

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

CHAPTER 3

DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Section</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
3.1	CONFORMANCE WITH NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA.....	3.1-1
3.2	CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, AND SYSTEMS	3.2-1
3.2.1	SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION	3.2-1
3.2.1.3	Classification of Building Structures	3.2-1
3.2.2	AP1000 CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM	3.2-1
3.3	WIND AND TORNADO LOADINGS	3.3-1
3.3.1.1	Design Wind Velocity.....	3.3-1
3.3.2.1	Applicable Design Parameters	3.3-1
3.3.2.3	Effect of Failure of Structures or Components Not Designed for Tornado Loads.....	3.3-1
3.3.3	COMBINED LICENSE INFORMATION	3.3-1
3.4	WATER LEVEL (FLOOD) DESIGN	3.4-1
3.4.1.3	Permanent Dewatering System.....	3.4-1
3.4.3	COMBINED LICENSE INFORMATION	3.4-1
3.5	MISSILE PROTECTION	3.5-1
3.5.1.3	Turbine Missiles.....	3.5-1
3.5.1.5	Missiles Generated by Events Near the Site	3.5-1
3.5.1.6	Aircraft Hazards.....	3.5-2
3.5.4	COMBINED LICENSE INFORMATION	3.5-5
3.5.5	REFERENCES.....	3.5-6
3.6	PROTECTION AGAINST THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE POSTULATED RUPTURE OF PIPING	3.6-1
3.6.4.1	Pipe Break Hazard Analysis	3.6-1
3.6.4.4	Primary System Inspection Program for Leak-before-Break Piping	3.6-1

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

<u>Section</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
3.7	SEISMIC DESIGN.....	3.7-1
3.7.1.1.1	Design Ground Motion Response Spectra.....	3.7-1
3.7.1.1.2	Foundation Input Response Spectra.....	3.7-1
3.7.2.12	Methods for Seismic Analysis of Dams	3.7-1
3.7.4.1	Comparison with Regulatory Guide 1.12.....	3.7-2
3.7.4.2.1	Triaxial Acceleration Sensors.....	3.7-2
3.7.4.4	Comparison of Measured and Predicted Responses	3.7-2
3.7.4.5	Tests and Inspections	3.7-3
3.7.5	COMBINED LICENSE INFORMATION	3.7-3
3.7.5.1	Seismic Analysis of Dams	3.7-3
3.7.5.2	Post-Earthquake Procedures	3.7-3
3.7.5.3	Seismic Interaction Review	3.7-3
3.7.5.4	Reconciliation of Seismic Analyses of Nuclear Island Structures	3.7-3
3.7.5.5	Free Field Acceleration Sensor	3.7-4
3.8	DESIGN OF CATEGORY I STRUCTURES.....	3.8-1
3.8.3.7	In-Service Testing and Inspection Requirements	3.8-1
3.8.4.7	Testing and In-Service Inspection Requirements	3.8-1
3.8.5.1	Description of the Foundations.....	3.8-1
3.8.5.7	In-Service Testing and Inspection Requirements	3.8-1
3.8.6.5	Structures Inspection Program	3.8-1
3.8.6.6	Construction Procedures Program	3.8-2
3.9	MECHANICAL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS	3.9-1
3.9.3.1.2	Loads for Class 1 Components, Core Support, and Component Supports	3.9-1
3.9.3.4.4	Inspection, Testing, Repair, and/or Replacement of Snubbers.....	3.9-2
3.9.6	INSERVICE TESTING OF PUMPS AND VALVES.....	3.9-6
3.9.6.2.2	Valve Testing	3.9-7
3.9.6.2.3	Valve Disassembly and Inspection	3.9-12
3.9.6.2.4	Valve Preservice Tests	3.9-13
3.9.6.2.5	Valve Replacement, Repair, and Maintenance.....	3.9-13
3.9.6.3	Relief Requests	3.9-13
3.9.8	COMBINED LICENSE INFORMATION	3.9-15
3.9.8.2	Design Specifications and Reports.....	3.9-15
3.9.8.3	Snubber Operability Testing	3.9-15
3.9.8.4	Valve Inservice Testing	3.9-15

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

<u>Section</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
3.9.8.5	Surge Line Thermal Monitoring	3.9-15
3.9.8.7	As-Designed Piping Analysis.....	3.9-15
3.9.9	REFERENCES.....	3.9-16
3.10	SEISMIC AND DYNAMIC QUALIFICATION OF SEISMIC CATEGORY I MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT.....	3.10-1
3.11	ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT.....	3.11-1
3.11.5	COMBINED LICENSE INFORMATION ITEM FOR EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION FILE.....	3.11-1
APP. 3A	HVAC DUCTS AND DUCT SUPPORTS	3A-1
APP. 3B	LEAK-BEFORE-BREAK EVALUATION OF THE AP1000 PIPING	3B-1
APP. 3C	REACTOR COOLANT LOOP ANALYSIS METHODS.....	3C-1
APP. 3D	METHODOLOGY FOR QUALIFYING AP1000 SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT.....	3D-1
APP. 3E	HIGH-ENERGY PIPING IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND.....	3E-1
APP. 3F	CABLE TRAYS AND CABLE TRAY SUPPORTS.....	3F-1
APP. 3G	NUCLEAR ISLAND SEISMIC ANALYSES	3G-1
APP. 3H	AUXILIARY AND SHIELD BUILDING CRITICAL SECTIONS.....	3H-1
APP. 3I	EVALUATION FOR HIGH FREQUENCY SEISMIC INPUT	3I-1

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	
3.2-201	Seismic Classification of Building Structures	
3.2-202	AP1000 Classification of Mechanical and Fluid Systems, Components, and Equipment	
3.5-201	Impact Area for Combined Containment/Shield and Auxiliary Buildings for Different Aircrafts	
3.9-201	Safety Related Snubbers	

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

LIST OF FIGURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
3.7-201	Horizontal and Vertical Nuclear Island FIRS for HAR 2
3.7-202	Horizontal and Vertical Nuclear Island FIRS for HAR 3
3.7-203	Horizontal and Vertical Annex Building FIRS for HAR 2
3.7-204	Horizontal and Vertical Annex Building FIRS for HAR 3

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

CHAPTER 3

DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS

3.1 CONFORMANCE WITH NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no departures or supplements.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

3.2 CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, AND SYSTEMS

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

3.2.1 SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.2.1**.

STD SUP 3.2-1 There are no safety-related structures, systems, or components outside the scope of the DCD.

The nonsafety-related structures, systems, and components outside the scope of the DCD are classified as non-seismic (NS).

HAR SUP 3.2-3 There are no site-specific nonsafety-related SSCs outside the scope of the DCD that are important to safety.

3.2.1.3 Classification of Building Structures

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.2.1.3**.

HAR SUP 3.2-1 The seismic classification of the raw water pump house, Harris Lake makeup water system pump house and intake structure, and Harris Lake makeup water system discharge structure is provided in **Table 3.2-201**.

3.2.2 AP1000 CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.2.2**.

STD SUP 3.2-1 There are no safety-related structures, systems, or components outside the scope of the DCD.

HAR SUP 3.2-4 There are no site-specific nonsafety-related SSCs outside the scope of the DCD that are important to safety.

HAR SUP 3.2-5 See **Table 3.2-202** for the classification of the Harris Lake makeup water system (HLMWS).

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

**Table 3.2-201
Seismic Classification of Building Structures**

Structure	Category ¹
Raw Water Pump House	NS
Harris Lake Makeup Water System Pump House and Intake Structure	NS
Harris Lake Makeup Water System Discharge Structure	NS

HAR SUP 3.2-1

C-I – Seismic Category I
C-II – Seismic Category II
NS – Non-seismic

Note:

1. Within the broad definition of seismic Category I and II structures, these buildings contain members and structural subsystems the failure of which would not impair the capability for safe shutdown. Examples of such systems would be elevators, stairwells not required for access in the event of a postulated earthquake, and nonstructural partitions in nonsafety-related areas. These substructures are classified as non-seismic.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

HAR SUP 3.2-5

**Table 3.2-202
AP1000 Classification of Mechanical and Fluid Systems, Components, and
Equipment**

Tag Number	Description	AP1000 Class	Seismic Category	Principal Construction Code	Comments
	Harris Lake Makeup Water System (HLMWS)				Location: Cove of the Cape Fear River
System components are Class E					

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

3.3 WIND AND TORNADO LOADINGS

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

3.3.1.1 Design Wind Velocity

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.3.1.1**.

HAR COL 3.3-1
HAR COL 3.5-1

The wind velocity characteristics for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 2 and 3 (HAR 2 and 3) are given in **Subsection 2.3.1.2.2**. These values are bounded by the design wind velocity values given in DCD **Subsection 3.3.1.1** for the AP1000 plant.

3.3.2.1 Applicable Design Parameters

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.3.2.1**.

HAR COL 3.3-1
HAR COL 3.5-1

The tornado characteristics for the HAR 2 and 3 are given in **Subsection 2.3.1.2.2**. These values are bounded by the tornado design parameters given in DCD **Subsection 3.3.2.1** for the AP1000 plant.

3.3.2.3 Effect of Failure of Structures or Components Not Designed for Tornado Loads

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.3.2.3**.

STD COL 3.3-1
HAR COL 3.5-1

Consideration of the effects of wind and tornado due to failures in an adjacent AP1000 plant are bounded by the evaluation of the buildings and structures in a single unit.

3.3.3 COMBINED LICENSE INFORMATION

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.3.3**.

HAR COL 3.3-1

The HAR 2 and 3 site satisfies the site interface criteria for wind and tornado (see **Subsections 3.3.1.1, 3.3.2.1, and 3.3.2.3**) and will not have a tornado-initiated failure of structures and components within the applicant's scope that compromises the safety of AP1000 safety-related structures and components (see also **Subsection 3.5.4**).

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

Subsection 1.2.2 discusses differences between the plant specific site plan (see Figure 1.1-201) and the AP1000 typical site plan shown in DCD Figure 1.2-2.

There are no other structures adjacent to the nuclear island other than as described and evaluated in the DCD.

Missiles caused by external events separate from the tornado are addressed in Subsections 2.2 through 2.2.3, 3.5.1.3, 3.5.1.5, and 3.5.1.6.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

3.4 WATER LEVEL (FLOOD) DESIGN

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

3.4.1.3 Permanent Dewatering System

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.4.1.3**.

HAR COL 3.4-1

No permanent dewatering system is required because site groundwater levels are two feet or more below site grade level as described in **Subsection 2.4.12.5**.

3.4.3 COMBINED LICENSE INFORMATION

Replace the first paragraph of DCD **Subsection 3.4.3** with the following text.

HAR COL 3.4-1

The site-specific water levels given in **Section 2.4** satisfy the interface requirements identified in DCD **Section 2.4**.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

3.5 MISSILE PROTECTION

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

3.5.1.3 Turbine Missiles

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.5.1.3**.

STD SUP 3.5-1

The potential for a turbine missile from another AP1000 plant in close proximity has been considered. As noted in DCD **Subsection 10.2.2**, the probability of generation of a turbine missile (or P1 as identified in SRP 3.5.1.3) is less than 1×10^{-5} per year. This missile generation probability (P1) combined with an unfavorable orientation P2 x P3 conservative product value of 10^{-2} (from SRP 3.5.1.3) results in a probability of unacceptable damage from turbine missiles (or P4 value) of less than 10^{-7} per year per plant which meets the SRP 3.5.1.3 acceptance criterion and the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.115. Thus, neither the orientation of the side-by-side AP1000 turbines nor the separation distance is pertinent to meeting the turbine missile generation acceptance criterion. In addition, the shield building and auxiliary building walls, roofs, and floors, provide further conservative, inherent protection of the safety-related SSCs from a turbine missile.

HAR SUP 3.5-1

The HNP turbine has the potential to produce turbine missiles. The orientation of the HNP turbine would preclude any potential turbine missiles from affecting safety-related structures, systems and components on HAR 2 and 3. Potential missiles for the HNP turbine would be ejected on an east-west trajectory while HAR 2 and 3 are located approximately 1000 feet north of the HNP turbine (**Figure 1.1-201**).

STD SUP 3.5-2

The turbine system maintenance and inspection program is discussed in **Subsection 10.2.3.6**.

3.5.1.5 Missiles Generated by Events Near the Site

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.5.1.5**.

HAR COL 3.3-1
HAR COL 3.5-1

The gate house, administrative building, security control building, warehouse and shops, water service building, diesel-driven fire pump / enclosure, and miscellaneous structures (including HNP structures) are common structures that are at a nuclear power plant. They are of similar design and construction to those that are typical at nuclear power plants. Therefore, any missiles resulting from a

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

tornado-initiated failure are not more energetic than the tornado missiles postulated for design of the AP1000.

The missiles generated by events near the site are discussed and evaluated in [Subsection 2.2.3](#). The effects of external events on the safety-related components of the plant are insignificant.

3.5.1.6 Aircraft Hazards

HAR COL 3.3-1
HAR COL 3.5-1

Add the following text to the end of DCD [Subsection 3.5.1.6](#).

The Sanford Lee County Regional Airport is located approximately 14.5 km (9 mi.) southwest of the HAR. Sanford-Lee County Regional Airport is the only airport that fails the deterministic screening criteria because its number of operations of 47,085 per year exceeds the threshold of 41,269 operations. The airport has one runway (Runway 3/21), and it is located to the south-west of the plant. The outer boundary of four airways is routed within 2 miles of the HAR site: IR718, V3-66-155, J207 and J52-55 (shown on [Figure 2.2.2-202](#)). Thus, an aircraft hazards evaluation needs to be performed for HAR 2 and 3.

The evaluation determined that the probability of small aircraft crashing on Seismic Category I structures (i.e., Containment/Shield Building and Auxiliary Building) is calculated to be 4.783×10^{-6} per year. This crash probability results in a core damage frequency (CDF) of 0.28×10^{-12} per year which is much smaller than the current plant CDF acceptance criteria of 1.0×10^{-8} per year. Therefore, small aircraft crash probability is acceptable. The probability of large aircraft crashing on Seismic Category I structures is calculated as 0.415×10^{-7} per year. This meets the acceptance criteria of 1×10^{-7} per year in [Subsection 19.58.2.3.1](#) of DCD. Therefore, the probability of crash for large aircrafts is acceptable. The acceptance criteria and methodology are discussed below.

Probabilistic Acceptance Criteria

Based on discussion in [Subsection 19.58.2.3.1](#) of the DCD, separate probabilistic acceptance criteria are used for small and large aircrafts. The definition of small and large aircraft is based on documented discussion with Westinghouse.

Small aircraft is an aircraft with less than 30 seats with pay load less than 7500 pounds. All aircraft not meeting the above small aircraft definition are considered as large aircraft.

- Acceptance Criteria for Large Aircraft:

Total probability of crash on Seismic Category I structures must be less than 1×10^{-7} per year.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

- Acceptance Criteria for Small Aircraft:

Equation 19.58-1 of the DCD will be applied with the initiating event frequency (IEF) equal to the calculated small aircraft crash probability per year. The small aircraft crash probability is acceptable if the calculated core damage frequency is less than 1.0×10^{-8} per year.

The calculation details for airport and the airways follows:

Calculation for Sanford-Lee Airport

The equation used is obtained from Item 3 in Section III of SRP 3.5.1.6 (Reference 201). Because there is only one runway, this equation is:

$$P_{\text{airport}} = \sum_j (C_j \cdot N_j \cdot A_j) \quad (1)$$

In Equation (1),

C_j = Probability per square mile of a crash per aircraft movement for aircraft type j

N_j = Number (per year) of movements for aircraft type j

A_j = Effective plan area (square miles) for aircraft type j

P_{airport} = Probability of crash per year from airport operations

C_j :

The value of C_j for each aircraft type is obtained from table in Item 3 of Section III of SRP 3.5.1.6 (Reference 201). Since the distance D from runway end to plant is in the range 8 miles to 9 miles, for some aircraft types the SRP tables lists "NA", meaning information is not available. An extrapolation procedure, employing available value from the last listed crash rate in SRP table and applicable values in the applicable Tables of DOE-STD-3014-96 (Reference 202), were used to obtain crash rates marked "NA" in the SRP table. For example, for general aviation C at the desired distance turned out to be zero. On the other hand, for military aircraft the calculated C value was non-zero.

N_j :

Although the total annual operations at this airport is 47,085, further data collection showed that this is an annual average. The maximum could be as high as 59,000. Also about 2% is air taxi traffic, another 2% is small military aircraft and the rest is general aviation. This information was used in probability calculation with Equation (1).

A_j :

Effective plant impact area is calculated by considering only Seismic Category I structures. Per the DCD, this is restricted to Containment/Shield Building and Auxiliary Building. As required by Item 7 in Section III of SRP 3.5.1.6 (Reference

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

201), A_j must include appropriate fly-in area and skid area. Additional details are not provided in SRP. The methodology in Section B.4 of the DOE-STD-3014-96 (Reference 202) provides details for buildings of rectangular foot print and of constant height above grade.

The value of A_j depends on the aircraft type because of differences in wing spans, crash angle, and skid distance. Table 3.5-201 lists the total areas for different aircraft types.

Calculation for Airways

Item 2 of Section III of SRP 3.5.1.6 (Reference 201) provides an equation to calculate probability of crash from a nearby airway. This equation contains a constant

C = in-flight crash rate per mile using the airway

For commercial aircraft, a C value of 4×10^{-10} per aircraft mile is provided in Reference 201. However, the reference does not provide C values for other types of aircraft (i.e., military aviation and general aviation). Because of the above unavailability of constant C for all aircraft types and since FAA does not provide clear flight information on specific airways, the Reference 201 equation for airways is not used in this assessment for airways.

Section 5.3.2 of DOE-STD-3014-96 (Reference 202) provides complete equations for calculating probability of aircraft crash from non-airport operations. The procedure is implemented using Tables in Appendix B of Reference 202.

The probability of crash from airways is calculated using the equation below:

$$P_{\text{all_airways}} = \sum_j (N_j \cdot P_j \cdot f_j \cdot A_j) \quad (2)$$

$N_j \cdot P_j$ = expected number of in-flight crashes per year for aircraft type j
(occurrence per year)

f_j = conditional probability, given a crash, that the crash occurs within one-square-mile area surrounding the facility of interest (per square mile)

A_j = impact area of the buildings of facility for aircraft type j (square mile)

Values of $N_j \cdot P_j \cdot f_j$ are provided in Table B-14 of Reference 202 for General aviation and in Table B-15 of Reference 202 for commercial and military aviations. Values of A_j for each aircraft type is the same as that used for airport operations and Equation (1).

When using Tables B-14 and B-15, the maximum value listed for Savannah River Site and average Continental United States (CONUS) was used. Savannah

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

information is included because Savannah River Site is closest of all sites listed in the tables to HAR site.

Calculated Crash Probability Results

Based on phone contacts with several airports near HAR site (including Raleigh-Durham International Airport, Sanford-Lee County Regional Airport and Fayetteville Regional Airport), the air taxi operations meet the definition small aircraft provided in the acceptance criteria above. Accordingly, the following aircraft types are considered as “small” aircrafts: air taxi, general aviation and small military. Large aircrafts are considered to be: air carrier and large military aircraft.

With the above identification of large and small aircrafts, the results are:

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\text{small_airport}} + P_{\text{small_airway}} &= 0.0178 \times 10^{-6} + 4.766 \times 10^{-6} \\ &= 4.78 \times 10^{-6} \text{ per year} \end{aligned}$$

$$P_{\text{large_airport}} + P_{\text{large_airway}} = 0 + 0.415 \times 10^{-7} = 0.415 \times 10^{-7} \text{ per year}$$

Conclusions from Probability Results

For large aircraft, acceptance criterion is 1×10^{-7} per year. Therefore, large aircraft crash probability of 0.415×10^{-7} is acceptable.

For small aircraft, apply Equation 19.58-1 of the DCD with conditional core damage probability (CCDP) of 5.85×10^{-8} . Plant core damage frequency is:

$$CDF_{\text{small_aircraft}} = (4.78 \times 10^{-6}) \times (5.85 \times 10^{-8}) = 0.28 \times 10^{-12} \text{ per year}$$

Clearly, the core damage frequency due to small aircraft crash is much smaller than the core damage frequency acceptance criteria of 1.0×10^{-8} per year, and the calculated small aircraft crash probability is acceptable.

3.5.4 COMBINED LICENSE INFORMATION

HAR COL 3.5-1

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.5.4**.

The HAR site satisfies the site interface criteria for wind and tornado (see **Subsections 3.3.1.1, 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.3**) and will not have a tornado-initiated failure of structures and components within the applicant's scope that compromises the safety of AP1000 safety-related structures and components (see also **Subsection 3.3.3**).

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

Subsection 1.2.2 discusses differences between the plant specific site plan (see Figure 1.1-201) and the AP1000 typical site plan shown in DCD Figure 1.2-2.

There are no other structures adjacent to the nuclear island other than as described and evaluated in the DCD.

Missiles caused by external events separate from the tornado are addressed in Subsections 2.2 through 2.2.3, 3.5.1.3, 3.5.1.5, and 3.5.1.6.

3.5.5 REFERENCES

Add the following information at the end of DCD Subsection 3.5.5:

201. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.5.1.6, "Aircraft Hazards", Rev. 3, March 2007.
202. Department of Energy Standard DOE-STD-3014-96, "Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash Into Hazardous Facilities", October 1996.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

**Table 3.5-201
Impact Area for Combined Containment/Shield and Auxiliary Buildings for
Different Aircrafts**

HAR COL 3.3-1 HAR COL 3.5-1	Aircraft Type	A_j (mile²)	
		Part I	Part II
	Air Carrier	0.03415	0.01872
	Air Taxi	0.01230	0.01630
	General Aviation	0.00984	0.01290
	Small Military	0.02035	0.01981
	Large Military	0.02364	0.02529

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

3.6 PROTECTION AGAINST THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE POSTULATED RUPTURE OF PIPING

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

3.6.4.1 Pipe Break Hazard Analysis

Replace the last paragraph in DCD **Subsection 3.6.4.1** with the following text.

STD COL 3.6-1

The as-designed pipe rupture hazards evaluation is made available for NRC review. The completed as-designed pipe rupture hazards evaluation will be in accordance with the criteria outlined in DCD **Subsections 3.6.1.3.2** and **3.6.2.5**. Systems, structures, and components identified to be essential targets protected by associated mitigation features (Reference is DCD **Table 3.6-3**) will be confirmed as part of the evaluation, and updated information will be provided as appropriate.

A pipe rupture hazard analysis is part of the piping design. The evaluation will be performed for high and moderate energy piping to confirm the protection of systems, structures, and components which are required to be functional during and following a design basis event. The locations of the postulated ruptures and essential targets will be established and required pipe whip restraints and jet shield designs will be included. The report will address environmental and flooding effects of cracks in high and moderate energy piping. The as-designed pipe rupture hazards evaluation is prepared on a generic basis to address COL applications referencing the AP1000 design.

The pipe whip restraint and jet shield design includes the properties and characteristics of procured components connected to the piping, components, and walls at identified break and target locations. The design will be completed prior to installation of the piping and connected components.

The as-built reconciliation of the pipe rupture hazards evaluation whip restraint and jet shield design in accordance with the criteria outlined in DCD **Subsections 3.6.1.3.2** and **3.6.2.5** will be completed prior to fuel load (in accordance with DCD Tier 1 **Table 3.3-6, item 8**).

This COL item is also addressed in **Subsection 14.3.3**.

3.6.4.4 Primary System Inspection Program for Leak-before-Break Piping

Replace the first paragraph of DCD **Subsection 3.6.4.4** with the following text.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

STD COL 3.6-4 Alloy 690 is not used in leak-before-break piping. No additional or augmented inspections are required beyond the inservice inspection program for leak-before-break piping. An as-built verification of the leak-before-break piping is required to verify that no change was introduced that would invalidate the conclusion reached in this subsection.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

3.7 SEISMIC DESIGN

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

HAR SUP 3.7-3

Add **Subsection 3.7.1.1.1** as follows:

3.7.1.1.1 Design Ground Motion Response Spectra

Figures 2.5.2-306 and **2.5.2-307** show a comparison of the horizontal and vertical site-specific ground motion response spectra (GMRS) to the AP1000 certified design seismic design response spectra (CSDRS). The horizontal and vertical response spectra were developed as free-field outcrop motions on the uppermost in-situ competent material using performance-based procedures as described in **Subsection 2.5.2.4.4**. Site response analyses were conducted to evaluate the effect of the Triassic sedimentary rock on the generic CEUS hard rock ground motions as described in **Subsection 2.5.2.5**.

Peak ground acceleration at 100 hertz is approximately 0.14g and is less than the AP1000 certified design site parameter of 0.3 g.

Add Subsection 3.7.1.1.2 as follows:

3.7.1.1.2 Foundation Input Response Spectra

The upper most in-situ competent material occurs 20-35 feet above the nuclear island foundation elevation. Foundation input response spectra (FIRS) were developed for the nuclear island and Annex Building foundations per **Subsection 2.5.2.5**. **Figures 3.7-201, 3.7-202, 3.7-203, and 3.7-204** show a comparison of the horizontal and vertical site-specific FIRS to the CSDRS.

These nuclear spectra are essentially enveloped by the CSDRS. For the HAR 3 site, the nuclear island FIRS exceeds the Westinghouse CSDRS in the frequency range of 33 to 35 Hz by a maximum value of 3 percent. However, these spectra were further included in a 2D SASSI site-specific soil structure interaction (SSI) analysis, (Westinghouse Seismic Bounding Study). This study did not consider backfill material adjacent to the nuclear island that included shear wave velocities from 300 fps to 1200 fps and dry density from 105 to 135 pcf. In-structure response spectra were generated and compared with floor response spectra of the AP1000 certified design at 5-percent damping as described in Appendix 3G. HAR floor response spectra do not exceed the AP1000 spectra for each location identified in DCD **Appendix 3G**.

3.7.2.12 Methods for Seismic Analysis of Dams

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.7.2.12**.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

HAR COL 3.7-1 There are no existing dams upstream or downstream of the Harris Lake that can affect the site interface flood level as specified in DCD [Subsection 2.4.1.2](#) and discussed in FSAR [Subsection 2.4.4](#).

3.7.4.1 Comparison with Regulatory Guide 1.12

Add the following text to the end of DCD [Subsection 3.7.4.1](#).

STD SUP 3.7-1 Administrative procedures define the maintenance and repair of the seismic instrumentation to keep the maximum number of instruments in-service during plant operation and shutdown in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.12.

3.7.4.2.1 Triaxial Acceleration Sensors

Add the following text to the end of DCD [Subsection 3.7.4.2.1](#).

STD COL 3.7-5 A free-field sensor will be located and installed to record the ground surface motion representative of the site. It will be located such that the effects associated with surface features, buildings, and components on the recorded ground motion will be insignificant. The trigger value is initially set at 0.01g.

3.7.4.4 Comparison of Measured and Predicted Responses

Add the following text to the end of DCD [Subsection 3.7.4.4](#).

HAR COL 3.7-2 Post-earthquake operating procedures utilize the guidance of EPRI Reports NP-5930, TR-100082, and NP-6695, as modified and endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guides 1.166 and 1.167. A response spectrum check up to 10Hz and the cumulative absolute velocity will be calculated based on the recorded motions at the free field instrument. If the operating basis earthquake ground motion is exceeded or significant plant damage occurs, the plant must be shutdown in an orderly manner.

STD COL 3.7-2 In addition, the procedures address measurement of the post-seismic event gaps between the new fuel rack and walls of the new fuel storage pit, between the individual spent fuel racks, and from the spent fuel racks to the spent fuel pool walls, and provide for appropriate corrective actions to be taken if needed (such as repositioning the racks or analysis of the as-found condition).

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

3.7.4.5 Tests and Inspections

Add the following text to the end of DCD [Subsection 3.7.4.5](#).

STD SUP 3.7-2 Installation and acceptance testing of the triaxial acceleration sensors described in DCD [Subsection 3.7.4.2.1](#) is completed prior to initial startup. Installation and acceptance testing of the time-history analyzer described in DCD [Subsection 3.7.4.2.2](#) is completed prior to initial startup.

3.7.5 COMBINED LICENSE INFORMATION

3.7.5.1 Seismic Analysis of Dams

HAR COL 3.7-1 This COL Item is addressed in [Subsection 3.7.2.12](#).

3.7.5.2 Post-Earthquake Procedures

HAR COL 3.7-2 This COL Item is addressed in [Subsection 3.7.4.4](#).
STD COL 3.7-2

3.7.5.3 Seismic Interaction Review

Replace DCD [Subsection 3.7.5.3](#) with the following text.

STD COL 3.7-3 The seismic interaction review will be updated for as-built information. This review is performed in parallel with the seismic margin evaluation. The review is based on as-procured data, as well as the as-constructed condition. The as-built seismic interaction review is completed prior to fuel load.

3.7.5.4 Reconciliation of Seismic Analyses of Nuclear Island Structures

Replace DCD [Subsection 3.7.5.4](#) with the following text.

STD COL 3.7-4 The seismic analyses described in DCD [Subsection 3.7.2](#) will be reconciled for detailed design changes, such as those due to as-procured or as-built changes in component mass, center of gravity, and support configuration based on as-procured equipment information. Deviations are acceptable based on an evaluation consistent with the methods and procedure of DCD [Section 3.7](#) provided the amplitude of the seismic floor response spectra, including the effect

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

due to these deviations, does not exceed the design basis floor response spectra by more than 10 percent. This reconciliation will be completed prior to fuel load.

3.7.5.5 Free Field Acceleration Sensor

HAR COL 3.7-5 This COL Item is addressed in [Subsection 3.7.4.2.1](#).

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

3.8 DESIGN OF CATEGORY I STRUCTURES

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

3.8.3.7 In-Service Testing and Inspection Requirements

Replace the existing DCD statement with the following:

STD COL 3.8-5

The inspection program for structures is identified in **Section 17.6**. This inspection program is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 and the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.160.

3.8.4.7 Testing and In-Service Inspection Requirements

Replace the existing DCD final statement of the subsection with the following:

STD COL 3.8-5

The inspection program for structures is identified in **Section 17.6**. This inspection program is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 and the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.160.

3.8.5.1 Description of the Foundations

Add the following text after paragraph one of DCD **Subsection 3.8.5.1**.

STD SUP 3.8-1

The depth of overburden and depth of embedment are given in **Subsection 2.5.4**.

3.8.5.7 In-Service Testing and Inspection Requirements

Replace the existing DCD first statement with the following:

STD COL 3.8-5

The inspection program for structures is identified in **Section 17.6**. This inspection program is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 and the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.160.

3.8.6.5 Structures Inspection Program

STD COL 3.8-5

This item is addressed in **Subsections 3.8.3.7, 3.8.4.7, 3.8.5.7, and 17.6**.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

3.8.6.6 Construction Procedures Program

Add the following to the end of **Subsection 3.8.6.6**:

STD COL 3.8-6

Construction and inspection procedures for concrete filled steel plate modules address activities before and after concrete placement, use of construction mock-ups, and inspection of modules before and after concrete placement as discussed in DCD **Subsection 3.8.4.8**. The procedures will be made available to NRC inspectors prior to use.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

3.9 MECHANICAL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

3.9.3.1.2 Loads for Class 1 Components, Core Support, and Component Supports

Add the following after the last paragraph under DCD subheading Request 3) and prior to DCD subheading Other Applications.

STD COL 3.9-5 PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE MONITORING

General

The pressurizer surge line is monitored at the first AP1000 plant to record temperature distributions and thermal displacements of the surge line piping, as well as pertinent plant parameters. This monitoring occurs during the hot functional testing and first fuel cycle. The resulting monitoring data is evaluated to verify that the pressurizer surge line is within the bounds of the analytical temperature distributions and displacements.

Subsequent AP1000 plants (after the first AP1000 plant) confirm that the heatup and cooldown procedures are consistent with the pertinent attributes of the first AP1000 plant surge line monitoring. In addition, changes to the heatup and cooldown procedures consider the potential impact on stress and fatigue analyses consistent with the concerns of NRC Bulletin 88-11.

The pressurizer surge line monitoring activities include the following methodology and requirements:

Monitoring Method

The pressurizer surge line pipe wall is instrumented with outside mounted temperature and displacement sensors. The data from this instrumentation is supplemented by plant computer data from related process and control parameters.

Locations to be Monitored

In addition to the existing permanent plant temperature instrumentation, temperature and displacement monitoring will be included at critical locations on the surge line. The additional locations utilized for monitoring during the hot functional testing and the first fuel cycle (see **Subsection 14.2.9.2.22**) are selected based on the capability to provide effective monitoring.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

Data Evaluation

Data evaluation is performed at the completion of the monitoring period (one fuel cycle). The evaluation includes a comparison of the data evaluation results with the thermal profiles and transient loadings defined for the pressurizer surge line, accounting for expected pipe outside wall temperatures. Interim evaluations of the data are performed during the hot functional testing period, up to the start of normal power operation, and again once three months worth of normal operating data has been collected, to identify any unexpected conditions in the pressurizer surge line.

3.9.3.4.4 Inspection, Testing, Repair, and/or Replacement of Snubbers

Add the following text after the last paragraph of DCD **Subsection 3.9.3.4.4**:

- STD SUP 3.9-3
- a. Snubber Design and Testing
1. A list of snubbers on systems which experience sufficient thermal movement to measure cold to hot position is included in **Table 3.9-201**.
 2. The snubbers are tested to verify they can perform as required during the seismic events, and under anticipated operational transient loads or other mechanical loads associated with the design requirements for the plant. Production and qualification test programs for both hydraulic and mechanical snubbers are carried out by the snubber vendors in accordance with the snubber installation instruction manual required to be furnished by the snubber supplier. Acceptance criteria for compliance with ASME Section III Subsection NF, and other applicable codes, standards, and requirements, are as follows:
 - Snubber production and qualification test programs are carried out by strict adherence to the manufacturer's snubber installation and instruction manual. This manual is prepared by the snubber manufacturer and subjected to review for compliance with the applicable provisions of the ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping Code of record. The test program is periodically audited during implementation for compliance.
 - Snubbers are inspected and tested for compliance with the design drawings and functional requirements of the procurement specifications.
 - Snubbers are inspected and qualification tested. No sampling methods are used in the qualification tests.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

- Snubbers are load rated by testing in accordance with the snubber manufacturer's testing program and in compliance with the applicable sections of ASME QME-1-2007, Subsection QDR and the ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code), Subsection ISTD.
 - Design compliance of the snubbers per ASME Section III Paragraph NF-3128, and Subparagraphs NF-3411.3 and NF-3412.4.
 - The snubbers are tested for various abnormal environmental conditions. Upon completion of the abnormal environmental transient test, the snubber is tested dynamically at a frequency within a specified frequency range. The snubber must operate normally during the dynamic test. The functional parameters cited in Subparagraph NF-3412.4 are included in the snubber qualification and testing program. Other parameters in accordance with applicable ASME QME-1-2007 and the ASME OM Code will be incorporated.
 - The codes and standards used for snubber qualification and production testing are as follows:
 - ASME B&PV Code Section III (Code of Record date) and Subsection NF.
 - ASME QME-1-2007, Subsection QDR and ASME OM Code, Subsection ISTD.
 - Large bore hydraulic snubbers are full Service Level D load tested, including verifying bleed rates, control valve closure within the specified velocity ranges and drag forces/breakaway forces are acceptable in accordance with ASME, QME-1-2007 and ASME OM Codes.
3. Safety-related snubbers are identified in **Table 3.9-201**, including the snubber identification and the associated system or component, e.g., line number. The snubbers on the list are hydraulic and constructed to ASME Section III, Subsection NF. The snubbers are used for shock loading only. None of the snubbers are dual purpose or vibration arrestor type snubbers.
- b. Snubber Installation Requirements
- Installation instructions contain instructions for storage, handling, erection, and adjustments (if necessary) of snubbers. Each snubber has

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

an installation location drawing that contains the installation location of the snubber on the pipe and structure, the hot and cold settings, and additional information needed to install the particular snubber.

STD COL 3.9-3

The description of the snubber preservice and inservice testing programs in this section is based on the ASME OM Code 2001 Edition through 2003 Addenda. The initial inservice testing program incorporates the latest edition and addenda of the ASME OM Code approved in 10 CFR 50.55a(f) on the date 12 months before initial fuel load. Limitations and modifications set forth in 10 CFR 50.55a are incorporated.

c. Snubber Preservice Examination and Testing

The preservice examination plan for applicable snubbers is prepared in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code), Subsection ISTD, and the additional requirements of this Section. This examination is made after snubber installation but not more than 6 months prior to initial system preoperational testing. The preservice examination verifies the following:

1. There are no visible signs of damage or impaired operational readiness as a result of storage, handling, or installation.
2. The snubber load rating, location, orientation, position setting, and configuration (attachments, extensions, etc.) are according to design drawings and specifications.
3. Snubbers are not seized, frozen or jammed.
4. Adequate swing clearance is provided to allow snubber movements.
5. If applicable, fluid is to the recommended level and is not to be leaking from the snubber system.
6. Structural connections such as pins, fasteners and other connecting hardware such as lock nuts, tabs, wire, cotter pins are installed correctly.

If the period between the initial preservice examination and initial system preoperational tests exceeds 6 months, reexamination of Items 1, 4, and 5 is performed. Snubbers, which are installed incorrectly or otherwise fail to meet the above requirements, are repaired or replaced and re-examined in accordance with the above criteria.

A preservice thermal movement examination is also performed, during initial system startup and cooldown. For systems whose design operating

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

temperature exceeds 250°F (121°C), snubber thermal movement is verified.

Additionally, preservice operational readiness testing is performed on snubbers. The operational readiness test is performed to verify the parameters of ISTD 5120. Snubbers that fail the preservice operational readiness test are evaluated to determine the cause of failure, and are retested following completion of corrective action(s).

Snubbers that are installed incorrectly or otherwise fail preservice testing requirements are re-installed correctly, adjusted, modified, repaired or replaced, as required. Preservice examination and testing is re-performed on installation-corrected, adjusted, modified, repaired or replaced snubbers as required.

d. Snubber Inservice Examination and Testing

Inservice examination and testing of safety-related snubbers is conducted in accordance with the requirements of the ASME OM Code, Subsection ISTD. Inservice examination is initially performed not less than two months after attaining 5 percent reactor power operation and is completed within 12 calendar months after attaining 5 percent reactor power. Subsequent examinations are performed at intervals defined by ISTD-4252 and Table ISTD-4252-1. Examination intervals, subsequent to the third interval, are adjusted based on the number of unacceptable snubbers identified in the current interval.

An inservice visual examination is performed on the snubbers to identify physical damage, leakage, corrosion, degradation, indication of binding, misalignment or deformation and potential defects generic to a particular design. Snubbers that do not meet visual examination requirements are evaluated to determine the root cause of the unacceptability, and appropriate corrective actions (e.g., snubber is adjusted, repaired, modified, or replaced) are taken. Snubbers evaluated as unacceptable during visual examination may be accepted for continued service by successful completion of an operational readiness test.

Snubbers are tested inservice to determine operational readiness during each fuel cycle, beginning no sooner than 60 days before the start of the refueling outage. Snubber operational readiness tests are conducted with the snubber in the as-found condition, to the extent practical, either in-place or on a test bench, to verify the test parameters of ISTD-5210. When an in-place test or bench test cannot be performed, snubber subcomponents that control the parameters to be verified are examined and tested. Preservice examinations are performed on snubbers after reinstallation when bench testing is used (ISTD-5224), or on snubbers where individual subcomponents are reinstalled after examination (ISTD-5225).

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

Defined test plan groups (DTPG) are established and the snubbers of each DTPG are tested according to an established sampling plan each fuel cycle. Sample plan size and composition is determined as required for the selected sample plan, with additional sampling as may be required for that sample plan based on test failures and failure modes identified. Snubbers that do not meet test requirements are evaluated to determine root cause of the failure, and are assigned to failure mode groups (FMG) based on the evaluation, unless the failure is considered unexplained or isolated. The number of unexplained snubber failures, not assigned to a FMG, determines the additional testing sample. Isolated failures do not require additional testing. For unacceptable snubbers, additional testing is conducted for the DTPG or FMG until the appropriate sample plan completion criteria are satisfied.

Unacceptable snubbers are adjusted, repaired, modified, or replaced. Replacement snubbers meet the requirements of ISTD-1600. Post-maintenance examination and testing, and examination and testing of repaired snubbers, is done to verify as acceptable the test parameters that may have been affected by the repair or maintenance activity.

Service life for snubbers is established, monitored and adjusted as required by ISTD-6000 and the guidance of ASME OM Code Nonmandatory Appendix F.

3.9.6 INSERVICE TESTING OF PUMPS AND VALVES

Revise the third sentence of the third paragraph of DCD **Subsection 3.9.6**, and add information between the third and fourth sentences as follows:

STD COL 3.9-4

The edition and addenda to be used for the inservice testing program are administratively controlled; the description of the inservice testing program in this section is based on the ASME OM Code 2001 Edition through 2003 Addenda. The initial inservice testing program incorporates the latest edition and addenda of the ASME OM Code approved in 10 CFR 50.55a(f) on the date 12 months before initial fuel load. Limitations and modifications set forth in 10 CFR 50.55a are incorporated.

Revise the fifth sentence of the sixth paragraph of DCD **Subsection 3.9.6** as follows:

STD COL 3.9-4

Alternate means of performing these tests and inspections that provide equivalent demonstration may be developed in the inservice test program as ~~described in subsection 3.9.8.~~

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

Revise the first two sentences of the final paragraph of DCD **Subsection 3.9.6** to read as follows:

STD COL 3.9-4 A preservice test program, which identifies the required functional testing, is to be submitted to the NRC prior to performing the tests and following the start of construction. The inservice test program, which identifies requirements for functional testing, is to be submitted to the NRC prior to the anticipated date of commercial operation as described above.

Add the following text after the last paragraph of DCD **Subsection 3.9.6**:

Table 13.4-201 provides milestones for preservice and inservice test program implementation.

3.9.6.2.2 Valve Testing

Add the following prior to the initial paragraph of DCD **Subsection 3.9.6.2.2**:

STD COL 3.9-4 Valve testing uses reference values determined from the results of preservice testing or inservice testing. These tests that establish reference and IST values are performed under conditions as near as practicable to those expected during the IST. Reference values are established only when a valve is known to be operating acceptably.

Pre-conditioning of valves or their associated actuators or controls prior to IST testing undermines the purpose of IST testing and is not allowed. Pre-conditioning includes manipulation, pre-testing, maintenance, lubrication, cleaning, exercising, stroking, operating, or disturbing the valve to be tested in any way, except as may occur in an unscheduled, unplanned, and unanticipated manner during normal operation.

Add the following sentence to the end of the fourth paragraph under the heading "Manual/Power-Operated Valve Tests":

STD COL 3.9-4 Stroke time is measured and compared to the reference value, except for valves classified as fast-acting (e.g., solenoid-operated valves with stroke time less than 2 seconds), for which a stroke time limit of 2 seconds is assigned.

Add the following paragraph after the fifth paragraph under the heading "Manual/Power-Operated Valve Tests":

STD COL 3.9-4 During valve exercise tests, the necessary valve obturator movement is verified while observing an appropriate direct indicator, such as indicating lights that signal the required changes of obturator position, or by observing other evidence

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

or positive means, such as changes in system pressure, flow, level, or temperature that reflects change of obturator position.

Insert new second sentence of the paragraph containing the subheading “Power-Operated Valve Operability Tests” in DCD **Subsection 3.9.6.2.2** (immediately following the first sentence of the DCD paragraph) to read:

STD COL 3.9-4 The POVs include the motor-operated valves.

Add the following sentence as the last sentence of the paragraph containing the subheading “Power-Operated Valve Operability Tests” in DCD **Subsection 3.9.6.2.2**:

STD COL 3.9-4 **Table 13.4-201** provides milestones for the MOV program implementation.

Insert the following as the last sentence in the paragraph under the bulleted item titled “Risk Ranking” in DCD **Subsection 3.9.6.2.2**:

STD COL 3.9-4 Guidance for this process is outlined in the JOG MOV PV Study, MPR-2524-A.

Insert the following text after the last paragraph under the sub-heading of “Power-Operated Valve Operability Tests” and before the sub-heading “Check Valve Tests” in DCD **Subsection 3.9.6.2.2**:

STD COL 3.9-4 **Active MOV Test Frequency Determination** - The ability of a valve to meet its design basis functional requirements (i.e. required capability) is verified during valve qualification testing as required by procurement specifications. Valve qualification testing measures valve actuator actual output capability. The actuator output capability is compared to the valve’s required capability defined in procurement specifications, establishing functional margin; that is, that increment by which the MOV’s actual output capability exceeds the capability required to operate the MOV under design basis conditions. DCD **Subsection 5.4.8** discusses valve functional design and qualification requirements. The initial inservice test frequency is determined as required by ASME OM Code Case OMN-1, Revision 1 (**Reference 202**). The design basis capability testing of MOVs utilizes guidance from Generic Letter 96-05 and the JOG MOV Periodic Verification PV Program. Valve functional margin is evaluated following subsequent periodic testing to address potential time-related performance degradation, accounting for applicable uncertainties in the analysis. If the evaluation shows that the functional margin will be reduced to less than established acceptance criteria within the established test interval, the test interval is decreased to less than the time for the functional margin to decrease below acceptance criteria. If there is not sufficient data to determine test frequency as described above, the test frequency is limited to not exceed two (2) refueling cycles or three (3) years, whichever is longer, until sufficient data exist

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report

to extend the test frequency. Appropriate justification is provided for any increased test interval, and the maximum test interval shall not exceed 10 years. This is to ensure that each MOV in the IST program will have adequate margin (including consideration for aging-related degradation, degraded voltage, control switch repeatability, and load-sensitive MOV behavior) to remain operable until the next scheduled test, regardless of its risk categorization or safety significance. Uncertainties associated with performance of these periodic verification tests and use of the test results (including those associated with measurement equipment and potential degradation mechanisms) are addressed appropriately. Uncertainties may be considered in the specification of acceptable valve setup parameters or in the interpretation of the test results (or a combination of both). Uncertainties affecting both valve function and structural limits are addressed.

Maximum torque and/or thrust (as applicable) achieved by the MOV (allowing sufficient margin for diagnostic equipment inaccuracies and control switch repeatability) are established so as not to exceed the allowable structural and undervoltage motor capability limits for the individual parts of the MOV.

Solenoid-operated valves (SOVs) are tested to confirm the valve moves to its energized position and is maintained in that position, and to confirm that the valve moves to the appropriate failure mode position when de-energized.

Other Power-Operated Valve Operability Tests – Power-Operated valves other than active MOVs are exercised quarterly in accordance with ASME OM ISTC, unless justification is provided in the inservice testing program for testing these valves at other than Code mandated frequencies.

Although the design basis capability of power-operated valves is verified as part of the design and qualification process, power-operated valves that perform an active safety function are tested again after installation in the plant, as required, to ensure valve setup is acceptable to perform their required functions, consistent with valve qualification. These tests, which are typically performed under static (no flow or pressure) conditions, also document the “baseline” performance of the valves to support maintenance and trending programs. During the testing, critical parameters needed to ensure proper valve setup are measured. Depending on the valve and actuator type, these parameters may include seat load, running torque or thrust, valve travel, actuator spring rate, bench set and regulator supply pressure. Uncertainties associated with performance of these tests and use of the test results (including those associated with measurement equipment and potential degradation mechanisms) are addressed appropriately. Uncertainties may be considered in the specification of acceptable valve setup parameters or in the interpretation of the test results (or a combination of both). Uncertainties affecting both valve function and structural limits are addressed.

Additional testing is performed as part of the air-operated valve (AOV) program, which includes the key elements for an AOV Program as identified in the JOG AOV program document, Joint Owners Group Air Operated Valve Program Document, Revision 1, December 13, 2000 ([References 203](#) and [204](#)). The AOV

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report

program incorporates the attributes for a successful power-operated valve long-term periodic verification program, as discussed in Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-03, Resolution of Generic Safety Issue 158: Performance of Safety-Related Power-Operated Valves Under Design Basis Conditions, by incorporating lessons learned from previous nuclear power plant operations and research programs as they apply to the periodic testing of air- and other power-operated valves included in the IST program. For example, key lessons learned addressed in the AOV program include:

- Valves are categorized according to their safety significance and risk ranking.
- Setpoints for AOVs are defined based on current vendor information or valve qualification diagnostic testing, such that the valve is capable of performing its design-basis function(s).
- Periodic static testing is performed, at a minimum on high risk (high safety significance) valves, to identify potential degradation, unless those valves are periodically cycled during normal plant operation, under conditions that meet or exceed the worst case operating conditions within the licensing basis of the plant for the valve, which would provide adequate periodic demonstration of AOV capability. If required based on valve qualification or operating experience, periodic dynamic testing is performed to re-verify the capability of the valve to perform its required functions.
- Sufficient diagnostics are used to collect relevant data (e.g., valve stem thrust and torque, fluid pressure and temperature, stroke time, operating and/or control air pressure, etc.) to verify the valve meets the functional requirements of the qualification specification.
- Test frequency is specified, and is evaluated each refueling outage based on data trends as a result of testing. Frequency for periodic testing is in accordance with [References 203](#) and [204](#), with a minimum of 5 years (or 3 refueling cycles) of data collected and evaluated before extending test intervals.
- Post-maintenance procedures include appropriate instructions and criteria to ensure baseline testing is re-performed as necessary when maintenance on the valve, repair or replacement, have the potential to affect valve functional performance.
- Guidance is included to address lessons learned from other valve programs specific to the AOV program.
- Documentation from AOV testing, including maintenance records and records from the corrective action program are retained and periodically evaluated as a part of the AOV program.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

Insert the following paragraph as the last paragraph under the sub-heading of "Power-Operated Valve Operability Tests" (following the previously added paragraph) and just before the sub-heading "Check Valve Tests" in DCD **Subsection 3.9.6.2.2**:

STD COL 3.9-4 Successful completion of the preservice and IST of MOVs, in addition to MOV testing as required by 10 CFR 50.55a, demonstrates that the following criteria are met for each valve tested: (i) valve fully opens and/or closes as required by its safety function; (ii) adequate margin exists and includes consideration of diagnostic equipment inaccuracies, degraded voltage, control switch repeatability, load-sensitive MOV behavior, and a margin for degradation; and (iii) maximum torque and/or thrust (as applicable) achieved by the MOV (allowing sufficient margin for diagnostic equipment inaccuracies and control switch repeatability) does not exceed the allowable structural and undervoltage motor capability limits for the individual parts of the MOV.

Add the paragraph below as the last paragraph of FSAR **Subsection 3.9.6.2.2** prior to the subheading "Check Valve Tests":

STD COL 3.9-4 The attributes of the AOV testing program described above, to the extent that they apply to and can be implemented on other safety-related power-operated valves, such as electro-hydraulic valves, are applied to those other power-operated valves.

Add the following new paragraph under the heading "Check Valve Tests" in DCD **Subsection 3.9.6.2.2**:

STD COL 3.9-4 Preoperational testing is performed during the initial test program (refer to DCD **Subsection 14.2**) to verify that valves are installed in a configuration that allows correct operation, testing, and maintenance. Preoperational testing verifies that piping design features accommodate check valve testing requirements. Tests also verify disk movement to and from the seat and determine, without disassembly, that the valve disk positions correctly, fully opens or fully closes as expected, and remains stable in the open position under the full spectrum of system design-basis fluid flow conditions.

Add the following new last paragraphs under the subheading "Check Valve Exercise Tests" in DCD **Subsection 3.9.6.2.2**:

STD COL 3.9-4 Acceptance criteria for this testing consider the specific system design and valve application. For example, a valve's safety function may require obturator movement in both open and closed directions. A mechanical exerciser may be used to operate a check valve for testing. Where a mechanical exerciser is used, acceptance criteria are provided for the force or torque required to move the

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

check valve's obturator. Exercise tests also detect missing, sticking, or binding obturators.

When operating conditions, valve design, valve location, or other considerations prevent direct observation or measurements by use of conventional methods to determine adequate check valve function, diagnostic equipment and nonintrusive techniques are used to monitor internal conditions. Nonintrusive tests used are dependent on system and valve configuration, valve design and materials, and include methods such as ultrasonic (acoustic), magnetic, radiography, and use of accelerometers to measure system and valve operating parameters (e.g., fluid flow, disk position, disk movement, disk impact, and the presence or absence of cavitation and back-tapping). Nonintrusive techniques also detect valve degradation. Diagnostic equipment and techniques used for valve operability determinations are verified as effective and accurate under the PST program.

Testing is performed, to the extent practicable, under normal operation, cold shutdown, or refueling conditions applicable to each check valve. Testing includes effects created by sudden starting and stopping of pumps, if applicable, or other conditions, such as flow reversal. When maintenance that could affect valve performance is performed on a valve in the IST program, post-maintenance testing is conducted prior to returning the valve to service.

Add the following new paragraph under the heading "Other Valve Inservice Tests" following the Explosively Actuated Valves paragraph in DCD **Subsection 3.9.6.2.2**:

STD COL 3.9-4 Industry and regulatory guidance is considered in development of IST program for squib valves. In addition, the IST program for squib valves incorporates lessons learned from the design and qualification process for these valves such that surveillance activities provide reasonable assurance of the operational readiness of squib valves to perform their safety functions.

3.9.6.2.3 Valve Disassembly and Inspection

Add the following paragraph as the new second paragraph of DCD **Subsection 3.9.6.2.3**:

STD COL 3.9-4 During the disassembly process, the full-stroke motion of the obturator is verified. Nondestructive examination is performed on the hinge pin to assess wear, and seat contact surfaces are examined to verify adequate contact. Full-stroke motion of the obturator is re-verified immediately prior to completing reassembly. At least one valve from each group is disassembled and examined at each refueling outage, and all the valves in each group are disassembled and examined at least once every eight years. Before being returned to service, valves disassembled for examination or valves that received maintenance that could affect their performance are exercised with a full- or part-stroke. Details

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

and bases of the sampling program are documented and recorded in the test plan.

Add **Subsections 3.9.6.2.4** and **3.9.6.2.5** following the last paragraph of DCD **Subsection 3.9.6.2.3**:

STD COL 3.9-4 3.9.6.2.4 Valve Preservice Tests

Each valve subject to inservice testing is also tested during the preservice test period. Preservice tests are conducted under conditions as near as practicable to those expected during subsequent inservice testing. Valves (or the control system) that have undergone maintenance that could affect performance, and valves that have been repaired or replaced, are re-tested to verify performance parameters that could have been affected are within acceptable limits. Safety and relief valves and nonreclosing pressure relief devices are preservice tested in accordance with the requirements of the ASME OM Code, Mandatory Appendix I.

Preservice tests for valves are performed in accordance with ASME OM, ISTC-3100.

3.9.6.2.5 Valve Replacement, Repair, and Maintenance

Testing in accordance with ASME OM, ISTC-3310 is performed after a valve is replaced, repaired, or undergoes maintenance. When a valve or its control system has been replaced, repaired, or has undergone maintenance that could affect valve performance, a new reference value is determined, or the previous value is reconfirmed by an inservice test. This test is performed before the valve is returned to service, or immediately if the valve is not removed from service. Deviations between the previous and new reference values are identified and analyzed. Verification that the new values represent acceptable operation is documented.

3.9.6.3 Relief Requests

Insert the following text after the first paragraph in DCD **Subsection 3.9.6.3**:

STD COL 3.9-4 The IST Program described herein utilizes Code Case OMN-1, Revision 1, “Alternative Rules for the Preservice and Inservice Testing of Certain Electric Motor-Operated Valve Assemblies in Light Water Reactor Power Plants” (**Reference 202**). Code Case OMN-1 establishes alternate rules and requirements for preservice and inservice testing to assess the operational readiness of certain motor operated valves in lieu of the requirements set forth in ASME OM Code Subsection ISTC.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report

OMN-1, Alternative Rules for the Preservice and Inservice Testing of Certain MOVs

Code Case OMN-1, Revision 1, "Alternative Rules for the Preservice and Inservice Testing of Certain Electric Motor Operated Valve Assemblies in Light Water Reactor Power Plants," establishes alternate rules and requirements for preservice and inservice testing to assess the operational readiness of certain motor-operated valves in lieu of the requirements set forth in OM Code Subsection ISTC. However, Regulatory Guide 1.192, "Operation and Maintenance Code Case Acceptability, ASME OM Code," June 2003, has not yet endorsed OMN-1, Revision 1.

Code Case OMN-1, Revision 0, has been determined by the NRC to provide an acceptable level of quality and safety when implemented in conjunction with the conditions imposed in Regulatory Guide 1.192. NUREG-1482, Revision 1, "Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants," recommends the implementation of OMN-1 by all licensees. Revision 1 to OMN-1 represents an improvement over Revision 0, as published in the ASME OM-2004 Code. OMN-1 Revision 1 incorporates the guidance on risk-informed testing of MOVs from OMN-11, "Risk-Informed Testing of Motor-Operated Valves," and provides additional guidance on design basis verification testing and functional margin, which eliminates the need for the figures on functional margin and test intervals in Code Case OMN-1.

The IST Program implements Code Case OMN-1, Revision 1, in lieu of the stroke-time provisions specified in ISTC-5120 for MOVs, consistent with the guidelines provided in NUREG-1482, Revision 1, Section 4.2.5.

Regulatory Guide 1.192 states that licensees may use Code Case OMN-1, Revision 0, in lieu of the provisions for stroke-time testing in Subsection ISTC of the 1995 Edition up to and including the 2000 Addenda of the ASME OM Code when applied in conjunction with the provisions for leakage rate testing in ISTC-3600 (1998 Edition with the 1999 and 2000 Addenda). Licensees who choose to apply OMN-1 are required to apply all of its provisions. The IST program incorporates the following provisions from Regulatory Guide 1.192:

- (1) The adequacy of the diagnostic test interval for each motor-operated valve (MOV) is evaluated and adjusted as necessary, but not later than 5 years or three refueling outages (whichever is longer) from initial implementation of OMN-1.
- (2) The potential increase in CDF and risk associated with extending high risk MOV test intervals beyond quarterly is determined to be small and consistent with the intent of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement.
- (3) Risk insights are applied using MOV risk ranking methodologies accepted by the NRC on a plant-specific or industry-wide basis, consistent with the conditions in the applicable safety evaluations.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

(4) Consistent with the provisions specified for Code Case OMN-11 the potential increase in CDF and risk associated with extending high risk MOV test intervals beyond quarterly is determined to be small and consistent with the intent of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement.

Compliance with the above items is addressed in [Section 3.9.6.2.2](#). Code Case OMN-1, Revision 1, is considered acceptable for use with OM Code-2001 Edition with 2003 Addenda. Finally, consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.192, the benefits of performing any particular test are balanced against the potential adverse effects placed on the valves or systems caused by this testing.

3.9.8 COMBINED LICENSE INFORMATION

3.9.8.2 Design Specifications and Reports

Add the following text after the second paragraph in DCD [Subsection 3.9.8.2](#).

STD COL 3.9-2 Design specifications and design reports for ASME Section III piping are made available for NRC review. Reconciliation of the as-built piping (verification of the thermal cycling and stratification loading considered in the stress analysis discussed in DCD [Subsection 3.9.3.1.2](#)) is completed by the COL holder after the construction of the piping systems and prior to fuel load (in accordance with DCD [Tier 1 Section 2](#) ITAAC line item for the applicable systems).

3.9.8.3 Snubber Operability Testing

STD COL 3.9-3 This COL Item is addressed in [Subsection 3.9.3.4.4](#).

3.9.8.4 Valve Inservice Testing

STD COL 3.9-4 This COL Item is addressed in [Subsections 3.9.6, 3.9.6.2.2, 3.9.6.2.4, 3.9.6.2.5, and 3.9.6.3](#).

3.9.8.5 Surge Line Thermal Monitoring

STD COL 3.9-5 This COL item is addressed in [Subsection 3.9.3.1.2](#) and [Subsection 14.2.9.2.22](#).

3.9.8.7 As-Designed Piping Analysis

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

Add the following text at the end of DCD [Subsection 3.9.8.7](#).

STD COL 3.9-7

The as-designed piping analysis is provided for the piping lines chosen to demonstrate all aspects of the piping design. A design report referencing the as-designed piping calculation packages, including ASME Section III piping analysis, support evaluations and piping component fatigue analysis for Class 1 piping using the methods and criteria outlined in DCD [Table 3.9-19](#) is made available for NRC review.

This COL item is also addressed in [Subsection 14.3.3](#).

3.9.9 REFERENCES

201. Not used.
 202. ASME Code Case OMN-1, Revision 1, "Alternative Rules for the Preservice and Inservice Testing of Certain Electric Motor-Operated Valve Assemblies in Light Water Reactor Power Plants."
 203. Joint Owners Group Air Operated Valve Program Document, Revision 1, December 13, 2000.
 204. USNRC, Eugene V. Imbro, letter to Mr. David J. Modeen, Nuclear Energy Institute, Comments on Joint Owners' Group Air Operated Valve Program Document, dated October 8, 1999.
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**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

STD SUP 3.9-3

**Table 3.9-201
Safety Related Snubbers**

System	Snubber (Hanger) No.	Line #	System	Snubber (Hanger) No.	Line #
CVS	APP-CVS-PH-11Y0164	L001	RNS	APP-RNS-PH-12Y2060	L006
PXS	APP-PXS-PH-11Y0020	L021A	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y0001	L003B
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0039	L215	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y0002	L003B
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0067	L005B	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y0004	L003B
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0080	L112	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y0057	L003A
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0081	L215	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y0058	L004B
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0082	L112	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y0063	L003A
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0090	L118A	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y0065	L005B
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0099	L022B	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-12Y0136	L015C
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0103	L003	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-12Y0137	L015C
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0105	L003	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y0470	L006B
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0112	L032A	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y2002	L006A
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0429	L225B	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y2021	L006A
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0528	L005A	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y3101	L006B
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0539	L225C	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y3102	L006B
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0550	L011B	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y3121	L006B
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0551	L011A	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y0463	L006A
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0553	L153B	SGS	APP-SGS-PH-11Y0464	L006A
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y0555	L153A	SGS	SG 1 Snubber A (1A)	(1)
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y2005	L022A	SGS	SG 1 Snubber B (1B)	(1)
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y2101	L032B	SGS	SG 2 Snubber A (2A)	(1)
RCS	APP-RCS-PH-11Y2117	L225A	SGS	SG 2 Snubber B (2B)	(1)

(1) These snubbers are on the upper lateral support assembly of the steam generators.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

3.10 SEISMIC AND DYNAMIC QUALIFICATION OF SEISMIC CATEGORY I
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no departures or supplements.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

3.11 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

3.11.5 COMBINED LICENSE INFORMATION ITEM FOR EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION FILE

Add the following text to the end of DCD **Subsection 3.11.5**.

STD COL 3.11-1

The COL holder is responsible for the maintenance of the equipment qualification file upon receipt from the reactor vendor. The documentation necessary to support the continued qualification of the equipment installed in the plant that is within the Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program scope is available in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design Criterion 1.

EQ files developed by the reactor vendor are maintained as applicable for equipment and certain post-accident monitoring devices that are subject to a harsh environment. The contents of the qualification files are discussed in DCD **Section 3D.7**. The files are maintained for the operational life of the plant.

For equipment not located in a harsh environment, design specifications received from the reactor vendor are retained. Any plant modifications that impact the equipment use the original specifications for modification or procurement. This process is governed by applicable plant design control or configuration control procedures.

Central to the EQ Program is the EQ Master Equipment List (EQMEL). This EQMEL identifies the electrical and mechanical equipment or components that must be environmentally qualified for use in a harsh environment. The EQMEL consists of equipment that is essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, or containment and reactor heat removal, or that is otherwise essential in preventing significant release of radioactive material to the environment. This list is developed from the equipment list provided in AP1000 DCD **Table 3.11-1**. The EQMEL and a summary of equipment qualification results are maintained as part of the equipment qualification file for the operational life of the plant.

Administrative programs are in place to control revision to the EQ files and the EQMEL. When adding or modifying components in the EQ Program, EQ files are generated or revised to support qualification. The EQMEL is revised to reflect these new components. To delete a component from the EQ Program, a deletion justification is prepared that demonstrates why the component can be deleted. This justification consists of an analysis of the component, an associated circuit review if appropriate, and a safety evaluation. The justification is released and/or referenced on an appropriate change document. For changes to the EQMEL,

Rev. 4 |

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

supporting documentation is completed and approved prior to issuing the changes. This documentation includes safety reviews and new or revised EQ files. Plant modifications and design basis changes are subject to change process reviews, e.g. reviews in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 or Section VIII of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52, in accordance with appropriate plant procedures. These reviews address EQ issues associated with the activity. Any changes to the EQMEL that are not the result of a modification or design basis change are subject to a separate review that is accomplished and documented in accordance with plant procedures.

Engineering change documents or maintenance documents generated to document work performed on an EQ component, which may not have an impact on the EQ file, are reviewed against the current revision of the EQ files for potential impact. Changes to EQ documentation may be due to, but not limited to, plant modifications, calculations, corrective maintenance, or other EQ concerns.

Table 13.4-201 provides milestones for EQ implementation.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

APPENDIX 3A HVAC DUCTS AND DUCT SUPPORTS

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no departures or supplements.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

APPENDIX 3B LEAK-BEFORE-BREAK EVALUATION OF THE AP1000
PIPING

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no departures or supplements.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

APPENDIX 3C REACTOR COOLANT LOOP ANALYSIS METHODS

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no departures or supplements.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

APPENDIX 3D METHODOLOGY FOR QUALIFYING AP1000
SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL
EQUIPMENT

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no departures or supplements.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

APPENDIX 3E HIGH-ENERGY PIPING IN THE NUCLEAR ISLAND

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no departures or supplements.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

APPENDIX 3F CABLE TRAYS AND CABLE TRAY SUPPORTS

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no departures or supplements.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

APPENDIX 3G NUCLEAR ISLAND SEISMIC ANALYSES

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no departures or supplements.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

APPENDIX 3H AUXILIARY AND SHIELD BUILDING CRITICAL
SECTIONS

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no departures or supplements.

**Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3
COL Application
Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report**

APPENDIX 3I EVALUATION FOR HIGH FREQUENCY SEISMIC INPUT

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no departures or supplements.