

TO: Leeds, NRR
Ref. G20120327

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE EDO, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

June 17, 2012

R. William Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Via Email hearingdocket@nrc.gov

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**SUPPLEMENT TO 2.206 ENFORCEMENT PETITION REGARDING LABOR
DISPUTE PILGRIM NPS (SUBMITTED MAY 16, 2012) – CONDITION
REPORTS**

Pilgrim Watch ("PW") respectfully requests to supplement its 2.206 enforcement petition submitted originally on May 16, 2012 regarding the labor dispute at Pilgrim Station highlighting its public safety implications.

We submit the following pertinent new information that supports PW's request for NRC to order Pilgrim closed for operations until the labor dispute is resolved and all 369 union workers reinstated back onsite in their original jobs.

The attached Condition Reports ("CRs") have occurred since the labor dispute and lock-out. They indicate to us that operations are not being maintained as they should. Further, the CRs add to the multiple safety issues previously brought forward by Pilgrim Watch ("PW") and Jones River Watershed Association ("JRWA") in prior supplements and in our initial 2.206. These concerns further erode the public's confidence that there is reasonable assurance of public safety. For example, two CRs (02549 and 02560) raise security issues over and above the lack of security training brought forward by Petitioners in earlier supplements. One CR (02459)

TEMPLATE: EDO-001

ERLWS: EDO-01

describes workers entering the site without their ID's being verified at the entry point. The other CR (CR 02560) reports from security that grasses onsite at PNPS are getting very long. We logically infer from the CR, although the CR comes to a very different explanation, that the real concern of high grass is that any party ("bad guy") hiding on site in the high grass could not be easily identified. But, the CR focuses instead on the risk of terrorists, or anyone for that matter, getting Lyme disease from ticks and become ill.

Petitioners maintain that absent reasonable assurance, NRC is required to order the reactor to cease operations until such time as the regular worker force is back on site in full.

Respectfully submitted on behalf of Petitioners,

(Electronically signed)

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June 17, 2012

ATTACHMENT

Below is a list of 41 CR's created from (6/7/2012 6:07:40 AM to 6/11/2012 6:07:40 AM). PW/JRWA highlighted those that appear most significant to us; however we appreciate that NRC technical staff may very well identify others.

Condition Number	Condition Description
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02528</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/7/2012 9:24:49 AM Originated: 6/7/2012 9:30:44 AM Originator: Sitkowski Jr,Dennis J Eng DE Elect Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Administrative issue - Due to circumstances related to the ongoing labor situation, there was no attendance at the 50% review meeting for EC34744 - GSU test switches on 6/7/12.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02529</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/7/2012 9:48:03 AM Originated: 6/7/2012 9:49:51 AM Originator: Hettwer,Michael H Operations Mgmt PNP</p> <p>Systems: 24 Equipment: VAC-104B</p>	<p>VAC-104B belts are broken and need to be replaced – NEED belts, none on-site, delivery scheduled for 06/11/2012</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02530</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/7/2012 9:49:24 AM Originated: 6/7/2012 10:06:12 AM Originator: Kelly,Gary R Maint Electrical Mgmt PNP</p> <p>Systems: 24 Equipment: VHU-103</p>	<p>WO-52311608-01 to perform 3.m.3-68 can't be completed. The dead date is 6/25/12. The 3.m.3-68 requires the breaker to be cycled 4 times and voltage readings to be taken. The inspection portion of the 3.m.3-68 is complete. Currently the breaker is tagged out IAW tagout 1C19-1-24H-015-VHU-103. A work order WO 226149-01 is to repair the VHU-103. Currently the Work order is in plan status.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02531</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/7/2012 11:48:40 AM Originated: 6/7/2012 11:59:59 AM Originator: Anonymous General Manager PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>SAFETY CONCERN: Multiple vehicles on site are without required Lighting underneath them</p>

<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02532</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/7/2012 1:56:20 PM Originated: 6/7/2012 2:01:08 PM Originator: Brain Sr,Jonathan E Security Plant Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>While posted at the I&S parking lot, Security Officer Noticed Madi security personnel assembling a pop up tent on company property. Security Officer noticed that Contractors were not using proper PPE and attempted to correct them but was ignored. Nuclear Security Officers should NOT be ignored, Safety is EVERYONES responsibility.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02533</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/7/2012 1:57:05 PM Originated: 6/7/2012 2:08:46 PM Originator: Corbo,William F Training Mgmt PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Based upon the focused Self Assessment of MFLS Training program, three negative observations and one Area for Improvement (AFI) have been identified. This CR is written to address these findings.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02534</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/7/2012 2:23:46 PM Originated: 6/7/2012 2:29:47 PM Originator: Mone,Patrick Eng Sys BOP Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: 56 Equipment: DR-161</p>	<p>Door knob on DR-161 Fan room two. does not turn on the inside, door will not open from the inside if latch worked, door does not latch. CR-PNP-2012-1109 identified this condition. (TORNADO BARRIER DOOR DR-161 FOR FAN ROOM 2,(51' TB), IS FAILING TO LATCH AND REQUIRES MANUAL ACTION TO FULLY CLOSE.) Door knob needs repair. WO 308134 was written to repair door</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02535</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/7/2012 3:15:23 PM Originated: 6/7/2012 3:35:17 PM Originator: Flynn,Grant Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: 10 Equipment: FI-1040-12B</p>	<p>During RHR Pump-B testing, FI-1040-2B, RHR TOTAL FLOW, was observed to indicate approximately 100-200 gpm lower that flow indication on FI-1040-12B, RHR Containment Cooling. These indicators should show the same flow while in the test lineup. See attached PI trace.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02536</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/7/2012 4:57:11 PM Originated: 6/7/2012 5:10:56 PM Originator: Flynn,Grant Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Received EPIC alarm RCW008, RWCU non-regen heat exchanger outlet temp high while establishing flow through the RHR heat exchanger. Throttled flow to the RHR Heat Exchanger to provide more flow to the RWCU NRHX, which cleared the alarm. Highest temperature observed was 123 deg-F. Normal temperature is approximately 110 deg-F. RWCU high-temperature trip is 140 deg-F.</p>

<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02537</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/7/2012 8:35:05 PM Originated: 6/7/2012 8:43:22 PM Originator: MacNeill,Craig Security Plant Mgmt PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>After viewing video footage and exiting out of the work window on The SAS SOCA Work Station, the Work Station locked up and required a reboot.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02538</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 4:54:39 AM Originated: 6/8/2012 4:59:17 AM Originator: Dagnello,Michael A Maint FIN Team Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: 46G Equipment: D15</p>	<p>D-15 250 VDC backup charger failed PMT WO# 315015-02</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02539</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 6:15:46 AM Originated: 6/8/2012 6:38:58 AM Originator: Anonymous General Manager PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>While conducting the daily surveillance of the EOF Mechanical Room it was noted that the hot water tank located in the EOF Mechanical Room had breached, which caused localized flooding in the room. Note: The hot water tank is NOT a piece of equipment that is important to EP, as delineated in EP-IP-100.1, Att. 9.3, and is only used for hot water supply to the EOF for the bathrooms and the kitchen area.</p> <p>Comment Petitioners:</p> <p>CR-PNP-2012-02539 was written because the hot water tank in the EOF Mechanical Room had breached. PW/JRWA does not believe that the evaluation that concluded that the hot water tank is not important is sufficient. When investigating a drive-by shooting, it really doesn't matter if the vehicle was traveling below the posted speed limit. The concern is that the bullets coming from the vehicle might harm people. In this case, that the hot water tank is not important has to be complemented by an evaluation of potential harm from the water it leaked into the room. Could that water damage equipment that IS important? Entergy failed to ask and answer all the right questions. It's not sufficient to have the right answers until one has asked all the right questions.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02540</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 6:33:50 AM Originated: 6/8/2012 6:46:49 AM Originator: Ellison,Heather Elizabeth Eng P&C Plant Prog/Comp</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Operations did not attend the T-28 meeting on June 7, 2012 to meet requirements of EN-WM-101.</p>

<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02541</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 6:43:56 AM Originated: 6/8/2012 6:47:07 AM Originator: O'Donnell,Jonathan Eng Sys NSSS Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: 31 Equipment: K-117, TT-1277, TT-21</p>	<p>K-117 diesel air compressor has exceeded its maintenance rule performance criteria of not more than 2 functional failures in the past 2 year period. Actual performance is 3 functional failures in the past 2 years. The most recent failure identified by CR-2012-2366 is also a repeat functional failure. EN-DC-205 requires the initiation of a new CR when performance criteria are exceeded or a repeat functional failure is identified.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02542</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 7:25:39 AM Originated: 6/8/2012 7:29:02 AM Originator: Dwyer,Joseph P Maint Electrical Mgmt PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>During performance of weekly battery surveillance under W/O 52421314-01 the 250V security battery bank voltage did not come inside the acceptance criteria range of 260-270VDC. As-found voltage was 270.1 VDC</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02543</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 10:10:20 AM Originated: 6/8/2012 10:14:45 AM Originator: Connerton,Kelly L Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Received "CRD/ DRYWELL/MISC AREAS TEMP HI" C903R (A1). Alarm due to high temp alarm on CRD 26-27. Temp reading is currently 250F.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02544</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 1:46:23 PM Originated: 6/8/2012 1:47:51 PM Originator: Haskell,Kenneth D Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Condensate pump area cooler VAC-101A red fan ON indicating light has a bulb broken off in the socket at Panel C60.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02545</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 2:28:18 PM Originated: 6/8/2012 2:30:35 PM Originator: Cook,Dennis J Maint I&C Mgmt PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>While performing the calibration of RR-1705-11 per 8.M.1-13 ATT 5, step [1] (e), the ?as-found? set point for the Blue pen was found at 4.00 E3. The desired trip setting is 3.00 E3. The alarm was adjusted to 3.00 E3, functionally tested and placed back into service.</p>

<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02546</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 2:29:36 PM Originated: 6/8/2012 2:34:34 PM Originator: Mantenfel,Martin B Eng P&C Code Program St</p> <p>Systems:</p> <p>Equipment: B4102</p>	<p>WWTF emergency diesel auto start. B41-2 transfer switch in tripped condition. Notified control room.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02547</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 2:23:00 PM Originated: 6/8/2012 2:37:30 PM Originator: Johnson,Adam Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems:</p> <p>Equipment:</p>	<p>While performing 2.1.25, Eyewash station checkoff list, one portable eyewash station was not fully charged. The Portable eyewash station in the EDG 'A' Compressor room had a charge indication of Yellow. Green is fully charged and Red indicates a need for recharge. Yellow indicates a lowering pressure.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02548</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 4:46:13 PM Originated: 6/8/2012 5:09:49 PM Originator: Flynn,Grant Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: 66</p> <p>Equipment: C-19B</p>	<p>The control room received a spurious C19A/B Trouble Alarm, in and clear. C19A is currently out of service. Chemistry investigated and found no abnormalities with C19B.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02549</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/7/2012 9:00:00 AM Originated: 6/8/2012 5:15:50 PM Originator: Brain Sr,Jonathan E Security Plant Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems:</p> <p>Equipment:</p>	<p>On Thursday 6/7/12 security officers were instructed not to board the bus loaded with contingency workers and let them pass without verifying their IDs. When security officer questioned management, officer was told IDs were verified at the pick up location by the senior security training supervisor. Security officer then questioned if the training supervisor was qualified to do the patrolman's job. This issue is currently being addressed by the NRC.</p> <p>Comment Petitioners: CR-PNP-2012-02549 was written because workers are entering the site without their ID's being verified at the entry point. Allegedly, their IDs are being verified at the pickup point. This is potentially dangerous. This practice could allow bad guys to intercept the bus between the pickup point and the entry point, board the bus, and whip through the entry point without challenge.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02550</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 6:58:50 PM Originated: 6/8/2012 7:04:25 PM</p>	<p>H2 analyzer B N-009B low flow alarm intermittent. Alarm in and clear approximately 1 minute cycles.</p>

<p>Originator: Smith,Wade M. Tech Chemistry Mgmt PNP</p> <p>Systems:</p> <p>Equipment:</p>	
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02551</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/8/2012 8:06:33 PM Originated: 6/8/2012 8:16:40 PM Originator: Henderson,Joseph C Human Performance PNP</p> <p>Systems:</p> <p>Equipment:</p>	<p>WADI Security personnel did not not receive EN-MA-126 brief as required by procedure</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02552</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/9/2012 10:25:54 AM Originated: 6/9/2012 10:43:25 AM Originator: Burnham Jr,Daniel Thomas Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems:</p> <p>Equipment:</p>	<p>During the performance of 8.C.22. Startup Transformer and 345kV Switchyard Surveillance, found voltage differential between battery ground detectors on D658 >30VDC. POS-to-GND reading was 68VDC. NEG-to-GND reading was 67VDC.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02553</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/9/2012 10:11:51 AM Originated: 6/9/2012 11:22:44 AM Originator: Keene,Jeffrey W Eng Sys Elect/I&C Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems:</p> <p>Equipment:</p>	<p>Doble Engineering has notified Entergy blanket PO 50014627 has expired. This means PNPS transformer oil analysis must be arrested until funding is renewed. Oil analysis is the primary performance monitoring tool for the large transformers.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02554</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/9/2012 4:57:42 PM Originated: 6/9/2012 5:02:23 PM Originator: Vazquez,George W QA Audit Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems:</p> <p>Equipment:</p>	<p>Found "gap vax" vehicle parked in front of executive building without wheel chocks in place.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02555</u></p>	<p>The following discrepancies were noted during the Weekly Control Rod Exercise IAW 8.3.2: Control Rod 38-31, Degraded Rod Motion 300# to Withdraw WR# 275252 Control Rod 50-23 Degraded Rod Motion 340 # to Insert. WR#275254 Control Rod 14-15, No rod</p>

<p>Discovered: 6/9/2012 4:27:59 PM Originated: 6/9/2012 5:23:21 PM Originator: Knell, Kenneth C Outage Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>select light on Full Core Display WR#275255 Control Rod 10-07 No rod selected light on Full Core Display. WR# 275256</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02556</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/9/2012 9:00:00 AM Originated: 6/9/2012 5:54:37 PM Originator: Clifford, Francis C Outage Mgmt PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Individual needed to cover the minimum manning requirements for Operations shift coverage during the strike contingency period. The individual was hired from 0700 to 1030 on 5/9/2012 after he worked the previous nightshift 1900 - 0700. As a result, this individual exceeded 26 work hours in a 48 hour period. The oncoming Radwaste / Fire Brigade Operator was found to be not coming in for his scheduled shift due to a planned vacation. Previous attempts on the nightshift to provide watch coverage this individual were unsuccessful. In addition, there is a limited amount of eligible candidates for coverage.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02557</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/10/2012 4:23:48 AM Originated: 6/10/2012 4:25:31 AM Originator: Paul, Stanley W Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>During an NRC inspector walk down of the intake structure toolbox that supports 2.1.37 COASTAL STORM - PREPARATIONS AND ACTIONS attachment 1 SCREENHOUSE PARTS AND TOOLS INVENTORY LIST; 12 one eighth inch cotter pins were missing from the toolbox inventory.</p> <p>Comment Petitioners CR-PNP-2012-02557 was written because an NRC inspector discovered 12 1/8 inch cotter pins missing from the toolbox staged in support of coastal storm procedures. However we wonder if the replacement workers are likely to even find the toolbox, yet alone notice that it's missing some pieces.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02558</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/10/2012 3:56:55 AM Originated: 6/10/2012 4:39:54 AM Originator: Webers, John W Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>The control room received a spurious C19A/B Trouble Alarm twice, in and clear. C19A is currently out of service. Chemistry investigated and found no abnormalities with C19B.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02559</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/10/2012 4:46:01 AM Originated: 6/10/2012 4:56:20 AM Originator: Webers, John W Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Received alarm C3R-C7, Line 342 Alternate Pilot twice. The first time, the alarm was spurious, the second alarm stayed in for several hours.</p>

<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02560</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/10/2012 7:29:30 AM Originated: 6/10/2012 7:42:01 AM Originator: Anonymous Security Plant Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>The grass onsite at PNPS is getting very long and tick season is in full bloom. As you may know, ticks carry Lyme Disease, a debilitating and potentially lethal ailment. In the interest of saving human lives, please cut the grass. Please see to this ASAP as even one death is one too many.</p> <p>Comment Petitioners : We suspect that the real, or certainly other, reason CR-PNP-2012-02560 was written by security is their concern for any terrorist's health who may be hiding in the grass onsite and get bitten by ticks carrying Lyme disease and become gravely ill.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02561</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/10/2012 10:04:19 AM Originated: 6/10/2012 12:02:52 PM Originator: Sheridan,Robert S Operations Mgmt PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>NRC personnel noted that control room log for 6/9/12 nightshift and 6/9/12 dayshift did not fully identify all of the members assigned to the fire brigade for those two shifts. Specifically, the deputy fire member for 6/9/12 nightshift and the 5th member for 6/9/12 dayshift were not logged. The positions not fully identified were from both Operations and Security. Review of all fire brigade positions for the contingency time period determined that although the log did not fully reflect fire brigade assignments, all required fire positions were properly staffed. See Immediate actions section below.</p> <p>Immediate Action Description:</p> <p>Reviewed fire brigade log entries from when contingency staffing began (6/5/12 @ 2300) ; log was not fully updated. Those instances were 4th and 5th positions on 6/6/12 dayshift ar personnel assignments and discussion with Security supervision for the shifts in question d required fire brigade positions were properly staffed. Those positions were covered by the Reid); 5th Position Security (Hart) 6/7/12 Nightshift: 5th Position Security (P. Nugent) 6/9 Confirmed via the Security Shift Commander that J. Couto was onsite for the full shift with (N. Reid)</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02562</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/10/2012 12:22:38 PM Originated: 6/10/2012 12:42:57 PM Originator: McGilvray,Kyle R Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Trending Condition Report. CRD Suction Filter 'B' has shown a rising Differential pressure increasing by 0.3 psid per day. Current reading is 5.7 psid and tour reading max is 10 psid.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02563</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/10/2012 4:40:31 PM Originated: 6/10/2012 4:47:03 PM Originator: Knell,Kenneth C Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Received accumulator alarm on HCU 14-15, reviewed ARP and dispatched Rx. Bldg. operator to investigate and restore.</p>

<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02564</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/10/2012 9:36:08 PM Originated: 6/10/2012 9:38:28 PM Originator: Coolidge,Robert W Operations Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>THE FIRST HALF OF THE BREAKERS IN P-6 DO NOT HAVE THE BREAKER INDEX SUPPLIED. THIS IS REQUIRED FOR THE TOUR OPERATOR TO DETERMINE IF BREAKERS ARE CLOSED AS APPROPRIATE.</p> <p>Comment Petitioners CR-PNP-2012-02564 was written because half the breakers in breaker panel P-6 are not labeled. The replacement workers need the labels to be able to check that the appropriate breakers are closed.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02565</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/11/2012 4:42:49 AM Originated: 6/11/2012 4:48:02 AM Originator: Smyth,Donald P Training Support Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Focused Self Assessment of the Maintenance First Line Supervisor (MFLS) identified the following Negative Observation: A comparison of focus areas to long range training plan for MFLS indicated there is not a strong correlation between site business plan goals or focus areas and the long range plan. The team recommends that the long range plan be enhanced by correlating site business plan goals and focus areas into the schedule. Also, we recommend including the reason for training in the schedule emphasizing training for performance improvement.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02566</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/11/2012 4:48:23 AM Originated: 6/11/2012 4:51:02 AM Originator: Smyth,Donald P Training Support Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Focused Self Assessment of the Maintenance First Line Supervisor (MFLS) identified the following Negative Observation: The quality of the management observations was found to be very light on comments for ME and EE. There was no indication of coaching being performed by the observer to the instructor and no indication of follow up actions or that comments for Needs Improvement (NI) was evaluated for action. Evaluate how to improve management observations at PNPS.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02567</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/11/2012 4:52:56 AM Originated: 6/11/2012 4:54:32 AM Originator: Smyth,Donald P Training Support Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Focused Self Assessment of the Maintenance First Line Supervisor (MFLS) identified the following Negative Observation: A negative finding was identified in the focused self assessment of MFLS training; Instructor evaluations contain little detail and there is a lack of SME evaluations. Evaluate how to improve instructor evaluations.</p>
<p><u>CR-PNP-2012- 02568</u></p> <p>Discovered: 6/11/2012 4:59:08 AM Originated: 6/11/2012 5:01:53 AM Originator: Smyth,Donald P Training Support Staff PNP</p> <p>Systems: Equipment:</p>	<p>Focused Self Assessment of the Maintenance First Line Supervisor (MFLS) identified the following Area for Improvement: An AFI was identified in the focused self assessment of MFLS training: There are two items in section 4 of ACAD 90-010 which are required to be completed prior to independent supervision (Phase I). These two topics are identified as phase two topics in EN-TQ-127 Att. 9.1. The topics are ?maintenance trending and analysis for root cause determination? (FLP-SUPV-RCAO) and ?provisions for the review, control, update, and use of vendor bulletins, reports, notices, and maintenance related regulatory requirements? (EN-TQ-127 STP-10), also FQC-MFLS-00001 does not contain the required interviews listed in ACAD 90-010 Appendix B (required for independent supervision).</p>

Comment Petitioners CR-PNP-2012-02564 was written because half the breakers in breaker panel P-6 are not labeled. The replacement workers need the labels to be able to check that the appropriate breakers are closed. The usual workers when which breaker was which.