

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

Before Administrative Judges:

Paul S. Ryerson, Chairman
Dr. James F. Jackson
Dr. Michael O. Garcia

In the Matter of:

GE-HITACHI GLOBAL LASER ENRICHMENT
LLC

(GLE Commercial Facility)

Docket No. 70-7016-ML

ASLBP No. 10-901-03-ML-BD01

April 4, 2012

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
(Initial Board Questions and Associated Administrative Directives)

In accordance with the Fourth Revised Scheduling Order, the parties shall respond, on or before May 2, 2012, to the Board's initial written questions attached hereto.¹ The parties are reminded that, pursuant to that Order, "[t]he parties' written answers shall, for each question, identify the responding subject matter expert(s) or individual(s), and shall be submitted in exhibit form, under oath, so that they are suitable for receipt into evidence without the necessity of the personal appearance of each expert or individual."²

To avoid potential confusion, if associated attachments are submitted with the answers, they should be labeled as "attachments" and not as "exhibits." The NRC's E-Filing system treats pre-filed written testimony and exhibits that are submitted in connection with an

¹ Licensing Board Fourth Revised Scheduling Order (Oct. 5, 2011) at 6-8 (unpublished).

² Id. at 6.

evidentiary hearing differently from other submissions.³ Instructions concerning the submission of such pre-filed hearing exhibits will be provided at the appropriate time in a subsequent order.

Although the Board's questions do not disclose classified information or sensitive unclassified information of other kinds, it is possible that submitting accurate and complete answers to some of the Board's questions might require National Security Information or Restricted Data to be addressed. The Board requests that, if practicable, the parties avoid discussing classified or sensitive unclassified information in their responses to the Board's initial written questions. Rather, a party should indicate that a more complete answer to a particular question would require discussion of such information, and the Board will allow an opportunity to expand such answers at the evidentiary hearing. Preliminarily, the Board expects that it will be necessary to cover criticality, radiological and chemical safety in some detail at the evidentiary hearing.

The parties may nonetheless determine that, for certain answers, it is not practicable to postpone discussion of all classified or sensitive unclassified information until the evidentiary hearing. If that is the case, the Applicant shall separately submit, in accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 95 as implemented by the Applicant's security plan, one copy of the classified portion of its answer to each such question to Ms. SherVerne Cloyd (301-415-6504) at the offices of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, using the following classified mailing address:

Outer Envelope:

Headquarters

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Caller Box 2500

Rockville, MD 20852

Inner Envelope:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Caller Box 2500

Rockville, MD 20852

Attn: Ms. SherVerne Cloyd (MS T-3F23)

³ See 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(g).

Likewise, the NRC Staff shall separately submit, in accordance with Management Directive 12.2, NRC Classified Information Security Program, one copy of the classified portion of its answer to each such question to Ms. Cloyd. The portion of either party's answer to a question that contains sensitive unclassified information shall be separately submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system, using the procedures for submitting non-public information and complying with the NRC transmission requirements specified for SUNSI and SGI when applicable. In accordance with the Fourth Revised Scheduling Order,⁴ if either party believes that any of the foregoing procedures may be inadequate to protect covered information, it should so advise the Board as soon as possible and suggest alternative procedures.

Consistent with the Board's role in this uncontested proceeding—that is, to consider the sufficiency of the NRC Staff's review of the Application—most of the Board's questions are directed primarily to the NRC Staff. As appropriate, however, answers to the Board's questions should be submitted both by the NRC Staff and by the Applicant. To the extent practicable, the parties are encouraged to coordinate their responses so as to avoid repetition.

It is so ORDERED.

FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY
AND LICENSING BOARD

/RA/

Paul S. Ryerson, Chairman
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

Rockville, Maryland
April 4, 2012

⁴ Licensing Board Fourth Revised Scheduling Order (Oct. 5, 2011) at 5 (unpublished).

Attachment A
(FSER-Related Questions)

1. Except for the laser-based separations process, much of the proposed facility is similar to previously licensed enrichment plants. While the safety risks may well be dominated by operations outside the cascade area, the understanding and control of these risks is rooted in an extensive operational history in other enrichment facilities. By contrast, there is no full-scale long-term operational experience for the laser-based separations process. Given these circumstances, explain the approach of the NRC Staff in testing the adequacy of the Applicant's safety evaluation related to this unique part of the facility.
2. Except as already discussed in the FSER or in response to other, more specific questions set forth below, identify any regulatory guides that were either directly or indirectly applicable to the proposed facility and explain how they were applied or adapted to the NRC Staff's review.
3. Except as otherwise discussed in response to more specific questions set forth below, identify significant issues to which the NRC Staff determined that no regulatory guide applied, and explain how the NRC Staff addressed such issues.
4. Except as otherwise discussed in response to more specific questions set forth below, describe the process (including timing considerations) by which the NRC Staff ensures that all of the Applicant's commitments, assumptions and procedures regarding the not-as-yet built facility are tracked and how it is determined that the assumptions are verified, commitments have been met, and procedures are in place at the appropriate time prior to facility operation.
5. What is the rationale for a notice-only license condition for changes made when the Applicant moves to enrichment greater than 5 percent U235 by weight? What recourse would the NRC Staff have if it were concerned about any changes to the facility, equipment, shipments, or operations? (SER, 1-9)¹
6. Clarify the scope of the authorization request and license condition in section 1.2.3.7.2. Does this mean that a process within the facility could be modified without prior approval as long as it does not degrade safety? If so, how is this safety determination made, and how does the NRC Staff ensure its accuracy? (SER, 1-12)
7. Do the exemption that allows incremental decommissioning funding and the associated license condition differ from the arrangements that the NRC Staff approved with respect to the Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility? If so, explain how they differ and the NRC Staff's reasoning. (SER, 1-14 to 1-16)
8. Did the NRC Staff approve Standard Practice Procedures Plan (SPPP)-03, or is it to be approved when SP-01 and SPPP-03 are combined? (SER, 1-24)

¹ Page references are to the public version of the SER, except for citations to the Accident Analysis Appendix to the non-public version.

9. How has the potential impact of tornado winds on the proposed facility been assessed in the absence of a final plant design? Preliminary plans call for large surface areas on the facility. What design evaluations have been done for wind? (SER, 1-34 to 1-35)
10. Expand on the rationale that a hurricane surge could not reach the site. Does the Regulatory Guide 1.59 methodology consider topographical features? Does the stated surge prediction include significant conservatism? (SER, 1-35, ISAS, 2-26)
11. Given recent events at Fukushima Daiichi, did the NRC Staff use an increased level of conservatism in evaluating the potential impact of a tsunami on site safety? (SER, 1-39)
12. What, if any, further tests or evaluations are planned regarding hydrology? (SER, 1-44)
13. The FSER states that the Nuclear Criticality Safety Manager, at a minimum, will have "experience in the understanding, application, and direction of NCS programs." This appears to require no specific education, training or firsthand experience with criticality safety methods, previous criticality events, or performing criticality safety analyses. Explain how the NRC Staff determined this to be an adequate level of qualification. (SER, 2-6)
14. Will the Industrial Safety Manager be required to have specific training and experience in laser safety? (SER, 2-6)
15. Did NUREG-1520 provide an adequate basis for the NRC Staff to review all aspects of this laser-based facility? Are there areas where the guidance needed to be supplemented? As a specific example, is the guidance adequate to form the basis for reviewing the Applicant's laser safety program? (SER, 3-3)
16. Regarding potential aircraft crashes at the site: (SER, 3-15 to 3-17)
 - a. Expand on the NRC Staff's rationale for accepting that crashes by single engine planes could be excluded. Specifically, what is the support for the NRC Staff's conclusions?
 - b. Were crashes into the tank storage areas considered? If not, why not?
17. Given that one of the two borings showed at least a marginal risk for liquefaction, why were additional borings not done to test this issue? How do the borings' locations compare to the proposed plant location? How will the Applicant's more detailed evaluation of liquefaction potential alleviate any concerns raised by the borings? (SER, 3-21 to 3-22)
18. What additional geotechnical tests will be included in the Applicant's more detailed evaluation of liquefaction potential for the soils at the final structure location of the GLE site? (SER, 3-22)
19. In the absence of the geotechnical report needed to assess problems with settlement and soil capacity, why did the NRC Staff conclude the Applicant's analysis of hazards from seismic events was acceptable? (SER, 3-22 to 3-23)

20. There appear to be no fire events postulated for the cascade region of the facility. Was this area also evaluated, and if so what were the conclusions? If not, why not? (SER, 3-40 to 3-41, 7-8)
21. What is the definition for "extremely unlikely" in item 2 in Section 3.3.16.1? (SER, 3-43)
22. How did the NRC Staff assure itself that the analytical methods used to evaluate the criticality hazard associated with the cascade region met regulatory requirements in terms of their experimental validation? Does the NRC Staff retain a copy of the Applicant's Validation Report? (SER, 5-18)
23. With respect to the Applicant's Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) exemption request: (SER, 5-32 to 5-33)
 - a. Do other enrichment facilities licensed in the United States have CAAS coverage in the areas that are included in this exemption?
 - b. What is the basis for the statement in the fourth full paragraph on page 5-32 that "a criticality accident is highly unlikely?"
 - c. While the possibility of heavy rainfall in conjunction with a tank breach was discussed in the fifth full paragraph on page 5-32, was the possibility of a flood also considered?
 - d. Part of the argument supporting the CAAS exemption is that maintenance personnel could be subjected to criticality accident doses. Could not the presence of a CAAS help other employees avoid exposure from a criticality accident? Expand on how the NRC Staff balanced the advantages and disadvantages in granting this exemption.
24. The NRC Staff points out that the safety evaluation it carried out "was based on the current facility design." (SER, 5-37, 11-6, 11.A-8)
 - a. Are there areas in the proposed facility design, such as the separations cascade, where the design is still evolving? If so, how can the NRC Staff assert that the design can and will meet regulatory requirements while important process steps are still changing? Has a baseline cascade design been established that is subject to the formal change control process?
 - b. The NRC Staff states in the last paragraph of page 1-3 that the Applicant provided adequate information to understand the processes at the facility. Does the NRC Staff consider the product collection process in the cascade region as something that needs to be understood? If yes, what are the sources of information used by the NRC Staff, and what criteria are used to judge the adequacy of the information?
25. Does the statement in the second paragraph on page 5-38 "Any increase in reflection conditions due to flooding is already accounted for since the CSAs [criticality safety analyses] use conservative reflection conditions" mean there are no arrangements of intact product tanks that if flooded would lead to criticality? If not, how are flooding and snow accumulation considered in the criticality evaluation of the product handling and storage areas? (SER, 5-38)
26. With respect to the unique Cascade/Gas Handling (Node 4600) area, how did the NRC Staff ensure that all of the significant accident sequences had been identified and their probabilities of occurrence were conservatively estimated (given the lack of operational experience to draw upon)? (SER, 5-37 to 5-38, A-10)

27. Are there any chemical release scenarios in the cascade region that the NRC Staff would consider to be unique to the laser-based process? For example, does the NRC Staff see any chemical release scenarios that would differ significantly from those in a gas centrifuge plant? (SER, 6-8)
28. Aside from the Cascade/Gas Handling (Node 4600) and the Laser System (Node 5500) areas, are there any operations or design approaches that differ significantly from those found at existing enrichment facilities? If yes, what parts of the facility or operations are significantly different? In particular, are there significant differences in those nodes that involve transferring UF₆ to and from storage tanks? (SER, 6-8, A-10)
29. Expand on how the Applicant will ensure that off-site fire departments (especially those using volunteers) will not use water-based fire suppression in areas that are inappropriate from a criticality safety viewpoint. (SER, 7-7 to 7-10)
30. No criticality accidents directly related to the cascade area are included in the accident discussions in the Accident Analysis Appendix (see Tables A.4-2 and A.6-1). How did the NRC Staff assure itself that potential criticality accidents in the cascade region (for example, in the product collection process) present an acceptably low level of risk? (SER, A-10, A-28)
31. What was the basis for choosing the wind speed assumed in the consequence assessment described in the first paragraph of page A-16?
32. What activates the door interlock discussed in the sixth paragraph on page A-23?

Attachment B
(FEIS-Related Questions)

1. Explain the measures taken to verify the accuracy of GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC's (GLE) 2008 Environmental Report to the extent it has been relied on as a primary source for the NRC Staff's analysis.
2. Why is the Applicant requesting authorization to enrich up to 8% U235? Has the NRC previously authorized enrichment up to 8% U235 at another facility? Does GLE, 2009j at 1 indicate that safety has been confidently demonstrated at U235 enrichment levels of only up to 5%? (EIS, 1-2)
3. Does 10 C.F.R. § 50.68(b)(7) limit Part 52 reactor license holders from using fuel assemblies enriched at levels above 5%? Does the NRC Staff expect a change to 10 C.F.R. § 50.68(b)(7)? From where does GLE expect demand for fuel enriched above 5%? (EIS, 1-2)
4. Why are the forecasts for annual demand for enrichment services based on 2003 projections? Given the economic turmoil of the past few years, does the NRC Staff believe these forecasts are accurate? Does the NRC Staff expect domestic and international demand for low enriched uranium (LEU) to be affected by the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the international economic downturn? (EIS, 1-6 to 1-8)
5. Provide any updated information the NRC Staff has on the status of the National Enrichment Facility, American Centrifuge Plant, and Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility. How would any updated output projections impact the NRC Staff's needs analysis and Table 1-1? (EIS, 1-7 to 1-8)
6. Under what conditions and timeline could the levels of LEU supplied to United States Enrichment Corporation under the TENEX agreement equal current levels under the Megatons-to-Megawatts Program? (EIS, 1-7) Does the NRC Staff expect other LEU imports to remain constant in future years? (EIS, 1-7) What are the relative costs of domestic production at currently operating and projected facilities (including GLE) versus importation? (EIS, 1-7 to 1-8) If domestic production were to increase, would foreign suppliers be able to undercut domestic prices?
7. As support for the need for a domestic supply of LEU, the FEIS offers evidence from 2002 and 2010 that a domestic supply of LEU is an issue of national energy security. Is there more recent support for the proposition that a domestic supply of LEU is a priority as a matter of public policy? (EIS, 1-8 to 1-9)
8. Except as already discussed in the FEIS, identify any regulatory guides that were either directly or indirectly applicable to the proposed facility and explain how they were applied or adapted to the NRC Staff's review.
9. Identify any significant issues to which the NRC Staff determined that no regulatory guide applied, and explain how the NRC Staff addressed such issues.

10. On page 2-3, in the last paragraph, the FEIS states, "The primary facilities include . . . six cylinder storage pads. . ." On page 2-7, the FEIS states, "There would be three UF6 Cylinder Pads at the proposed GLE Facility . . ." What are the other three cylinder pads referred to on page 2-3?
11. Is the fresh water that could be potentially needed for cooling tower make up, as discussed on page 2-11, included in the 75,000 gal/day mentioned on page 4-27? If not, where is the impact of this make up water evaluated (if it is ultimately needed)?
12. Are GLE's detailed construction plans available? Has preconstruction begun? Explain how construction phasing will work so that operations can begin in 2014. (EIS, 2-18)
13. In evaluating the No-Action Alternative, the impacts in Table 2-3 do not appear to include electricity consumption. Did the NRC Staff consider the impact of electrical energy consumption (with its associated environmental impact)? In particular, if the separative work units were produced at other gas centrifuge facilities in the no-action case, was the potential difference in electrical energy usage considered? (EIS, 2-20 to 2-41)
14. How did GLE's panel of experts assess the weighting factors that are given to each criterion for the alternative sites analysis? (EIS, 2-45, 2-48)
15. Why did the NRC Staff not consider electrical energy consumption in its comparisons between the laser-based and centrifuge technologies on Table 2-6 (or in another appropriate location)? (EIS, 2-55 to 2-64)
16. In the Waste Management area of Table 2-6, the FEIS states "the amount of waste generated by a gas centrifuge facility during operations is estimated to be considerably less than the proposed GLE Facility. The potential difference could be on the order of a factor of two for LLW [low-level waste] and hazardous waste, and a factor of five or six for solid non-radioactive/nonhazardous waste." What are the primary reasons for the increased generation of waste in the GLE facility as compared to a gas centrifuge facility? (EIS, 2-62)
17. On page 4-99 under the first bullet under "Mitigation Measures Identified by GLE," the FEIS states, "Select the laser enrichment process over . . . gas centrifuge technologies, which would reduce the amount of waste generated for production of the same amount of enriched product." This seems to contradict the statement on page 2-62 referred to in the previous question. Explain this apparent conflict. (EIS, 2-62, 4-99)
18. Downblended highly enriched uranium (HEU) is eliminated in the NRC Staff's analysis as a source of enrichment services for reasons of viability, reliability, and competition. In the Shaw AREVA MOX Services (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility) case, the NRC Staff supported an application for a facility producing downblended HEU. Explain why downblending HEU is not considered a viable or reliable alternative and is not considered in the alternatives analysis. (EIS, 2-50)
19. Regarding the groundwater contamination discussed on pages 3-41 to 3-43, what was the most recent discovery of contamination on the site? Have contamination levels of all compounds declined since monitoring began? Are there any concerns about undiscovered groundwater contamination? In what ways could GLE construction and operation exacerbate existing problems? Specifically, what will be the effects of

increased groundwater usage on groundwater quality? Will greater groundwater use affect the natural attenuation that is helping to clean up existing groundwater contamination? (EIS, 3-41 to 3-43)

20. Explain how the NRC Staff derived the assumption that the contributions to impacts are 50 percent during preconstruction and 50 percent during construction. (EIS, 4-3 to 4-4)
21. The assumption that a licensing decision will be made by June 2012 is no longer realistic. Discuss what, if any, consequences result from a later licensing decision. (EIS, 4-2)
22. Twenty-four hour concentrations of particulate matter are predicted to exceed air quality standards during preconstruction and construction phases. How widespread will this decrease in air quality be? What effects are expected on the residents of the Wooden Shoe residential subdivision? (EIS 4-13)
23. On page 4-18, the NRC Staff recommends that “best available practices should be implemented” in order “to minimize potential air quality impacts.” What are these practices? What will the impacts be if GLE does not institute these practices? (EIS, 4-18)
24. If preconstruction has begun, what air quality impacts have been witnessed thus far? What “aggressive dust control” measures have been taken in the preconstruction phase? How effective have they been?
25. Clarify in more detail the significance of Table 4-5. In particular, explain the relationships of the columns with one another. (EIS, 4-31)
26. Was there any investigation of how GLE construction and operation may affect active nearby red-cockaded woodpecker (RCW) groups beyond habitat protection? For example, will they be harmed by noise, dust, and other increased human activity in the area? How would the generalized discussion of dust impacts to wildlife translate to the woodpecker groups neighboring the site and the well-documented responses of birds to disturbances generally? (EIS, 4-35 to 4-36) If so, can anything be done to mitigate impacts?
27. Did the NRC Staff consider how noise from preconstruction and construction activities may impact the threatened, endangered, and other special status species relevant to this site? (EIS, 4-36 to 4-37, 4-40 to 4-48)
28. In Appendix B, Fish and Wildlife Service agrees that impacts can be mitigated on RCWs by engaging in a tree mitigation program and their agreement to finding no adverse impacts on RCWs seems conditioned on the implementation of this program. (EIS, B-103) Why is this program only being “considered” by GLE, and what is the status of GLE’s consideration? (EIS, 4-55)
29. The FEIS discusses noise level impacts in terms of decibels above ambient levels. Is there any machinery anticipated to be used during the construction or operation of GLE likely to produce an impact of sound in frequencies outside the range of human hearing such that it would cause discomfort/disruption to humans and/or wildlife? (EIS, 4-57 to 4-62)

30. Page 4-68 refers to "empty cylinders with tails . . ." Elsewhere in the FEIS, "tails" refers to the depleted UF6 from the separations process. Is it correct to assume in this case that the FEIS is referring to empty cylinders with the residual feed (natural UF6) not removed when the tanks were emptied? (EIS, 4-68)
31. In evaluating worker radiological safety, the NRC Staff accepts General Electric-Hitachi's assumption that the new GLE facility will have UF6 release levels similar to a gas centrifuge plant. Part of this assumption is that releases in the separations area will be much smaller than those associated with connecting and disconnecting UF6 tanks. Did the NRC Staff attempt to validate (even qualitatively) whether or not the releases from the laser-based separations process will indeed be similar to those in a gas centrifuge process? If yes, what is the logic that supported the validity of the assumption? (EIS, 4-77)
32. Are there situations where the high-efficiency particulate air filters and/or carbon beds associated with the main ventilation stack can be bypassed? If so, what controls will be in place to guard against inappropriate bypass? (EIS, 4-79)
33. What is the logic behind using the data from the FMO (Fuel Manufacturing Operation) vents to approximate what would be expected for the GLE facility? Did the NRC Staff compare this data with that from an operating gas centrifuge facility? (EIS, 4-81)
34. Why was the wind speed data used to calculate potential radiation emissions/dosages to the public from 1988 to 1992? Has the NRC Staff ascertained the availability of more recent data? Have there been any changes in local weather patterns in recent years that could influence results? (EIS, 4-82)
35. On page 4-86, the FEIS states that the public dose estimates are based on conservative assumptions. What is the basis for the NRC Staff's understanding that using the FMO source terms is indeed conservative?
36. Will all of the mitigation measures proposed by GLE in Table 5-1 be implemented? What processes will GLE use to decide which of the NRC-recommended mitigation measures in Table 5-2 will ultimately be implemented? Will the NRC Staff have any ongoing role in monitoring implementation?
37. Explain how the NRC Staff's overall assessment that environmental impacts are SMALL would be impacted if GLE only implemented the mitigation measures proposed in Table 5-1. How would overall impacts change if GLE only implemented mandatory mitigation measures? (EIS, 2-65, Table 5-1, Table 5-2)
38. Except as already explicitly specified, how often will GLE conduct each type of monitoring outlined on pages 6-4 to 6-11?
39. Will all gaseous diffusion enrichment operations in the United States have ceased operation by the end of 2012? (EIS, 7-13)
40. The NRC Staff comments on the laser-based separations technology by stating "GE-Hitachi expects it to offer certain advantages over both the gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge processes." From an environmental perspective, what are the advantages that are expected over the gas centrifuge process? (EIS, 7-13)

41. Explain why no surveys of the project area associated with the site security fence have been conducted. (H-7)¹
42. Why does the proposed license condition identified in Section 4.2.2.2 only require consultation regarding mitigation rather than the implementation of any mitigation measures given the likelihood that known archaeological sites may be impacted? (H-7 to H-8, EIS 4-6)

¹ Questions 41 and 42 reference pages in Appendix H, a non-public attachment to the FEIS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of)
)
GE-HITACHI GLOBAL LASER) Docket No. 70-7016-ML
ENRICHMENT FACILITY LLC)
(GLE Commercial Facility))

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (INITIAL BOARD QUESTIONS AND ASSOCIATED ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVES) have been served upon the following persons by Electronic Information Exchange.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB)
Mail Stop T-3F23
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Paul S. Ryerson, Chair
Administrative Judge
paul.ryerson@nrc.gov

James F. Jackson
Administrative Judge
james.jackson@nrc.gov

Michael O. Garcia
Administrative Judge
michael.garcia@nrc.gov

Anthony C. Eitrem, Esq., Chief Counsel
ace1@nrc.gov

Anne Siarnacki, Law Clerk
anne.siarnacki@nrc.gov

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication
Mail Stop O-16C1
Washington, DC 20555-0001
OCA Mail Center
ocaamail@nrc.gov

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of the Secretary of the Commission
Rulemakings & Adjudications Staff
Mail Stop O-16C1
Washington, DC 20555-0001
hearingdocket@nrc.gov

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of the General Counsel
Mail Stop O-15 D21
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Catherine Scott, Esq.
clm@nrc.gov
Carrie Safford, Esq.
carrie.safford@nrc.gov
Marcia Simon, Esq.
marcia.simon@nrc.gov
Molly Barkman Marsh, Esq.
molly.barkmanmarsh@nrc.gov
Michelle Albert, Esq.
Michelle.albert@nrc.gov

OGC Mail Center:
OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov

GE-HITACHI GLOBAL LASER ENRICHMENT FACILITY LLC
DOCKET NO. 70-7016-ML
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (INITIAL BOARD QUESTIONS AND ASSOCIATED
ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVES)

Counsel for the Applicant
GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment
3901 Castle Hayne Road
P.O. Box 780
Wilmington, NC 28402
Harold J. Neems, Esq.
General Counsel
harold.neems@ge.com

Counsel for the Applicant
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
1111 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004
Donald J. Silverman, Esq.
dsilverman@morganlewis.com
Martin J. O'Neill, Esq.
martin.oneill@morganlewis.com
Audrea Salters
asalters@morganlewis.com
Anna Jones, Esq.
anna.jones@morganlewis.com
Charles Moldenhauer, Esq.
cmoldenhauer@morganlewis.com

[Original signed by Evangeline S. Ngbea]
Office of the Secretary of the Commission

Dated at Rockville, Maryland
this 4th day of April 2012