



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I**
2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-2713

July 27, 2012

Mr. Kevin Walsh
Site Vice President
Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC
c/o Mr. Michael O'Keefe
P.O. Box 300
Seabrook, NH 03874

**SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION UNIT 1– NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND
RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2012008**

Dear Mr. Walsh:

On June 28, 2012, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit 1. The enclosed report documents the results of this inspection, which were discussed on June 28, 2012 with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

From June 6 – 23, 2011, Seabrook Station participated in an International Atomic Energy Agency Operational Safety Review Team evaluation. The results of this evaluation were made publicly available on March 21, 2012 (ML12081A105). As such, in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Section 08.05, the inspection hours for this biennial problem identification and resolution inspection were reduced by approximately 25 percent.

Based on the samples selected for review, the inspectors did not identify any findings during this inspection. The inspectors concluded that problems were, in most cases, properly identified, evaluated, and resolved in the corrective action program. NextEra personnel identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. NextEra prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the problems and corrective actions were implemented in a timely manner. The inspectors determined that in general, NextEra appropriately considered industry operating experience information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. Additionally, the inspectors concluded that self-assessments, audits, and other internal NextEra assessments reviewed during the inspection were typically critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Arthur L. Burritt, Chief
Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-443
License Nos.: NPF-86

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000443/2012008
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket Nos.: 50-443

License Nos.: NPF-86

Report Nos.: 05000443/2012008

Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC

Facility: Seabrook Station, Unit 1

Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874

Dates: June 11, 2012 – June 28, 2012

Team Leader: Carey Bickett, Senior Project Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects

Inspectors: Elise Burket, Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety
Nathan Lafferty, Project Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects

Approved by: Arthur L. Burritt, Chief
Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000443/2012008; 06/11/2012 – 06/28/2012; Seabrook Station, Unit 1; Biennial Baseline Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution.

This NRC team inspection was performed by three regional inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Problem Identification and Resolution

The inspectors concluded that NextEra was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. NextEra personnel identified problems, entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, and prioritized issues commensurate with their safety significance. NextEra appropriately screened issues for operability and reportability, and performed causal analyses that appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also determined that NextEra typically implemented corrective actions to address the problems identified in the corrective action program in a timely manner.

Based on those items selected for review, the inspectors concluded that, in general, NextEra adequately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience to Seabrook Station operations. Additionally, the inspectors determined that NextEra's self-assessments and audits were thorough.

Based on the interviews the inspectors conducted over the course of the inspection, observations of plant activities, and reviews of individual corrective action program and employee concerns program issues, the inspectors did not identify any indications that site personnel were unwilling to raise safety issues. The inspectors also concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable safety conscious work environment and no significant challenges to the free flow of information.

No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152B)

This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolution as defined by Inspection Procedure 71152. All documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

From June 6 – 23, 2011, Seabrook Station participated in an International Atomic Energy Agency Operational Safety Review Team evaluation. The results of this evaluation were made publicly available on March 21, 2012¹. As such, in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Section 08.05, the inspection hours for this biennial problem identification and resolution inspection were reduced by approximately 25 percent.

.1 Assessment of Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the procedures that described NextEra's corrective action program at Seabrook Station. To assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program, the inspectors reviewed performance in three primary areas: problem identification, prioritization and evaluation of issues, and corrective action implementation. The inspectors compared performance in these areas to the requirements and standards contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," and NextEra procedures PI-AA-204, "Condition Identification and Screening Process," Revision 16, and PI-AA-205, "Condition Evaluation and Corrective Action," Revision 15. For each of these areas, the inspectors considered risk insights from the station's risk analysis and reviewed action requests selected across the seven cornerstones of safety in the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process. Additionally, the inspectors attended Initial Screening Team and Management Review Committee meetings. The inspectors selected items from the following functional areas for review: engineering, operations, maintenance, emergency preparedness, radiation protection, chemistry, physical security, and oversight programs.

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification

In addition to the items described above, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, a sample of completed work orders, a sample of active clearances, and periodic trend reports. The inspectors also completed field walkdowns of various systems on site, such as the emergency feedwater system and the emergency diesel generators. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of action requests written to document issues identified through internal self-assessments, audits, emergency preparedness drills, and the operating experience program. The inspectors completed this review to verify that NextEra entered conditions adverse to quality into their corrective action program as appropriate.

¹ The evaluation report can be found in ADAMS under accession number ML12081A105.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and prioritization of a sample of action requests issued since the last NRC biennial Problem Identification and Resolution inspection completed in October 2010. The inspectors also reviewed action requests that were assigned lower levels of significance that did not include formal cause evaluations to ensure that they were properly classified. The inspectors' review included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution. The inspectors assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes for the issues and developed appropriate corrective actions to address the identified causes. Further, the inspectors reviewed equipment operability evaluations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for selected problems to verify these processes adequately addressed equipment operability, reporting of issues to the NRC, and the extent of the issues.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors reviewed NextEra's completed corrective actions through documentation review and, in some cases, field walkdowns to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspectors also reviewed action requests for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actions were effective in addressing the broader issues. The inspectors reviewed NextEra's timeliness in implementing corrective actions and effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of action requests associated with selected non-cited violations, findings, and licensee-identified violations to verify that NextEra personnel properly evaluated and resolved these issues. In addition, the inspectors expanded the corrective action review to five years to evaluate NextEra's actions related to the emergency feedwater system.

b. Assessment

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification

Based on the selected samples, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel in multiple functional areas, the inspectors determined that NextEra identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. NextEra staff at Seabrook Station initiated approximately 25,000 action requests between October 2010 and May 2012. The inspectors observed Seabrook staff at Initial Screening Team and Management Review Committee meetings appropriately questioning and challenging action requests to ensure clarification of the issues. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that NextEra trended equipment and programmatic issues, and appropriately identified problems in action requests. The inspectors verified that conditions adverse to quality identified through this review were entered into the corrective action program as appropriate. Additionally, inspectors concluded that personnel were identifying trends at low levels. In general, inspectors did not identify any issues or concerns that had not been appropriately entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. In response to several questions and minor equipment observations identified by the inspectors during plant walkdowns, NextEra personnel promptly initiated action requests and/or took immediate action to address the issues.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors determined that, in general, NextEra appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. NextEra screened action requests for operability and reportability, categorized the action requests by significance, and assigned actions to the appropriate department for evaluation and resolution. The action request screening process considered human performance issues, radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, adverse trends, and potential impact on the safety conscious work environment.

Based on the sample of action requests reviewed, the inspectors noted that the guidance provided by NextEra corrective action program implementing procedures appeared sufficient to ensure consistency in categorization of issues. Operability and reportability determinations were generally performed when conditions warranted and in most cases, the evaluations supported the conclusion. Causal analyses appropriately considered the extent of condition or problem, generic issues, and previous occurrences of the issue. However, the inspectors did note one observation in NextEra's evaluation of the following issue:

In accordance with Seabrook's Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, during a steam generator tube rupture with a loss of offsite power, operators must be able to manually isolate a failed open atmospheric steam dump valve within 20 minutes to minimize radiological consequences. In January 2011, the station wrote action request 1609948 to evaluate operating experience that could potentially affect this time-critical action. Based on this operating experience, the station concluded that the force required to close the block valve during this event may be higher than originally thought. Additionally, the station determined that there was no testing method to evaluate closing times under conditions that would be experienced during this design basis event. The station developed a routine work action assignment, due in May 2013, to determine if operators can meet the time critical requirement to close the block valves given the new conditions. The in-progress notes for this action stated that the station was working with the industry to provide a generic solution to the testing issue. However, the action request never evaluated whether operators would still be able to complete the time-critical action given the new conditions.

The station performed an evaluation and determined that the operators would be able to complete this time critical action within the 20 minute limit discussed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The evaluation determined that the force required to close the valve would likely be less due to the decreasing pressure in the faulted steam generator. In addition, the station conducted a job performance measure to verify the approximate time it would take an operator to complete this task. Operators were able to simulate closing the block valves within approximately nine minutes for the valves that were farthest from the control room, and five minutes for the valves closest to the control room.

NextEra procedure PI-AA-205, "Condition Evaluation and Corrective Action," Section 4.3.5, requires that condition evaluations be conducted to the extent necessary to understand the condition and develop adequate corrective actions. In this case, the station did not fully evaluate whether operators could complete a time-critical action based on new information obtained via operating experience. The inspectors independently evaluated this issue for significance in accordance with the guidance in

IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening," and Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues." Because Seabrook ultimately determined that operators would still be able to complete this action within the 20 minutes specified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the inspectors determined that the issue was of minor significance and not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. NextEra documented this issue in action request 1779955.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse to quality, NextEra identified actions to prevent recurrence. The inspectors concluded that corrective actions to address the sample of NRC non-cited violations, findings, and licensee-identified violations since the last problem identification and resolution inspection were timely and effective.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of action requests associated with review of industry operating experience to determine whether NextEra appropriately evaluated the operating experience information for applicability to Seabrook Station and had taken appropriate actions, when warranted. The inspectors also reviewed evaluations of operating experience documents associated with a sample of NRC generic communications to ensure that NextEra adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issues for resolution via their corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors observed various plant activities to determine if the station considered industry operating experience during the performance of routine and infrequently performed activities.

b. Assessment

The inspectors determined that in general, NextEra appropriately considered industry operating experience information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The inspectors determined that in most cases, operating experience was appropriately applied and lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations and procedures when applicable. However, the inspectors did note one observation related to documenting evaluations of operating experience in the corrective action program.

NextEra procedure PI-AA-201-1001, "Operating Experience Program Screening and Responding to Incoming Operating Experience Guideline," Revision 9, states that all operating experience evaluations shall be completed within 60 days. The only exceptions to this are evaluations of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations level three event reports, which are to be completed within 30 days. During the inspection, the team identified instances where NextEra either assigned due dates for evaluations, or extended initial due dates, beyond this 60-day limit. Examples include the following:

- Action requests 66020 and 26494, which document NRC Information Notices 2005-15 and 2007-14, respectively. NextEra created action request 66020 in 2005, with a routine work assignment to complete the evaluation in November 2012. NextEra created action request 26494 in 2007, with a routine work assignment to complete the evaluation in December 2016. Following inspector identification of these examples, the station completed a review of any open action requests that addressed NRC Information Notices and discovered three additional action requests with untimely applicability evaluations. NextEra documented this issue in action request 1779678, including a corrective action to complete the evaluations by July 20, 2012.
- Action request 1611787, which documents operating experience obtained at a motor operated valve users group meeting. NextEra entered this operating experience into their corrective action program in January 2011 as a routine work tracking item to be completed by February 2011. In August 2011, Nuclear Oversight identified this evaluation was not completed and initiated action request 1676747 with a new due date of March 2013 to complete the evaluation. NextEra documented this issue in action request 1779319, including a corrective action to complete the evaluation by July 31, 2012.

The inspectors independently evaluated this issue for significance in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening," and Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues." The inspectors did not identify any events at Seabrook that may have been mitigated by the use of this operating experience. Additionally, the inspectors concluded that this issue was not programmatic as the evaluations were limited to one department. As such, the inspectors determined that the issue was of minor significance and not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of audits, departmental self-assessments, and assessments performed by independent organizations. Inspectors performed these reviews to determine if NextEra entered problems identified through these assessments into the corrective action program, when appropriate, and whether NextEra initiated corrective actions to address identified deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the audits and assessments by comparing audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified observations made during the inspection.

b. Assessment

The inspectors concluded that self-assessments, audits, and other internal NextEra assessments were generally critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues. The inspectors observed that NextEra personnel knowledgeable in the subject completed these audits and self-assessments in a methodical manner. NextEra completed these audits and self-assessments to a sufficient depth to identify issues which were then

entered into the corrective action program for evaluation. In general, the station implemented corrective actions associated with the identified issues commensurate with their safety significance.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

During interviews with station personnel, the inspectors assessed the safety conscious work environment at Seabrook Station. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed personnel to determine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC, and observed a station Nuclear Safety Culture Meeting. The inspectors also interviewed the station Employee Concerns Program coordinator to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employees were aware of the program and its availability with regards to raising safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed the Employee Concerns Program files to ensure that NextEra entered issues into the corrective action program when appropriate.

b. Assessment

During interviews, Seabrook staff expressed a willingness to use the corrective action program to identify plant issues and deficiencies, and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues. All persons interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the corrective action program and the Employee Concerns Program. The Nuclear Safety Culture Meeting included representatives from each department on site, and participants were actively engaged during the meeting. Based on these limited interviews and observations, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable safety conscious work environment and no significant challenges to the free flow of information.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On June 28, 2012, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Kevin Walsh and other members of the Seabrook staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

K. Walsh	Site Vice President
T. Vehec	Plant General Manager
K. Boehl	ALARA Coordinator
P. Brangiel	Principal Engineering Analyst (Plant Engineering)
P. Brown	Motor Operated Valve Engineer
V. Brown	Senior Licensing Analyst
J. Connolly	Director of Engineering
D. Egonis	Programs Engineer
J. Griffin	Security Analyst
T. Jennis	Senior Mechanic
J. Johnson	Emergency Feedwater System Engineer
G. Kilby	Licensing Engineer
M. Leone	Training Supervisor
D. McGonigle	Design Engineering
S. Morrisey	Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
C. Moynihan	Senior Analyst
J. Normandin	Security Corrective Action Program Coordinator
D. Robinson	Chemistry Department Manager
R. Samson	Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
S. Samstag	Assistant Operations Manager Work Management
G. Sessler	Principal Engineer
T. Smith	Radiation Protection Supervisor
J. Sobotka	Mechanical Design Engineering Supervisor
B. Stacey	Senior Analyst Maintenance Department
T. Waechter	Operations Manager
B. Whyte	Electrical Maintenance Supervisor

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened and Closed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 40A2: Problem Identification and Resolution

Audits and Self-Assessments

Operations Training Mid-Cycle Comprehensive Self Assessment 2011
SBK 11-010, Seabrook Nuclear Oversight Audit Report – Emergency Preparedness 2011
SBK 11-024, Seabrook Nuclear Oversight Audit Report – Engineering Programs 2011

SBK 12-005, Seabrook Nuclear Oversight Audit Report – Security 2012
 SBK 11-025, Environmental Monitoring, Regulatory Compliance and Chemistry Audit 2011
 Conduct Maintenance Practices Post Outage Focused Self Assessment

Condition Reports (* indicates that condition report was generated as a result of this inspection)

1016	393294	1633042	1707964
2180	393528	1637112	1710481
2590	568605	1640845	1712174
3922	575577	1642264	1712183
10367	579817	1653316	1712191
13347	581217	1661010	1712196
16401	583526	1662052	1714318
17633	583721	1665190	1718306
17936	585992	1665812	1730493
25209	587537	1666118	1730682
59346	588554	1666121	1733805
92343	589687	1666354	1735250
124943	592288	1666363	1735667
155125	593471	1667113	1736977
170544	595699	1667245	1747183
173529	596058	1667490	1747654
210446	597609	1667857	1764369
216347	1599860	1669480	1772183
217481	1603091	1673102	1775153*
218646	1603270	1676423	1775441*
218825	1604014	1676747	1775744*
219266	1609948	1676753	1775819*
219494	1611494	1678071	1778569*
220237	1616033	1680478	1779319*
220373	1616125	1684108	1779664*
220576	1616130	1684652	1779678*
221221	1623270	1686024	1779955*
221321	1627594	1686038	
223050	1629182	1689398	
392008	1633034	1693814	

Operating Experience

2010-35-00, Part 21 Report – Limitorque Limit Switch Defect, dated 11/8/10
 NRC Information Notice 2006-26, Failure of Magnesium Rotors in Motor-Operated Valve
 Actuators
 NRC Information Notice 2011-02, Operator Performance Issues Involving Reactivity
 Management at Nuclear Power Plants, dated 1/31/11

Non-Cited Violations, Findings, and Licensee-Identified Violations

05000443/2011003-01, Inadequate Control of Combustible Materials
 05000443/2011003-05, Inadequate Operability Evaluation for Decreased Emergency Diesel
 Generator Heat Exchanger Cooling Water Flow
 05000443/2011005-01, Reactor Trip Caused by Inadequate Condensate Pump Restoration

Licensee-Identified Violation 2010005, Failure to Place Standby Service Water Pump Control Switch in Normal

Licensee-Identified Violation 2012002, Failure to Correct Hold-Down Clamp on 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Return

Procedures

AD-AA-103, Nuclear Safety Culture Program, Revision 3
 E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Revision 42
 EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments, Revision 6
 MM-ON-05, Review Deviation Component Log, Revision 2
 NA-AA-200, Employee Concerns Program Process Description, Revision 5
 NAP-415, Maintenance Rule Program Administration, Revision 4
 ON1034.02, Condensate and Feedwater System Fill and Vent, Revision 16
 ON1034.03, Condensate System Operation, Revision 18
 OP-AA-101-1000, Clearance and Tagging, Revision 4
 OS1016.05, Service Water Cooling Tower Operation, Revision 20
 OS1026.01, Operation of DG 1A, Revision 19
 OS1430.05, ASDV 18-Month Local Valve Stroke, Revision 5
 OX1426.05, DG 1B Monthly Operability Surveillance, Revision 24
 OX1426.22, Emergency Diesel Generator 1A 24 Hour Load Test and Hot Restart Surveillance, Revision 13
 OX1426.34, Diesel Generator 1A 18 Month Operability Surveillance, Revision 4
 PEG-45, Maintenance Rule Program Monitoring Activities, Revision 16
 PI-AA-001, Corrective Action Program and Condition Reporting, Revision 3
 PI-AA-003, Operating Experience, Revision 0
 PI-AA-100-1005, Root Cause Analysis, Revision 5
 PI-AA-100-1006, Common Cause Evaluation, Revision 4
 PI-AA-100-1007, Apparent Cause Evaluation, Revision 5
 PI-AA-101, Self-Assessment and Benchmarking, Revision 9
 PI-AA-101-1000, Focused Self-Assessment Planning, Conduct and Reporting, Revision 8
 PI-AA-101-1001, Quick Hit Assessments, Revision 4
 PI-AA-101-1002, Benchmarking Process, Revision 4
 PI-AA-102, Operating Experience Program, Revision 3
 PI-AA-102-1001, Operating Experience Program Screening and Responding to Incoming Operating Experience Guideline, Revision 9
 PI-AA-102-1003, Sharing Operating Experience with Nuclear Industry, Revision 1
 PI-AA-203, Action Tracking Management, Revision 4
 PI-AA-204, Condition Identification and Screening Process, Revision 16
 PI-AA-205, Condition Evaluation and Corrective Action, Revision 15

Work Orders

121106	611267	1735491
596518	1719542	94004842

Miscellaneous

1994 SIR 94-063
 1-FW-B20688, Emergency Feedwater System Details, Revision 12
 Anonymous condition reports created since October 1, 2010

Emergency Feedwater System Health Report
Environmental sampling mini-scenario (June 2012)
EO1072C, Offsite Monitoring Training Slides (June 2012)
Job Performance Measure L0149J, Locally Isolate ASDV, Revision 3
Licensee Event Report 2005-005
List of clearances active for greater than 45 days
List of clearances active for greater than 90 days
PowerPoint presentation on "Cycling Time Critical Local Valves"
Quarterly review of cancelled work requests and work orders
Quick Hit Self Assessment of Fluid Dynamics for Licensed Operators Questions 2012
Radiation Protection Survey M-20110403-27
Seabrook Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 15.6.3.2, Revision 12
WMDI-032, Screen Team Guideline, Revision 4

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMS	Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PARS	Publicly Available Records System