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Region IV
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FEMA

February 15, 2012

Victor M. McCree
Regional Administrator - RII
State and Local Government Affairs
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One Marquis Tower
245 Peachtree Center Avenue, Suite 1200
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. McCree:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the November 2, 2011, partial participation plume pathway exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific to the Hatch Nuclear Plant. This report addresses the evaluation of the plans and preparedness for the State of Georgia and the Counties of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs Counties that are within the 10-mile EPZ. Copies of this report will be forwarded to the State of Georgia, FEMA and NRC Headquarters by my staff.

The Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) and Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs Counties activated their emergency response plans in response to a simulated incident at Hatch Nuclear Plant. Their response showed the effectiveness of their response plans and dedication of their emergency response organizations.

All objectives of the exercise were demonstrated. No Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) or Deficiencies were identified.

Two ARCAs were resolved from the 2009 HNP exercise, one at the Emergency News Center concerning staffing, the other concerning unavailable information in Toombs County; both were corrected in accordance with the approved schedule, therefore, there are no outstanding issues resulting from this exercise.

Based on the results of the November 2, 2011, exercise, and FEMA's review of the Annual Letters of Certification for 2009 and 2010, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Georgia and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the HNP can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.

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The Title 44 CFR, Part 350, approval of the for the State of Georgia offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to the Hatch Nuclear Plant, granted on May 5, 1981 will remain in effect.

If you should have any questions, please contact Conrad S. Burnside at 770/220-5486.

Sincerely,

Major P. May
Regional Administrator

Enclosure

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AFTER ACTION REPORT
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP) REP Program Exercise

[FINAL]

November 2, 2011
Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program

FEMA

Published February 15, 2012

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Administrative Handling Instructions

This After Action Report (AAR) for the 2011 Edwin I. (EI) Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP) Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Partial Participation Plume Phase Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Exercise is considered a public document.

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Executive Summary

On November 2, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program staff evaluated a partial participation plume exposure pathway exercise in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP). HNP is located in Appling County, approximately eleven miles north of Baxley, Georgia and is operated by Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC). The HNP EPZ is divided into sixteen emergency response planning zones. The 10 mile EPZ encompasses parts of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs Counties; with an EPZ population of approximately 8,394 residents.

FEMA's overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency at HNP. This exercise was conducted in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on October 14, 2009. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted October 1980.

The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for further improvement and support development of corrective actions.

The objectives for the 2011 HNP REP Exercise were as follows:

- **Objective 1:** Demonstrate the ability to provide emergency operations center (EOC) management including direction and control through the state and counties Emergency Operations Centers.

- **Objective 2:** Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for state and county emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.

- **Objective 3:** Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for state and county emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.

- **Objective 4:** Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the Prompt Notification System/Emergency Alert System (PNS/EAS) through exercise play.

- **Objective 5:** Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information Center (JIC)/Emergency News Center (ENC) for joint (public and private sector) emergency information communications.

These objectives encompass the REP Program evaluation area criteria and were successfully demonstrated during this exercise.

Officials and representatives from the State of Georgia; the risk counties of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs performed well during this exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made the exercise a success. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.

State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them.

FEMA identified no ARCAs or Deficiencies during this exercise.

There were two ARCAs from the previous 2009 HNP exercise; ARCA 31-09-5.b.1-A-01 regarding the ENC staffing support from the Counties, addressed in Section 3.2.1.2 (ENC) and ARCA 31-09-3.c.1-A-02 regarding the Toombs County EOC and functional needs information, addressed in Section 3.2.2.4 (Toombs County EOC) of this report. Both jurisdictions successfully demonstrated these capabilities during this exercise and have therefore resolved the ARCAs in accordance with the specified corrective action plan.

FEMA will provide an Improvement Plan (IP) to the State of Georgia that describes Strengths and Areas for Improvement observed during the exercise. The IP will be published under a separate cover and classified For Official Use Only (FOUO) in compliance with Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) standards.

Section 1: Exercise Overview

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name
2011 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant REP Program Evaluated Exercise

Type of Exercise
Full-Scale Exercise

Exercise Out of Sequence (OOS) Date(s)
September 20, October 25-26 and November 9, 2011

Exercise Date
November 2, 2011

Location(s)
See App. D for a listing of exercise locations

Program
FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Mission
Response

Capabilities
- Emergency Operations Center Management
- Emergency Public Information and Warning
- Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place
- Emergency Public Safety and Security Response
- Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
- Mass Care
- Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment

Scenario Type
Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Partial Participation Plume Phase EPZ

1.2 Participating Organizations

The following agencies, organizations and units of government participated in the 2011 HNP REP Exercise.

State of Georgia
Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA)
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) • Environmental Protection Division (EPD)
Department of Public Safety (DPS) / Georgia State Patrol (GSP)
Department of Social Services (DSS)
Department of Agriculture
Risk Jurisdictions
Appling County, Georgia
• Emergency Management Agency • Appling County Fire Services • Sheriff's Office • Social Services • Appling County School District
Jeff Davis County, Georgia
• Emergency Management Agency • Jeff Davis County Fire Services • Sheriff's Office • Social Services
Tattnall County, Georgia
• Emergency Management Agency • Tattnall County Fire Department • Sheriff's Office
Toombs County, Georgia
• Emergency Management Agency • Sheriff's Office • Toombs Fire Department • Social Services • Toombs County School District • Toombs County EMS • Meadows Regional Medical Center
Non-Governmental Organizations
Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES)/Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES)
American Red Cross (ARC), Savannah/Bullock Chapter
Southern Nuclear Company (SNC)
Federal Organizations
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

DHS/FEMA administers the REP Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) parts 350, 351 and 352. 44 CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for licensee, State, tribal and local governments impacted by the EPZs established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of State, Tribal and local government Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) and procedures by DHS/FEMA. One of the REP program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises State, Tribal and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise together with review of the RERPs and procedures and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 through the Annual Letter of Certification and staff assistance visit enables FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final AAR to the NRC that State, Tribal and local plans and preparedness are (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

Formal submission of the RERPs for Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP) to FEMA by the State of Georgia occurred on January 23, 1980. Formal approval of the State of Georgia's RERP was granted on May 5, 1981 under Title 44 CFR 350.

A REP exercise was evaluated on November 2, 2011, and included evaluations of the out-of-sequence activities held on September 20, October 25-26 and a Medical Services Drill (MSD) on November 9, 2011.

2.2 FEMA Exercise Objectives and Capabilities

Capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items that were derived from the Target Capabilities List (TCL). The capabilities listed below form the foundation for the organization of all FEMA Region IV REP Program objectives and observations in this exercise.

1. **Emergency Operations Center Management:** Is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC management includes EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities;

coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, state, and federal EOCs; coordination public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities.

2. **Emergency Public Information and Warning:** Is the capability that includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.

3. **Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place:** Is the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately execute the safe and effective sheltering-in-place of an at-risk population (and companion animals), and/or the organized and managed evacuation of the at-risk population (and companion animals) to areas of safe refuge in response to a potentially or actually dangerous environment. In addition, this capability involves the safe reentry of the population where feasible.

4. **Emergency Public Safety and Security Response:** Is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination among officials from law enforcement (LE), fire and emergency medical services (EMS).

5. **Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination:** Is the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attack. It includes testing and identifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; ensuring that responders have protective clothing and equipment; conducting rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conducting geographical survey searches of suspected sources or contamination spreads and establishing isolation perimeters; mitigating the effects of hazardous materials, decontaminating on-site victims, responders, and equipment; coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies, and notifying environmental, health, and law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction for the incident to begin implementation of their standard evidence collection and investigation procedures.

6. **Mass Care:** Is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected by a large-scale incident, including functional needs populations. Functional needs populations include individuals with physical or mental disabilities who require medical attention or personal care beyond basic first aid. Other special-needs populations include non-English speaking populations that may need to

have information presented in other languages. The mass care capability also provides for pet care/handling through local government and appropriate animal-related organizations. Mass care is usually performed by nongovernmental organizations (NGO), such as the ARC, or by local government-sponsored volunteer efforts, such as Citizen Corps. Special-needs populations are generally the responsibility of local government, with medical needs addressed by the medical community and/or its alternate care facilities. State and Federal entities also play a role in public and environmental health by ensuring safe conditions, safe food, potable water, sanitation, clean air, etc.

7. **Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment:** Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment is the capability to appropriately dispatch emergency medical service (EMS) resources; to provide feasible, suitable, and medically acceptable pre-hospital triage and treatment of patients; to provide transport as well as medical care en-route to an appropriate receiving facility; and to track patients to a treatment facility.

Additionally, each capability is linked to several corresponding activities and tasks to provide additional detail. Based upon the identified exercise objectives, the following capabilities and associated activities are:

Objective 1:	Capability – EOC Management
Objective 2:	Capability – EOC Management Capability – Emergency Public Information and Warning
Objective 3:	Capability – EOC Management Capability – Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability – Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Capability – Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability – Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, Related Services) Capability – Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment
Objective 4:	Capability – Emergency Public Information and Warning
Objective 5:	Capability – Emergency Public Information and Warning

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Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the November 2, 2011 partial participation plume phase exercise and OOS activities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

- Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) assessed and no unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise)
- ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from previous exercises
- Deficiency assessed
- Plan Issues
- Not Demonstrated

3.2 Evaluation Capability Summaries

3.2.1 State of Georgia

Emergency Operations Center Management:

The Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) successfully demonstrated the Emergency Operations Center management capability at the State Operations Center (SOC) during this exercise. The SOC was alerted, mobilized and activated in a timely manner. The SOC staff was not prepositioned as outlined in the Extent of Play Agreement (EOPA) with the exception of personnel not located near GEMA Headquarters. Personnel were alerted and mobilized in accordance with plans and procedures. The State Warning Point acted promptly and efficiently while performing notification procedures.

With assistance and coordination from the REP Director and Chief of Operations, the Governors Authorized Representative (GAR), and staff under his guidance, were proficient and exercised exceptional direction and control. The decision making process was defined and deliberate, resulting in timely protective action decisions as conditions changed. Several staff briefings were conducted, in conjunction with command group pre-briefs, which allowed input from key staff. This process kept all staff abreast of changing conditions and allowed forecasting that contributed to the efficiency of operations.

The SOC had sufficient space and equipment to support emergency response efforts. The SOC displayed and effectively used County, State, and HNP information from WebEOC, in addition to the Georgia *Online Disaster* Awareness *Geospatial System* (GODAWGS), a web based geospatial visualization tool for Emergency Responders, to assist them in drastically improving the situational awareness of response, recovery and coordination. Each Emergency Support Function (ESF) had an operational area, complete with current

plans and procedures necessary to complete their duties. Maps and status boards were visible and made vital information readily available to the staff for reference and aided in situational awareness.

The GEMA SOC staff was professional and demonstrated a high degree of knowledge and proficiency in support of the emergency response effort, and performed their duties in accordance with established plans and procedures.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1 and 2.b.2

Emergency Public Information and Warning: (SOC)

GEMA successfully demonstrated the capability to promptly alert, notify and warn the public of a simulated emergency at HNP, through coordination with Appling, Toombs, Tattnall and Jeff Davis Counties, other agencies in the State of Georgia and HNP. The Public Information Officer (PIO) and her staff worked seamlessly with the Director of Public Affairs, located at the Emergency News Center (ENC) which provided counties with the most up to date information possible.

Two Prompt Notification System (PNS) activations were coordinated between the Operations Chief and the National Weather Service (NWS). Initial PNS activation at 1149 was confirmed verbally during conference calls with each of the counties. The subsequent activation was also coordinated and simulated in accordance with the EOP.

Eight news releases were generated, approved and disseminated. News releases were generated at the SOC and approved by the SOC command group, then sent via facsimile and email to the counties for concurrence. A GEMA Area Coordinator stationed in each county then telephoned SOC management with concurrence. Distribution of these releases was made from the ENC.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 5.a.1 and 5.b.1

Emergency Public Information and Warning: (Waterway Warning)

Rangers from the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in Appling, Jeff Davis, Toombs and Tattnall Counties were interviewed in the respective county EOC's. In addition, a member of the Appling County Fire Rescue Department was available to support as needed. The four Rangers explained the process of being notified, reporting to the EOC and coordinating their activities with the district office in Metter. Dosimetry, KI requirements and reporting requirements were consistent with established procedures. Communications would be accomplished by the use of portable radios and cell phones. After obtaining the radiological support equipment they would report to their designated launch site on the Altamaha River. When ordered to begin clearance operations personal contact with other boaters would be the primary method of providing information and would be supplemented by the use of a public address system as the secondary means. Due to low water levels, two helicopters from the Georgia Department of Aviation were

requested (simulated) to assist in notifications if necessary. Descriptions of river clearance operations were consistent with the information available in emergency plans.

Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination: (Dose)

The State of Georgia DNR Environmental Protection Division (EPD) dose assessment staff mobilized at the SOC in Atlanta, Georgia and successfully demonstrated dose assessment capabilities. The Radiation Emergency Coordinator (REC) provided direction and control for the SOC dose assessment staff and functions. There were three staff members that assisted the REC. In accordance with the EOPA, field teams were not deployed for the exercise. Since there was no controller providing field team data the REC coordinated and worked closely with assigned utility liaisons at the SOC and EOF to get plant status information. The REC and his staff routinely monitored and evaluated plant, radiological and meteorological data. Dose projections were performed and they compared favorably with the results provided by the utility. The REC provided protective action recommendations (PAR) based upon available information to the GAR and SOC Chief for consideration in making and implementing protective action decisions (PAD) to protect the public and for issuing guidance for emergency workers to take KI. The REC proactively recommended that the Department of Energy mobilize and dispatch resources to support emergency response activities. The dose assessment staff exhibited exemplary conduct, competence, teamwork and dedication during the execution of their responsibilities and all activities were performed in accordance with plans and procedures.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1 and 6.b.1

3.2.2 Joint Operations

3.2.2.1 Emergency News Center

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

The ability to provide emergency information and instructions to the public through the media was successfully demonstrated at the ENC. The different agency representatives performed their roles in accordance with their published procedures and plans. The ENC served as the central point of contact for briefing the news media during this simulated emergency at HNP. The ENC is maintained by the utility and occupies five rooms in the building. This fixed facility offers ample space for the PIO's and supplemental technical staff from the utility, GEMA, DNR/EPD, counties of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs, and Federal agencies to perform the duties required of them.

The ENC was activated in accordance with published plans and procedures in support of the simulated incident at HNP, following the declaration of Alert. For this exercise, in accordance with the EOPA, state and county PIOs were pre-deployed in the area and responded to the ENC upon notification by their agencies of the Alert Emergency Classification Level (ECL).

The ENC was well equipped and had redundancy in communications, which included landline phones, facsimiles, and internet connectivity. Primary communications between the ENC and outside locations was by commercial telephone, with cellular telephones, WebEOC and SouthernLINC radio networks being secondary. Equipment and supplies were sufficient to support ENC operations.

All state news releases were prepared by GEMA public affairs staff in the SOC in consultation with GEMA's lead public affairs officer who was located at the ENC. News releases were forwarded to the ENC by fax and e-mail and reviewed and approved by county representatives in the ENC before being distributed to the media by the SOC. During this exercise a total of eight news releases were generated by GEMA and four joint GEMA – HNP news media briefings were conducted.

The public inquiry and rumor control function was performed at both the ENC and SNC's Corporate Communications Center. The public inquiry staff at the ENC responded to 41 calls, identifying three trends. These trends were passed to the appropriate utility or GEMA spokespersons, who were then able to provide correct information at subsequent news briefings. Public inquiry telephone operators were able to satisfactorily answer individual calls using information provided in the HNP annual calendar, news releases issued by the utility and GEMA, and notes generated from the news media briefings.

Area Requiring Corrective Action:

31-09-5.b.1-A-01– (2009 HNP Exercise) – *Resolved.* ENC – Emergency Public Information and Warning.

> **Condition:** The State of Georgia and Appling, Jeff Davis and Tattnall Counties did not provide sufficient staff to the ENC to effectively run ENC operations.
>
> **Corrective Action Demonstrated:** During the 2011 exercise, in accordance with the approved schedule of corrective action plan, the ENC was adequately staffed with public information personnel from the State and each of the Risk Counties. Each jurisdiction successfully demonstrated coordinated activities within the ENC and with their respective county Emergency Operations Center (EOC); aiding in the successful dissemination of timely and accurate information to the public and the media, therefore ARCA 31-09-5.b.1-A-01 is resolved.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1 and 6.b.1

3.2.3 Risk Jurisdictions

3.2.3.1 Appling County

Emergency Operations Center Management:

Appling County successfully demonstrated their ability to manage emergency response operations at the EOC. Through discussion with the Emergency Management Director (EMD) and review of county recall rosters provided, it was determined the county has an effective recall system with all key and essential positions identified for each county level of activation for each 12 hour shift. Personnel recall was accomplished by the EOC telephone paging system. Required personnel responded to the recall and the EMD declared the EOC operational.

Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, Potassium Iodide (KI) and other supplies were sufficient to support emergency operations in the county. Multiple communications systems were available and utilized during the exercise. Communications systems were effective and uninterrupted throughout the exercise.

The Appling County EMD was in charge of direction and control of the response to the incident at this location. Limited direction was needed by EOC staff as they were all familiar with the county plans and procedures and conducted their assigned responsibilities seamlessly by using their tabletop Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) provided for each agency. Frequent staff briefings and round table discussions were conducted to ensure that all essential emergency response elements were carried out as identified in the plan. The county demonstrated their ability to effectively coordinate with the State, other risk counties, and outside agencies throughout the exercise. Resource requests and taskings were effectively managed by the use of message forms, and a document number tracking system. As provided in their plan the county decided to relocate school children and the functional needs populations, and the EOC staff implemented those decisions effectively. PADs for the general public were made by the State after coordination with the affected counties. PADs were based on the HNP provided PARs and the state's independent analysis of the incident. Plant conditions, air monitoring reports, road conditions and local weather, were consistently monitored to ensure the safety of the public and emergency workers (EW). The EMD utilized radiation exposure limits that were established by the State and county for EWs that included dosimetry correction factors and ensured EW exposures to radiation were kept to a minimum through the implementation of the policy; As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA).

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2

Emergency Public Information and Warning: (EOC)

Appling County used their PIO to develop, coordinate and disseminate accurate emergency information to the media and the public. The EMD directed the PIO to report to the ENC to coordinate all county news releases and keep the county informed of all other news releases emanating from the ENC.

Timely alert and dissemination of emergency information of the public was accomplished by activation of the Tone Alert Radios (TARS) by the National Weather Service (NWS). This activation was directed by the SOC after the coordinated decision with the risk counties was made. News releases and EAS messages were coordinated and released through the ENC. No rumor calls or public inquiries were received in the Appling County EOC.

Emergency Public Information and Warning: (Backup Route Alerting)

Backup route alert and notification of the public can be completed in a timely manner following the detection of a failure of the primary alert and notification system, TARs. Officers from Baxley City Police and Appling County Sheriffs' Office were interviewed. They were knowledgeable of the requirement to expeditiously alert and notify residents along their designated routes. In addition to back-up route alerting Appling County would also utilize a call-down system to call each home to ensure that residents received the emergency information.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 3.a.1 and 5.a.3

Emergency Public Safety and Security Response:

Traffic Control Point (TCP) implementation was discussed with the Chief of Police of the Baxley Police Department and a Lieutenant from the Appling County Sheriff's Office at the EOC. TCP's would be staffed by officers of the two agencies and if necessary mutual aid would be obtained from the Georgia State Patrol (GSP). Officers have been trained on personal dosimetry, turn back values and KI. Officers have also been trained on procedures for identifying and removing traffic impediments as well as re-entry procedures for citizens and emergency workers. Appling County demonstrated the ability through discussion to reduce the impact and consequence of an evacuation of a major portion of their county by rapidly establishing TCPs. These TCPs would assist traffic and would also discourage theft and vandalism from occurring in the evacuation zones.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2

Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place:

Appling County Schools successfully demonstrated the capability of Citizen Evacuation

and Shelter in Place through interview. The County School Safety and Transportation Director (SSTD) was interviewed at the EOC. He explained the alert, notification and mobilization process, as well as accountability by staff, relocation and sheltering procedures. He exhibited a keen understanding and thorough knowledge of emergency response procedures and was very familiar with county and school contingencies for ensuring timely notification through the automated 'I Call' System, to alert parents of relocation after a PAD and where to pick up their children. He demonstrated the ability to conduct remote operations to dispatch and control transportation resources with a static display of a county schools system bus, which was equipped with redundant communications systems, including SouthernLinc wireless communications and two-way radio, with cell phone as back-up. TARs operation, as part of the PNS was demonstrated by a scheduled weekly test in the EOC during the interview. The SSTD explained the use of radiological instrumentation, KI, and the impact of exposure. Bus drivers are not considered emergency workers and do not carry radiological equipment, however they are escorted through the EPZ by local law enforcement and receive annual radiological training. Transportation resources were adequate to transport affected students and staff, including functional needs students in a single trip. The Appling County School system is capable of carrying out the responsibilities of relocation and sheltering in place in response to an incident at HNP.

For this capability the following REP criterion was met: 3.c.2

3.2.3.2 Jeff Davis County

Emergency Operations Center Management:

The Jeff Davis County Commissioner, Hazlehurst City Mayor and the EMD successfully demonstrated the capability to alert, notify and mobilize key staff in response to an incident at HNP. The participation of the elected officials in the decision making process demonstrated a commendable dedication to the safety and welfare of the county residents. EOC staff members were highly proficient in the performance of their duties and were proactive in their planning and implementation of County emergency response actions. The EOC was activated in accordance with the County plan and the EOPA. Redundant interoperable communications and sufficient equipment and supplies further enhanced the County's emergency response capability. The EMD and his Operations Officer worked well together to maintain direction and control, ensured situational awareness by conducting frequent staff briefings and properly coordinated protective action decisions. Their explanation of coordination efforts with local, regional and State agencies to establish evacuation routes, waterway warning, traffic control points and back-up route alerting was consistent with plans and procedures. All personnel interviewed were professional, well trained and knowledgeable of their responsibility to relocating residents.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2

Emergency Public Information and Warning: (EOC)

The EMD dispatched a county PIO to the ENC. The county PIO ensured Jeff Davis County was advised of news releases that affected and /or impacted the county and sent faxes of those news releases.

Timely alert and dissemination of emergency information to the public was accomplished by activation of the TARS by the NWS. This activation was directed by the SOC after the coordinated decision with the risk counties was made.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 5.a.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.1

Emergency Public Information and Warning: (Backup Route Alerting)

Backup route alerting in Jeff Davis County was the responsibility of the Emergency Management Director and would be accomplished by the Jeff Davis County Sheriff's Office (JDSO) and the Hazlehurst Police Department (HPD). This activity was demonstrated by interview with the EMD. He stated that personnel performing backup route alerting would be dispatched through the EOC by direct contact with JDSO and HPD representatives within the EOC. All personnel utilized in this activity would be issued radiological kits containing dosimetry and KI and would be briefed before dispatch. The message to be broadcast would be determined at the time of failure and would be broadcast via public address system from the assigned patrol vehicles. The Sheriff and Police Chief acknowledged their responsibilities in this mission and felt they possessed sufficient manpower and equipment to perform this function within 45 minutes.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 3.a.1 and 5.a.3

Emergency Public Safety and Security Response:

Traffic control in Jeff Davis County during an incident at the HNP is the responsibility of the JDSO. They are assisted in this effort by the HPD. Jeff Davis County successfully demonstrated through interview the ability to establish, support and maintain TCPs as required by the County Radiological Emergency Plan. Officers from the JDSO and the HPD displayed commendable knowledge of radiation exposure control methods and demonstrated the ability to position, read and record dosimetry properly. They were familiar with the pre-established location of all TCPs and described direct routes for reaching each one. They demonstrated a working knowledge of traffic control methods and articulated an understanding of their objectives in this mission. They were prepared to clear impediments to the free flow of evacuating traffic in an expeditious manner and were able to quickly identify available resources to assist in this endeavor. Both agencies demonstrated the ability to sufficiently train and equip their officers for the successful completion of TCP duty.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1

and 3.d.2

3.2.3.3 Tattnall County

Emergency Operations Center Management:

Tattnall County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) staff and county agencies successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management by activating and operating their EOC. This included EOC activation, notification, staffing, management, direction, control and coordination of response activities. They also demonstrated the ability for coordination of public information and warning and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response activities.

Alert and notification of all essential personnel was made in a timely manner using a variety of notification methods. Notification systems included a computer based digital notification system, a text message dispatch and notification system, pagers, and cell phones supplementing the roster call down by EMA staff. Other communications equipment included digital Very High Frequency (VHF) radios, landline, fax and internet. The EOC had sufficient equipment and communications for conducting operations and communicating with other State and local governments and agencies. Communications were redundant and reliable throughout this exercise.

The EMD and the EOC staff clearly demonstrated the ability to provide effective emergency response. The EOC staff, composed of representatives from various municipal and county agencies, clearly understood their responsibilities, followed their plans and performed their assigned duties with proficiency and zeal. The EMD provided outstanding direction and control throughout the exercise and demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the citizens of Tattnall County.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2

Emergency Public Information and Warning: (EOC)

The EMD authorized the PIO to proceed to the ENC to coordinate all County activities immediately after receipt of ECL of Site Area Emergency (SAE) at 0955. The EMD requested that the EOC Operations Officer (OO) stay in constant contact with the ENC PIO and relay current information. Timely alert and dissemination of emergency information to the public was accomplished by activation of the TARS by the NWS. This activation was directed by the SOC after the coordinated decision with the risk counties was made. Timely dissemination of information to the media occurred in the form of news releases and press conferences generated and released from the ENC.

Throughout the exercise demonstration, the OO utilized his cell phone and text messaging to keep the county ENC PIO informed of current operations and accurate

information. No media briefings or media messages were initiated in the Tattnall EOC. Also, no rumor calls were received in the EOC that needed to be relayed to the PIO to potentially address in media briefings.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 5.a.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.1

Emergency Public Information and Warning: (Backup Route Alerting)

Tattnall County personnel successfully demonstrated backup route alerting and notification of the public. This activity can be completed in a timely manner following the detection of a failure of the primary alert and notification system (TARS). The County Sheriff, Sheriffs Deputies, EMS and Public Works personnel were interviewed regarding procedures and personnel that facilitate the notification of residents in the affected zone in the event of a primary alert and notification system failure. The EMD participated in the discussion/interview and displayed thorough knowledge of the backup route alerting processes. All interviewed were very familiar with procedures they would use to notify residents in the affected zone and were knowledgeable of the requirements to conduct operations along their designated routes. Tattnall County would supplement this process with an automated call-down system to call each home in the affected area to ensure that residents received the emergency information.

In addition, the Radiological Officer briefed other emergency workers (EMS and Public Works staff), who would assist the Sheriff's Deputies in route alerting and notification. The EWs and Deputies were issued a marked evacuation map of the area in their radiological packet and were well aware of the proper roads to follow to direct the evacuees to Reidsville Middle School for monitoring and shelter. There were sufficient communications capabilities to stay in touch with the EOC and all were aware of the importance of alerting and notifying affected residents. They were knowledgeable in the use of dosimetry and understood how to manage their exposure control, documentation and were familiar with the use and importance of KI.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 3.a.1 and 5.a.3

Emergency Public Safety and Security Response:

Prior to being dispatched by the Tattnall County EMD to staff TCPs, two Tattnall County Sheriff's deputies were interviewed. The Deputies were experienced in traffic management, had sufficient communications capabilities and were well aware of the importance of assisting in the movement of evacuees and traffic flow from the evacuated zone in a safe and timely manner. They were knowledgeable in their use of dosimetry and understood how to manage their exposure control/documentation, along with the use and importance of KI. The officers reviewed the EPZ map in their radiological packet and were well aware of the proper evacuation routes and the locations of the seven TCPs in Tattnall Zone L-10. A continued discussion regarding availability of TCP barricades, signs, cones and removal of impediments included the county and local public works staff who were also well prepared to provide assistance as requested.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.

Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination: (Emergency Worker and Vehicle Decontamination)

Emergency worker and vehicle monitoring and decontamination (EWD) in Tattnall County was performed by the Tattnall EMA and the Georgia State Prison Fire Department. This capability was successfully demonstrated by volunteer firemen of Georgia State Prison Fire Station # 4. Alert and notification was simulated, however mobilization was observed. Responders were assembled in the firehouse, briefed initially by the team leader, followed by a second more detailed brief by the radiation protection officer (RPO). As he issued radiological monitoring equipment, he reviewed its use, exposure control and use of KI. The team was briefed by the RPO again immediately before assuming their positions at the decontamination site, adjacent to the firehouse on GA Highway 147. All team members were knowledgeable and familiar with the purpose, setup and conduct of the EWD site and performed their duties without fault. The site was well prepared, laid out and marked in a fashion that was clear, functional and effective. Team members demonstrated monitoring and decontamination of two vehicles and emergency workers with proper competency, technique and timeliness and performed in accordance with established plans and procedures.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1 and 6.b.1

Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination: (Reception and Congregate Care Center)

Tattnall County successfully demonstrated the Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability at the Reception and Congregate Care Center (RCCC) facility located at Reidsville Middle School. In accordance with plans, this capability is performed by the Tattnall County Emergency Management Agency, volunteer firemen from the Georgia State Prison Fire Station #4, Reidsville Fire Department, Reidsville Police Department and Tattnall County School System. Staff personnel were prepositioned as allowed in the EOPA. The RPO demonstrated the ability to manage radiological exposure through his mission brief to EW that consisted of KI usage, precautions, wear and documentation of personal dosimetry, radiation exposure limits, reporting requirements and disposition of items at the end of the shift. The site was set up in a logical sequence, provided adequate space and facilities and had adequate resources, space, supplies and equipment, and radiation monitoring instruments required to function effectively to perform monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees. The area was well defined with adequate markings, barrier tape and signage that made the job efficient and assisted in limiting the possible spread of contamination. Operators, monitors and other supporting team members were knowledgeable, professional and proficient in their duties and of personal protection from radiation exposure and contamination.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1 and 6.a.1

Mass Care:

Congregate care is the responsibility of DFCS and ARC. The Savannah/Bullock ARC Chapter is responsible for managing the TC congregate care center (CCC). The registration of evacuees is the responsibility of DFCS. The Lead ARC volunteer (Shelter Manager) certified that the CCC complied with ARC mass care planning guidelines. All evacuees are required to be monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated. They are then transported to the reception center's registration desk located at the front of Reidsville Middle School. The registration desk was staffed by three ARC representatives and one DFCS staff member. Six evacuees' were processed into the RCCC, after verifying they had been processed through the monitoring/decontamination station. The ARC had sufficient equipment and supplies to sustain 24 hour emergency response operations at the reception center. Staff rosters revealed that sufficient personnel were available to operate two 12 hour shifts in support of emergency operations. Current procedures allow for the use of school resources (computers, paper products for feeding, cleaning supplies, etc.) to supplement ARC resources and additional ARC supplies can be obtained from the local ARC Chapter. The staff was very professional, knowledgeable and well trained. The RCCC is located outside the EPZ, therefore radiological detection and monitoring equipment is not expected to be necessary and was not issued. It was stated that shelter will be provided for any companion animals that are brought to the reception center by evacuees seeking to stay in the ARC facilities and that there are current efforts in process to locate facilities to house other animals that may require care outside the capability of this facility.

For this capability the following REP criteria was met: 6.c.1

3.2.3.4 Toombs County

Emergency Operations Center Management:

The Toombs County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) successfully demonstrated the ability to conduct EOC Management activities during this exercise. The EMD was exceptionally knowledgeable and was expert in carrying out his duties. Elected and municipal officials were notified, alerted and mobilized along with principle EOC staff members and reported to the EOC in an organized and timely manner. The EMD used focused direction and control and capitalized on opportunities as teaching points for staff members. Routine briefings guided response activities with deliberative forethought and enabled staff to be proactive and effective in mitigating issues and coordinating PADs that included relocation of schools, emergency worker decontamination and reception and congregate care center operations. Support agencies in the EOC contributed to interpretation of information and aided in efficiency of operations. Staff positions were clearly marked and each had a position binder which detailed position duties for quick reference. The facility had sufficient maps, displays, status boards, electronic data

resources and supplies. Staff and EWs, to include Police, Firemen, DFCS, ARC and numerous other volunteers were interviewed. All were knowledgeable of assigned equipment and procedures related to radiation safety. They were also equally knowledgeable of their missions that included school relocations, decontamination, traffic control, water clearing operations and alternate notification. Staff exhibited a high level of competence, was professional and carried out their duties in accordance with plans and procedures and made evident the ability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an incident at HNP.

Area Requiring Corrective Action:

31-09-3.c.1-A-02 – (2009 HNP Exercise) – *Resolved:* Toombs County EOC – Emergency Operations Center Management

Condition: Numbers, names and addresses of functional needs populations were not available in the Toombs County EOC.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: During the 2011 exercise, in accordance with the approved schedule of corrective action plan, the County EMA clarified procedures for acquiring and providing access to functional needs information and protecting its' sensitivity. Procedures are now in place that facilitates communication between responsible agencies to manage and assist in the maintenance and accuracy of the functional needs residents register within the county, and will be enhanced through training that will ensure familiarity and access to the register. This process was successfully demonstrated during this exercise; therefore ARCA 31-09-3.c.1-A-02 is resolved.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2

Emergency Public Information and Warning: (Emergency Operations Center)

Upon receiving the notification of an Alert at HNP the PIO was dispatched to the ENC and maintained constant contact with the Public Information Liaison in the EOC. All documentation was properly coordinated, reviewed and disseminated through the ENC and to the Toombs County staff. The PNS, TARS and NWS serve as the primary public notification system at HNP and was activated by coordination with the SOC and NWS to notify the public located within the ten mile EPZ. Emergency instructions were read aloud over the PNS during the initial activation and simulated during the second activation. Information was timely and accurate and in accordance with plans and procedures.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 5.a.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.1

Emergency Public Information and Warning: (Backup Route Alerting)

For Back- up Route Alerting, the Toombs County EMA would notify the Sheriff's Office either by telephone or from the EOC. They would be given a radiological briefing from the RPO and a kit containing a Direct Reading Dosimeter (DRD), a Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD); a single dose of KI, and a briefing card containing instructions for each item and specific instructions about dose limits and turn-back values. A Ranger from DNR interviewed at the County EOC, explained Waterway Warning operations in response to a simulated incident at HNP. He explained the process of alert, notification and mobilization for water clearings, which included a mission brief from the RPO, equipment, routes, maps, areas of special interest, turn back values and exposure control. He exhibited extensive knowledge and understanding of river operations and discussed communication, coordinated activities and procedures to conduct after completion of the mission.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 3.a.1 and 5.a.3

Emergency Public Safety and Security Response:

An interview was held with members of the Toombs County Sheriff's Office and police departments for Vidalia and Lyons. The EMD and the Operations Officer worked well with them in the coordination and establishment of effective TCPs. The Public Works Department assists law enforcement agencies day to day and is familiar and comfortable with supporting traffic control operations. Officers explained they would report to the EOC; receive a brief and equipment from the RPO and instructions on issued equipment, radiation exposure, turn back dose and use of KI. They demonstrated knowledge of established TCP locations, routes and procedures for conducting backup route alerting and communication procedures with dispatch, the EOC and message communicated to the public. They are aware of methods to overcome traffic impediments and of their resources for additional officers and equipment if they were needed.. Procedures are in accordance with plans and procedures.

For this capability the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2

Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place:

Toombs County Schools successfully demonstrated the capability of Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place by interview. The Principle of Toombs Central School and County School Administrator were interviewed at the Toombs County EOC. They demonstrated exceptionally thorough knowledge and understanding of the county plans and procedures for evacuation, relocation and sheltering in response to a protective action decision. They explained school notification, alert and relocation procedures as specified in local plans, that included the activation of PNS and method used to notify parents of the situation and where to pick up their children. They explained the process for transporting, accounting for students and staff, traveling designated routes and exposure control to protect the wellbeing of students and staff affected. Both were familiar with the communications

systems used to communicate with the EMA, 911, transportation and other local agencies and their points of contact. They explained the use of radiological instrumentation, KI, and the impact of exposure. Bus drivers are not considered emergency workers, therefore none were present or interviewed. It was stated that they do not carry radiological equipment; however they receive annual radiological training. There was sufficient documentation and explanation to believe available transportation resources are adequate to relocate all students and staff, including functional needs students in a single trip to the designated shelter. The Toombs County School system is capable of carrying out the responsibilities of relocation and sheltering in place in response to an incident at HNP.

For this capability the following REP criterion was met: 3.c.2.

3.2.3.5 Medical Services Drill

Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Capability Summary:

Toombs County EMS staff successfully demonstrated their activities under the Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Capability during the Medical Services Drill (MSD) conducted OOS on November 9, 2011, in Toombs County. After receiving a call for assistance, TC EMS dispatched appropriate EMS resources, effectively managed contamination control for the victim and EMS personnel in accordance with procedures, appropriately notified Meadows Regional Medical Center (MRMC) staff of the status of the potentially contaminated and injured patient and transported the patient to the hospital, minimizing cross contamination and without causing further injury, to the patient.

MRMC successfully demonstrated activities under this capability by alerting and mobilizing staff and coordinating receipt and treatment of the contaminated injured patient. Leadership was engaged upon notification and provided exceptional direction and control and situational awareness throughout. The hospital effectively established a radiation emergency area, controlled access and emphasized the requirement to mitigate, isolate, restrict and contain contamination within the operational area. The staff was proactive, well trained, decisive and they worked well together. There was constant procedural and active communication, which aided in situational awareness. Checklists and illustrations with directions posted on the decontamination room walls, coupled with double checks and verbal reminders aided in proficiency, prevented mistakes and ensured procedural compliance. Priority protocols to treat the patient first and cause no further injury was observed and emphasized as paramount, consistently. There was adequate space and equipment to effectively perform medical responsibilities; however the electronic DRDs stored at the facility for medical staff use were not able to be zeroed, making them useless for their purpose to the medical staff. This shortcoming was identified by the utility health physicist (HP) who used the SRDs of the two HP staff as team equipment to bridge the equipment deficit. This shortcoming had no adverse impact on the exercise or its' outcome, however had the HPs not brought their SRDs with them; there may have been an issue.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 1.e.1, 3.a.1 and 6.d.1

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Section 4: Conclusion

Officials and representatives from the State of Georgia; the risk counties of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs performed well during this exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made the exercise a success. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. All contributed to the success of the emergency response effort.

State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them.

FEMA identified no ARCAs or Deficiencies during this exercise.

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Appendix A: Exercise Timeline

DATE AND SITE: November 2, 2011 – Hatch Nuclear Plant

Emergency Classification Level	Time Utility Declared	Time Notification was Received or Action Taken						
2011 Hatch NP REP Exercise		**SOC**	**DOSE**	**ENC**	**Appling County**	**Jeff Davis County**	**Tattnall County**	**Toombs County**
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	8:23	8:34	8:34	8:43	8:44	8:30	8:29	8:42
Site Area Emergency	9:42	9:58	9:58	10:03	9:58	10:06*	9:55	9:54
General Emergency	11:03	11:14	11:14	11:09	11:20	11:20	11:20	11:20
Simulated Rad Release Began	9:48	N/A	N/A	10:08	9:48	10:31	10:31	10:46
Simulated Rad Release Ended	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing
Facility Declared Operational		9:48	9:48	9:18	9:10	8:57	10:25	8:47
Declaration of State of Emergency: State		10:03	10:03	10:27	10:30	N/A	10:31	10:28
Local		N/A	N/A	N/A	9:55		10:45	10:30
Exercise Terminated		13:30	13:30	13:31	12:43	13:16	13:13	13:08
Pre-Protective Action Decisions:		9:35	9:35	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Pre-Protective Action Decisions: Schools and Functional Needs Residents Relocated		N/A	N/A	N/A	9:54	N/A	N/A	10:40
Pre-Protective Action Decisions: Refer to Utility issued calendar for possible protective measures		N/A	N/A	10:08	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1st Protective Action Decision: Evacuate Zones: A, B5, E5 Agriculture Advisory: A, B5, B10, E5, J10, K10, L10		11:39	11:39	11:39	11:39	11:39	11:39	11:39
1st NWS Alert & Message		N/A	N/A	11:58	11:58	11:58	11:58	11:58
2nd Protectective Action Decision: Evacuate Zones: A, B5, C5, D5, E5, J10, K10, L10		12:18	12:18	12:18	12:18	12:18	12:18	12:18
2nd NWS Alert & Message		12:28	12:28	12:28	12:28	12:28	12:28	12:28
KI Decision: Emergency Workers to Ingest		12:18	12:18	12:18	12:18	12:18	12:18	12:18
*Initial ENF was unintelligible								

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Appendix B: Exercise Capability/Criterion Summary

DATE AND SITE: November 2, 2011 – Hatch Nuclear Plant

Capability / Activity	GEMA	DOSE	ENC	EOF	Appling	Jeff Davis	Tattnall	Toombs
Emergency Operations Management								
Activate EOC	M				M	M	M	M
Provide EOC Connectivity	M				M	M	M	M
Direct EOC Tactical Operations	M				M	M	M	M
Support and Coordinate Response	M			NE	M	M	M	M
Emergency Public Information and Warning								
Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning and Notification	M		M					
Manage Emergency Public Information and Warning	M		M		M	M	M	M
Establish JIS			M					
Issue Emergency Warnings	M		M		M	M	M	M
Provide Public Rumor Control	M		M		M	M	M	M
Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place								
Direct Evacuation and/or Shelter In Place Protection					M	M	M	M
Emergency Public Safety and Security Response								
Activate Public Safety and Security Response	M				M	M	M	M
Command and Control Public Safety and Security Response	M				M	M	M	M
Control Traffic, Crowd and Scene					M	M	M	M
Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination					M	M	M	M
Site Management and Control		M			M	M	M	M
Hazard Assessment and Risk Evaluation		M						
Decontamination and Clean-up/Recovery Operations					M	M	M	M
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment								
Activate Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment								M
Direct Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment								M
Provide Treatment and Transport								M
Mass Care								
Establish Shelter Operations							M	

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Appendix B: Exercise Capability/Criterion Summary (Cont'd)

DATE AND SITE: November 2, 2011 – Hatch Nuclear Plant

ELEMENT/Sub-Element	SOC	DOSE	ENC	EOF	Appling	Jeff Davis	Tattnall	Toombs
1. Emergency Operations Management								
1.a.1. Mobilization	M	M	M	NE	M	M	M	M
1.b.1. Facilities								
1.c.1. Direction and Control	M	M	M	NE	M	M	M	M
1.d.1. Communications Equipment	M	M	M	NE	M	M	M	M
1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations	M	M	M	NE	M	M	M	M
2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING								
2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control	M	M			M	M	M	M
2.b.1. Rad Assessment & PARs Based on available information		M		NE				
2.b.2. Rad Assessment & PADs for General Public	M				M	M	M	M
2.c.1. Protectective Action Decision for Special Populations					M	M	M	M
2.d.1. Rad Assessment & Decision Making for Ingestion Exposure								
2.e.1. Rad Assessment & Decision Making for Relocation, Re-entry, Return								
3. Protective Action Implementation								
3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control	M	M			M	M	M	M
3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions	M	M			M	M	M	M
3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations					M	M	M	M
3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools					M			M
3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic / Access Control					M	M	M	M
3.d.2. Impediments of Traffic / Access Control					M	M	M	M
3.e.1. Implementation of Ingestion Decision Using Adequate Info								
3.e.2. Implementation of IP Decisions Showing Strategies & Instructional Methods								
3.f.1. Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry & Return Decisions								
4. Field Measurement & Analysis								
4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment								
4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management								
4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Procedures								
4.b.1. Post Plume Field Measurement & Analysis								
4.c.1. Laboratory Operations								
5. Emergency Notification & Public Information								
5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert & Notification	M				M	M	M	M
5.a.2. Reserved								
5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert & Notification Back-up Route Alert & Notification					M	M	M	M
5.b.1. Emergency information & Instructions for the Public & Media			M		M	M	M	M
6. Support Operations / Facilities								
6.a.1. Monitoring & Decon of Evacuees & EW / Registration of Evacuees						M		
6.b.1. Monitoring & Decon of Emergency Worker Equipment						M		
6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees						M		
6.d.1. Transport & Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals								M

Legend: M = Met N = Not Met NE = Not Evaluated

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Appendix C: Exercise Evaluators and Assignments

Location	Evaluation Team	Capability & Activity
Joint Operations		
EOF	Not Evaluated	EOC Management
ENC	T. Hegele (ICF)	Emergency Public Information & Warning
State of Georgia		
SOC	R. Gantt (ICF) Q. Ivy (FEMA)	EOC Management
Dose Assessment	L. Generette (EPA)	HAZMAT Response & Decontamination
Appling County		
EOC	W. Cushman (FEMA) J. Sandberg (FEMA)	EOC Management Emergency Public Information & Warning
Protective Actions for Schools	Odis Spencer (FEMA)	Citizen Evacuation & Shelter In Place
TCPs	J. Sandberg (FEMA)	Emergency Public Safety & Security Response
Backup Route Alerting	J. Sandberg (FEMA)	Emergency Public Information & Warnings
Jeff Davis County		
EOC	R. Shaw (FEMA) M. Dalton (ICF)	EOC Management Emergency Public Information & Warning
TCPs	M. Dalton (ICF)	Emergency Public Safety & Security Response
Backup Route Alerting	M. Dalton (ICF)	Emergency Public Information & Warnings
Tattnall County		
EOC	JT Ackermann (FEMA) R. Smith (ICF)	EOC Management Emergency Public Information & Warning
TCPs	R. Smith (ICF)	Emergency Public Safety & Security Response
Backup Route Alerting	R. Smith (ICF)	Emergency Public Information & Warnings
Toombs County		
EOC	O. Spencer (FEMA) D. White (ICF)	EOC Management Emergency Public Information & Warning
TCPs	D. White (ICF)	Emergency Public Safety & Security Response
Backup Route Alerting	D. White (ICF)	Emergency Public Information & Warnings
Emergency Worker & Vehicle Decon	O. Spencer (FEMA) W. Cushman (FEMA) R. Shaw (FEMA)	HAZMAT Response & Decontamination
Reception & Congregate Care	W. Cushman (FEMA) O. Spencer (FEMA) R. Shaw (FEMA)	HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Mass Care

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Appendix D: Exercise Locations

Exercise Locations	Out of Sequence Locations
GA State Operations Center (SOC) POC: Stephen Clark 935 E. Confederate Ave Atlanta, Georgia 30316 404/635-7233	**Appling County Schools** Appling County EOC 259 West Parker St. Baxley, Georgia 31513 912/367-8170
Appling County EOC EMD: Dane Bruce 259 West Parker St. Baxley, Georgia 31513 912/367-8170	**Toombs County Schools** Toombs County EOC 321 North West Broad Street Lyons, Georgia 30436
Jeff Davis County EOC EMD: James Dunn 10 Public Safety Drive Hazelhurst, Georgia 31539 912/375-6628	**Tattnall County EWD** Georgia State Prison Fire Station 1978 State Highway147 Reidsville, Georgia 30453 912/557-6778
Tattnall County EOC EMD: Walt Rogers 194 John O. Parker Dr. Reidsville, Georgia 30453 912/557-6820	**Tattnall County RCCC** Reidsville Middle School 148 West Brazell Street Reidsville, Georgia 30453 912/557-6778
Toombs County EOC EMD: Lynn Moore 321 North West Broad Street Lyons, Georgia 30436 912/526-6424	**Meadows Regional Hospital (MSD)** 1 Meadows Parkway Vidalia, Georgia 30474 912/537-8921
Emergency News Center 406 E. Oxley Blvd. Vidalia, GA 30474	**Toombs-Montgomery EMS** 509 Maple Drive Vidalia, Georgia 30474 912/537-0880
EOF 40 Inverness Center Parkway Birmingham, Alabama 35242 205/992-7431	**MSD Incident Location** 355 Cedar Crossing Point Lyons, Georgia 30436

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Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements

EI Hatch Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise
November 2, 2011

1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-Element 1.a—Mobilization
Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

Extent of Play
Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- The State of Georgia will exercise command and control from the State Operations Center (SOC), located at GEMA Headquarters in Atlanta, GA. SOC staff will be notified using normal notification procedures. Participating agencies not located near GEMA headquarters may pre-position at the GEMA complex, however, they will not participate until they receive notification through normal notification procedures.

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs will use normal notification procedures as the scenario dictates. Some participating agencies may pre-position personnel at their local county EOC, however, they will not participate until they receive notification through normal notification procedures.

- Those facilities and organizations which may be involved in the pre-positioning of personnel may include, but are not limited to, the following:

  - State Operations Center, Atlanta, GA
  - GA DNR/EPD

- GA Department of Agriculture Plant Hatch 2011 Evaluated Exercise Extent of Play Plant Hatch Emergency News Center, Vidalia, GA
- GEMA Public Affairs Officers
- Participating county public information representatives
- Southern Company Emergency Operations Facility – Birmingham, AL
- GEMA Liaison(s)
- Appling County EOC / Jeff Davis EOC / Tattnall County EOC / Toombs County EOC
- GEMA Liaison(s)
- Local EOC participants

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 1.c—Direction and Control
Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b)

Extent of Play
Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.
All activities associated with direction and control must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State direction and control will be directed from the SOC in Atlanta, GA. GEMA liaisons will be pre-deployed to each participating county Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to assist in the communication and coordination between the SOC and multiple off-site response organizations. In addition, GEMA liaisons will be pre-deployed to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) in Birmingham, AL.
- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs will provide direction and control from their respective county EOC.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 1.d—Communications Equipment
Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2)

Extent of Play

OROs will demonstrate that a primary and at least one backup system are fully functional at the beginning of an exercise. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed. Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units should be used as needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and field teams should have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OROs should ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. The specific communications capabilities of OROs should be commensurate with that specified in the response plan and/or procedures. Exercise scenarios could require the failure of a communications system and the use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.
- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs are in agreement.

Sub-Element 1.e—Equipment and Supplies to Support Operation
Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a)

Extent of Play

Equipment within the facility (facilities) should be sufficient and consistent with the role assigned to that facility in the ORO's plans and/or procedures in support of emergency operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged.

All instruments, should be inspected, inventoried and operationally checked before each use. Instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. A label indicating such calibration should be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. Additionally, instruments being used to measure activity should have a range of readings sticker affixed to the side of the instrument. The above considerations should be included in 4.a.1 for field team equipment; 4.c.1 for radiological laboratory equipment (does not apply to analytical equipment); reception center and emergency worker facilities' equipment under 6.a.1; and ambulance and medical facilities' equipment under 6.d.1.

Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers that could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry should allow individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Dosimetry should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced, if necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the Annual Letter of Certification, and/or through a staff assistance visit. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as indicated on rosters; where stipulated by the plan and/or procedures.

Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification submission, and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit. Available supplies of KI should be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their availability described.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- All dosimeters and radiation detection instruments are commercially procured. Practice or simulated TLDs, self- reading dosimetry, and simulated KI will be furnished to State and county emergency workers as necessary. A participating County Radiation Protection Officer will issue the equipment and instructions at the participating county EOCs. The general public is not provided KI.

- Evaluation of equipment and supplies will be completed during Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs) identified below:

  September 20 Staff Assistance Visits September 21 Staff Assistance Visits
  Toombs County 1300-1400 Appling County 0900-1000
  Tattnall County 1530-1630 Jeff Davis County 1100-1200

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Sub-Element 2.a—Emergency Worker Exposure Control
Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4, J.10.e, f)

Extent of Play
OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures.

If necessary, the state OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of preauthorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels. As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for KI administration.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.
- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement.

Sub-Element 2.b—Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency
Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, I.8, 10 and Supplement 3)

Extent of Play
During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO should demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plan and/or procedures, to develop protective action recommendations (PAR) for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations from the licensee and field monitoring data, if available.

When release and meteorological data are provided by the licensee, the ORO also considers these data. The ORO should demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs appropriate to the scenario. In all cases,

calculation of projected dose should be demonstrated. Projected doses should be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs should be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a prearranged format.

Differences greater than a factor of 10 between projected doses by the licensee and the ORO should be discussed with the licensee with respect to the input data and assumptions used the use of different models, or other possible reasons. Resolution of these differences should be incorporated into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The ORO should demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.f, m)

Extent of Play
Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs. They should demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner appropriate to the situation, based on notification from the licensee, assessment of plant status and releases, and PARs from the utility and ORO staff.

The dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. The decision makers should demonstrate the capability to change protective actions as appropriate based on these projections.

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public under offsite plans, then the ORO should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for the general public to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision should be based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision making process should involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff.

If more than one ORO is involved in decision-making, OROs should communicate and coordinate PADs with affected OROs. OROs should demonstrate the capability to communicate the contents of decisions to the affected jurisdictions.

All decision-making activities by ORO personnel must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement.

Sub-Element 2.c—Protective Action Decisions for Protection of Special Populations
Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, e)

Extent of Play
Usually, it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for situations where there is a high-risk environment where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, examples of factors that should be considered are: weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the administration of KI should be considered by the OROs. Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. Contacts with public school systems/districts must be actual.

In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts should demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. Officials should demonstrate that the decision making process for protective actions considers (that is, either accepts automatically or gives heavy weight to) protective action recommendations made by ORO personnel, the ECL at which these recommendations are received, preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, and the location of students at the time (for example, whether the students are still at home, en route to the school, or at the school).

All decision-making activities associated with protective actions, including consideration of available resources, for special population groups must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- This to be accomplished by interview with appropriate county officials.

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-Element 3.a—Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control
Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)

Extent of Play

OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) contained in the ORO's plans and procedures. Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated. During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn back values are reached.

The emergency worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans and procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan and/or procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the event authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be effected for all members of the team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, e.g., at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers, may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted that, even in these situations, each team member must still have their own permanent record dosimetry.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- This capability is to be demonstrated by interview only. The interview with the County Radiological Protection Officer (RPO) and Emergency Workers (EWs) will take place at each county Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
- The RPO will conduct a briefing prior to the simulated deployment of Emergency Workers (EWs). The RPO interview and briefing will take place in, or in close proximity to, each respective county EOC.

- Emergency Workers will be available following the RPO briefing to demonstrate, by interview, how to operate/use the equipment they are issued and understand the directions/guidance given by the RPO.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 3.b—Implementation of KI Decision
Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e)

Extent-of-play
Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to make KI available to emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plan and/or procedures, to members of the general public. OROs should demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made. Organizations should have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers and institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. The ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI is not necessary. OROs should demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on the use of KI for those advised to take it. If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information should be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the use of KI whether or not the scenario drives the use of KI. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- This capability is to be demonstrated by interview only. The interview with the county Emergency Workers (EWs) will take place at each county Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 3.c—Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations:
Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)

Extent-of-play

Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (for example, provide protective action recommendations and emergency information and instructions) special populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired individuals, transportation dependent, etc.). OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of special populations in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures.

Contact with special populations and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent-of-play. Some contacts with transportation providers should be actual, as negotiated in the extent-of-play. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.

All implementing activities associated with protective actions for special populations must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Implementation of protective actions for special populations will be demonstrated through interview with human service agencies represented in each county EOC as identified below;

Appling County	Public Health representatives within the Appling County EOC
Jeff Davis County	EMA Director within the Jeff Davis EOC
Tattnall County	EMA personnel within the Tattnall County EOC
Toombs County	EMA and DFCS personnel within the Toombs County EOC

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)

Extent-of-play

Public school systems/districts shall demonstrate the ability to implement protective action decisions for students. The demonstration shall be made as follows: At least one school in each affected school system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the implementation of protective actions. The implementation of canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering should be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process.

If accomplished through an interview process, appropriate school personnel including decision making officials (e.g., superintendent/principal, transportation director/bus dispatcher), and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) should be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plan

and/or procedures, should be verified.

Officials of the school system(s) should demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools. The provisions of this criterion also apply to any private schools, private kindergartens and day care centers that participate in REP exercises pursuant to the ORO's plans and procedures as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of-play agreement.

- Implementation of protective actions for schools will be demonstrated through interview with the following agency represented in each county EOC;

Appling County	Appling County EMA / Appling County School System personnel located in the EOC
Toombs County	Toombs County EMA / Toombs County School System personnel located in the EOC

- All participating counties, to include Appling and Toombs counties are in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 3.d—Implementation of Traffic and Access Control
Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j)

Extent of Play
OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with protective action decisions (for example, evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. This capability may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), they should demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies with authority to control access.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Demonstration regarding Traffic Control Points and River Clearance will be demonstrated by interview within each county EOC by representatives of the agencies identified below. However, the availability of DNR personnel may limit participation in each participating EOC. If this occurs, river clearance will be demonstrated, by interview, by DNR personnel in a single county EOC may represent all affected counties.

Traffic Control Points
- Appling County Appling County Sheriff's Department personnel in the Appling County EOC
- Jeff Davis County Jeff Davis County Sheriff's Department personnel in the Jeff Davis County EOC
- Tattnall County Tattnall County Sheriff's Department personnel in the Tattnall County EOC
- Toombs County Toombs County Sheriff's Department personnel in the Toombs County EOC

River Clearance
- Appling County GA DNR personnel in the Appling County EOC
- Jeff Davis County GA DNR personnel in the Jeff Davis County EOC
- Tattnall County GA DNR personnel in the Tattnall County EOC
- Toombs County GA DNR personnel in the Toombs County EOC

- If resources allow, personnel responsible for traffic control and river clearance may transport FEMA evaluators to an identified traffic control or river clearance point location. Due to safety considerations, traffic control points and actual river clearance will not be demonstrated.

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10.k)

Extent of Play

OROs should demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, should be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- The exercise scenario will not involve any impediments to evacuation. However, designated traffic control personnel will be available in each participating county EOC to demonstrate, through interview, actions that could be taken to resolve any impediments to evacuation.

Appling County	Appling County Sheriff's Department personnel in the Appling County EOC
Jeff Davis County	Jeff Davis County EMA Director in the Jeff Davis County EOC
Tattnall County	Tattnall County EMA and Tattnall County Sheriff's Department personnel in the Tattnall County EOC
Toombs County	Toombs County EMA and Toombs County Sheriff's Department personnel in the Toombs County EOC

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

4. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-Element 5.a—Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System
Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7)

Extent of Play
Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures, completion of system activation should be accomplished in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) for primary alerting/notification. The initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with route alerting as the primary method of alerting and notifying the public should demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting, following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures. At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location. The initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "the responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay." If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message should be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages *is not* required. The alert signal activation may be simulated. However, the procedures should be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis should be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- GEMA and participating counties will coordinate PNS activation to include initial activation. Subsequent PNS activations will be simulated.
- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.
- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report) 5–10 miles from the nuclear power plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s) within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The 45-minute clock will begin when the OROs make the decision to activate the alert and notification system for the first time for a specific emergency situation. The initial message should, at a minimum, include: a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and where to obtain additional information. For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

Backup alert and notification of the public should be completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. Backup

route alerting only needs to be demonstrated and evaluated, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures and the extent-of-play agreement, if the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s), or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function. If demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- This capability to be demonstrated by interview within each county EOC by representatives of the agency identified below:

Appling County	Appling County EMA / Appling County Sheriff's Department personnel located in the EOC
Jeff Davis County	Jeff Davis EMA Director in the Jeff Davis County EOC
Tattnall County	Tattnall County EMA
Toombs County	Toombs County EMA / 911 Director located in the EOC

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 5.b—Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media
Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c)

Extent of Play
Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "the responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay." If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

The ORO should ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The emergency information should contain all necessary and applicable instructions (for example, evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, information concerning pets, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and special populations, public inquiry telephone number, etc.) to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided to them. The ORO should also be prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident. At a

minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs should demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information should be all-inclusive by including previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plan and/or procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the situation warrants. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and media releases should be consistent with protective action decisions and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (for example,

Emergency Alert System [EAS] messages and media releases) and media information kits should be available for dissemination to the media. OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls to the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff should demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, should be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases. All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- The State will pre-deploy a GEMA Public Information Officer and two Public Affairs staff members to the Emergency News Center (ENC) in Vidalia GA.

- Participating counties will each pre-deploy one Public Affairs staff member to the Emergency News Center (ENC) in Vidalia GA.

- Two GEMA Public Affairs representatives will participate in the State Operations Center to coordinate State and local joint press releases which are then provided to the Public Information Officer at the ENC.

- Information is not currently disseminated thru the EAS system. Each county may contact designated local television and radio stations to supplement tone alert radios.

- Local radio (LP1) and television stations used for information dissemination by participating counties are identified below:

Appling County
Radio Stations WUFE (AM 1260) and WBYZ (FM 94.5) in Baxley
Savannah Television Stations, Channels WSAV-TV 3, WTOC-TV 11 and WJCL-TV 22

Jeff Davis County
Radio Stations WVOH (AM 920) and WVOH (FM 93.5) in Hazlehurst
Savannah Television Stations, Channels WSAV-TV 3, WTOC-TV 11 and WJCL-TV 22

Tattnall County
Radio Station WBYZ (FM 94.5) in Baxley, and WTCQ (FM 97.7) in Vidalia
Savannah Television Stations WSAV-TV-3, WTOC-TV-11 and WJCL-TV-22

Toombs County
Radio Stations WVOP (AM 970), WYUM (FM 101.7) and WTCQ (FM 97.7) in Vidalia, WBBT (AM 1340) and WLYU (FM 92.5) in Lyons
WPHJ-TV Channel 46 in Ailey or Savannah Television Stations, Channels WSAV-TV 3, WTOC-TV 11 and WJCL-TV 22

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

5. SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-Element 6.a—Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a)

Extent of Play

Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees/emergency workers should be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Expected demonstration should include 1/3 of the monitoring teams/portal monitors required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours. Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate the

capability to attain and sustain a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20% emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours. This monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored per hour by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate monitoring procedure. A minimum of six individuals per monitoring station should be monitored, using equipment and procedures specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators in order to determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be met. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the twelve-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers. Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated and conducted by interview. The availability of provisions for separately showering should be demonstrated or explained. The staff should demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and appropriate means (for example, partitions, roped-off areas) to separate clean from potentially contaminated areas.

Provisions should also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contaminated, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any individual found to be contaminated, procedures should be discussed concerning the handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings.

Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They should also explain the procedures for referring evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow up in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source.

The capability to register individuals upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities should be demonstrated. The registration activities demonstrated should include the establishment of a registration record for each individual, consisting of the individual's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination, if any, or as otherwise designated in the plan. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration. All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Tattnall County will conduct an evaluated Reception Center Exercise on Tuesday, October 25, 2011.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.
- All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 6.b—Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment:
Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the

accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

Extent of Play
The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to monitor equipment, including vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organization's (ORO's) plans and procedures. Specific attention should be given to equipment, including vehicles, that was in contact with individuals found to be contaminated. The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of equipment, including vehicles, based on guidance levels and procedures stated in the plan and/or procedures.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles should be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with individuals found to be contaminated should also be checked. Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontaminated, may be simulated and conducted by interview.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Tattnall County in agreement (OOS). Exercise date – October 25, 2011.

- The demonstration will occur at the Georgia State Prison Fire Station on State Highway 147.

Sub-Element 6.c—Temporary Care of Evacuees
Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in MASS CARE—Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12)

Extent of Play
Under this criterion, demonstration of congregate care centers may be conducted out of sequence with the exercise scenario. The evaluator should conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with ARC 3031. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this objective, exercise demonstration expectations should be clearly specified in extent-of-play agreements.

Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been registered before entering the facility. This capability may be determined through an interview process. If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility (facilities). However, availability of such items should be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities. All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Tattnall County Middle School is a certified American Red Cross shelter.

Sub-Element 6.d—Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals
Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)

Extent of Play
Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts will not delay urgent medical care for the victim.

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities. An ambulance should be used for the response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended time, any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) may be utilized to transport the victim to the medical facility. Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility should be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for transport to the medical facility, this communication must occur before releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation monitoring results, if available. Additionally, the ambulance crew should demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for such information. Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport, done enroute, or deferred to the medical facility. Before using a monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities should be completed as they would be in an actual emergency. Appropriate contamination control measures should be demonstrated before and during transport and at the Plant receiving medical facility. The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Equipment and supplies should be available for the treatment of contaminated injured individuals.

The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual, to follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and to maintain records of all survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures for the collection and analysis of samples and the decontamination of the individual should be demonstrated or described to the evaluator.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- The Toombs County / Meadows Regional Medical Center MS-1 will be conducted on November 9, 2011.
- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.
- All participating counties, to include Toombs County are in agreement with clarifications above.

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Appendix F: Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AAC	After Action Conference
AAR	After Action Report
ALARA	As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ARC	American Red Cross
ARCA	Area Requiring Corrective Action
ARES	Amateur Radio Emergency Services
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DNR	Department of Natural Resources
DOT	Department of Transportation
DPS	Department of Public Safety
DRD	Direct Reading Dosimeter
DSS	Department of Social Services
EAL	Emergency Action Level
EAS	Emergency Alert System
ECL	Emergency Classification Level
EEG	Exercise Evaluation Guide
EMA	Emergency Management Agency
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
ENC	Emergency News Center
ENN	Emergency Notification Network
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EOPA	Extent of Play Agreement
EMD	Emergency Management Director
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ESF	Emergency Support Function
EW	Emergency Worker
EWD	Emergency Worker Decontamination
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMT	Field Monitoring Team
FOUO	For Official Use Only
GAR	Governors Authorized Representative

Acronym	Meaning
GE	General Emergency
GEMA	Georgia Emergency Management Agency
GODAWGS	Georgia Online Disaster Awareness Geospatial System
GSP	Georgia State Patrol
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
HPD	Hazlehurst Police Department
HNP	Hatch Nuclear Plant
HP	Health Physicist
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
HQ	Headquarters
IC	Incident Commander
IP	Improvement Plan
IPZ	Ingestion Pathway Zone
JDSO	Jeff Davis County Sheriff's Department
KI	Potassium Iodide
LE	Law Enforcement
LP-1	Local Primary -1
MAC	Multi-agency coordination
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
mR	milliroentgen
mR/h	milliroentgen per hour
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOUE	Notification of Unusual Event
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NWS	National Weather Service
OO	Operations Officer
OOS	Out-of-Sequence
ORO	Offsite Response Organization
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PAG	Protective Action Guide
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PIO	Public Information Officer
PNS	Prompt Notification System
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PRD	Permanent Record Dosimetry

Acronym	Meaning
R	Roentgen
RAC	Regional Assistance Committee
RACES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service
RCCC	Reception Congregate Care Center
REC	Radiation Emergency Coordinator
REA	Radioactive Emergency Area
REM	Roentgen Equivalent Man
REP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
RERP	Radiological Emergency Response Plan
R/h	Roentgen(s) per hour
RO	Radiological Officer
RPO	Radiation Protection Officer
SAE	Site Area Emergency
SSTD	School Safety and Transportation Director
SOC	State Operations Center
GSP	Georgia State Patrol
SIP	Shelter-in-Place
SOG	Standard Operating Guide
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRD	Self-Reading Dosimeter
TAR	Tone Alert Radio
TCL	Target Capabilities List
TCP	Traffic Control Point
THD	Technological Hazard Division
TLD	Thermoluminescent dosimeter
UTL	Universal Task List
VFD	Volunteer Fire Department
VHF	Very High Frequency

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