



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 20, 2012

Vice President, Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 – BULLETIN 2011-01, "MITIGATING STRATEGIES" (TAC NO. ME6475)

Dear Sir or Madam:

On May 11, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 2011-01, "Mitigating Strategies" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML111250360), to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those that have permanently ceased operation and have certified that fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel. The purpose of the bulletin was to obtain a comprehensive verification that licensees' mitigating strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, spent fuel cooling, and containment following a large explosion or fire were compliant with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Section 50.54(hh)(2).


The bulletin required two sets of responses pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f). The first responses were due 30 days after issuance of the bulletin. Entergy Operations Inc., the licensee for the River Bend Station, Unit 1 (RBS, provided a response to the first set of questions by letter dated June 9, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11165A093). The second responses were due 60 days after issuance of the bulletin. By letter dated July 11, 2011, Entergy responded to this second set of questions. The letter dated July 11, 2011, contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (security-related) and has been withheld from public disclosure in its entirety. By letter dated November 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113210384), the NRC sent a request for additional information (RAI) on the second response. By letter dated December 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11355A153), Entergy responded to the RAI.

The NRC staff has reviewed the information submitted by the licensee and concludes that its response to the bulletin is acceptable. As summarized in the enclosure, the NRC staff verified that the licensee provided the information requested in the bulletin and no further information or actions under the bulletin are requested.

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If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at 301-415-1445 or via e-mail at Alan.Wang@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Alan Wang". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping tail on the letter "g".

Alan Wang, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch IV
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-458

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv

REVIEW OF LICENSEE'S RESPONSES TO NRC

BULLETIN 2011-01, "MITIGATING STRATEGIES"

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-458

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On May 11, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 2011-01, "Mitigating Strategies," (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML111250360) to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those that have permanently ceased operation and have certified that fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel. The bulletin required two sets of responses pursuant to the provisions of with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Section 50.54(f). The first responses were due 30 days after issuance of the bulletin. By letter dated June 9, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11165A093), Entergy Operations Inc. (Entergy, the licensee), provided its response for the River Bend Station, Unit 1 (RBS), to this first set of questions (first response). The second responses were due 60 days after issuance of the bulletin. By letter dated July 11, 2011, Entergy provided its response to this second set of questions. The letter dated July 11, 2011, contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (security-related) and has been withheld from public disclosure in its entirety. By letter dated November 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113210384), the NRC sent a request for additional information (RAI) on the second response. By letter dated December 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11355A153), Entergy responded to the RAI. As summarized below, the NRC staff has verified that Entergy provided the information requested in the bulletin for RBS.

2.0 BACKGROUND

On February 25, 2002, the NRC issued EA-02-026, "Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures" (ICM Order). Section B.5.b of the ICM Order required licensees to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire.

By letter dated August 2, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072110473), the NRC staff issued its safety evaluation (SE) to document the final disposition of information submitted by the licensee regarding Section B.5.b of the ICM Order. Along with the SE, the NRC staff issued a conforming license condition to incorporate the B.5.b mitigating strategies into the licensing basis. On March 27, 2009, the NRC issued 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) as a new rule, in order to capture the B.5.b mitigating strategies and related license conditions as regulatory requirements for both current and future licensees. At that time, licensee compliance with the conforming license conditions was sufficient to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2)

Enclosure

(74 FR 13926; March 27, 2009) so no further actions were required on the part of current licensees.

3.0 30-DAY REQUEST

In order to confirm continued compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), the bulletin requested that licensees address the following two questions within 30 days of issuing the bulletin:

1. Is the equipment necessary to execute the mitigating strategies, as described in your submittals to the NRC, available and capable of performing its intended function?
2. Are the guidance and strategies implemented capable of being executed considering the current configuration of your facility and current staffing and skill levels of the staff?

The NRC staff reviewed Entergy's first response for RBS to determine if it had adequately addressed these questions for RBS.

3.1 Question 1: Availability and Capability of Equipment

In its first response, Entergy confirmed that equipment it needs to execute the 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) mitigating strategies is available and capable of performing its intended function. The NRC staff verified that this confirmation covered equipment needed for each of the three phases of B.5.b mitigation strategies. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that Entergy has adequately responded to Question 1 for RBS.

3.2 Question 2: Guidance and Strategies Can Be Executed

In its first response, Entergy confirmed that the guidance and strategies it has implemented for 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) at RBS are capable of being executed considering the current facility configuration, staffing levels, and staff's skills. Since Entergy has considered its current facility configuration, staffing levels, and staff's skills, and confirmed that it can execute its implemented guidance and strategies, the NRC staff concludes that Entergy has adequately responded to Question 2 for RBS.

4.0 60-DAY REQUEST

The bulletin required a response to the following five questions within 60 days of issuing the bulletin:

1. Describe in detail the maintenance of equipment procured to support the strategies and guidance required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) in order to ensure that it is functional when needed.
2. Describe in detail the testing of equipment procured to support the strategies and guidance required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) in order to ensure that it will function when needed.

3. Describe in detail the controls for ensuring that the equipment is available when needed.
4. Describe in detail how configuration and guidance management is ensured so that strategies remain feasible.
5. Describe in detail how you ensure availability of offsite support.

The NRC staff reviewed Entergy's submittals to determine if it had adequately addressed these questions. This was accomplished by verifying that the submittals listed equipment, training, and offsite resources which were relied upon to make conclusions in the August 2, 2007, SE or are commonly needed to implement the mitigating strategies.

4.1 Questions 1 and 2: Maintenance and Testing of Equipment

Questions 1 and 2 of the 60-day request required licensees to describe in detail the maintenance and testing of equipment procured to support the strategies and guidance required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) in order to ensure that it is functional when needed. In its second response, Entergy listed the equipment used to support the 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) mitigating strategies at RBS which receives maintenance or testing. For each item, the licensee described the maintenance and testing performed, including the frequency and basis for the maintenance or testing activity.

The NRC staff verified that Entergy listed equipment that typically requires maintenance or testing at RBS which was relied upon to make conclusions in the SE or commonly needed to implement the mitigating strategies. In its second response, Entergy stated that the portable pump, portable power supply, hoses, and communications equipment receive maintenance or testing. In its RAI response, Entergy stated that it has taken action to develop a preventative maintenance task for its monitor nozzles. In its RAI response, Entergy described how it ensures there is sufficient fuel for the portable pump. Entergy also identified other items that support the mitigating strategies that receive maintenance or testing at RBS.

The NRC staff verified that Entergy described the process used for corrective actions and listed the testing performed to ensure that the strategies were initially feasible. Entergy stated in its second response that its 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, corrective action program is used to document equipment failure, establish priorities, and perform trending.

Based upon the above, the NRC staff concludes that Entergy has provided the information requested by Questions 1 and 2 for RBS.

4.2 Question 3: Controls on Equipment

Question 3 of the 60-day request required licensees to describe in detail the controls on equipment, such as inventory requirements, to ensure that the equipment is available when needed. A list of inventory deficiencies and associated corrective actions to prevent loss was also requested.

The NRC staff verified that Entergy described its process for ensuring that B.5.b equipment will be available when needed at RBS. In its second response, Entergy identified equipment included in its inventory, the inventory frequency, storage requirements, and items verified. Items verified include proper quantity of equipment. Entergy states that at the time of its second response there were no outstanding inventory deficiencies that would render the strategies not viable at RBS.

The NRC staff verified that Entergy inventoried equipment which was relied upon to make conclusions in the SE or commonly needed to implement the mitigating strategies. In its second response, Entergy stated that procured non-permanently installed B.5.b equipment is inventoried in accordance with station procedures. The NRC staff noted that most items listed are inventoried at least quarterly. The second response specifically stated that the following items are included in the inventory: fire brigade van, hoses, communications equipment, monitor nozzles, connectors, instruments, and tools. The portable pump and portable power supply were not listed as items which are inventoried, but these items receive periodic maintenance or testing which would ensure their availability. In its RAI response, Entergy clarified that its inventory does include firefighter turnout gear.

Based upon the above, the NRC staff concludes that Entergy has provided the information requested by Question 3 for RBS.

4.3 Question 4: Configuration and Guidance Management

Question 4 of the 60-day request required licensees to describe in detail how configuration and guidance management is assured so that the strategies remain feasible.

The NRC staff verified that Entergy described its measures to evaluate plant configuration changes for their effects on the mitigating strategies and to ensure its procedures are current at RBS. In its second response, Entergy stated that plant configuration changes are procedurally evaluated against the licensing basis, which includes the B.5.b mitigating strategies. Entergy states that the design change process requires a review of affected procedures and that procedure changes are validated to ensure that the B.5.b mitigating strategies remain viable.

The NRC staff verified that Entergy described measures it has taken to validate the procedures or guidelines developed to support the mitigating strategies at RBS. In its second response, Entergy identified testing in response to Question 2 that demonstrated the ability to execute some strategies. The licensee also stated, in part, that "initially, mitigating strategies were validated by walkdowns, engineering evaluations and/or table top reviews" and they were similarly revalidated in 2011.

The NRC staff verified that Entergy described the training program implemented in support of the mitigating strategies and how its effectiveness is evaluated. In its second response, Entergy identified the training provided to its operations personnel, emergency response organization key decision makers, and fire brigade. Entergy also identified the frequency with which each type of training is provided and the methods for training evaluating.

Based upon the above, the NRC staff concludes that Entergy has provided the information requested by Question 4 for RBS.

4.4 Question 5: Offsite Support

Question 5 of the 60-day request required licensees to describe in detail how offsite support availability is assured.

The NRC staff verified that Entergy listed the offsite organizations it relies upon for emergency response, including a description of agreements and related training. The NRC staff compared the list of offsite organizations that Entergy provided in its second response with the information relied upon to make conclusions in the SE. The NRC staff noted that agreements with Grand Gulf and Waterford nuclear plants were not listed in the second response. In its RAI response, Entergy clarified that Entergy's company practice, not formal agreements, would be followed to obtain support from Grand Gulf and Waterford following a severe event. Entergy stated that it maintains memoranda of understanding, letters of agreement, and contracts with the offsite organizations listed in its second response, which are reviewed annually, and that these agreements were current at the time of its second response. Entergy also described the training and site familiarization it provides to these offsite organizations. Entergy stated that it reviewed its corrective action program back to 2008 and found no issues involving lapsed agreements related to offsite support for B.5.b events.

Based upon the above, the NRC staff concludes that Entergy has provided the information requested by Question 5 for RBS.

5.0 CONCLUSION

As described above, the NRC staff has verified that Entergy has provided the information requested in Bulletin 2011-01 for RBS. Specifically, Entergy responded to each of the questions in the bulletin as requested. The NRC staff concludes that Entergy has completed all of the requirements of the bulletin and no further information or actions under the bulletin are needed for RBS.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at 301-415-1445 or via e-mail at Alan.Wang@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Alan Wang, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch IV
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-458

Enclosure:
As stated

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