

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Millstone Power Station
Rope Ferry Road
Waterford, CT 06385



DominionSM

JAN 30 2012

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Serial No. 12-002
MPS Lic/TGC R0
Docket No. 50-336
License No. DPR-65

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2011-005-00
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 ENCLOSURE BUILDING RENDERED
INOPERABLE DUE TO DEGRADED DOOR SEAL

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2011-005-00 documenting a condition discovered at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 on December 3, 2011. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems to control the release of radioactive material.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. William D. Bartron at (860) 444-4301.

Sincerely,

Stephen E. Scace
Site Vice President – Millstone

Attachments: 1

Commitments made in this letter: None

JES2
NRR

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
475 Allendale Road
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NRC Senior Resident Inspector
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ATTACHMENT

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2011-005-00

**MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2
DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.**

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOF-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME

Millstone Power Station - Unit 2

2. DOCKET NUMBER

05000336

3. PAGE

1 OF 2

4. TITLE

Enclosure Building Rendered Inoperable Due to Degraded Door Seal

5. EVENT DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
12	03	2011

6. LER NUMBER

YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV. NO.
2011	005	00

7. REPORT DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
01	30	2012

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED

FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
	05000
FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
	05000

9. OPERATING MODE

1

10. POWER LEVEL

100

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

- | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b) | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d) | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1) | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) | <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) | <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) | |

Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME

William D. Bartron, Supervisor Nuclear Station Licensing

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

860-444-4301

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

At 1230 on December 3, 2011, with Millstone Power Station Unit 2 operating at 100 percent power in Mode 1, the control room was notified that a door sweep became dislodged on a door credited as a boundary door for the Enclosure Building. Operators declared the door inoperable and entered the Action for plant Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.5.2 Enclosure Building at 1235. TS 3.6.5.2 Action requires that the Enclosure Building be restored to operable status with 24 hours or be in Cold Shutdown within the next 36 hours. Repairs to the door were completed and operators exited the Action at 1524 on December 3, 2011. The last known time where the door sweep was not dislodged was within 18 hours of the time of discovery.

The operability of the Enclosure Building ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. Since there is no bounding analysis on the impact of this size opening on the ability to complete the safety function, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.

The direct cause of the door seal failure was that the mounting hardware (screws) loosened and fell out. The apparent cause is the door was not being properly maintained. The door was repaired. Doors that are part of the Enclosure Building boundary have been added to the preventive maintenance program.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Millstone Power Station - Unit 2	05000336	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	2 OF 2
		2011	-- 005 --	00	

NARRATIVE

1. Event Description

At 1230 on December 3, 2011, with Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) operating at 100 percent power in Mode 1, the control room was notified that a door sweep became dislodged on a door credited as a boundary door for the Enclosure Building (EB) (door 205-(-25)-001). Operators declared the door inoperable and entered the Action for plant Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.5.2 Enclosure Building at 1235. TS 3.6.5.2 Action requires that the EB be restored to operable status with 24 hours or be in Cold Shutdown within the next 36 hours. Repairs to the door were completed and operators exited the Action at 1524 on December 3, 2011. The last known time where the door sweep was not dislodged was within 18 hours of the time of discovery.

The operability of the EB ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.6.5.2.2 stipulates that the Enclosure Building Filtration Train produces a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 1/4 inches water gauge (wg) in the Enclosure Building Filtration Region within 1 minute after an EBF Actuation Signal. When the door sweep dislodged, it created an opening estimated as 3/4 inch by 36 inches (27 square inches). Since there is currently no bounding analysis on the impact of this size opening on the ability of the Emergency Building Filtration System (EBFS)[BD] to produce the required negative pressure, the EB was declared inoperable.

This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.

2. Cause

The direct cause of the door seal failure was that the mounting hardware (screws) loosened and fell out. The apparent cause is the door was not being properly maintained.

3. Assessment of Safety Consequences

The safety consequences of this event were low. The door was repaired within three hours of discovery and within 21 hours of the last known operable condition. The safety function of the EBFS is to control and monitor radioactive releases from Containment and Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) leaks in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Operability of the EBFS is necessary to ensure doses to the public and control room operators do not exceed 10 CFR 50.67 limits in the event of a design basis LOCA. This function is achieved when EBFS is operational by maintaining a required negative pressure of 1/4 inches wg. It is not credited for any other design basis accidents.

Reactor coolant radioactivity levels were normal (significantly less than Technical Specification limits). Based on a review of effluent and containment radiation monitors, there was no indication of abnormal Reactor Coolant System, containment or ECCS leakage. Based on these conditions, there were no adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public or the plant and its personnel resulting from this EB boundary breach.

4. Corrective Action

The door was repaired. Doors that are part of the Enclosure Building boundary have been added to the preventive maintenance program.

Additional corrective actions are being taken in accordance with the station's corrective action program.

5. Previous Occurrences

LER 2011-001-00 "Enclosure Building Rendered Inoperable Due to Dislodged Bushings" describes a condition at MPS2 where the EBFS was not able to meet the acceptance criteria of a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 1/4 inch wg. The direct cause for not meeting the Enclosure Building drawdown acceptance criteria was that sliding bushings on the main steam safety valves exhaust piping had dislodged and not resealed.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].