

generation

*m***Power**

*Nuclear Steam Supply Systems
Redacted*

March 22, 2012

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Nuclear Island Systems

- Systems Design Approach
- Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
- Reactor Coolant Inventory and Purification System (RCI)
- Emergency Core Cooling System (ECC)
- Auxiliary Condenser System (CNX)
- Fuel Handling System (FHS)
- Summary



Systems Design Approach

- Utilize unique features of the integral RCS to increase system response time
 - Large coolant inventory
 - Small coolant penetrations
- Eliminate use of soluble boron in normal operation
- Utilize non-safety systems to respond to day-to-day plant transients
 - Simplifies operator workload
 - Provides defense in depth
 - Minimizes reliance on emergency systems
- Maximize the flexibility of non-safety systems
 - All major RCS support functions incorporated into RCI
 - Reduce system and component count

Systems Design Approach-cont.

- Use passive safety systems

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
- PRA informed design

[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]

- ▶ System diversity
- ▶ Component diversity
- ▶ Defense in depth


RCS Design Changes

- Power increase
 - Core thermal power increased from 425 to 530 MWt
 - Fuel assemblies [CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]
 - Additional steam generator tubes added
 - RCS flow increased
- Reactor coolant pumps
 - Internal mixed flow pumps replaced with canned pumps using external motors
 - Upper steam generator and pressurizer modified




RCS Safety Functions

- Maintain pressure boundary integrity
- Remove core decay heat via natural circulation
- Provide overpressure protection for all RCS pressure boundary components for design basis events
- Provide a method of venting of non-condensable gases following severe accidents
- Provide means of unlatching the control rods



RCS Non-Safety Functions

- Provide forced circulation of reactor coolant to transfer heat produced in the core to the secondary side
- Maintain steam-water interface in the pressurizer





RCS Process Flow Diagram

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Key Features of the Integral RCS

Feature	B&W 177	Typical Gen 3 PWR	[B&W mPower
Rated Core power (MW_{th})	2568	3415	530
Core average linear heat rate (kW_t/m)	18.7	18.7	[
Average flow velocity through the core (m/s)	4.8	4.8	
RCS volume (m^3)	325	272	
RCS volume to power ratio (m^3/MW_t)	0.14	0.08	
Maximum LOCA area (m^2) *	1.3	1.0	
RCS volume/LOCA area ratio (m^3 /m^2)	250	270]


[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]

RCS volume and small break sizes allow simplification of RCS safety systems

* Assumes double ended break



Unique RCS Characteristics



[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]



RCI Design Changes

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[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]



Reactor Coolant Inventory & Purification System Safety Functions

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
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[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]



Reactor Coolant Inventory & Purification System Non-Safety Functions

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


[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]]



[RCI [

] [CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]





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RCI [

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[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]

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[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]


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[RCI [

] [CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]

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


] [CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]



[RCI [

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ECCS Design Changes

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[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]



ECCS Safety Functions

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[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]



ECCS Process Flow Diagram

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ECCS [

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
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ECCS [

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ECCS [

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[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]

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[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]



ECCS Challenges

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[CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]



Auxiliary Condenser System (CNX) Functions

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CNX Process Flow Diagram

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Fuel Handling System (FHS)

- System Functions:
 - Transfer new and spent fuel assemblies and control equipment into and out of containment and the reactor service building while maintaining subcriticality and preventing fuel damage.
 - Store new and spent fuel assemblies and control equipment in seismically qualified storage racks while maintaining subcriticality and preventing fuel damage.



Fuel Handling System (FHS)

- Key Design Features:

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Reliability Assurance Program

The purpose of the Reliability Assurance Program (RAP) is to ensure:

- The plant is designed, constructed and operated consistent with assumptions and risk insights for risk-significant Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs).
- Risk-significant SSCs are selected and maintained so that they do not degrade to an unacceptable level during the life of the plant.
- The frequency of transients to risk-significant SSCs is minimized.
- These SSC will function reliably when challenged.



Reliability Assurance Program (cont.)

- Consistent with ISG-018, implementation of D-RAP in the mPower Project will be accomplished in the following phases:
- Phase I: Develop: (1) Design Reliability Assurance Program (D-RAP), a standard plant design list of risk-significant SSCs, and Tier 1 ITAAC
- Phase II: Develop a plant-specific list of risk-significant SSCs; define the integration of RAP SSCs into existing programs; and ensure that RAP SSCs have been placed under the appropriate programs
- Phase III: Apply reliability assurance to procurement, fabrication, construction and preoperational testing activities



Summary

- Plant safety is enhanced by:
 - Unique features of the integral RCS that increase system response time
 - Elimination of soluble boron for normal operation
 - Flexible, non-safety systems that can respond to day-to-day plant transients
 - Use of passive safety systems
- [▸] [CCI per Affidavit 4(a)-(d)]
- PRA risk insights guiding design to maximize reliability

Risk Informed – Simplification - Defense in Depth