

## **STATUS OF NRC ACTIVITIES OF POTENTIAL INTEREST TO O&M MAIN COMMITTEE**

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**ASME O&M Code Committee Meeting on July 18-20, 2012, at Chattanooga, TN**

### **10 CFR 50.55a Rulemaking**

10 CFR 50.55a was amended by the last rulemaking, to incorporate by reference the 2005 and 2006 Addenda of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Code, the 2005 Addenda through 2008a Edition of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code Section XI, and 2004 Edition through 2008 addenda of the ASME Section III.

In the spring of 2011, the NRC started the next 10 CFR 50.55a rulemaking to incorporate the 2009 Edition of the ASME O&M with 2011 Addenda and the 2009 Addenda and 2010 Edition with 2011 Addenda of ASME Section III and XI into 10 CFR 50.55a. This proposed rulemaking is currently scheduled to be published for public comment in the first calendar quarter of 2013.

### **Regulatory Guide (RG) Update – O&M Code Case Acceptability**

The NRC staff has completed its review of the new and revised code cases published in the 2003 Addenda through the 2006 Addenda of the ASME O&M. The proposed rulemaking and RGs (Revision 1 of RG 1.192, Revision 36 of RG 1.184, and Revision 17 of RG 1.147) for the code cases published in the 2003 Addenda through the 2006 Addenda of the ASME O&M and the Section III and XI code cases listed in Supplements 1 through 10 to the 2007 B&PV Code are scheduled to be published for public comment in September 2012. This proposed rulemaking will contain revisions to the structure and numbering of 10 CFR 50.55a, as required by the Office of the Federal Register.

Based on concerns raised by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), three new conditions are being added by the NRC for usage of OMN-3, "Requirements for Safety Significance Categorization of Components Using Risk Insights for Inservice Testing of LWR Power Plants," in draft RG 1.192, Revision 1. Comments may be provided on these additional conditions for usage of OMN-3, during the public comment period.

The NRC staff has also completed a review of the new and revised code cases published in the 2009 Edition and 2011 Addenda of the ASME O&M. The proposed rulemaking and RGs for these code cases will be issued following the incorporation of the 2009 Edition and 2011 Addenda of the ASME O&M into 10 CFR 50.55a. Beginning with Revision 1 of RG 1.192, code cases will be numbered as the code case is described in the O&M Code. Each code case in Revision 1 of RG 1.192 will be identified by the number assigned by the O&M Code and the applicable edition or addendum of the O&M Code.

**Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2010-06 and Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 10-001 for Inservice Inspection and Testing Requirements of Snubbers**

On June 1, 2010, the NRC issued RIS 2010-06 and EGM 10-001 related to the Inservice Inspection and Testing of Snubbers. The NRC discovered that some operating reactor licensees were not following the regulatory requirements for snubbers as specified in 10 CFR 50.55a.

NRC expects that licensees not meeting the 10 CFR 50.55a regulations have entered their noncompliances into a corrective action program, and have submitted relief requests to the NRC to use alternatives in lieu of the ASME Code requirements. All actions for RIS 2010-06, as described in EGM 2010-01, were required to be completed by June 1, 2012.

The EPTB staff has developed a draft Temporary Instruction (TI) Inspection Procedure (TI 2515/189) to review the compliance of licensees' snubber programs with the 10 CFR 50.55a and ASME Code requirements. The NRC plans to issue the TI in the fall of 2012.

**Draft NUREG-1482, Revision 2, "Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants," "Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves and Inservice Examination and Testing of Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers)"**

Draft NUREG-1946 was issued for public comment in August 2010. Based on public comments, draft NUREG-1946 was rewritten as NUREG-1482, Revision 2 and most of the information contained in NUREG-1482, Revision 1 was retained in Revision 2. Draft NUREG-1482, Revision 2 was issued for public comment in August 2011 and the public comment period ended on December 20, 2011. Based on public comments, NUREG-1482, Revision 2 will maintain the same structure and section numbers as Revision 1 for the inservice testing (IST) of pumps and valves. All newly added sections will have new section numbers. NUREG-1482, Revision 2 will have a new Appendix A, which contains information describing snubber inservice examination and testing programs. Currently, the NRC staff is preparing responses to all of the public comments received during the last comment period and incorporating many of these comments into Revision 2. The NRC is planning to issue NUREG-1482, Revision 2 in the fall of 2012.

**Task Interface Agreement (TIA) 2010-001– Evaluation of Application of Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.3, Surveillance Requirement Applicability**

The NRC issued TIA 2010-001 on April 19, 2010 addressing the incorrect usage of TS SR 3.0.3 for a missed ASME O&M Code inservice test, at the Clinton Power Station.

On February 24, 2012, the NRC issued EGM 2012-01, "Dispositioning Noncompliance with Administrative Controls Technical Specifications Programmatic Requirements that Extend Test Frequencies and Allow Performance of Missed Tests," to allow enforcement discretion and provide guidance to licensees prior to the issuance of a long term solution for addressing frequencies and frequency extensions for IST intervals (i.e. ASME O&M code case/change). The EGM also addresses the use of SR 3.0.3 for missed TS surveillances and inservice tests. This EGM establishes a proper generic application of TS requirements consistent with TIA

2010-001. The enforcement discretion made available by this EGM for inservice tests performed under 10 CFR 50.55a (f), not related to TS SRs, permits licensees to apply the provisions of the TS SR frequencies and TS SR 3.0.2 but not the provisions of TS SR 3.0.3. EPTB staff continues to work with the ASME O&M Subcommittee on O&M Codes to finalize a separate code case and/or code change to address requirements for inservice testing frequency and allowable testing grace periods. For missed inservice tests (i.e. tests not performed within the required testing frequency), in lieu of TS SR 3.0.3, licensees should use the guidance in RIS 2005-20, Revision 1, "Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety,"" and perform an appropriate operability evaluation or functionality assessment, as needed. A RIS which addresses the proper application of TS SR 3.0.2 and TS SR 3.0.3 has been developed. The NRC expects to issue this RIS in the fall of 2012.

### **Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 1, Red Inspection Finding**

On October 23, 2010, at BFN, Unit 1, Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI)/residual heat removal (RHR) outboard injection valve, 1-FCV-74-66 failed to open when the plant operators attempted to place the RHR Shutdown Cooling loop II in service. Subsequently, the licensee determined that the valve disc had separated from the stem and become lodged in the valve seat, preventing RHR flow.

In the NRC's Final Significance Determination Inspection Report (NRC Inspection Report No. 05000259/2011008) (ADAMS No. ML111290482), dated May 9, 2011, the NRC determined that the failure of 1-FCV-74-66 resulted in a violation of the BFN Unit 1, TSs. This valve stem/disc failure was determined to be highly safety significant (RED Finding) by the NRC due to the significant increase in core damage frequency during certain fire mitigation strategies at BFN, Unit 1.

During the reviews of the Performance Deficiencies associated with this issue, the NRC identified concerns with the clarity of the requirements in Sections ISTC 4.1 and ISTC 4.2.3 of the ASME O&M Code, 1995 Edition with the 1996 and 1997 Addenda. These sections involve verification of valve obturator position and movement. The NRC noted that the ISTC 4.1 and ISTC 4.2.3 requirements were not sufficiently clear to detect a stem/disc failure in certain types of valves. The NRC also determined that there was a need to address issues associated with the intent and requirements in ISTC 4.1 and ISTC 4.2.3 through either a revision to the ASME O&M Code or establishment of new or revised NRC requirements.

A member of the EPTB staff, on the ASME O&M Subgroup on ISTA/ISTC, presented several recommended changes at the August ASME O&M meeting, to clarify the requirements in ASME O&M, Subsection ISTC, for obturator movement verification. These changes and clarifications include:

- Separate the concepts of position indication testing and exercise testing (i.e., position indication testing verifies accuracy of light indication; exercise testing verifies obturator movement) and clarify that obturator position/movement verification is required for all valves as part of the exercise test; and

- Clarify obturator movement verification requirements for the various check valve exercise test methods

At the December ASME O&M meeting, the ISTA/ISTC subgroup formed a task group to address the code change recommendations. The ISTA/ISTC subgroup members will discuss, debate, and vote on these changes at the July 2012 meeting. The proposed changes will then be advanced to the formal balloting process. Following the July 2012 meeting, EPTB staff will assess the subgroup actions and determine the need for any further regulatory guidance.

An Information Notice (IN) on the Browns Ferry motor-operated valve (MOV) failure has been drafted. The IN should be published by the end of July 2012. The scope of the IN focuses on:

- The MOV should have been in the Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 scope
- Augmented testing of the MOV did not have acceptance criteria as required by Criterion V of Appendix B in 10 CFR Part 50
- The ASME O&M Code was not clear
- There was an inadequate application of industry test data

### **GL 96-05 Periodic Verification of MOVs**

GL 96-05 requested each plant to establish a program, or ensure the effectiveness of its current program, to verify on a periodic basis that safety-related MOVs continue to be capable of performing their safety functions within the current licensing basis of the facility. The industry responded to GL 96-05 by forming a Joint Owners Group (JOG) to address the concerns of the GL.

A final report with recommended actions was submitted to the NRC for review. The NRC approved the final report with conditions. Plants committed to implement the final program recommendations within six years from the date of NRC safety evaluation, September 25, 2006.

RIS 2011-13, "Follow Up to Generic Letter 96-05 for Evaluation of Class D Valves Under Joint Owners Group Motor-Operated Valve Periodic Verification Program," was issued on January 6, 2012. This RIS provides guidance for addressing periodic verification programs for valves not covered by the JOG MOV Periodic Verification (PV) program.

The EPTB staff is developing inspection guidance to review the evaluation of Class D valves and associated MOV PV programs. This inspection guidance should be available for public comment prior to issuance.

### **Risk-informing Special Treatment Requirements of 10 CFR 50.69**

The NRC 50.69 working group, comprised of NRR headquarters staff, with regional participation, developed an inspection procedure which was shared with the nuclear industry for comments in early 2011. Industry comments regarding this document were addressed and incorporated into NRC Inspection Procedure ((IP) 37060, which was issued on September 14, 2011. The IP draws in part from the ASME developed Part 29 (Standard), "Alternative

Treatment Requirements for Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC)-3 Pumps and Valves,” as well as from insights gained through a review of the South Texas Project 50.69-like treatment program. A second round of industry comments were recently discussed with the NRC and the NRC is preparing a revision to the IP. This revision should be issued, with incorporation of most of the new industry comments, by October 2012.

At this time, no licensee has submitted an application requesting to implement 10 CFR 50.69, though at least one licensee has indicated that they will submit a pilot application in the third quarter of 2012. Following the initial pilot application, lessons learned from the application review will be used to revise the associated industry guidance and RG 1.201. The NRC staff recognizes the need for an effective, stable and predictable regulatory climate for the implementation of 10 CFR 50.69.

### **NRC Activities Associated with the Follow-up to the Events at the Japanese Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Plant After the March 11, 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami**

In response to the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power plant, the NRC chartered a Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) to review processes and regulations and to determine if additional improvements should be made to the regulatory system governing nuclear power plants and to make recommendations to the Commission regarding policy direction. In examining the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident for insights for reactors in the United States, the NTTF addressed protecting against accidents resulting from natural phenomena, mitigating the consequences of such accidents, and ensuring emergency preparedness. The NTTF studied the manner in which the NRC has historically required protection from natural phenomena and how the NRC has addressed events that exceed the current design basis for plants in the United States. In general, the NTTF found that the current NRC regulatory approach includes:

- requirements for design-basis events with protection and mitigation features controlled through specific regulations or the general design criteria (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants”)
- requirements for some “beyond-design-basis” events through specific regulations (e.g. station blackout, large fires, and explosions)
- voluntary industry initiatives to address severe accident features, strategies, and guidelines for operating reactors

In SECY-11-0137 (ADAMS No. ML11269A204 – October 3, 2011), the NRC staff provided the Commission with the proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations to (1) reflect regulatory actions to be taken by the staff in response to the Fukushima lessons-learned; (2) identify implementation challenges; (3) include the technical and regulatory bases for the prioritization; (4) identify additional recommendations; and (5) include a schedule and milestones with recommendations for appropriate stakeholder engagement and involvement of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). As a result of the staff’s prioritization and assessment process, the NTTF recommendations were prioritized into three tiers.

Tier 1 activities are those actions that should be resolved without unnecessary delay. They consist of the actions noted above from SECY-11-0124 with the addition of the following items:

- Inclusion of Mark II containments in the recommendations for reliable hardened vents
- Implementation of spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation

Tier 2 activities consisted of the NTTF recommendations which could not be initiated in the near term due to the need for further technical assessment and alignment, dependence on Tier 1 issues, or availability of critical skill sets. However, these actions do not require long-term study. These actions included:

- SFP makeup capability
- Emergency preparedness (EP) regulatory actions

Tier 3 activities consisted of the NTTF recommendations that require further NRC staff study to support a regulatory action, have as associated shorter-term actions that needs to be completed to inform the longer-term action, are dependent on the availability of critical skill sets, or are dependent on the resolution of the “Clarify the Regulatory Framework” recommendation from the NTTF Report (SECY-11-0093). The Tier 3 actions include the following items:

- Ten-year confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards
- Potential enhancements to the capability to prevent and mitigate seismically-induced fires and floods
- Reliable hardened vents for other containment designs
- Hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings
- EP enhancements for station blackout (SBO) and multiunit events
- Enhanced ERDS capability
- Additional EP topics for prolonged SBO and multiunit events
- EP topics for decision-making, radiation monitoring, and public education
- Reactor Oversight Process modifications to reflect the recommended defense-in-depth framework
- Staff training on severe accidents and resident inspector training on severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs)

In this paper the NRC staff also identified a number of additional issues with a nexus to the Fukushima accident that warrant further consideration and potential prioritization, but were not identified in the NTTF recommendations. These issues include:

- Filtration of containment vents
- Instrumentation for seismic monitoring
- Basis for emergency planning zone size
- Prestaging of potassium iodide beyond 10 miles
- Transfer of spent fuel to dry cask storage
- Loss of ultimate heat sink

On December 15, 2011, the Commission issued an SRM to SECY-11-0137 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113490055) approving the staff's recommended three-tiered prioritization of the NTTF recommendations.

On December 23, 2011, the U.S. President signed the Conference Report on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74), which states in part:

*The conferees recognize the progress that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has made on the recommendations of the Near Term Task Force. Commission staff has proposed a prioritized list of the Task Force recommendations that reflects the order regulatory actions are to be taken. The conferees direct the Commission to implement these recommendations consistent with, or more expeditiously than, the "schedules and milestones" proposed by NRC staff on October 3, 2011.*

In response to the conferees' request and the input it received from stakeholders, the NRC accelerated the schedule originally proposed in SECY-11-0137. On February 17, 2012, the NRC staff proposed orders and a request for information to the Commission in SECY-12-0025, "Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12039A103). SECY-12-0025 also discussed the disposition of recommendations from the Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as well as the six additional recommendations identified after the NTTF report was issued, that the NRC staff determined may also warrant additional action. The NRC staff's evaluation of the ACRS recommendations can be found in Enclosure 3 to SECY-12-0025 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12039A121). The detailed assessment of the additional recommendations can be found in Enclosure 2 to SECY-12-0025 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12039A118).

### Regulatory Actions Taken

To ensure the NRC made well-informed decisions on the Tier 1 regulatory actions, the NRC staff conducted over a dozen public meetings with stakeholders to better understand the public's point of view, as well as the industry's views on the NRC's proposed actions. The staff also solicited comments from members of the public so they could provide input on the NRC's resolution of the Tier 1 recommendations. The NRC staff considered this input when developing the orders and the request for information.

By letter dated December 16, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11353A008), the Nuclear Energy Institute, the policy organization for the nuclear industry, presented its plans to respond to Fukushima-like events. The industry developed a concept of a diverse and flexible mitigation capability called "FLEX." The NRC staff has considered this industry approach and is generally encouraged by the actions the industry is taking in this area. The NRC staff envisions that many elements of FLEX may satisfy the requirements of the order to mitigate challenges to key safety functions resulting from beyond-design-basis natural phenomena hazards.

## Orders

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued three immediately effective orders. The first two orders were issued to all power reactor licensees, including holders of construction permits and combined licenses. The third order was issued to licensees operating boiling water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II containment designs. The following is a summary of each of the orders:

1. Licensees are ordered to develop strategies to mitigate the effects of beyond-design-basis natural phenomena that address both multiunit events and reasonable protection of equipment identified to implement such strategies.

This order requires development of strategies to deal with beyond-design-basis external events resulting in simultaneous loss of all alternating current (ac) power and loss of normal access to the ultimate heat sink. The strategies and guidance developed and implemented by licensees in response to the requirements imposed by this order will provide the necessary capabilities to supplement those of the permanently installed plant structures, systems, and components that could be unavailable following beyond-design-basis external events. These strategies and guidance will enhance the safety and preparedness capabilities established following the events of September 11, 2001, and codified in Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) 50.54(hh) (2). To address the potential for more widespread effects of beyond-design-basis external events, this order requires licensees to have increased capabilities to implement multiple strategies concurrently at multiple units on a site. The strategies shall be developed to add multiple ways to maintain or restore core cooling, containment and SFP cooling capabilities in order to improve the defense in depth of licensed nuclear power reactors.

The order also requires that the equipment needed to implement the strategies be reasonably protected.

2. Licensees are ordered to install enhanced SFP instrumentation.

This order requires enhanced, reliable SFP instrumentation. During the events at Fukushima, responders were without reliable instrumentation to determine the water level in the SFP. This caused concerns that the pool may have boiled dry, resulting in fuel damage, but in fact the spent fuel had remained covered at all times. Fukushima demonstrated that confusion and misapplication of resources may result from beyond-design-basis external events when adequate instrumentation is not available. The instrumentation installed at U.S. nuclear power plants is typically only for a narrow range of SFP level and, therefore, only capable of monitoring normal and slightly off-normal conditions in the pool. Although the likelihood of a catastrophic event affecting U.S. nuclear power plants and their associated SFPs remains very low, beyond-design-basis external events could challenge the ability of existing SFP instrumentation to provide emergency responders with reliable information on the condition of SFPs. Reliable and available indication is essential to ensure that plant personnel can effectively prioritize emergency actions.

3. Licensees with BWR Mark I and Mark II containments are ordered to have reliable, hardened vents.

This order requires reliable, hardened vents in BWR Mark I and Mark II containments. At Fukushima, limitations in time and the unpredictable conditions associated with the accident significantly challenged the attempts by responders to preclude core damage and containment failure. In particular, the operators were unable to successfully operate the containment venting system. The inability to reduce containment pressure inhibited efforts to cool the reactor core. Had additional backup or alternate sources of power been available to operate the containment venting system remotely, or had certain valves been more accessible to allow manual operation, the operators at Fukushima might have been able to depressurize the containment earlier. This, in turn, could have allowed operators to implement strategies using low-pressure water sources. Thus, the events at Fukushima demonstrate that reliable hardened vents at BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containment designs are important to maintain core and containment cooling.

The Commission concluded that the orders on mitigation strategies and reliable, hardened vents were necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety (rather than redefine it, as the staff had originally proposed) under the provisions of the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109(a) (4) (ii). The Commission also concluded that the order on SFP instrumentation represents a significant enhancement to the protection of public health and safety and therefore used their administrative exemption authority to issue that order.

The NRC plans to issue guidance for implementation of the technical requirements of the orders by August 2012. Licensees will then be required, by February 28, 2013, to submit to the Commission an integrated plan including a description of how compliance with the orders will be achieved. After reviewing the licensee submittals, the NRC plans to issue facility-specific orders, as necessary, imposing license conditions that address the requirements of the orders. Each licensee will be required to achieve full compliance within two refueling outages after submittal of its integrated plan, or by December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

#### Request for Information

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a request for information to power reactor licensees pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), which requires a written response. The request for information asked licensees to do the following:

- Reevaluate seismic and flooding hazards at each site using present-day information, guidance, and methodologies.<sup>1</sup>
- Perform seismic and flooding walkdowns to identify and address plant-specific degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions.
- Assess current communication systems and equipment under conditions of onsite and offsite damage and prolonged SBO.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to Sections 161.c and 182.a of the Atomic Energy Act, holders of construction permits will be required to respond to this portion of the information request.

- Perform a staffing study to determine the number and qualifications of staff required to fill all necessary positions to respond to a multiunit event.<sup>2</sup>

Protection from natural phenomena is critical for continued safe operation of nuclear power plants. Given that new information has been developed on natural phenomena hazards since the licensing basis of currently operating plants was established, the NRC found it necessary to confirm the adequacy of the hazard assumptions for U.S. plants, and their ability to protect against them. These hazards include earthquakes, local intense precipitation, floods of streams and rivers, storm surges, seiches, tsunamis, and dam failures. Further, the NRC found that the accident at Fukushima highlighted a need to verify the adequacy of emergency planning, including communications infrastructure and staffing levels of response personnel, to address a prolonged SBO and multiunit event.

The NRC will evaluate each licensee's response to the request for information and take additional regulatory action, if necessary.

#### Status of Other NTTF Recommendations and Additional Issues

SECY-11-0137 included two Tier 1 recommendations that were not addressed by the orders or the request for information. One was a recommendation to enhance SBO mitigation capability, and the other was to strengthen and integrate onsite emergency response procedures, training, and exercises. Both of these recommendations remain Tier 1 priority issues and are being actively implemented through the NRC's rulemaking process. The NRC expects to complete the SBO rule in 2014 and the emergency response enhancements rule in 2016. The NRC published an advance notice of its proposed rulemaking (ANPR) on SBO on March 20, 2012, and an ANPR for the integration of emergency procedures on April 18, 2012.

The Conference Report on the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74), stated in part:

*The conferees direct the Commission to maintain an implementation schedule such that the remaining recommendations (not identified as Tier I priorities) will be evaluated and acted upon as expeditiously as practicable.*

The NRC will address Tier 2 recommendations consistent with the milestone schedule set forth in SECY-11-0137.

The NRC staff is developing a Commission paper, currently scheduled for July 2012, where it will propose project plans for implementing the Tier 3 recommendations. Furthermore, the NRC has established a process to assess additional issues as they are identified; applying the same three-tiered prioritization process used for the NTTF recommendations.

In accordance with Section 402 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, the NRC will also consider external natural phenomena hazards. The request for information issued on March 12,

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<sup>2</sup> Holders of construction permits and combined licenses will be required to respond to this portion of the information request.

2012, addresses seismic, tsunami, and flooding hazards, which the NRC believes will encompass the dominant, albeit low, risks to operating plants. The NRC intends to address other external hazards, such as wind and missile loads from tornadoes and hurricanes, and snow and ice loads from winter weather, as a Tier 2 activity that will be initiated as soon as sufficient resources become available.

## **ASME-Related Generic Communications**

ASME-related generic communications issued by (or in the process of being issued by) the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Office of New Reactors (NRO) since the last report (December 2011) to the OM Standards Committee are listed below:

### **Bulletins (BLs)**

None

### **Generic Letters (GLs)**

None

### **Information Notices (INs)**

- IN 2012-06 (04/24/2012): Ineffective Use of Vendor Technical Recommendations
- IN 2012-05 (04/25/2012): Abnormal Releases of Radioactive Water Potentially Resulting in Groundwater Contamination
- IN 2012-04 (04/19/2012): Impacts on Normal Plant Operations Due to Leaks or Spills of Chemicals
- IN 2012-01 (01/26/2012): Seismic Considerations – Principally Issues Involving Tanks
- IN 2011-22 (12/21/2011): Instrumentation and Control Module Hardware, Configuration, and Procedure Issues

### **Regulatory Issue Summaries (RISs)**

- RIS 2012-02 (01/24/2012): Insights into Recent License Renewal Application Consistency with the Generic Aging Lessons Learned Report
- RIS 2011-14 (12/29/2011): Metal Fatigue Analysis Performance by Computer Software
- RIS 2011-13 (01/06/2012): Follow Up to Generic Letter 96-05 for Evaluation of Class D Valves Under Joint Owners Group Motor-Operated Valve Periodic Verification Program
- RIS 2011-12, Rev. 1:  
(12/29/2011) Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages

The full text of any of these NRC generic communications can be accessed by visiting the NRC's public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/index.html>.