

**From:** Franke, Mark -R2  
**To:** Walker, Shakur; Suggs, LaDonna; Kolcum, Gregory; Jackson, Rahsean  
**Cc:** McCoy, Gerald; Clagg, Rodney  
**Subject:** RE: seismic electrical inspection conclusions North Anna  
**Date:** Tuesday, September 06, 2011 6:14:46 PM  
**Attachments:** image001.png

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Yes – while I am in HQ, Greg will serve as team lead and will also run the calls.

I'll be on the call tomorrow, but then am in HQ.

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**From:** Walker, Shakur  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 06, 2011 6:11 PM  
**To:** Franke, Mark; Suggs, LaDonna; Kolcum, Gregory  
**Cc:** McCoy, Gerald; Clagg, Rodney  
**Subject:** RE: seismic electrical inspection conclusions North Anna

Will we have a call in the morning (0800)? Same number?

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**From:** Franke, Mark  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 06, 2011 6:10 PM  
**To:** Suggs, LaDonna; Kolcum, Gregory; Walker, Shakur  
**Cc:** McCoy, Gerald; Clagg, Rodney  
**Subject:** RE: seismic electrical inspection conclusions North Anna

I agree. Gerry and I will be in HQ Thursday to hear what they have to say. We'll also have the opportunity to talk with Meena Khanna and George Wilson to get a feel for NRR's stance.

Let's keep going on our fact finding and reviews so we can cover the ground we need to cover.

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**From:** Suggs, LaDonna  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 06, 2011 5:32 PM  
**To:** Kolcum, Gregory; Walker, Shakur  
**Cc:** Franke, Mark; McCoy, Gerald; Clagg, Rodney  
**Subject:** RE: seismic electrical inspection conclusions North Anna

Team –

This appears to contradict what the licensee indicated while we were onsite with regard to their plans to return the EE system to an operable status. It was my understanding that the visual inspections were just the first phase in a tiered approach to recover the system and that following those inspections, they would be performing a battery of surveillance tests (comparable to those performed during a refueling outage) prior to returning the system to operable. The verbiage of the conclusion statement is a bit ambiguous, but it does seem to stop short of calling the system operable so I think we need to discuss this further amongst ourselves and with the licensee to get a clear understanding of what is meant by that statement ("Therefore, the EE system should be considered as fully qualified to deliver its design function.") and what their subsequent plans are for the system prior to restart.

B/29



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**From:** Kolcum, Gregory  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 06, 2011 4:58 PM  
**To:** Walker, Shakur; Suggs, LaDonna  
**Cc:** Franke, Mark; McCoy, Gerald; Clagg, Rodney  
**Subject:** FYI: seismic electrical inspection conclusions North Anna

**AIT team members will review.**

**From licensee log:**

**In conclusion, the inspections performed on the EE system have not identified components that would be considered inoperable or non functional as a result of damage due to the earthquake that occurred 8/23/2011. Therefore, the EE system should be considered as fully qualified to deliver its design function. Details below.**

**9/6/2011 14:09**

Emergency Electrical System Walkdowns:

No abnormal electrical issues have been encountered since the initial seismic event and all operating parameters are as expected. Walk downs on all equipment, external to operating cabinets and electrical switchgear, have been completed on 100% of the EE system with no seismic related deficiencies observed. Subsequent internal inspections in accordance with 0-GEP-30 "POST SEISMIC EVENT ENGINEERING WALKDOWN" of accessible equipment have also been conducted with the following percentages of completion noted below.

1. Transfer Buses: 100% of the equipment was inspected.
2. 4160VAC Switchgear 96%: Breakers 01-EE-BKR-15J12 and 01-EE-BKR-15J14 were not inspected because the current plant configuration did not allow for an open cubicle inspection. The sample set for the 4160VAC Switchgear was approximately 96% of the 55 breaker cubicles. With no seismic damage noted, it is acceptable to not inspect the remaining 4% of the sample set.
3. 480VAC load centers 100%

Motor Control Center Internal Cubical Inspections 95%: The following breakers were not inspected because the current plant configuration did not allow for an open cubicle inspection: 01-EE-BKR-1J1-2S-C1/F3 01-EE-BKR-1J1-3-B4, 02-EE-BKR-2J1-2N-K4, 02-EE-BKR-2J1-2S-F3, 02-EE-BKR-2H1-2N-H4/L3, 01-EE-BKR-1H1-2S-D1/F1/F2/G1/G2/G3/H2/H3/J1, 01-EE-BKR-1H1-2N-L3/M3/N3/P1/P2.

The following breakers were not inspected because cubicle doors were unable to be opened. A known issue exists with the Klockner Moeller Motor Control Centers where the breaker handle interlock does not fully release upon depression. Without full release of the mechanical interlock, the breaker cubicle door remains bound. This deficiency does not impede the any form of circuit protection for the Motor Control Center Cubicle. 02-EE-BKR-2H1-2S-F1/J4, 02-EE-BKR-2H1-4-A1/A4, 02-EE-BKR-2J1-1-D2R/D2L, 01-EE-BKR-1H1-2S-M1, 01-EE-BKR-1H1-2N-G2, 01-EE-BKR-1J1-2S-B2.

The sample set for the Motor Control Center Internal Cubical Inspections was approximately 95% of 632 breaker cubicles. With no seismic damage noted, it is acceptable to not inspect the remaining 5% of the sample set.

A review of the existing work orders for the system identified no open deficiencies that would prohibit any system component from being considered functional or fully capable of performing its design function.

In conclusion, the inspections performed on the EE system have not identified components that would be considered inoperable or non functional as a result of damage due to the earthquake that occurred 8/23/2011. Therefore, the EE system should be considered as fully qualified to deliver its design function.