

# **FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT**

## **CHAPTER 19**

### **PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT AND SEVERE ACCIDENT EVALUATION**

## 19.0 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT AND SEVERE ACCIDENT EVALUATION

This chapter of the U.S. EPR Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) is incorporated by reference with supplements as identified in the following sections.

The U.S. EPR FSAR includes the following COL Item in Section 19.0:

The COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will either confirm that the PRA in the design certification bounds the site-specific design information and any design changes or departures, or update the PRA to reflect the site-specific design information and any design changes or departures.

This COL Item is addressed as follows:

{There are no departures between the U.S. EPR standard design and the BBNPP site-specific design that would impact the PRA. Hence, the U.S. EPR PRA model can be used without modification as the BBNPP PRA model for the COL application. Site and plant parameters that could influence the U.S. EPR PRA results are addressed in COL FSAR Section 19.1 and the plant-specific items identified for BBNPP are adequately modeled in the U.S. EPR PRA.

Based on the evaluation performed, the U.S. EPR PRA:

- ◆ Bounds or sufficiently captures site and plant parameters, and
- ◆ The site and plant parameters do not have a significant impact on the PRA results and insights.

Therefore, it is not necessary to make any changes to the U.S. EPR PRA when considering specific BBNPP site and plant parameters.}

## 19.1 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT

This section of the U.S. EPR FSAR is incorporated by reference with the following supplements.

### 19.1.1 Uses and Application of the PRA

#### 19.1.1.1 Design Phase

The U.S. EPR FSAR includes the following COL Item in Section 19.1.1.1:

A COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will describe the uses of PRA in support of site-specific design programs and processes during the design phase.

This COL Item is addressed as follows:

{No additional site-specific PRA-related design activities are anticipated for BBNPP.} The adequacy of the PRA will be assessed relative to any future risk-informed application during the design phase.

The PRA maintenance and update activities described in Section 19.1.2.4.1 will be performed as needed during the design phase.

#### 19.1.1.2 Combined License Application Phase

The U.S. EPR FSAR includes the following COL Item in Section 19.1.1.2:

A COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will describe the uses of PRA in support of licensee programs and identify and describe risk-informed applications being implemented during the combined license application phase.

This COL Item is addressed as follows:

PRA uses in the combined license application phase include:

- ◆ identification of risk-informed safety insights associated with the design and operation.
- ◆ provide PRA importance measures for input to the Reliability Assurance Program (RAP).
- ◆ gain risk insights associated with establishing allowed outage times for certain equipment technical specifications.
- ◆ input to the procedure development process/human factors.

The PRA is used to perform a conservative, quantitative screening of airplane hazard and tornado hazard in the assessment of external events. There are no additional risk-informed applications currently proposed. The adequacy of the PRA will be assessed relative to any future risk-informed application during the Combined License Application Phase.

#### 19.1.1.3 Construction Phase

The U.S. EPR FSAR includes the following COL Item in Section 19.1.1.3:

A COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will describe the uses of PRA in support of licensee programs and identify and describe risk-informed applications being implemented during the construction phase.

This COL Item is addressed as follows:

{No specific PRA uses are anticipated during the construction phase. There are no risk-informed applications currently proposed.} The adequacy of the PRA will be assessed relative to any future risk-informed application during the construction phase.

#### **19.1.1.4 Operational Phase**

The U.S. EPR FSAR includes the following COL Item in Section 19.1.1.4:

A COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will describe the uses of PRA in support of licensee programs and identify and describe risk-informed applications being implemented during the operational phase.

This COL Item is addressed as follows:

The PRA risk insights will be used to support typical licensee programs such as:

- ◆ the Significance Determination Process (SDP).
- ◆ Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI).
- ◆ 10 CFR 50.65 Maintenance Rule and associated (a)(4) determinations.

{There are no additional risk-informed applications currently proposed for BBNPP.}

### **19.1.2 Quality of PRA**

No departures or supplements.

#### **19.1.2.1 PRA Scope**

No departures or supplements.

#### **19.1.2.2 PRA Level of Detail**

The U.S. EPR FSAR includes the following COL Item in Section 19.1.2.2:

A COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will review as-designed and as-built information and conduct walk-downs as necessary to confirm that the assumptions used in the PRA, including PRA inputs to RAP and severe accident mitigation design alternatives (SAMDA), remain valid with respect to internal events, internal flooding and fire events (routings and locations of pipe, cable and conduit), and human reliability analyses (HRA) (i.e., development of operating procedures, emergency operating procedures and severe accident management guidelines and training), external events including PRA-based seismic margins, high confidence, low probability of failure (HCLPF) fragilities, and low power shutdown (LPSD) procedures.

This COL Item is addressed as follows:

As-designed and as-built information will be reviewed, and walk-downs will be performed, as necessary, to confirm that the assumptions used in the PRA, including design certification related PRA assumptions found in U.S. EPR FSAR Table 19.1-109 and PRA inputs to RAP and SAMDA, remain valid with respect to internal events, internal flooding and fire events (routings and locations of pipe, cable and conduit), and HRA (i.e., development of operating procedures, emergency operating procedures and severe accident management guidelines and training), external events including PRA-based seismic margins, HCLPF fragilities, and LPSD procedures. This shall be performed prior to fuel load.

### **19.1.2.3 PRA Technical Adequacy**

The U.S. EPR FSAR includes the following COL Item in Section 19.1.2.3:

A COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will conduct a peer review of the PRA relative to the ASME PRA Standard prior to use of the PRA to support risk-informed applications or before fuel load.

This COL Item is addressed as follows:

A peer review of the PRA relative to the ASME PRA Standard shall be performed prior to use of the PRA to support risk-informed applications or before initial fuel load.

### **19.1.2.4 PRA Maintenance and Upgrade**

No departures or supplements.

#### **19.1.2.4.1 Description of PRA Maintenance and Upgrade Program**

The U.S. EPR FSAR includes the following COL Item in Section 19.1.2.4.1:

A COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will describe the applicant's PRA maintenance and upgrade program.

This COL Item is addressed as follows:

A PRA Maintenance and Update program was included in the U.S. EPR FSAR. The information contained in this section is a supplement to that program to support the additional needs of an operating nuclear plant.

The PRA is treated as a living document. The PRA Configuration Control Program maintains (updates) or upgrades the PRA in the manner prescribed by ASME RA-Sc-2007, "Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications" (ASME, 2007) and as clarified by Regulatory Guide 1.200 (NRC, 2007a). Thus:

- ◆ Not later than the date of initial fuel loading, the site specific PRA will be upgraded to contain Level 1 and Level 2 analyses, and to include those events and modes for which NRC-endorsed consensus standards on PRA existed one year prior to scheduled fuel loading.
- ◆ The PRA will be upgraded every four years until permanent cessation of operations. The upgraded PRA will include initiating events and modes of operation contained in NRC-endorsed consensus standards in effect one year prior to each upgrade.

- ◆ Not later than the date on which a site specific application for a renewed license is submitted, the PRA will be upgraded to cover all modes and all initiating events.

The key PRA terms "Maintenance" and "Upgrade" are defined as follows:

- ◆ **PRA Maintenance:** Update of PRA models to reflect plant changes such as design modifications, procedure changes, or plant performance (data).
- ◆ **PRA Upgrade:** Incorporation into a PRA system of a new PRA methodology or a significant change in PRA scope or capability. This could include, for instance, items such as a new human error analysis methodology, new data update method, new approach to quantification or truncation, or new treatment of common cause failure.

Industry peer review will be performed for the PRA upgrades, as they are defined above. Appendix A of ASME RA-Sc-2007 (ASME, 2007) provides example revisions to increase clarity on what constitutes an upgrade, versus an update and, therefore, what requires a peer review. When assessing a need for a peer review, consideration will also be given to scope or number of PRA maintenance activities performed. Although individual changes to a PRA model may be considered PRA maintenance activities, the integrated nature of several changes may make a peer review desirable. This is because multiple PRA maintenance activities can, over time, lead to considerable changes in the PRA insights (e.g., relative risk importance of SSCs), and a periodic peer review might be prudent.

Peer reviews will be performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.200 (NRC, 2007a), which endorses NEI 00-02, "Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Peer Review Process Guidance" (NEI, 2006), with exceptions. Peer review findings and observations using this process will indicate what improvements are needed to raise the grade given for each PRA technical element. Review findings and observations will be dispositioned based on their importance.

### 19.1.3 Special Design/Operational Features

No departures or supplements.

### 19.1.4 Safety Insights from the Internal Events PRA for Operations at Power

#### 19.1.4.1 Level 1 Internal Events PRA for Operations at Power

{Two BBNPP site-specific items have been identified as having the potential to affect the PRA model:

- ◆ Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) frequency and duration
- ◆ Balance of plant systems (e.g., Circulating Water System, Auxiliary Cooling Water System, Normal Heat Sink)

These items are evaluated as follows for potential deviations from the U.S. EPR FSAR.

#### Loss of Offsite Power

LOOP frequencies used in the U.S. EPR PRA model are consistent with NUREG/CR-6890 guidelines (NRC, 2005). The LOOP frequency value used in the U.S. EPR PRA model is 1.9E-02/yr, based on the generic USA LOOP frequency value of 3.6E-02/yr from NUREG/CR-6890, modified by crediting U.S. EPR full load rejection capability for grid-related events and by excluding consequential LOOP events (consequential LOOP is treated separately in the PRA model).

The base value for LOOP frequency at the SSES Units 1 and 2 site from NUREG/CR-6890 is approximately  $2.9\text{E-}02/\text{yr}$ . A composite LOOP frequency is calculated by using the U.S. EPR FSAR PRA-generated frequency values for plant- and switchyard-centered LOOP events, and site-specific values for weather- and grid-centered LOOP events. This results in a LOOP event frequency (adjusted for consequential LOOP and full load rejection) of approximately  $1.7\text{E-}02/\text{yr}$  for BBNPP. This LOOP event frequency is smaller than the value used in the U.S. EPR PRA model ( $1.9\text{E-}02/\text{yr}$ ); therefore the LOOP event frequency for BBNPP is bounded by the value in the U.S. EPR FSAR PRA model. In general, given that the generic LOOP frequency for the USA is used in the U.S. EPR PRA, this frequency is likely to be conservative for advanced plants because better plant and switchyard performances are expected. Generic U.S. data is also considered applicable for LOOP nonrecovery values, and, consequential LOOP values.

The site-specific LOOP nonrecovery probabilities are as follows:

- ◆ 1-Hour LOOP nonrecovery probability of 0.516 compared with a U.S. EPR value of 0.530
- ◆ 2-Hour LOOP nonrecovery probability of 0.307 compared with a U.S. EPR value of 0.318
- ◆ 24-Hour LOOP and nonrecovery probability of  $3.95\text{E-}05$  compared with a U.S. EPR value of  $4.8\text{E-}05$

The use of U.S. EPR data for LOOP nonrecovery probabilities bounds BBNPP site-specific values and the difference does not have a significant impact on the PRA results.

For the consequential LOOP, there is limited industry data. The U.S. EPR FSAR analysis used generic data from NUREG/CR-6890. This data is applicable to BBNPP.

A summary of LOOP related conclusions is given below:

- ◆ The U.S. EPR PRA Loss of Offsite Power frequency bounds the BBNPP site-specific frequency.
- ◆ The U.S. EPR PRA Loss of Offsite Power nonrecovery probabilities bound BBNPP site-specific values.
- ◆ The U.S. EPR PRA consequential LOOP probabilities do not need to be changed for BBNPP because they are not site dependent (they are initiating event dependent).

#### Site-Specific Balance of Plant Systems

Site-specific balance of plant (BOP) systems that are evaluated for potential site specific deviations are the Circulating Water System (CWS), the Closed Cooling Water System (CLCWS), the Auxiliary Cooling Water System (ACWS) and the Normal Heat Sink (NHS).

These site-specific systems were evaluated for differences between the U.S. EPR PRA assumptions and the BBNPP site-specific design. It was concluded that the U.S. EPR PRA inputs for the NHS, CWS, CLCWS, and ACWS provide a reasonable and conservative representation of these systems for BBNPP. This conclusion is based on the following:

- ◆ Loss of Balance of Plant" initiating event is modeled by the fault tree for the BOP support systems. For "Loss of Condenser" and "Loss of Main Feedwater" initiating events the generic initiating event frequencies are used, based on current industry

experience. The advanced plants are expected to perform better. Also, the modeling of both loss of main feedwater (generic data) and loss of balance of plant (fault tree) initiating events is conservative since the loss of main feedwater contribution is double-counted (due to a loss of the BOP supporting systems).

- ◆ The NHS and the CWS are modeled in the U.S. EPR PRA as one underdeveloped event, with scope that includes failures of:
  - ◆ the NHS
  - ◆ the CWS ability to provide cooling to the Main Condenser and to the ACWS system.

This undeveloped event has a failure frequency of 1.0E-02 per year and a failure probability of 2.8E-05 in a 24-hour mission time. These numbers are based on generic industry data from NUREG/CR-6928 (NRC,2007e) and NUREG/CR-5750 (NRC, 1999). These NUREGs give a frequency of failure of 1.3E-02 per year. The use of 1.0E-02 per year is considered reasonable for the following reasons:

- ◆ the value of 1.3E-02 per year included events such as screen plugging, not likely in a closed system, as is used in BBNPP
- ◆ Loss of Auxiliary Cooling Water events, to which failures of the CWS and NHS contribute, are also included within the Loss of Main Feedwater initiating event and the Loss of Condenser initiating event, multiple-counting some events

The values used and system characteristics used for the NHS and CWS are generic and/or applicable to BBNPP.

- ◆ In addition, the U.S. EPR PRA unavailability of the NHS is estimated based on the unavailability of the safety UHS that requires operation of one of two cooling fans. This unavailability is expected to bound the unavailability for the BBNPP NHS that uses natural draft cooling towers.
- ◆ The U.S. EPR PRA model also does not credit the CWS pumps to cool ACWS loads. BBNPP has the ability to utilize either the CWS pumps or the ACWS pumps to supply auxiliary cooling water flow to turbine building equipment. Therefore, the ACWS unavailability in the U.S. EPR PRA is expected to bound the unavailability for the BBNPP ACWS.
- ◆ The Fussell-Vesely importance measures for the evaluated BOP SSCs are low (<0.01%). Based on these importance measures, the applicable U.S. EPR PRA inputs and assumptions would not have a significant impact on the BBNPP PRA results and insights.

#### Conclusions for Level 1 Internal Events PRA for Operations at Power

Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the U.S. EPR PRA for Level 1 internal events at power is applicable and bounding for the BBNPP site. The site and site-specific parameters do not have a significant impact on the PRA results and insights. Therefore, no changes to the U.S. EPR Level 1 internal events PRA are necessary to accommodate specific BBNPP site and plant parameters.



#### **19.1.4.2 Level 2 Internal Events PRA for Operations at Power**

The U.S. EPR FSAR Section 19.1.4.2 is incorporated by reference with the following supplemental information.

The discussion presented in Section 19.1.4.1 is also applicable to the U.S. EPR PRA for Level 2 internal events at power because Level 1 and Level 2 event trees are linked together and the initiating events and the systems are merged. The Level 2 PRA also considers two additional LOOP long term recovery probabilities. The conclusions are the same as in the preceding section.

The U.S. EPR PRA for Level 2 internal events at power is applicable and bounding for BBNPP. The site and site-specific parameters do not have a significant impact on the PRA results and insights. Therefore, no changes to the U.S. EPR Level 2 internal events PRA are necessary when considering specific BBNPP site and plant parameters.}

### **19.1.5 Safety Insights from the External Events PRA for Operations at Power**

#### **19.1.5.1 Seismic Risk Evaluation**

No departures or supplements.

##### **19.1.5.1.1 Description of the Seismic Risk Evaluation**

###### **19.1.5.1.1.1 Methodology**

No departures or supplements.

###### **19.1.5.1.1.2 Seismic Hazard Input**

{Section 3.7 discusses the Ground Motion Response Spectra (GMRS). The GMRS is shown in Figures 3.7-1 and 3.7-2. The PRA-based seismic margin assessment follows the guidance in SECY 93-087 and demonstrates that there is a minimum seismic margin of 1.67 times the GMRS for BBNPP. The 1.67 times the GMRS is referred to as seismic margin earthquake (SME) in the combined license.}

###### **19.1.5.1.1.3 Seismic Fragility Evaluation**

No departures or supplements.

###### **19.1.5.1.1.4 Systems and Accident Sequence Analysis**

No departures or supplements.

###### **19.1.5.1.1.5 HCLPF Sequence Assessment**

No departures or supplements.

##### **19.1.5.1.2 Results from the Seismic Risk Evaluation**

###### **19.1.5.1.2.1 Risk Metrics**

No departures or supplements.

###### **19.1.5.1.2.2 Significant Initiating Events and Sequences**

No departures or supplements.

### 19.1.5.1.2.3 Significant Functions, SSCs, and Operator Actions

No departures or supplements.

### 19.1.5.1.2.4 Key Assumptions and Insights

The U.S. EPR FSAR includes the following COL Item in Section 19.1.5.1.2.4:

A COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will confirm that the U.S. EPR PRA-based seismic margin assessment is bounding for their specific site, and will update it to include site-specific SSC and soil effects (including sliding, overturning, liquefaction, and slope failure).

This COL Item is addressed as follows:

The PRA-based seismic margins assessment performed for the U.S. EPR FSAR is based on the assumption that the U.S. EPR is designed using the EUR-based certified seismic design response spectra (CSDRS) anchored to a peak ground acceleration (PGA) of 0.3g for selected generic soil profiles. The seismic margins assessment for the U.S. EPR FSAR used CSDRS times 1.67 to define the targeted seismic margin. The seismic margins assessment for the U.S. EPR FSAR remains valid if it can be demonstrated that the U.S. EPR FSAR seismic design parameters bound those for the site-specific seismic characteristics, including the ground motion response spectra (GMRS) and site-specific soil profiles.

{A comparison of the GMRS versus the CSDRS is provided in Section 3.7.1. The BBNPP horizontal GMRS is significantly below the envelope of EUR-S, EUR-M and EUR-H ground motion for frequencies less than about 21 Hz. The BBNPP horizontal GMRS is above the envelope of the EUR ground motions for frequencies greater than about 21 Hz. In the vertical direction, the BBNPP final GMRS exceeds the EUR design envelope for frequencies greater than about 23 Hz. The horizontal and vertical GMRS have peak ground acceleration (PGA) values of about 0.21g and 0.19g, respectively.

Based on a similar evaluation of these low-frequency and high-frequency exceedances performed for the BBNPP site, it is expected that the BBNPP specific seismic margin evaluation for the U.S. EPR will demonstrate compliance with the requirement of plant HCLPF at least as great as 1.67 times the GMRS. It is also expected that these low-frequency and high-frequency exceedances will not significantly impact PRA results and insights. This will be verified using as-designed and as-built information in accordance with the COL Item 19.1-9 prior to fuel load.}

### 19.1.5.1.2.5 Sensitivities and Uncertainties

No departures or supplements.

### 19.1.5.2 Internal Flooding Risk Evaluation

{The U.S. EPR FSAR Section 19.1.5.2 is incorporated by reference with the following supplemental information. Design-specific and site-specific systems were considered as flood sources in the PRA Internal Flooding analysis described in the U.S. EPR FSAR. The flooding frequency from design-specific systems was derived based on the available design information.

The flooding frequency from site-specific systems such as the Circulating Water System, the Closed Cooling Water System and the Auxiliary Cooling Water System was not derived using design information. Instead the U.S. EPR FSAR internal flooding frequency for the turbine

building is based on a conservative generic frequency, which is judged to include contributions from all of these site-specific systems. Therefore the U.S. EPR FSAR internal flooding PRA is applicable for BBNPP.}

### **19.1.5.3 Internal Fires Risk Evaluation**

No departures or supplements.

### **19.1.5.4 Other External Risk Evaluations**

The U.S. EPR FSAR includes the following COL Item in Section 19.1.5.4:

A COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will perform the site-specific screening analysis and the site specific risk analysis for external events applicable to their site.

This COL Item is addressed as follows:

The U.S. EPR FSAR scope of external event screening includes a high level assessment of high winds and tornadoes, external flooding and external fires.

{A progressive screening approach using the guidance in ANSI/ANS-58.21-2007 (ANSI, 2007) was applied. This document provides a standard for the treatment of external events in PRA, referencing NUREG-1407 (NRC, 1991) and NUREG-0800 (NRC, 2007b). The quantitative screening threshold has been lowered to 1.0E-07/yr using demonstrably conservative analysis. An external event that meets the ANSI/ANS-58-21-2007 screening criteria, where the CDF threshold is adjusted to 1.0E-07/yr using demonstrably conservative analysis, is not considered to be a significant risk and is screened from further consideration. All of the external events listed in Appendix A of ANSI/ANS-58.21-2007 (ANSI, 2007) have been addressed.

The plant design bases for external events are compared against ANSI/ANS-58.21-2007 and NUREG-0800 screening criteria. If the event cannot be qualitatively screened, a quantitative PRA assessment is performed to assess the risk posed by that external event against quantitative screening criteria.

As defined in the ANSI/ANS-58.21-2007, Table 19.1-1 provides a list of all external events considered. Also provided is the reason for screening each event or the relevant section where screening is discussed.

#### **19.1.5.4.1 High Winds and Tornado Risk Evaluation**

The risks posed by high winds, tornado wind loads and tornado missiles events at the BBNPP site on U.S. EPR FSAR structures were evaluated using ANSI/ANS-58.21-2007 (ANSI, 2007) and NUREG-0800 (NRC, 2007b) screening criteria.

A screening evaluation was performed for high winds, tornadoes and tornado missile as defined in ANSI/ANS-58.21-2007. Additionally a conservative quantitative evaluation was performed for tornadoes and tornado missiles. Screening and quantitative evaluations are summarized below.

### **Screening Evaluation**

#### High Wind Loads

The BBNPP safety-related structures are designed to withstand high wind load characteristics as specified in NUREG-0800, Section 3.3.1. The SRP acceptance criteria for high winds specify that the design velocity pressure for safety-related structures must be greater than or equal to the velocity pressure corresponding to the speed of the 100-year return period 3-second wind gust. The design basis wind speed for safety-related structures is 145 mph (65 m/sec) in open terrain with a 50-year mean recurrence interval. This design wind is increased by an importance factor of 1.07 to obtain a 100-year mean recurrence interval.

As documented in FSAR Section 2.3.1.2.2.15, the 50 year return period 3-second wind gust for the Bell Bend NPP site is 90 mph (40 m/sec). This is significantly lower than the design basis wind speed for safety-related structures of 145 mph (65 m/sec). Therefore, all BBNPP safety-related structures satisfy the SRP acceptance criteria for high winds. High wind loads can be screened for BBNPP.

Non safety-related structures design wind speed will comply with local building codes, including ASCE/SEI 7-05 (ASCE, 2007), which stipulates that structures shall be designed for the 50 year return period wind gust of 90 mph (40 m/sec) for BBNPP with an importance factor of 1.15. This is equivalent to designing non-safety structures for the local 100-year return period wind gust.

Non safety-related structures that house SSCs modeled in the BBNPP PRA include:

- ◆ Switchyard and 500kV GIS Switchyard Building
- ◆ Auxiliary Transformer Area
- ◆ Switchgear Building
- ◆ Turbine Building
- ◆ Nuclear Auxiliary Building
- ◆ CWS Cooling Tower, CWS Pumphouse, and BBNPP Intake Structure
- ◆ Structure for Demineralized Water Tanks

A bounding evaluation of the plant risk associated with the loss of those structures is provided below for a tornado scenario and in the Quantitative Evaluation section.

#### Tornado Wind Loads

The U.S. EPR safety-related structures are designed to meet the design-basis tornado wind characteristics of Tornado Intensity Region I as specified in NUREG-0800, Section 3.3.2. Tornado Intensity Region 1 (Central U.S.) is the most limiting for tornado wind loads and is characterized by a maximum tornado wind speed of 230 mph (103 m/sec), (184 mph (82 m/sec) maximum rotational speed, 46 mph (21 m/sec) maximum translational speed). Therefore, all U.S. EPR safety-related structures satisfy the SRP acceptance criteria for tornadoes at the BBNPP site. Tornado wind loads can be screened for BBNPP.

#### Tornado Missiles

The U.S. EPR safety-related structures are designed to withstand the tornado missile loads of Tornado Intensity Region I. Region I (Central U.S.), as defined in Reg. Guide 1.76 (NRC, 2007c) is

the most limiting for tornado missiles; therefore, the U.S. EPR satisfies the SRP acceptance criteria for the BBNPP site.

A more detailed analysis of the risk to an U.S. EPR at the BBNPP site is performed in the Quantitative Evaluation section below in order to assess the risk posed by the effect of tornadoes and tornado missiles on non-safety structures.

### **Quantitative Evaluation**

A more detailed analysis was performed to evaluate plant risk as a result of tornado impact on non-safety-related structures. The detailed analysis considers a bounding tornado event plant impact scenario and tornado event frequency. The screening core damage frequency associated with the bounding scenario is the plant impact (conditional core damage probability) multiplied by the event frequency.

Safety-related structures are screened from further evaluation based on comparison of the design to NUREG-0800 criteria. Therefore, it is assumed that a tornado event will not affect safety-related structures or associated systems and components. A bounding plant impact scenario is used to develop risk insights associated with a tornado wind loading on non-safety-related BBNPP plant structures, which contain systems and components credited in the PRA model. The following non-safety-related structures of the BBNPP plant and associated systems and components are considered in the bounding impact scenario.

1. Switchyard, 500 kV GIS Switchyard Building and Auxiliary Transformer Area - contain components related to offsite power. Unrecoverable loss of offsite power (LOOP) event is assumed in the bounding scenario.
2. Switchgear Building - contains the two station black-out diesel generators (SBO DG), non-1E switchgear equipment, load centers, motor control centers and 12-hour uninterruptible power supply system. Failure of both SBO DGs and failure of all non-1E electrical buses and buses powered by the 12-hour uninterruptible power supply system is assumed in the bounding scenario.
3. Turbine Building, CWS Cooling Tower, CWS Pumphouse, and BBNPP Intake Structure - contains systems and components associated with secondary heat removal, for example, main condenser and feedwater. The risk impact from a loss of these locations is enveloped by the loss of the switchgear building.
4. Nuclear Auxiliary Building - contains the operational chilled water system (OCWS). Note - because of its proximity to safety-related structures, the Nuclear Auxiliary Building is a reinforced concrete structure and designed for tornado loading per Regulatory Guide 1.76 (NRC, 2007c). Therefore, the plant impact scenario assumes that this structure and associated equipment are not affected by the postulated tornado event.
5. Structure for Demineralized Water Tanks – the demineralized water system provides makeup to the feedwater storage tanks. The risk impact from a loss of this location is enveloped by the loss of the switchgear building.

The BBNPP FSAR Level 1 PRA LOOP event tree model is used to calculate the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) of this scenario. Based on the above scenario, the CCDP is approximately  $8.8E-04$ . The dominant CCDP sequence involves common cause failure of all four emergency diesel generators (EDGs), resulting in a station blackout event.

NUREG/CR-4461, Tornado Climatology of the Contiguous United States (NRC, 2007d) is used to determine the tornado strike frequency. The tornado strike frequency is the likelihood that a tornado will strike a given point or structure on an annual basis. It is calculated as the sum of two terms: (1) point structure probability (which is calculated based on recorded tornado dimensions within a certain area) and (2) the life-line term (which is based on the dimensions of the plant-specific target structure).

As defined in FSAR Table 2.1.1-1, the geographical coordinates of the BBNPP site are (41°05' N, 76°10' W). The point structure probability, life-line term, and the total strike probability are calculated for the local 2° square box containing the BBNPP site (40-42° N, 75-77° W). The characteristic dimension used to calculate the plant-specific life-line term is the Turbine Building length, assumed to be 300 ft (91 m). Because the point structure probability dominates the total strike probability for structures of this general size, the total strike probability is not sensitive to the deviations within the range of anticipated Turbine Building lengths.

Based on the NUREG/CR-4461 information, the BBNPP site-specific strike frequency of a tornado with a wind speed greater than 96 mph (43 m/sec) (the design wind velocity for non-safety related structures at BBNPP) is determined as approximately 9E-05/yr .

The screening core damage frequency associated with the bounding scenario is the plant impact CCDP (8.8E-04) multiplied by the event frequency (9E-05/yr). The core damage frequency (CDF) for this scenario is approximately 8E-08/yr . As described in Section 19.1.5.4, external events can be screened if the core damage frequency, calculated using a demonstrably conservative analysis, has a CDF less than 1.0E-7/yr.

The bounding tornado strike scenario defined and quantified above conservatively assumes failure of all non-safety-related structures of the plant. The tornado strike scenario is judged bounding for all credible tornado and tornado missile events. Therefore, tornado missile effect on unprotected plant structures is not evaluated further. This is demonstrably conservative analysis due to:

- ◆ Bounding consequence assumptions, including no credit is taken for separation of buildings. It is unlikely that all structures assumed to fail would fail.
- ◆ No credit for operational precautions taken when severe weather is anticipated.

It is concluded that BBNPP satisfies the screening criteria set forth in NUREG-0800, RG 1.76, and, ANSI/ANS 58.21-2007. High winds can be screened directly based on the BBNPP design basis. A quantitative PRA analysis was performed to evaluate the risk associated with tornadoes (including tornado missiles). The results of this demonstrably conservative analysis show that the contribution to CDF from tornado winds and tornado generated missiles is less than 1.0E-07/yr. As a result, high winds, tornadoes and tornado missiles can be screened from the PRA for BBNPP.

#### **19.1.5.4.2 External Flooding Evaluation**

Section 2.4.3 through Section 2.4.7 provide an evaluation of the different flooding conditions considered for the BBNPP site, as well as the U.S. EPR FSAR's protection features against those conditions. The flooding conditions include the probable maximum flood (PMF) on streams and rivers, potential dam failures, probable maximum surge and seiche flooding, probable

maximum tsunami and ice effect flooding. Maximum flooding levels due to local intense precipitation are also addressed.

The results of the probable maximum flooding (PMF) analysis of local streams (i.e., Walker Run, Unnamed Tributary No. 1 and Unnamed Tributary No. 2) near the BBNPP site indicate a maximum PMF water surface elevation of 675.69 feet (204.51 m) North American Vertical Datum, 1988 (NAVD 88) at cross section 12764.15 along Walker Run, 672.34 feet (204.93 m) NAVD 88 at cross section 1614.092 along Unnamed Tributary No.1, and 715.03 feet (217.94 m) NAVD 88 at cross section 1645.505 along Unnamed Tributary No. 2 in the vicinity of the BBNPP site. The finished plant grade elevation for BBNPP will be 719 feet NAVD 88. The maximum estimated water surface elevations resulting from all design basis flood considerations, as discussed in FSAR Section 2.4.2 through Section 2.4.7, are below the entrance and grade slab elevations for the power block safety-related facilities. Therefore, flood protection measures are not required for the BBNPP power block area.

The BBNPP Intake Structure is the only SSC modeled in the PRA which may not be located above PMP grade. Failure of the Normal Heat Sink (NHS) would cause a Loss of Balance of Plant (loss of Closed Cooling Water or Auxiliary Cooling Water). Assuming that external flooding occurs that causes the NHS to fail, thereby causing a Loss of Balance of Plant, the conditional core damage probability would be  $1.2\text{E}-07$  per year. Combined with a potential flood hazard frequency, this is likely to result in a CDF of less than  $1.0\text{E}-08$  per year.

This remains a demonstrably conservative analysis because the frequency of external floods that cause a Loss of Balance of Plant are low and it is likely that sufficient time would be available for a controlled shutdown.

Therefore, the applicable SRP screening criteria in NUREG-0800, SRP Section 2.4.10 (NRC, 2007b), are met for the different types of external flooding events. As described in Section 19.1.5.4, external events can be screened if the core damage frequency, calculated using a demonstrably conservative analysis, has a CDF less than  $1.0\text{E}-7/\text{yr}$ . Therefore, external flooding can be screened for BBNPP.

#### **19.1.5.4.3 External Fire Evaluation**

As described in Section 2.2.3.1.4, the cleared zones surrounding BBNPP are of sufficient size to afford substantial protection in the event of a fire, and it is not expected that there would be any hazardous effects from fires or heat fluxes associated with wild fires, fires in adjacent industrial plants or from onsite storage facilities.

In addition, the impact of external smoke on the habitability of the main control room is considered in the design of the control room envelope (CRE) and the control room air conditioning system (CRACS) (see Section 6.4 and Section 9.4). The CRE has isolation capability in the event of external fire/smoke and the CRACS can be operated in full recirculation mode. The CRACS maintains the control room envelop at a positive pressure to prevent uncontrolled, unfiltered in-leakage during normal and accident conditions. The CRACS can support occupancy for eight people in the MCR and associated rooms for 70 hours without outside makeup air. Portable self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) are also available for use by the control room operators.

Therefore, an external fire will not have an adverse impact on the operation of BBNPP. Therefore external fire events can be screened per NUREG-0800, Section 2.2.3.

#### 19.1.5.4.4 Aircraft Crash Hazard Risk Evaluation

This section is added as a supplement to the U.S. EPR FSAR.

The risk posed by random airplane crash events to BBNPP are evaluated using ANSI/ANS-58.21-2007 and NUREG-0800 screening criteria. The location of the site with respect to airports, military training routes and airways was evaluated against the screening criteria presented in NUREG-0800, Section 3.5.1.6. A quantitative, demonstrably conservative screening analysis was also performed in order to screen the aircraft crash hazard for BBNPP.

##### Screening Analysis for Airplane Crash

NUREG-0800, Section 3.5.1.6 acceptance criteria for airplane crash hazard stipulates that the frequency of an event causing radiological consequences greater than the 10 CFR 100 (CFR, 2007) exposure guidelines should be less than 1.0E-07/yr. This acceptance criterion can be met provided that all of the following conditions exist:

- ◆ The plant-to-airport distance  $D$  is between 5 and 10 statute miles (8 and 16 km), and the projected annual number of operations is less than the numerical value of  $500 D^2$ .
- ◆ The plant is at least 5 statute miles (8 km) from the nearest edge of military training routes, including low-level training routes, except for those military training routes associated with usage greater than 1000 flights per year, or where activities (such as practice bombing) may create an unusual stress situation.
- ◆ The plant is at least 2 statute miles (3.2 km) from the nearest edge of a Federal airway, holding pattern, or approach pattern.

The following information is specific to the BBNPP site and can be found in Section 2.2.2:

- ◆ There are no public airports within 10 mi (16 km) of the BBNPP midpoint. Airports beyond 10 mi (16 km) from the BBNPP site midpoint were evaluated and determined to meet NUREG-0800 acceptance criteria. Small private airports exist within 10 mi (16 km) of the plant. These airports support only sporadic operations and are judged not to exceed the NUREG-0800 threshold.
- ◆ There are no military training routes within 5 mi (8 km) of the BBNPP site midpoint.
- ◆ The centerline of Airway V106 is 2.1 nautical miles (2.4 mi (3.9 km)) southeast of the BBNPP midpoint and the centerline of Airway V499 is about 2.7 nautical miles (3.1 mi (5.0 km)) west of the BBNPP midpoint. The width of a federal airway is typically 8 nautical miles (9.2 mi (14.8 km)), extending 4 nautical miles (4.6 mi (7.4 km)) on each side of the centerline. When airway width is considered, the edge of both those airways is closer to the plant than the two statute miles criterion for screening. Therefore this screening criterion from NUREG-0800 is not met and more analysis is required.

##### Detailed Airplane Crash Assessment

As discussed in Section 3.5.1.6 BBNPP employs a geographical separation or residence within shielded buildings to provide a minimum number of SSCs to achieve and maintain the plant in cold shutdown and prevent damage to fuel in the spent fuel pool following an aircraft hazard (ACH). Specifically, sufficient geographical separation between redundant or diverse SSCs limits the extent of damage from an ACH. Similarly, placing SSCs within shield buildings designed to



prevent penetration by aircraft provides protection of redundant or diverse SSCs to achieve and maintain the plant in cold shutdown and prevent damage to fuel in the spent fuel pool.

Given the BBNPP building design, a quantitative assessment of aircraft hazard was performed for various random aircraft hazard scenarios using the BBNPP PRA. This analysis was performed using the following steps:

1. Develop target sets based on similar building structural strength (shielded or non-shielded), site location and expected plant response.
2. Calculate the estimated impact frequency (initiating event frequency) for each target set based on representative dimensions of the buildings within each target set.
3. Define aircraft crash scenarios based on the target sets defined in 1) and on the frequency defined in 2).
4. Evaluate the aircraft crash scenarios using a bounding PRA analysis in order to obtain a core damage (or a release) frequency estimate for each scenario.

Target sets were screened when it was judged that one of the following conditions applies:

- ◆ a crash into the target set would not result in damages to SSCs modeled in the PRA (e.g., shielded buildings)
- ◆ the worst consequences of a crash into the target set would be enveloped by an initiating event already modeled in the PRA, and the frequency of this initiating event in several orders of magnitude higher than the postulated airplane crash frequency (e.g., a crash into the Normal Heat Sink is enveloped by the Loss of Balance of Plant initiating event).

Target sets that were retained for the analysis are: (1) Safeguard Building 1 (or 4) and (2) Turbine and Switchgear Building. Aircraft crash frequencies into these two target sets are estimated using the methodology of DOE Standard 3014-2006 (DOE, 2006). Bounding aircraft crash scenarios are developed for the two target sets defined. The most limiting failures of all the components in the affected building are assumed. This is a demonstrably conservative approach since:

- ◆ Bounding consequence assumptions, including an unisolable steam line rupture, main feed lines intact and continuing to feed, and EFW cross-connect valves open.
- ◆ Aircraft crash frequencies used are inherently conservative, including non-crash incidents such as damage to aircraft while landing and in-flight turbulence injuries. Detailed methods usually use fatal accidents instead of accidents as a measure of crashes.

The assessment is judged to be a conservative and bounding approach for screening purposes to satisfy Section 3.5.1.6 of NUREG-0800. The core damage frequency associated with the conservative aircraft scenario is  $9.9\text{E-}08$  per year.

#### Conclusion for Detailed Airplane Crash Hazard Assessment

As described in Section 19.1.5.4, external events can be screened if the core damage frequency, calculated using a demonstrably conservative analysis, has a CDF less than  $1.0\text{E-}7/\text{yr}$ . Also, the NUREG-0800 acceptance criterion is met when the frequency of a release

exceeding 10 CFR 100 (CFR, 2007) limits is realistically less than  $1.0E-07$  per year. The total CDF (CDF bounds large release frequency) from airplane crash into the BBNPP, using a demonstrably conservative analysis, is calculated to be  $9.9E-08$  per year. Based on a comparison of this analysis to NUREG-0800 and ANSI/ANS-58.21-2007, it is concluded that the BBNPP design satisfies the ANSI/ANS-58.21-2007 screening criteria for this external event. As a result, aircraft crash has been screened from the PRA.

#### **19.1.5.4.5 Industrial and Transportation Accidents Risk Evaluation**

This section is added as a supplement to the U.S. EPR FSAR.

The risks posed by potential industrial and transportation accidents to the BBNPP site are evaluated against the SRP screening criteria as defined in NUREG-0800, Section 2.2.3. As described in Section 19.1.5.4, external events can be screened if the core damage frequency, calculated using a demonstrably conservative analysis, has a CDF less than  $1.0E-7$ /yr.

The following types of hazards are evaluated: highway hazards, waterway hazards, pipeline hazards, railroad hazards, and nearby facilities hazards. Each of these hazards was evaluated with regard to the effects from potential accidents relating to explosions, flammable vapor clouds (delayed ignition), and toxic chemicals (vapors or gases), including liquid spills. The evaluation methods for these hazards were according to Regulatory Guides 1.91 and 1.78 (NRC, 1978) (NRC, 2001).

Bounding combinations of chemicals, volumes and locations were identified for further analysis, which were bounding for all of the hazards identified. These bounding chemicals are provided with the assumed quantity and location of the chemical. Other combinations are bounded and are not described. Following is a summary of the evaluation of these chemicals and the results.

##### Highway Hazards

In Section 2.2.3, an evaluation is made of the risks posed by an accident involving hazardous material occurring on the major roads within 5 mi (8 km) from the plant site. These are:

- ◆ Route 11 (Salem Blvd)
- ◆ Route 93 (Berwick Hazleton Highway)
- ◆ Route 239 (Wapwallopen Road)
- ◆ Interstate 80
- ◆ Interstate 81

BBNPP is located approximately 1.3 mi (2.0 km) from Route 11. Hazards on all other roads are bounded by the hazards from facilities. For each type of event and for the largest amount of hazardous material susceptible to be involved in that event, the minimum separation distance (i.e., safe distance) is calculated. The results are summarized in Section 2.2. In each case, the largest minimum separation distance is found to be less than the actual distance using demonstrably conservative analysis. Therefore, highway hazards have been screened from the PRA.

##### Waterway Hazards

The Susquehanna River is the only waterway within 5 mi (8 km) of BBNPP, but it is too shallow to support navigation of any watercraft other than personal watercraft. Therefore, no releases or explosions are analyzed for any boats or barges. No chemicals or commodities presenting with a plausible capability of forming a vapor or toxic cloud are transported on the river. Thus, the river is not considered a nearby route (Section 2.2).

#### Pipeline Hazards

There are three pipelines within 5 mi (8 km) of the BBNPP site reactor building. These pipelines include:

- ◆ Transco Natural Gas Pipeline
- ◆ UGI Natural Gas Pipeline
- ◆ Sunoco Gasoline Pipeline

The minimum distance from the Transco 42 in (1.1 m) natural gas pipeline to the BBNPP nearest safety-related building is 1.55 mi (2.49 km). The minimum distance from the UGI 12 in (31 cm) natural gas pipeline to the BBNPP nearest safety-related building is 0.17 mi (0.28 km). The minimum distance from the Sunoco 6.6 in (16.8 cm) pipeline to the BBNPP nearest safety-related building is 1.72 mi (2.77 km). For the pipelines, a worst case break of the pipeline is assumed at the nearest approach of the pipeline to BBNPP. All of the pipelines are assumed to have an infinite pressure source. The results are summarized in Section 2.2. In each case, either the largest minimum separation distance is found to be less than the actual distance, or the analysis shows that more than 2 minutes elapses between the time of hazard detection and reaching the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) threshold, or a quantitative risk assessment was used to show that the rate of exposure to a peak positive incident overpressure in excess of 1 psi (6.89 kPa) was less than 1.0E-07 per year using demonstrably conservative analysis. Therefore, pipeline hazards have been screened from the PRA.

### Railroad Hazards

There are two railroads within 5 mi (8 km) of the BBNPP reactor building:

- ◆ North Shore Railroad
- ◆ Canadian Pacific Railroad

The North Shore Railroad is located approximately 1.1 mi (1.8 km) east of the site at its nearest approach. The Canadian Pacific Railroad is located approximately 1.9 mi (3.1 km) east at its nearest approach. For each type of event and for the largest amount of hazardous material susceptible to be involved in that event, the minimum separation distance (i.e., safe distance) is calculated. The results are summarized in Section 2.2. In each case, either the largest minimum separation distance is found to be less than the actual distance, or the analysis shows that more than 2 minutes elapses between the time of hazard detection and reaching the IDLH. Therefore, railroad hazards have been screened from the PRA.

### Nearby Facilities Hazards

There are three facilities within 5 mi (8 km) of the BBNPP reactor building:

- ◆ Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES)
- ◆ Heller's Gas and Custom Made Fireplaces
- ◆ Deluxe Building Systems (DBS)

Western International Distribution Center is not included in this evaluation because the hazards to BBNPP are shipments along U.S. Route 11. These hazards were evaluated in the "Highway Hazards" evaluation previously discussed. The distance between the BBNPP nearest safety-related building and the SSES is between 0.70 mi (1.13 km) and 0.85 mi (1.37 km). The distance between Heller's Gas and the BBNPP nearest safety-related building is 1.78 mi (2.86 km) and the distance from Deluxe Building Systems to the BBNPP nearest safety-related building is 4.48 mi (7.21 km). For each type of event and for the largest amount of hazardous material susceptible to be involved in that event, the minimum separation distance (i.e., safe distance) is calculated. The results are summarized in Section 2.2. In each case, either the largest minimum separation distance is found to be less than the actual distance, or the analysis shows that more than 2 minutes elapses between the time of hazard detection and reaching the IDLH using demonstrably conservative analysis. Therefore, nearby facilities hazards have been screened from the PRA.

#### **19.1.5.4.6 Other External Events Risk Evaluation**

This section is added as a supplement to the U.S. EPR FSAR.

Three types of external events from Table 19.1-1 are addressed in this section. These are turbine generated missiles, collisions with the BBNPP Intake Structure, and lightning strikes.

### Turbine Missiles

NUREG-0800, Section 3.5.1.3 provides acceptance criteria for turbine missile hazard based on the frequency of a turbine failure resulting in the ejection of turbine rotor (or internal structure) fragments through the turbine casing. The acceptance criteria are 1.0E-04/year for favorably oriented turbines and 1.0E-05 per year for unfavorably oriented turbines. A favorable orientation is one that excludes the containment and all, or mostly all, safety-related

structures, systems or components (SSCs) from the low trajectory missile (LTM) pathway. Meeting these criteria provides confidence that the frequency of unacceptable damage from turbine missiles has been screened from the PRA.

The conclusion of frequency of unacceptable damage from turbine missiles less than or equal to  $1.0E-07$ /yr above is based on assumptions stated in the SRP acceptance criteria of Section 3.5.1. The use of these assumptions results in a demonstrably conservative value due to the improved redundancy of the U.S. ERP design, for example, the presence of four safety trains for most systems.

The BBNPP design requires a favorably oriented turbine with respect to containment. Detailed analyses and assessments show that the probability of turbine rotor failure resulting in ejection of the turbine rotor fragments through the turbine building casing is less than  $1.0E-04$  for a favorably oriented turbine with respect to containment. Therefore the risk to BBNPP from a turbine missile from the BBNPP turbine is within the NRC acceptance criteria as provided in NUREG-0800, Section 3.5.1.3.

#### Collisions with Intake Structure

BBNPP is located a few thousand feet from and about 200 feet above the Susquehanna River. There are no safety-related structures located near the shore line. In addition, the Susquehanna River is not used as a navigable waterway for other than small recreational boats, which do not constitute any hazard potential to the BBNPP Intake Structure.

As discussed above in Section 19.1.5.4.2, the conditional core damage probability associated with the failure of the NHS would be  $1.2E-07$ . Combined with a potential frequency for collisions with intake structures, this is likely to result in a CDF of less than  $1.0E-08$  per year. This remains a demonstrably conservative analysis because the frequency of collisions with intake structures that cause a Loss of Balance of Plant are low and it is likely that sufficient time would be available for a controlled shutdown. The NHS also provides long-term makeup to the safety UHS. However, each train of the safety UHS can provide sufficient plant cooling for 72 hours. Therefore, this dependency does not impact the risk from collisions with intake structures. Collisions with intake structures have been screened from the PRA.

#### Lightning Strikes

The BBNPP site location is located in an area of moderate lightning strike frequency, with between 1 to 4 strikes per square kilometer per year (247 acres). BBNPP uses guidelines and requirements for the methods of protecting the plant from the effects of lightning strikes and other voltage strikes, in accordance with the latest IEEE Standards as endorsed and summarized in Regulatory Guide 1.204.

The most likely result of a lightning strike to BBNPP would be a loss of offsite power. Based on the recorded lightning frequency for the area of BBNPP, the impact of lightning strikes should be well represented by the loss of offsite power initiating events analyzed in the BBNPP PRA. The BBNPP PRA model calculates a CDF from loss of offsite power of approximately  $1.0E-07$  per year. Since lightning strikes result in only a fraction of the loss of offsite power events, lightning strikes are judged to have a CDF less than  $1.0E-07$  per year using demonstrably conservative analysis. As such, lightning strikes have been screened from the PRA.}

### **19.1.6 Safety Insights from the PRA for Other Modes of Operation**

{No departures or supplements.

### 19.1.6.1 Description of the Low-Power and Shutdown Operations PRA

The information in this section of the reference U.S. EPR FSAR, including all subsections, tables and figures, is incorporated by reference with no departure or supplement.

### 19.1.6.2 Results from the Low-Power and Shutdown Operations PRA.

The information in this section of the U.S. EPR FSAR, including all subsections, tables and figures, is incorporated by reference with the following supplemental information.

The discussion in Section 19.1.4.1 on the site-specific LOOP frequency and duration is also applicable to the U.S. EPR PRA for Low-Power and Shutdown Operations (LPSD). The LPSD PRA also considers LOOP frequency and the nonrecovery probabilities. The U.S. EPR shutdown LOOP nonrecovery value is 0.413 and is generic data taken from NUREG/CR-6890. The value is applicable to BBNPP. The conclusions are the same as in Section 19.1.4.1.

The U.S. EPR PRA for LPSD is applicable and bounding for BBNPP. The site-specific parameters do not have a significant impact on the PRA results and insights. Therefore, no changes to the U.S. EPR PRA for LPSD are necessary when considering the specific BBNPP site.

### 19.1.6.3 Low-Power and Shutdown Operations - Level 2 Assessment

No departures or supplements.

### 19.1.6.4 Low Power and Shutdown Level 2 Risk Metrics (LRF)

No departures or supplements}.

## 19.1.7 PRA-Related Input to Other Programs and Processes

{No departures or supplements.}

## 19.1.8 Conclusions and Findings

No departures or supplements.

## 19.1.9 References

{**ANSI, 2007.** External Events PRA Methodology, ANSI/ANS-58.21-2007, American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society, 2007.

**ASCE, 2007.** American Society of Civil Engineers, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE/SEI 7-05, 2007.

**ASME, 2007.** Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME RA-Sc-2007, August 31, 2007.

**CFR, 2007.** Title 10, Code of Federal Regulation, CFR Part 100, Reactor Site Criteria, Nuclear Regulatory Commissions.

**DOE, 2006.** Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, DOE-STD-3014-2006, October 1996, Reaffirmed May 2006.

**NEI, 2006.** Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Peer Review Process Guidance, NEI 00-02, Revision 1, Nuclear Energy Institute, May 2006.

**NRC, 1978.** Regulatory Guide 1.91, Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 1978.

**NRC, 1991.** Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events, NUREG-1407, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 1991.

**NRC, 1999.** Rates of Initiating Events at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR-5750, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 1999.

**NRC, 2001.** Regulatory Guide 1.78, Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 2001.

**NRC, 2005.** Reevaluation of Station Blackout Risk at Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR-6980, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 2005.

**NRC, 2007a.** An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, Regulatory Guide 1.200, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 2007.

**NRC, 2007b.** Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0800, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 2007.

**NRC, 2007c.** Design Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants, Regulatory Guide 1.76, Revision 1, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 2007.

**NRC, 2007d.** Tornado Climatology of the Contiguous United States, NUREG/CR-4461, Revision 2, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 2007.

**NRC, 2007e.** Industry Average Performance for Components and Initiating Events at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR-6928, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 2007.}

**Table 19.1-1— {Summary of External Events Evaluated for BBNPP}**

(Page 1 of 2)

<b>External Event Hazard</b>	<b>Evaluation</b>
Aircraft Impacts	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.4.
Avalanche	Excluded due to lack of mountains near BBNPP.
Biological Events	This event is included in the definition of other events. Specifically, this is included in the Loss of Condenser Heat Sink initiating event, the Loss of Balance of Plant initiating event, and the Loss of Main Feedwater initiating event.
Coastal Erosion	Shore erosion would be a slowly developing condition. There would be adequate time to respond to any significant shore erosion.
Drought	The BBNPP safety-related Essential Service Water System (ESWS) consists of four safety-related ESWS cooling towers and basins with an inventory for 72 hours of heat removal under design basis accident conditions (2 of 4 trains available). Makeup is supplied from the 27-day safety-related Essential Service Water Emergency Makeup System (ESWEMS) Retention Pond. Makeup to the retention pond is supplied from the Susquehanna River. Periods of prolonged drought should not significantly impact the Susquehanna River's ability to provide retention pond makeup. The normal heat sink takes makeup from the Susquehanna River. Periods of prolonged drought should not significantly impact the river's ability to provide makeup to the normal heat sink.
External Flooding	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.2.
Extreme Winds and Tornadoes	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.1.
Fog	Fog can be a contributor to transportation accidents. Airplane crash and transportation accidents are covered in Section 19.1.5.4.4 and Section 19.1.5.4.5, respectively. An additional scenario could be the collision of a boat with the BBNPP Intake Structure. See Section 19.1.5.4.6 for a discussion of this scenario.
Forest Fire	The cleared zones and fuel reduction zones surrounding BBNPP are of sufficient size to afford substantial protection in the event of a fire, and it is not expected that there would be any hazardous effects from fires or heat fluxes associated with wild fires, fires in adjacent industrial plants or from onsite storage facilities. Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.3.
Frost	The impact of frost is bounded by snow and ice loads.
Hail	The impact of hail would be bounded by events such as tornado missiles.
High Tide	Not applicable to the BBNPP site as it is inland from the ocean.
High Summer Temperature	A maximum ambient air temperature of 115°F is assumed for buildings within the power block. HVAC systems are designed with consideration of this outdoor temperature. The safety-related ESWS is designed for at least 27 days of operation without offsite makeup.
Hurricane	Hurricane flooding impacts are screened in Section 19.1.5.4.2 and hurricane winds are bounded by the analysis in Section 19.1.5.4.1.
Ice Cover	The U.S. EPR minimum design live load due to precipitation (snow and ice) is 100 psf on the ground. This value includes the weight of the normal winter precipitation event and the weight of the extreme winter precipitation event. This bounds the BBNPP site-specific design snow load. Ice blockage of river is included in Section 19.1.5.4.2.
Industrial or Military Facility Accident	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.5.
Landslide	Excluded due to lack of nearby mountains or steep slopes in the vicinity of BBNPP.
Lightning	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.6.



**Table 19.1-1— {Summary of External Events Evaluated for BBNPP}**

(Page 2 of 2)

External Event Hazard	Evaluation
Low Water Level	<p>The BBNPP safety-related ESWS consists of four safety-related ESWS cooling towers and basins with an inventory for 72 hours of heat removal under design basis accident conditions (2 of 4 trains available). Makeup is supplied from the 27-day safety-related ESWEEMS Retention Pond. Makeup to the retention pond is supplied from the Susquehanna River. Water levels reached in the Susquehanna River is not likely impact the river's ability to provided retention pond makeup.</p> <p>The normal heat sink takes makeup from the Susquehanna River. Water levels reached in the Susquehanna River is not likely impact its ability to provide makeup to the normal heat sink.</p>
Low Winter Temperature	A minimum ambient air temperature of -40°F is assumed for buildings within the power block. HVAC systems are designed with consideration of this outdoor temperature. Generally, there is adequate warning of icing on the ESWS so that remedial action can be taken.
Meteorite/Satellite Strike	All sites have approximately the same frequency of occurrence. Low probability event.
Intense Precipitation	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.2.
Onsite Release of Chemicals	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.5.
Pipeline Accident	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.5
River Diversion	<p>The BBNPP safety-related ESWS consists of four safety-related ESWS cooling towers and basins with an inventory for 72 hours of heat removal under design basis accident conditions (2 of 4 trains available). Makeup is supplied from the 27-day safety-related ESWEEMS Retention Pond.</p> <p>River diversion would cause a loss of the normal heat sink. This event is included in the Loss of condenser, Loss of Balance of Plant, and Loss of Main Feedwater initiating events.</p>
Sandstorm	No nearby sand dunes or desert. Potential blockage of air intakes with particulate matter is generally considered in plant design.
Seiche	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.2.
Seismic Activity	Plant seismic capacity is evaluated in Section 19.1.5.1.
Snow/Ice Loads	<p>The U.S. EPR minimum design live load due to precipitation (snow and ice) is 100 psf on the ground. This value includes the weight of the normal winter precipitation event and the weight of the extreme winter precipitation event. This bounds the BBNPP site-specific design snow load.</p> <p>Snow melt causing river flooding is included in Section 19.1.5.4.2.</p>
Soil Shrink-Swell	Site-suitability evaluation and site development for the plant are designed to preclude the effects of this hazard.
Storm Surge	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.2.
Toxic Gas	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.5.
Transportation Accidents (other than aircraft)	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.5.
Tsunami	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.2.
Turbine Missile	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.6.
Volcanic Activity	No volcanoes in vicinity
Waves	Screened in Section 19.1.5.4.2.
Other	None identified

**19.2 SEVERE ACCIDENT EVALUATIONS**

This section of the U.S. EPR FSAR is incorporated by reference with the following supplements. |

**19.2.1 Introduction**

No departures or supplements. |

**19.2.2 Severe Accident Prevention**

No departures or supplements. |

**19.2.3 Severe Accident Mitigation**

No departures or supplements. |

**19.2.4 Containment Performance Capability**

No departures or supplements. |

**19.2.5 Accident Management**

The U.S. EPR FSAR includes the following COL Item in Section 19.2.5:

A COL applicant that references the U.S. EPR design certification will develop and implement severe accident management guidelines prior to fuel loading using the Operating Strategies for Severe Accidents (OSSA) methodology described in U.S. EPR FSAR Section 19.2.5 and ANP-10314, "The Operating Strategies for Severe Accidents Methodology for the U.S. EPR Technical Report".

This COL Item is addressed as follows:

Severe accident management guidelines will be developed and implemented, prior to fuel load, using the Operating Strategies for Severe Accidents (OSSA) methodology described in U.S. EPR FSAR Section 19.2.5 and ANP-10314, "The Operating Strategies for Severe Accidents Methodology for the U.S. EPR Technical Report." |

**19.2.6 Consideration of Potential Design Improvements under 10 CFR 50.34(f)**

No departures or supplements. |

**19.2.7 Beyond Design Basis Large Commercial Aircraft Impact Assessment**

No departures or supplements. |

**19.2.8 References**

No departures or supplements. |

**19.3 OPEN, CONFIRMATORY, AND COL ACTION ITEMS IDENTIFIED AS UNRESOLVED**

This section of the U.S. EPR FSAR is incorporated by reference.