to be able to fulfill certain safety functions. Some of the requirements for the concrete include the ability to maintain structural integrity during seismic events and withstand the impacts of flying objects such as those generated during a tornado.

Q35. Why are these cracks only being found now, since the building was cut open before? Did the licensee miss something?

A35. The NRC and the licensee did not identify any cracks in the shield building when it was opened in 2002 for the previous reactor vessel head replacement. While the opening in 2002 was positioned within the area of the opening that had been made in the concrete during original construction, the 2011 opening extended beyond this original entry into portions of concrete that have never been cut.

From the Internal Comm Plan non-public Q&A's

Does having the crack undiscovered constitute a violation?

NRC inspectors are currently on-site performing an independent inspection of the conditions identified in the concrete of the shield building as well as evaluating the licensee's analysis and actions taken to disposition these indications. If any discrepancies are identified between the licensee's actions and the NRC's requirements, NRC will take the appropriate measures to address them.

Does NRC have regulatory requirements on the condition of the shield building from the safety perspective?

Yes, the Shield Building is a safety related structure. The licensee is required to maintain the quality of this structure in a condition that ensures it will be able to fulfill its safety function. The shield building was designed to withstand the impact of earthquakes, tornadoes and external objects.

How about the security implications of having the building that is supposed to protect the plant from an airplane crash develop a crack or even multiple cracks?

We cannot publicly discuss security related information. However we can say that since 9/11, the NRC has implemented a number of actions that ensure nuclear power plants are able to cope with a catastrophic event.

Does having a hole cut in the shield structure compromise its security function of protecting the plant from missiles?

We cannot publicly discuss security related information. The site performed a safety evaluation of this temporary condition, which the NRC reviewed to ensure it would not compromise the safety of the plant.

How come there is no event report on this issue? Is it reportable to the NRC?

The issue didn't have to be reported because it did not represent an immediate safety concern because the plant was shut down. The licensee is still evaluating the safety significance of the issue.

What if there was a terrorist attack by flying a plane into the reactor with the crack?

We cannot publicly discuss security related information. However, we can say that since 9/11, the NRC has implemented a number of actions that help ensure nuclear power plants are able to cope with a catastrophic event.

Are the public and the environment safe with the hole in the containment vessel and the shield building plus a crack in the shield building?

Yes. The temporary condition has been evaluated by the licensee and the NRC. Prior to cutting a doorway in the containment vessel the fuel was removed from the reactor vessel. The cut in the shield building was evaluated prior to creating the temporary maintenance access.

Did they conceal this from the NRC and the public?

No, based on the method of discovery, it is our understanding that they communicated the conditions they identified immediately after discovery.

How is this different from Crystal River?

Comparisons have been made between the cracks found in the shield building at Davis-Besse and cracks in the containment structure at the Crystal River nuclear plant in Florida. However, there are significant differences between the two plants. Crystal River's containment vessel is attached to the shield building serving as a single structure to prevent radiation from reaching the environment whereas at Davis-Besse the free-standing steel containment vessel, that is separate from the shield building, serves that function. Because of this difference, the cracks

identified in the containment structure at Crystal River in 2009 challenge its safety and that is why the plant is currently shut down.

Crystal River has been shut down for a long time because of a similar problem. How come the NRC isn't requiring DB to shut down?

Davis Besse is currently in a shutdown condition. The problem at Crystal River is different to the conditions identified at Davis Besse (see above). Also, the conditions at Davis Besse have not been fully evaluated yet and therefore, no determination has been made with respect to the actions going forward.

Public Meeting Q&As

Can you describe more specifically or give example of what the calculations and other documents FENOC had to submit to the NRC to show the shield building was safe to operate with cracks?

When FENOC was performing mapping and core bores did NRC inspectors monitor those activities to make sure they were properly performed?

I still don't understand how NRC can claim to have assurance of shield building safety without having a root cause analysis, i.e. without having an understanding of the mechanism(s) that caused the cracks.

Do shield buildings get inspected to ensure they have not been degraded by age in the course of the license renewal process?

Why is delamination bad?

Where was it found?

How do you know FENOC hasn't hidden other, more serious cracks in the shield building from you? They have a history of lying. Did NRC verify all of FENOC information on the cracks?

Explain structural vs. architectural parts of the shield building and what this distinction is relevant to the safety analysis.

How much of the shield building has been examined?

How did you decide that examining a small fraction of the shield building is sufficient?

Is the NRC satisfied with the quality of tests, calculations, assumptions and analyses provided by FENOC?

Was FENOC thorough in their analysis of the shield building's safety?

You said you still don't know if the plant meets its design basis. How could you allow the plant restart if there is a question about this plant operating in accordance with its license?

If you find the shield building doesn't meet its design basis, are you going to fine FirstEnergy?

Did you delay Davis-Besse's restart?

Did FENOC wait for you guys to finish your review to restart?

Did you consider FENOC's restart goals during your safety review?

How could you let DB restart without having a root cause of the cracking given that it's the first time it's been identified in a shield building and you don't know what you are dealing with?

Jamnes

Q14. How could you let the plant restart without having the root cause, without having an understanding of what caused these cracks?

A14. The NRC has reasonable assurance that the shield building can fulfill its safety function. NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter documenting the licensee's commitments to:

- Monitor the extent and the size of the cracks before and during the next refueling outage to ensure that the extent of cracking and condition of cracking assumed in the analyses remain valid
- Submit a root cause evaluation by February 28, 2012.
- Develop a long-term monitoring program that will effectively monitor the cracks in the shield building going forward after the root causes of the cracking are understood.

NRC will closely monitor these actions.

Q15. Can the cracks get worse? How quickly can they get worse? Can you guarantee they won't get worse?

A15. The NRC has commitments from the company to monitor the cracks in the shield building to detect changes in the conditions of the cracks. Additionally, the root cause analysis will provide a clearer picture of what caused these cracks and what actions need to be taken to adequately monitor them long-term.

Q16. What is the NRC going to do if the root cause is not completed to NRC's satisfaction?

A16. The NRC will review the utility's root cause analysis and ensure it is thorough and complete. If the NRC identifies any concerns they will engage the utility and ensure that the utility will take appropriate actions to address the issue.

Q31. How does the NRC plan to monitor these cracks to ensure they do not get worse?

A31. The NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter confirming commitments by FENOC to have available to the NRC a root cause for the shield building cracking and to establish a shield building monitoring program. This program includes actions to monitor the existing cracks to ensure they do not challenge the safety functions of the shield building.

Public Meeting Q&As

This plant has been plagued with problems for decades and the NRC has been letting them get away with it. When are you guys going to start putting our safety before the nuclear industry's profits?

How many times will you let a plant off the hook as they continue to have major problems? Is it going to take an actual meltdown for you to do your work as regulators?

So, what's your assessment of their current performance? Do you have any inspections going on to figure if they don't have some other unidentified cracks in some other part of the plant?

Are you still considering relicensing the plant when even its containment building is crumbling?

The confirmatory action letter is nothing but a fancy way of putting on paper what FENOC told you they would do to placate you. Are you really going to tell me it's a strong regulatory tool?

When is the NRC going to realize that FENCO isn't capable of operating nuclear plants safely? Look at Perry – they overexposed their workers to radiation and had to evacuate the plant. What did NRC do? No fines, nobody fired. Just a little more inspecting. What kind of regulations are these?

PAT

Public Meeting Q&As

What's going on with NRC's Japan reviews?

Are you guys changing your regulations?

How long is it going to take you to act?

I heard that NRC commissioners are dragging their feet on implementing necessary safety changes and fighting the Chairman who want to make them happen more quickly. What's going on with that?

Are you going to extend the EPZ to 50 miles?

What is the status of the plant's in Japan?

Is there still radiation coming to the US from Japan?

MIKE MAHONEY

Q36. What impact do these cracks have on license renewal?

A36. The NRC's license renewal inspection team is continuing to evaluate this issue and will take all necessary actions to ensure the licensee addresses any concerns they may have prior to Davis-Besse entering their period of extended operation along with reviewing the issue for any generic concerns for other facilities.

The discovery of the crack in the containment means that this plant is a danger to the public. Is the NRC really going to even consider renewing the plant's license after all the "surprise" problems it has had?

The potential concrete cracking is in the shield building which is not equivalent to the containment vessel. The licensee is currently completing the evaluation of the crack indications in the shield building. Once the evaluation is complete, the NRC will review it and take any actions necessary to ensure the licensee is taking the actions necessary to ensure the shield building will perform its design function and the safety of the plant is maintained.

Public Meeting Q&As

If you cared about safety, you wouldn't rubber stamp license renewal applications for all these aging plants. How can you even consider renewing this plant's license in light of all the problems, including the plant coming close to a meltdown in 2002?

What is the status of license renewal activities?

When is the next public meeting on license renewal?

Will the shield building cracking be considered in the license renewal reviews?