



**Pacific Gas and
Electric Company®**

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PG&E Letter DCL-12-051

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

10 CFR 21.21

Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
10 CFR Part 21 Notification: Scientech/NUS Hand Controller Specification Defect

Dear Commissioners and Staff;

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) is submitting the enclosed Part 21 Notification, in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), to provide written notification of the identification of a defect. This information was initially reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center on April 29, 2012 (Event Number 47872). The information provided in the enclosed report meets the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4).

PG&E makes no new or revised regulatory commitments (as defined by NEI 99-04) in this report.

This event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

Sincerely,

James R. Becker

wrl8/50476172

Enclosure

cc/: Diablo Distribution
cc/enc: Elmo E. Collins, NRC Region IV
Michael S. Peck, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Joseph M. Sebrosky, NRR Project Manager
INPO

Enclosure

10 CFR Part 21 Notification

Sciencetech/NUS Hand Controller Specification Defect

10 CFR Part 21 Notification

Scientech/NUS Hand Controller Specification Defect

This notification is presented in a format specified in 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4).

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the commission:

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(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Facility:

Pacific Gas & Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
9 Miles NW of Avila Beach
Avila Beach, CA 93424

Basic Component which fails to comply or contains a defect:

Four (4) AMS826 and four (4) AMS827 Scientech/NUS Hand Controllers

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The controllers were manufactured by Scientech/NUS, a business unit of Curtiss Wright Flow Control Services Corporation.

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

On March 23, 2012, Scientech/NUS sent a report (Letter Numbers 12-08-BB and 12-09-BB) to Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E). This report identified that four AMS826 and four AMS827 hand controllers supplied to Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) had a deviation from the purchase specification. DCPP specified the controllers to be qualified to meet electromagnetic interference (EMI)/radio frequency interference (RFI) emissions and susceptibility in

accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.180, Rev. 1. Contrary to this requirement, Scientech/NUS did not perform the EMI/RFI testing on the AMS826 controllers, and shipped them to DCPD with a Certificate of Conformance to DCPD's specification. Scientech/NUS tested the AMS827 controllers, which failed some of the required testing, but these were shipped to DCPD with a Certificate of Conformance nonetheless. DCPD accepted the controllers based on the Certificates of Conformance, but did not install them.

The inability of these hand controllers to meet the EMI/RFI emissions and susceptibility requirements as set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.180, Rev. 1 could have created a substantial safety hazard if the controllers had been installed for their intended use. Specifically, DCPD intended to install the hand controllers to control auxiliary feed water from the Unit 1 control room and the hot shutdown panel. Following a postulated fire in the control room, plant shutdown would be managed from the hot shutdown panel. In this instance, radios would be used to communicate with operators at the panel. The controllers would be susceptible to EMI/RFI interference and could potentially affect the operators' ability to safely shut down the plant and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

On April 27, 2012, PG&E completed its evaluation of the hand controller specification deviation and made an initial report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center on April 29, 2012 (Event Number 47872).

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

DCPD received four (4) AMS826 and four (4) AMS827 hand controllers, but had never installed them in the plant. DCPD subsequently hired a different vendor to modify the controllers to meet the Regulatory Guide requirements, has properly received them, and is currently installing the controllers for their original intended use.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

Following acceptance of the controllers, DCPD hired a different vendor to modify the controllers to meet Regulatory Guide 1.180, Rev. 1, EMI/RFI requirements, as confirmed by testing. DCPD has properly received them, and is currently installing the controllers for their original intended use.

DCPP issued a Supplier Deficiency Report to Scientech/NUS requiring a cause analysis and corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

- (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.**

These controllers were designed and built specifically for use at DCPP. No additional advice is recommended.