No.	Topic-Generic Issue	Actions / Disposition	Ref.	Status/Comment
1	Monitoring Program (ML113210461 - Slide 11) – Closure of FAQ 59 is necessary and clarification on use of maintenance rule	FAQ 59 will address this topic.	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218 ML120750108	Added additional information added to Section 4.6 in LAR Template (Rev. 1N). Mirrors RAI responses for Callaway and DAEC
				FAQ 59, Rev. 5 sent to NRC 02/10/12. Technical agreement reached on 2/16/12.
2	Seismic standpipes/Hose Stations (ML113210461 -Slide 12) – The NRC wants additional information on the ability to fight fires following an earthquake.	Additional dialogue with the NRC is needed on this topic.	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	The exception to Section 3.6.4 is not endorsed. The NRC is asking licensees without seismic hose stations to discuss how they would fight a fire in the event of a seismic event. This seems to be in conflict with Section III. Comment Resolution on Proposed Rule in the Federal Register.
				[Discussed at 4/26/12 FAQ meeting. This topic will be eliminated as a generic RAI and plant specific RAIs will be "pulled back" based on NRC discussion with legal staff. ML121370055]
				Additional dialogue with NRC is needed to finalize appropriate compliance basis (N/A or complies via previous approval)
3	Total CDF/LERF (ML113210461-Slide 13) –NRC indicated that the last sentence on Slide 13 was incorrect and the CDF and LERF values should be E-06 and E-07, respectively.	Guidance on this topic is already in the LAR template	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	Added "Note to LAR Developer" in Att. W. No technical change made to LAR Template (Rev. 1L).
		(Rev. 1k), Section W.2		Task Force considers this issue closed.

No.	Topic-Generic Issue	Actions / Disposition	Ref.	Status/Comment
4	FSAR (ML113210461-Slide 14) – Industry expressed concern that the NRC had changed their mind on this topic and is requesting information that previously had been identified as not necessary. NRC acknowledged the change in direction and referred to guidance in RG 1.174 and SRP 19.2 as some of the rationale for desiring information on FSAR content	Make FSAR content an attachment in NEI 04-02, Rev. 3, rather than part of the LAR. NRC desires general information, not an FSAR markup or detailed information.	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	This topic is not being handled consistently between the transitioning plants. Is there a need to treat this as a generic topic. Change made to LAR Template (Rev. 1L) Section 5.4 (Section 5.4 Transition Schedule renumbered to Section 5.5). Added "Note to LAR Developer" FAQ 12-0062 is with NRC for technical agreement. Task Force considers this issue closed.
5	Defense-in-Depth/Safety Margin (ML113210461-Slide 15)— The NRC expressed concern that guidance on the process simply referred to NEI 04-02, rather than describing the process in the LAR. They indicated that they do not want detailed information by Fire Area.	LAR Template Section 4.5.2.2 to include additional information from FAQ 54 to address this concern	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	Change made to LAR Template (Rev. 1L) Section 4.5.2.2. Additional discussion with the NRC is needed to determine closure method.
6	Fire PRA Quality (ML113210461-Slide 16) – Inconsistent use of terms was the main concern (focused scope peer review, gap assessment, etc.)	The NFPA 805 TF will work with the Fire PRA TF to clarify terminology and update the LAR template, as necessary (Att. U, V).	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	Added "Note to LAR Developer" to Tables U-1 and V-1 that discusses closure of F&Os, treatment of suggestion F&Os, and adequate documentation of F&O resolution. Task Force considers this issue closed.
7	Post-Transition Change Process (ML113210461-Slide 17) – The NRC wants to know more on site specific implementation. The industry expressed concern about being able to provide a lot of specifics with the LAR submittal. The NRC indicated that some level of detail on which site specific processes and procedures would be modified would need to be provided in the LAR	Guidance about this is provided in the LAR template (Rev. 1k) Section 4.7.2. FAQ 61 (under development) will help address this topic.	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	Added "Note to LAR Developer" in Section 4.7.2 of LAR Template (Rev. 1L) and referred to an example (Oconee RAI 7-05 Response Dated 9/27/10 ML102720409) Task Force considers this issue closed.

No.	Topic-Generic Issue	Actions / Disposition	Ref.	Status/Comment
8	Non-Power Operations (ML113210461-Slide 18) – The NRC wants more detailed information in the LAR on pre-fire actions to prevent spurious operation (e.g., removal of power to component) and recovery actions.	The TF will update the LAR template (Section 4.3.2, Att. D) to address this topic, rather than trying to revise FAQ 40.	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	Added "Note to LAR Developer" in Attachment D of LAR Template (Rev. 1L). Task Force considers this issue closed.
9	B-2 Table (ML113210461-Slide 19) – The concern was that B-2 table statements should reference how the post-transition program meets the guidance, and not reference Appendix R or superseded documents.	The TF will review and see if additional guidance is needed in LAR template (Section 4.2.1, Att. B).	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	No change to LAR Template (Rev. 1L) Task Force considers this issue closed.
10	NEI 00-01 Rev. 2 (ML113210461-Slide 20) – Although FAQ 39 endorsed Rev. 1 of NEI 00-01 Chapter 3 in the B-2 table, the NRC referenced Rev. 2 of NEI 00-01 in RG 1.205 Rev. 1. The NRC would like a gap analysis of Rev. 2 vs. Rev. 1 of NEI 00-01 and a discussion of the gap analysis and results in the LAR submittal.	The NRC would like a gap analysis of Rev. 2 vs. Rev. 1 of NEI 00-01 and a discussion of the gap analysis and results in the LAR submittal (Section 4.2.1, Att. B)	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	Added additional discussion and "Note to LAR Developer" to LAR Template (Rev. 1L) Section 4.2.1.1. Task Force developed a list of the 'substantive change topics' Task Force considers this issue closed.
11	Safe and Stable (ML113210461-Slide 21) – The NRC would like a justification (qualitative risk analysis) if a defined time period is specified.	Guidance on this topic is already available in FAQ 54 and in the LAR template. (Section 4.2.1.2)	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	No change to LAR Template (Rev. 1L) Additional reviews indicate that the NRC may desire a qualitative risk analysis even if a defined time period is not specified. Task Force considers this issue closed.
12	Complies with Clarification (ML113210461-Slide 22) – This concern was referencing an incorrect compliance statement.	It was believed that sufficient guidance exists on this topic.	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	No change made to LAR Template (Rev. 1L). Task Force considers this issue closed.

No.	Topic-Generic Issue	Actions / Disposition	Ref.	Status/Comment
13	Redaction of Security Related Information (ML113210461-Slide 27)	NEI-NRC to work on approach	11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	Not characterized as "Generic RAI" at 11/18/11 meeting.
			WE 113340210	No change made to LAR Template (Rev. 1L).
				Discussed at 2/16/12 FAQ meeting. A separate meeting will be held on this topic.
14	Treatment of FPRA Unreviewed Analysis Methods (UAMs) (ML113210461-Slide 61).	Industry needs clear ML113210461 understanding of how UAMs are treated and closed 11/18/11 Meeting ML113210461 ML113340218	Not characterized as "Generic RAI" at 11/18/11 meeting.	
			WIL 113340216	No change made to LAR Template (Rev. 1L).
		out.		Additional discussion with the NRC is needed to determine closure method.
15	NRC now asking for 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii) submittal for use of EPRI process for surveillance optimization uses. (Fort Calhoun, Callaway)		Fort Calhoun, Callaway	New item discussed at 3/22/12 TF meeting.
			Odilaway	Need additional discussion with staff to determine path for closure.
16	FPRA - Sensitivity study on CPT factor 2.		DAEC, Cook, Callaway RAIs,	New item discussed at 3/22/12 TF meeting.
	It was recently stated at the industry fire forum that the Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table Panel being conducted for the circuit failure tests from the DESIREEFIRE and CAROL-FIRE tests may be eliminating the credit for Control Power Transformers (CPTs) (about a factor 2 reduction) currently allowed by Tables 10-1 and 10-3 of NUREG/CR-6850, Vol. 2, as being invalid when estimating circuit failure probabilities. Provide a sensitivity analysis that removes this CPT credit from the PRA and provide new results that show the impact of this potential change on CDF, LERF, □CDF, and □LERF. If the sensitivity analysis indicates that the change in risk acceptance guidelines would be exceeded after eliminating CPT credit, please justify not meeting the guidelines.		Waterford "generic" RAIs (#9)	Need additional discussion with staff to determine path for closure.
17	Please describe how your evaluation includes the possible increase in heart (sic) release rate caused by the spread of a fire from the ignition source to other combustibles. Please summarize how suppression is included in your evaluation.		Waterford "generic" RAIs (#1)	This is addressed by SRs within the PRA Standard.

No.	Topic-Generic Issue	Actions / Disposition	Ref.	Status/Comment
18	Transient fires should at a minimum be placed in locations within the plant PAUs where CCDPs are highest for that PAU, i.e., at "pinch points." Pinch points include locations of redundant trains or the vicinity of other potentially risk-relevant equipment, including the cabling associated with each. Transient fires should be placed at all appropriate locations in a PAU where they can threaten pinch points. Hot work should be assumed to occur in locations where hot work is a possibility, even if improbable (but not impossible), keeping in mind the same philosophy.		Waterford "generic" RAIs (#2)	This is addressed by SRs within the PRA Standard.
19	Discuss the calculation of the frequencies of transient and hot work fires. Characterize your use of the influence factors for maintenance, occupancy, and storage, noting if the rating "3" is the most common, as it is intended to be representative of the "typical" weight for each influence factor.		Waterford "generic" RAIs (#3, 4)	This is addressed by SRs within the PRA Standard.
20	Section 10 of NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1 states that a sensitivity analysis should be performed when using the fire ignition frequencies in the Supplement instead of the fire ignition frequencies provided in Table 6-1 of NUREG/CR-6850. Provide the sensitivity analysis of the impact on using the Supplement 1 frequencies instead of the Table 6-1 frequencies on CDF, LERF, □CDF, and □LERF for all of those bins that are characterized by an alpha that is less than or equal to one. If the sensitivity analysis indicates that the change in risk acceptance guidelines would be exceeded using the values in Table 6-1, please justify not meeting the guidelines.		Waterford "generic" RAIs (#7)	This is addressed by SRs within the PRA Standard.
21	Please describe how CDF and LERF are estimated in main control room (MCR) abandonment scenarios. Do any fires outside of the MCR cause MCR abandonment because of loss of control and/or loss of control room habitability? Are "screening" values for post MCR abandonment used (e.g., conditional core damage probability of failure to successfully switch control to the Primary Control Station and achieve safe 3 shutdown of 0.1) or have detailed human error analyses been completed for this activity. Please justify any screening value used.		Waterford "generic" RAIs (#8)	This is addressed by SRs within the PRA Standard.

No.	Topic-Generic Issue	Actions / Disposition	Ref.	Status/Comment
22	Attachment W of the LAR provides theCDF andLERF for the variances from the deterministic requirements (VFDRs) for each of the fire areas, but the LAR does not describe either generically or specifically howCDF andLERF were calculated. Describe the method(s) used to determine the changes in risk reported in the Tables in Appendix W. The description should include: a) A summary of PRA model additions or modifications needed to determine the reported changes in risk. If any of these model additions used data or methods not included in the fire PRA Peer Review please describe the additions. b) Identification of new operator actions (not including post MCR		Waterford "generic" RAIs (#10)	This is a candidate for revision to LAR template.
	abandonment which are addressed elsewhere) that have been credited in the change in risk estimates. If such actions are credited, how is instrument failure addressed in the HRA.			
23	Did the peer reviews for both the internal events and fire PRAs consider the clarifications and qualifications from Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200, Revision 2, "An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities," March 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML09041 0014) to the ASME/AMS PRA Standard? If not, provide a self-assessment of the PRA model for the RG 1.200 clarifications and qualifications and indicate how any identified gaps were dispositioned.		Waterford "generic" RAIs (#11)	Will add a note to LAR Developer to discuss RG 1.200 Revision 2.
24	Identify if any variance from deterministic requirement (VFDRs) in the LAR involved performance-based evaluations of wrapped or embedded cables. If applicable, describe how wrapped or embedded cables were modeled in the Fire PRA including assumptions and insights on how the PRA modeling of these cables contributes to the VFDR delta risk evaluations.		Waterford "generic" RAIs (#12)	This appears to be related to Generic Issue #22.

No.	Topic-Generic Issue	Actions / Disposition	Ref.	Status/Comment
25	Identify any plant modification (implementation item) in Attachment S of the LAR that have not been completed but which have been credited directly or indirectly in the change-in-risk estimates provided in Attachment W. When the affects of a plant modification has been included in the PRA before the modification has been completed, the models and values used in the PRA are necessarily estimates based on current plans. The as-built facility after the modification is completed may be different than the plans. Please add an implementation item that, upon completion of all PRA credited implementation items, verifies the validity of the reported change-in-risk. This item should include your plan of action should the as-built change-in-risk exceed the estimates reported in the LAR.		Waterford "generic" RAIs (#13)	This is a candidate for revision to LAR template.
26	Please identify any changes made to the internal events or fire PRA since the last full scope peer review of each of these PRA models that are consistent with the definition of a "PRA upgrade" in ASME/ANS-RA-Sa-2009, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.200. Also, please address the following: i) If any changes are characterized as a PRA upgrade, please identify if a focused scope peer review was performed for these changes consistent with the guidance in ASME/ANS-RA-Sa-2009, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.200, and describe any findings from that focused-scope peer review and the resolution of these findings for this application. ii) ii) If a focused-scope peer review has not been performed for changes characterized as a PRA upgrade, please describe what actions will be implemented to address this review deficiency.		Waterford "generic" RAIs (#14)	This is a candidate for revision to LAR template.