GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy

Jerald G. Head
Senior Vice President
Regulatory Affairs

3901 Castle Hayne Road
P.O. Box 780
Wilmington, NC 28402
USA

T 910 819 5692
F 910 362 5692
Jerald.Head@ge.com

MFN 11-240

December 20, 2011

Document Control Desk
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

ATTENTION: Christopher Welch

SUBJECT: Submittal of Definitive ESBWR ITAAC Listing for COL Reference

REFERENCE: 1. Letter from US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Jerald G. Head, *Final Design Approval for the Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor*, March 9, 2011.

This letter transmits the definitive ESBWR ITAAC listing for COL reference, based on Revision 9 of the ESBWR Design Control Document, as approved in Reference 1.

If you have any questions about the information provided, please contact me.

Sincerely,

for

Jerald Head
Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs

D068
NRO

Enclosure:

1. Definitive ESBWR ITAAC Listing for COL Reference, December 2011 (Excel spreadsheet).

Commitments:

No further commitments are made in this letter.

cc:	CW Bagnal	GEH/Wilmington
	HF Butler	GEH/Wilmington
	PL Campbell	GEH/Washington
	LF Dougherty	GEH/Wilmington
	JW McLamb	GEH/Wilmington
	W Schumitsch	GEH/Wilmington
	eDRF Section	0000-0142-3988

Enclosure 1

MFN 11-240

Definitive ESBWR ITAAC Listing
for COL Reference

December 2011

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Total ITAACs	1614	Error Checking Counts - Sub-Total ITAACs	1614
Total DAC-ITAACs	392	Error Checking Counts - Sub-Total DAC-ITAACs	392
Total Con-ITAACs	1222	Error Checking Counts - Sub-Total Con-ITAACs	1222

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1	2.101.1	02.10.01-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:K10	2.10.1-2	1. The LWMS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.10.1 and Table 2.10.1-1.	Inspections of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built LWMS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.10.1 and Table 2.10.1-1.	0	1	NO
2	2.101.2	02.10.01-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:K10	2.10.1-2	2. The LWMS piping systems retain their pressure boundary integrity under internal pressures that will be experienced during service.	A hydrostatic test in accordance with ASME/ANSI B31.3 will be conducted on the LWMS piping systems, except (1) at atmospheric tanks where no isolation valves exist, (2) when such testing would damage equipment, and (3) when such testing could seriously interfere with other systems or components required to be hydrostatically tested by the API or ASME Code per Regulatory guide 1.143, Revision 2.	The results of the hydrostatic test of the LWMS piping systems in accordance with ASME/ANSI B31.3 comply with the requirements in the ASME Code per Regulatory Guide 1.143, Revision 2 and indicate no unacceptable pressure boundary leakage.	0	1	NO
3	2.101.3	02.10.01-02:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:K10	2.10.1-2	3. LWMS discharge flow is monitored for high radiation. A radiation monitor provides an automatic closure signal to the discharge line isolation valve. Discharge flow is terminated on receipt of a high radiation signal from this monitor.	Tests will be conducted using a standard radiation source or portable calibration unit that exceeds a setpoint value that is preset for the testing. Inspections will be conducted to confirm that the as-built indication, alarm, and automatic initiation functions are met.	The LWMS discharge flow terminates upon receipt of a simulated high radiation signal and associated indication and alarm functions are met.	0	1	NO
4	2.101.4	02.10.01-02:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:K10	2.10.1-2	4. LWMS demineralizers have the filter efficiency and sufficient demineralizer media as specified in design specifications.	Inspections will be conducted to verify the amount of filtration and demineralization media is loaded in demineralizer vessels.	The vendor specified filter efficiency and amount of demineralization media is loaded in the demineralizer vessels.	0	1	NO
5	2.102.1	02.10.02-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:K20	2.10.2-2	1. The SWMS functional arrangement is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.10.2.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built SWMS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.10.2.	0	1	NO
6	2.102.2	02.10.02-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:K20	2.10.2-2	2. The SWMS provides the nonsafety-related function of storing radioactive solids prior to processing for shipment.	Inspection will be performed to verify the nominal volumes of each of the SWMS tanks.	The nominal volume of each of the SWMS tanks is the nominal value indicated on Table 2.10.2-1.	0	1	NO
7	2.103.1	02.10.03-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:K30	2.10.3-1	1. The OGS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.10.3.	Inspections of the as-built OGS will be performed.	The as-built OGS conforms to the functional arrangement as described the Design Description of this Section 2.10.3.	0	1	NO
8	2.103.2	02.10.03-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:K30	2.10.3-1	2. The OGS is designed to withstand internal hydrogen explosions.	A pressure test of the as-built OGS will be conducted in the plant in accordance ASME/ANSI B31.3 requirements.	The OGS pressure testing results conform to the requirements in ASME/ANSI B31.3.	0	1	NO
9	2.103.3	02.10.03-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:K30	2.10.3-1	3. Leakage from the process through purge or tap lines to external atmospheric pressure is sufficiently low so it is undetectable by "soap bubble" test.	"Soap bubble" tests will be performed on the OGS mechanical joints on purge or tap lines at normal system operating pressure.	The OGS "soap bubble" test results show no detectable leakage.	0	1	NO
10	2.103.4.i	02.10.03-01:04BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:K30	2.10.3-1	4. The OGS automatically controls the OGS flow bypassing or through the charcoal adsorber beds depending on the radioactivity levels in the OGS process gas downstream of the charcoal beds.	i. A standard radiation source or portable calibration unit that exceeds a setpoint value that is preset for the testing will provide a simulated high charcoal gas discharge radioactivity signal that will give a MCR alarm.	i. The Main Control Room alarm activates on a high OGS discharge radiation signal.	0	1	NO
11	2.103.4.ii	02.10.03-01:04BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:K30	2.10.3-1	4. The OGS automatically controls the OGS flow bypassing or through the charcoal adsorber beds depending on the radioactivity levels in the OGS process gas downstream of the charcoal beds.	ii. A standard radiation source or portable calibration unit that exceeds a setpoint value that is preset for the testing will provide a simulated high-high charcoal gas discharge radioactivity signal when the OGS process gas flow is bypassing the main charcoal beds and will give a MCR alarm and direct the gas flow through the charcoal beds.	ii. The OGS charcoal bed valves operate to automatically align to process offgas flow through both the guard beds and all of the charcoal beds.	0	1	NO
12	2.103.4.iii	02.10.03-01:04BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:K30	2.10.3-1	4. The OGS automatically controls the OGS flow bypassing or through the charcoal absorber beds depending on the radioactivity levels in the OGS process gas downstream of the charcoal beds.	iii. A standard radiation source or portable calibration unit that exceeds a setpoint value that is preset for the testing will provide a simulated OGS gas discharge radioactivity signal that closes the off-gas system discharge valve when the signal reaches a high-high level.	iii. The OGS discharge valve closes on a high-high-high OGS discharge radioactivity signal.	0	1	NO

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
13	2.103.5	02.10.03-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:K30	2.10.3-1	5. The OGS minimizes and controls the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere by delaying release of the offgas process stream initially containing radioactive isotopes of krypton, xenon, iodine, nitrogen, and oxygen. This delay, using activated charcoal absorber beds, is sufficient to achieve adequate decay before the process offgas stream is discharged from the plant.	Inspections will be performed to verify the mass of charcoal loaded in the Charcoal Guard Bed and Charcoal Decay Bed.	The Charcoal Guard Bed has a minimum of 15,000 kg (33,000 lb) of charcoal. The Charcoal Decay Bed has a minimum of 223,000 kg (490,000 lb) of charcoal.	0	1	NO
14	2.11.1	02.01.01-03:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	1. The functional arrangement of the RPV and Internals is as described in the Design Description of Subsection 2.1.1, Table 2.1.1-1 and Figure 2.1.1-1.	Inspections of the as-built RPV and Internals will be conducted.	The RPV and Internals and core arrangement conforms to the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.1.1, Table 2.1.1-1 and Figure 2.1.1-1.	0	1	NO
15	2.11.10	02.01.01-03:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:GN:B11	2.1.1-3	10. The fuel bundles and control rods intended for initial core load have been fabricated in accordance with the approved fuel and control rod design.	An inspection of the fuel bundles and control rods will be performed.	The fuel bundles and control rods intended for the initial core load have been inspected upon receipt to verify that they have been fabricated in accordance with the approved fuel and control rod design.	0	1	YES
16	2.11.11	02.01.01-03:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	11. The reactor internals arrangement conforms to the fuel bundle, instrumentation, neutron sources, and control rod locations shown on Figure 2.1.1-2.	An inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built reactor system fuel bundle, control rod, instrumentation, and neutron source locations conform to the locations shown on Figure 2.1.1-2.	0	1	NO
17	2.11.12	02.01.01-03:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	12. The number and locations of pressure sensors installed on the steam dryer for startup testing ensure accurate pressure predictions at critical locations.	An analysis of the number and locations of pressure sensors installed on the steam dryer for startup testing will be performed.	The number and locations of pressure sensors installed on the steam dryer for startup testing ensure accurate pressure predictions at critical locations.	0	1	NO
18	2.11.13	02.01.01-03:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	13. The number and locations of strain gages and accelerometers installed on the steam dryer for startup testing are capable of monitoring the most highly stressed components, considering accessibility and avoiding discontinuities in the components.	An analysis of the number and locations of strain gages and accelerometers installed on the steam dryer for startup testing will be performed.	The number and locations of strain gages and accelerometers installed on the steam dryer for startup testing are capable of monitoring the most highly stressed components, considering accessibility and avoiding discontinuities in the components.	0	1	NO
19	2.11.14	02.01.01-03:14BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	14. The number and locations of accelerometers installed on the steam dryer for startup testing are capable of identifying potential rocking and of measuring the accelerations resulting from support and vessel movements.	An analysis of the number and locations of accelerometers installed on the steam dryer for startup testing will be performed.	The number and locations of accelerometers installed on the steam dryer for startup testing are capable of identifying potential rocking of and measuring the accelerations resulting from support and vessel movements.	0	1	NO
20	2.11.15	02.01.01-03:15BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:GN:B11	2.1.1-3	15. The initial fuel to be loaded into the core will be able to withstand fuel lift and seismic and dynamic loads under normal operation and design basis conditions.	An analysis of the fuel lift and seismic and dynamic loads will be performed on the fuel bundle design that will be loaded into the ESBWR initial core.	The initial fuel to be loaded into the core will have primary stresses and maximum fuel bundle lift out of the fuel support piece that do not exceed the allowable values provided in the approved Fuel Assembly Mechanical Design Report.	0	1	YES
21	2.11.2	02.01.01-03:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	2. The key dimensions (and acceptable variations) of the as-built RPV are as described in Table 2.1.1-2.	Inspection of the as-built RPV key dimensions (and acceptable variations thereof) will be conducted.	The RPV conforms to the key dimensions (and acceptable variations) described in Table 2.1.1-2.	0	1	NO
22	2.11.3a1	02.01.01-03:03a1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	3a1. The RPV and its components identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, shroud support, top guide, core plate, control rod guide tubes and fuel supports) as ASME Code Section III are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the RPV and its components identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, shroud support, top guide, core plate, control rod guide tubes and fuel supports) as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III, including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined.	0	1	NO
23	2.11.3a2	02.01.01-03:03a2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	3a2. The RPV and its components identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, shroud support, top guide, core plate, control rod guide tubes and fuel supports) as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the components using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed in accordance with the ASME Code for as-built reconciliation of the RPV and its components identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, shroud support, top guide, core plate, control rod guide tubes and fuel supports) as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
24	2.11.3a3	02.01.01-03:03a3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	3a3. The RPV and its components identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, shroud support, top guide, core plate, control rod guide tubes and fuel supports) as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the RPV and its components identified in Table 2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-1/N-1A Data reports, where applicable) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports exist and conclude that the RPV and its components identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, shroud support, top guide, core plate, control rod guide tubes and fuel supports) as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
25	2.11.4	02.01.01-03:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	4. Pressure boundary welds in the RPV meet ASME Code Section III nondestructive examination requirements	Inspection of as-built pressure boundary welds in the RPV will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds in the RPV.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
26	2.11.5	02.01.01-03:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	5. The RPV retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on the RPV as it is required to be hydrostatically tested by the ASME Code.	ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of the RPV comply with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
27	2.11.6.i	02.01.01-03:06BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	6. The equipment identified in Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i.Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.1-1 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified in Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
28	2.11.6.ii	02.01.01-03:06BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	6. The equipment identified in Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of equipment RPV identified in Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
29	2.11.6.iii	02.01.01-03:06BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	6. The equipment identified in Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspection and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment RPV identified in Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I, including anchorage, is bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I, including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
30	2.11.7	02.01.01-03:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	7. RPV surveillance specimens are provided from the forging material of the beltline region and the weld and heat affected zone of a weld typical of those adjacent to the beltline region. Brackets welded to the vessel cladding at the location of the calculated peak fluence are provided to hold the removable specimen holders and a neutron dosimeter in place	Inspections of the as-built RPV and internals will be conducted for implementation of the RPV surveillance specimens, neutron dosimeter, and brackets. An analysis is performed to determine the location of the peak fluence.	The RPV surveillance specimens and neutron dosimeters are provided and brackets are installed at the location(s) of calculated peak fluence determined by an analysis of the as-built configuration.	0	1	NO
31	2.11.8a	02.01.01-03:08aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	8a. The RPV internal structures listed in Table 2.1.1-1 (chimney and partitions, chimney head and steam separators assembly, and steam dryer assembly) must meet the limited provisions of ASME Code Section III regarding certification that these components maintain structural integrity so as not to adversely affect RPV core support structure.	Inspections will be conducted of the as-built internal structures as documented in the ASME Code design reports.	The RPV internal structures listed in Table 2.1.1-1 (chimney and partitions, chimney head and steam separators assembly, and steam dryer assembly) meet the limited provisions of ASME Code Section III, NG-1122 (c), regarding certification that these components maintain structural integrity so as not to adversely affect RPV core support structure.	0	1	NO
32	2.11.8b	02.01.01-03:08bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B11	2.1.1-3	8b. The RPV internal structures listed in Table 2.1.1-1 (chimney and partitions, chimney head and steam separators assembly, and steam dryer assembly) meet the requirements of ASME B&PV Code, Subsection NG-3000, except for the weld quality and fatigue factors for secondary structural non-load bearing welds.	Inspections will be conducted of the as-built internal structures as documented in the ASME Code design reports.	The RPV internal structures listed in Table 2.1.1-1 (chimney and partitions, chimney head and steam separators assembly, and steam dryer assembly) meet the requirements of ASME B&PV Code, Subsection NG-3000, except for the weld quality and fatigue factors for secondary structural non-load bearing welds.	0	1	NO
33	2.11.9	02.01.01-03:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:GN:B11	2.1.1-3	9. The initial fuel to be loaded into the core will withstand flow-induced vibration and maintain fuel cladding integrity during operation.	Flow-Induced Vibration (FIV) testing will be performed on the fuel bundle design that will be loaded into the ESBWR initial core and on the reference fuel design in reactor use during the time of the tests. Bundle and rod responses at various elevations between the ESBWR design and the fuel design with the most similar design features will be compared.	The initial fuel to be loaded into the core will withstand flow-induced vibration and maintain fuel cladding integrity during operation.	0	1	YES
34	2.111.1	02.11.01-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	1. The TMSS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.11.1 and as shown on Figures 2.11.1-1 through 2.11.1-3	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built TMSS conforms to the functional arrangement description in Subsection 2.11.1 and as shown on Figures 2.11.1-1 through 2.11.1-3.	0	1	NO
35	2.111.10a	02.11.01-01:10aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	10a. Pressure boundary welds in the ASME Code Section III components of TMSS meet ASME Code Section III nondestructive examinations requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in the TMSS components.	0	1	NO
36	2.111.10b	02.11.01-01:10bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	10b. Pressure boundary welds in the ASME Code Section III piping of the TMSS meet the ASME Code Section III non-destructive examinations requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in the TMSS piping.	0	1	NO
37	2.111.11a	02.11.01-01:11aBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	11a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance have maintenance valves installed such that freeze seals will not be required.	Inspections of piping design isometric drawings will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	A review of piping design isometric drawings confirms that maintenance valves are included such that freeze seals will not be required. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
38	2.111.11b	02.11.01-01:11bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	11b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV in the TMSS that require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.	A reconciliation evaluation of valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance using as-designed and as-built information will be performed.	A design reconciliation has been completed for the as-built location of valves relative to the design requirements. The report documents the results of the reconciliation evaluation.	0	1	NO
39	2.111.12	02.11.01-01:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	12. The non-return valves shown on functional arrangement Figure 2.11.1-2 and 2.11.1-3 are spring assisted to close.	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted.	The non-return valves shown on functional arrangement Figure 2.11.1-2 and 2.11.1-3 are spring assisted to close.	0	1	NO
40	2.111.2a1	02.11.01-01:02a1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	2a1. The ASME Code Section III components of the TMSS are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the ASME code components of the TMSS complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
41	2.111.2a2	02.11.01-01:02a2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	2a2. The ASME Code Section III components of the TMSS shall be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the components using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed in accordance with the ASME Code for as-built reconciliation of the ASME Code Section III components of the TMSS.	0	1	NO
42	2.111.2a3	02.11.01-01:02a3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	2a3. The ASME code components of the TMSS are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the components will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N5 Data reports, where applicable) (certified, when required by ASME code) and inspection reports exist and conclude that the ASME Code Section III components of the TMSS are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
43	2.111.2b1	02.11.01-01:02b1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	2b1. The ASME Code Section III components of the TMSS retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on those Code components of the TMSS required to be hydrostatically tested by the ASME Code.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of the ASME ode components of the TMSS comply with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
44	2.111.2b2	02.11.01-01:02b2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	2b2. The ASME Code Section III piping of the TMSS retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on the code piping of the TMSS required to be hydrostatically tested by the ASME Code.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of the ASME Code piping of the TMSS comply with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
45	2.111.3	02.11.01-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	3. Upon receipt of an MSIV closure signal, the Steam Auxiliary Isolation Valve(s) close(s) and required MSIV fission product leakage path TMSS drain valve(s) open(s).	Tests will be performed on the Steam Auxiliary Isolation Valves(s) and required MSIV fission product leakage path TMSS drain valve(s) using simulated MSIV closure signals.	The Steam Auxiliary Isolation Valve(s) close(s) and required MSIV fission product leakage path TMSS drain valve(s) open(s) following receipt of a simulated MSIV closure signal.	0	1	NO
46	2.111.4	02.11.01-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	4. The Steam Auxiliary Isolation Valve(s) fail(s) closed and required MSIV fission product leakage path TMSS drain valve(s) fail(s) open on loss of electrical power to the valve actuating solenoid or on loss of pneumatic pressure.	A functional test will be performed on Steam Auxiliary Isolation Valve(s) and required MSIV fission product leakage path TMSS drain valve(s).	The Steam Auxiliary Isolation Valve(s) fail(s) closed and required MSIV fission product leakage path TMSS drain valve(s) fail(s) open on loss of electrical power to the valve actuating solenoid or on loss of pneumatic pressure.	0	1	NO
47	2.111.5	02.11.01-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	5. TMSS piping, which consists of the piping (including supports) for the MSL from the seismic interface restraint (or seismic guide) to the turbine stop valves (non-inclusive), turbine bypass valves (non-inclusive) and the connecting branch lines (nominal 6.35 cm. (2.5 in) and larger) up to and including the first isolation valve which is either normally closed or capable of automatic closure during all modes of normal reactor operation, is classified as Seismic Category II.	An inspection will be performed to verify that a seismic analysis has been completed for the as-built TMSS piping.	The as-built TMSS piping, which consists of the piping (including supports) for the MSL from the seismic interface restraint (or seismic guide) to the turbine stop valves (non-inclusive), turbine bypass valves (non-inclusive) and the connecting branch lines 6.35 cm. (2.5 in.) and larger up to and including the first isolation valve which is either normally closed or capable of automatic closure during all modes of normal reactor operation, meets Seismic Category II requirements.	0	1	NO
48	2.111.6	02.11.01-01:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	6. The integrity of the as-built MSIV leakage path to the condenser (main steam piping, bypass piping, required drain piping, and main condenser) is not compromised by non-seismically designed systems, structures and components.	Inspections of non-seismically designed systems, structures and components overhead, adjacent to, and attached to the MSIV leakage path (i.e., the main steam piping, bypass piping, required drain piping and main condenser) will be performed.	The non-seismically designed systems, structures and components overhead, adjacent to, and attached to the MSIV leakage path to the condenser will not compromise the integrity of the main steam piping, bypass piping, required drain piping and main condenser.	0	1	NO
49	2.111.7	02.11.01-01:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	7. The non-seismic portion of the MSIV leakage path to the condenser (main steam piping from the stop valve (inclusive) to turbine nozzle, bypass piping, required drain piping, and main condenser) maintains structural integrity under SSE loading conditions	An analysis of the as-built non-seismic portion of the MSIV leakage path to the condenser will be performed to verify that it maintains structural integrity under SSE loading conditions.	The as-built non-seismic portion of the MSIV leakage path to the condenser (main steam piping from the stop valve (inclusive) to turbine nozzle, bypass piping, required drain piping, and main condenser) maintains structural integrity under SSE loading conditions.	0	1	NO
50	2.111.8	02.11.01-01:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	8. The TMSS piping is sized to ensure that RPV dome to turbine stop valve pressure drop, total main steam system volume, and steamline length are consistent with assumptions in Abnormal Event analyses.	Inspection and analysis of the as-built TMSS piping will be performed to confirm RPV to turbine calculated pressure drop, total main steam system volume, and steamline length are consistent with assumptions in Abnormal Events analyses.	The TMSS piping is sized to be consistent with these Abnormal Events analyses inputs: • Minimum Steamline Pressure Drop from RPV Dome to Turbine Throttle at rated conditions: 0.179 MPa (26 psi) • Minimum Main Steam System Volume: 103.3 m3 (3648 ft^3) • Minimum Steamline Length: 65.26 m (214.1 ft)	0	1	NO
51	2.111.9a	02.11.01-01:09aBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	9a. The TMSS piping portion designated as ASME Code Section III is designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements and Seismic Category II requirements.	Inspection of ASME code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the TMSS piping portion designated as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of the ASME Code, Section III, and meets Seismic Category II requirements. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
52	2.111.9b	02.11.01-01:09bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	9b. The as-built TMSS piping portion designated as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the piping design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the piping using the as-designed and as-built information and ASME code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed in accordance with the ASME code for as-built reconciliation of the TMSS piping portion designated as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
53	2.111.9c	02.11.01-01:09cBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N11	2.11.1-1	9c. The TMSS piping portion designated as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspections of the piping will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME code) and inspection reports (including N-5 Data Reports where applicable) exist and conclude that the TMSS piping portion designated as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
54	2.112.1	02.11.02-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N21	2.11.2-1	1. The functional arrangement for the C&FS is as described in Subsection 2.11.2.	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted to confirm the functional arrangement.	The as-built C&FS conforms to the functional arrangement described in Subsection 2.11.2	0	1	NO
55	2.112.2	02.11.02-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N21	2.11.2-1	2. The C&FS provides sufficient feedwater flow and volume to mitigate AOOs.	An analysis of the as-built C&FS and feedwater pumps will be performed to confirm the minimum capacity of three feedwater pumps. The analysis may be supported by type testing.	Three operating feedwater pumps are capable of supplying 135% of the rated feedwater flow at 7.34 MPaG (1065 psig) for mitigating AOOs.	0	1	NO
56	2.112.3	02.11.02-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N21	2.11.2-1	3. The C&FS limits maximum feedwater flow to mitigate AOOs.	Analysis or type testing of the as-built C&FS and feedwater pumps will be performed to confirm that the C&FS limits maximum feedwater flow. The analysis may be supported by type testing.	The maximum capacity of three feedwater pumps at 7.34 MPaG (1065 psig) is less than or equal to 155% of rated feedwater flow for mitigating AOOs.	0	1	NO
57	2.112.4	02.11.02-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N21	2.11.2-1	4. The C&FS, in conjunction with the feedwater control system, provides sufficient feedwater flow after MSIV isolation to mitigate AOOs	Inspection or analysis of the as-built feedwater system will be performed to confirm that the C&FS provides sufficient feedwater flow after MSIV isolation.	The C&FS, in conjunction with the feedwater control system, provides feedwater flow greater than or equal to 240 seconds of rated feedwater flow after MSIV isolation for mitigating AOOs.	0	1	NO
58	2.112.5	02.11.02-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N21	2.11.2-1	5. The C&FS, in conjunction with the feedwater control system, limits the maximum feedwater flow for a single pump following a single active component failure or operator error to mitigate AOOs.	Testing or analysis of the as-built C&FS and feedwater pumps or type testing of a single feedwater pump will be performed to confirm that the C&FS limits the maximum feedwater flow from a single pump.	The C&FS, in conjunction with the feedwater control system, limits the maximum feedwater flow for a single pump to 75% of rated flow following a single active component failure or operator error for mitigating AOOs.	0	1	NO
59	2.112.6	02.11.02-01:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N21	2.11.2-1	6. The C&FS, in conjunction with the feedwater control system, is designed so that the loss of feedwater heating is limited in the event of a single operator error or equipment failure.	Inspection or analysis of the as-built feedwater system will be performed to confirm that the C&FS, in conjunction with the feedwater control system, limits the loss of feedwater heating in the event of a single operator error or equipment failure.	The C&FS, in conjunction with the feedwater control system, is designed so that the loss of feedwater heating is limited to a final feedwater temperature reduction less than or equal to 55.6°C (100°F) in the event of a single operator error or equipment failure.	0	1	NO
60	2.112.7	02.11.02-01:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N21	2.11.2-1	7. The C&FS, in conjunction with other Power Cycle Systems, provides a nominal full load final feedwater temperature that is consistent with assumptions in AOOs analyses.	Inspection or analysis of the as-built feedwater system and other Power Cycle Systems will be performed to confirm the nominal full load final feedwater temperature.	The C&FS, in conjunction with other Power Cycle Systems, provides a nominal full load final feedwater temperature of 216°C (420°F) as assumed in AOOs.	0	1	NO
61	2.112.8	02.11.02-01:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N21	2.11.2-1	8. The C&FS has a nominal feedwater flow rate at rated conditions that is consistent with inputs and assumptions in AOOs analyses.	Testing or analysis of the as-built C&FS and feedwater pumps and type testing of a single feedwater pump will be performed to confirm the nominal feedwater flow rate at rated conditions.	The C&FS has a nominal feedwater flow rate at rated conditions of 2.43 x 10^3 kg/s (19.3 x 10^6 lbm/hr) as assumed in AOOs.	0	1	NO
62	2.112.9a	02.11.02-01:09aBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:N21	2.11.2-1	9a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV system that require maintenance have maintenance valves such that freeze seals will not be required	Inspections of piping design isometric drawings will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	A review of piping design isometric drawings confirms that maintenance valves are included such that freeze seals will not be required. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
63	2.112.9b	02.11.02-01:09bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N21	2.11.2-1	9b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV system in the C&FS that require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.	A reconciliation evaluation of valves on lines attached to the RPV system that require maintenance using as-designed and as-built information will be performed.	A design reconciliation has been completed for the as-built location of valves relative to the design requirements. The report documents the results of the reconciliation evaluation.	0	1	NO
64	2.114.1	02.11.04-02:01BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N31	2.11.4-2	1. The physical layout of the Main Turbine system assures that protection is provided to essential systems and components, as required, from the effects of high and moderate energy Main Turbine system piping failures or failure of the connection(s) from the low pressure turbine exhaust hood(s) to the condenser. Essential systems and components are defined in BTP SPLB 3-1 as systems and components required to shut down the reactor and mitigate the consequences of a postulated piping failure, without offsite power. The physical layout also includes protection for the structures, systems, or components (SSCs) listed in Table 2.11.4-1.	Inspections of the as-built Turbine Building and plant arrangements will be conducted.	The physical layout of the Main Turbine system protects essential systems and components from the effects of high and moderate energy Main Turbine system piping failures or failure of the connection(s) from the low pressure turbine exhaust hood to the condenser. Essential systems and components are defined in BTP SPLB 3-1 and equipment, structures, systems, or components (SSCs) listed in Table 2.11.4-1 as systems and components required to shut down the reactor and mitigate the consequences of a postulated piping failure, without offsite power.	0	1	NO
65	2.114.2	02.11.04-02:02BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N31	2.11.4-2	2. The Main Turbine has a favorable orientation to minimize the potential effects of turbine missiles on safety-related structures, systems, or components and the structures, systems, or components listed in Table 2.11.4-1. The safety-related SSCs that are located within the low-trajectory turbine missile strike zone are failsafe or protected by physical barriers	Inspections of turbine orientation with respect to safety-related SSCs and the SSCs listed in Table 2.11.4-1 will be conducted. The consequences of turbine missile impact on those SSCs that are located within the low-trajectory turbine missile strike zone defined by Figure 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.115 will be analyzed.	An analysis exists that confirms that any safety-related SSCs and SSCs listed in Table 2.11.4-1 that are located inside the low trajectory turbine missile strike zone are failsafe or are protected by physical barriers.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
66	2.114.3	02.11.04-02:03BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N31	2.11.4-2	3. The Main Turbine control valve closing times are limited to mitigate Abnormal Events.	Testing or analysis of the as-built Main Turbine and type testing of a single turbine control valve will be performed to confirm control valve closing times.	The Main Turbine control valve fast closing time characteristic is limited to a minimum greater than or equal to the equivalent of 0.08 seconds at 100% NBR. The servo closing time is limited to a minimum greater than or equal to 2.5 seconds for mitigating Abnormal Events.	0	1	NO
67	2.114.4	02.11.04-02:04BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N31	2.11.4-2	4. The Main Turbine stop valve closing times are limited to mitigate Abnormal Events.	Testing or analysis of the as-built Main Turbine and type testing of a single turbine stop valve will be performed to confirm stop valve closing time.	The Main Turbine stop valve closing time is limited to a minimum greater than or equal to 0.100 seconds for mitigating Abnormal Events.	0	1	NO
68	2.114.5	02.11.04-02:05BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N31	2.11.4-2	5. The Main Turbine can accommodate sufficient steam flow through three control valves to mitigate Abnormal Events.	An inspection of the analysis of the as-built Main Turbine will be performed to confirm that the Main Turbine can accommodate sufficient steam flow through three control valves.	The Main Turbine can accommodate a flow greater than or equal to 85% of rated steam flow through three control valves for mitigating Abnormal Events.	0	1	NO
69	2.114.6	02.11.04-02:06BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N31	2.11.4-2	6. The probability of a strike by a turbine missile is sufficiently low to prevent equipment damage to essential systems.	A turbine missile probability analysis will be performed to demonstrate the probability of turbine failure resulting in the ejection of turbine rotor (or internal structure) fragments through the turbine casing is less than the regulatory limiting value.	Turbine Missile Probability Analysis Report(s) exist and conclude that the probability of turbine failure resulting in the ejection of turbine rotor (or internal structure) fragments through the turbine casing is less than $1x10^{-4}$ per year.	0	1	NO
70	2.114.7	02.11.04-02:07BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N31	2.11.4-2	7. The as-built turbine material properties, turbine rotor and blade designs, pre-service inspection and testing results and in-service testing and inspection requirements meet the requirements defined in the Turbine Missile Probability Analysis.	An inspection of the as-built turbine material properties, turbine rotor and blade designs, pre-service inspection and testing results, and in-service testing and inspection requirements will be conducted.	The as-built turbine material properties, turbine rotor and blade designs, preservice inspection and testing results and in-service inspection and testing requirements meet the requirements of the Turbine Missile Probability Analysis.	0	1	NO
71	2.115.1	02.11.05-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N33	2.11.5-1	1. The TGSS functional arrangement is described in Subsection 2.11.5 and shown in Figure 2.11.5-1.	Inspections of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built TGSS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in Subsection 2.11.5 and as shown on Figure 2.11.5-1.	0	1	NO
72	2.116.1	02.11.06-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N37	2.11.6-1	1. The TBS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.11.6.	Inspections of the as-built TBS will be conducted.	The as-built TBS conforms to the functional arrangement described in Subsection 2.11.6.	0	1	NO
73	2.116.2	02.11.06-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N37	2.11.6-1	2. The TBVs are controlled by the SB&PC System.	Tests will be conducted using a simulated signal.	The TBVs operate upon receipt of a simulated signal from the SB&PC System.	0	1	NO
74	2.116.3	02.11.06-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N37	2.11.6-1	3. The TBS steam pressure retaining and structural components are analyzed to demonstrate structural integrity under SSE loading conditions.	An inspection of the as-built TBS will be performed to verify that it conforms with the seismic analysis.	The as-built TBS can withstand a SSE without loss of structural integrity.	0	1	NO
75	2.116.4	02.11.06-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N37	2.11.6-1	4. The TBS accommodates steam flow to mitigate Abnormal Events.	An inspection will be performed to confirm that the as-built TBS accommodates steam flow to mitigate Abnormal Events.	The TBS accommodates at least 110% of rated main steam flow for mitigating AOOs.	0	1	NO
76	2.116.5	02.11.06-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N37	2.11.6-1	5. The TBS maintains sufficient capacity to mitigate Abnormal Events with a single active failure.	An inspection will be performed to confirm that the as-built TBS maintains sufficient capacity to mitigate Abnormal Events with a single active failure.	The TBS maintains capacity greater than or equal to 50% of the maximum capacity for a period greater than or equal to 6 seconds with a single active failure for mitigating AOOs.	0	1	NO
77	2.116.6	02.11.06-01:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N37	2.11.6-1	6. The TBS design limits the capacity of individual TBVs.	A type test and analysis of the TBS will be performed to confirm that the TBS design limits the capacity of individual TBVs.	Analysis and test data exist and conclude that no single TBV has a capacity greater than 15% of rated steam flow.	0	1	NO
78	2.116.7	02.11.06-01:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N37	2.11.6-1	7. The TBS design allows the TBVs to open rapidly to support Abnormal Event mitigation.	Testing or analyses of the TBS will be performed to confirm that the as-built TBS design allows the TBVs to open rapidly to support Abnormal Event mitigation.	The TBS can achieve a flow greater than or equal to 80% of total bypass capacity in a time period less than or equal to 0.17 seconds after initiation of TBV fast opening function for AOO mitigation.	0	1	NO
79	2.117.1	02.11.07-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N61	2.11.7-1	1. The main condenser structural members, supports, and anchors are designed to maintain condenser integrity following a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).	An inspection will be performed to verify the ability of the as-built main condenser structural members, supports, and anchors to maintain condenser integrity following a safe shutdown earthquake.	The as-built main condenser structural members, supports, and anchors are able to maintain condenser integrity following a safe shutdown earthquake.	0	1	NO
80	2.117.2	02.11.07-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N61	2.11.7-1	2. The main condenser can accommodate TBS steam flow to mitigate Abnormal Events.	An inspection of the as-built condenser will be performed to confirm the capability of the as-built condenser to accommodate TBS steam flow to mitigate Abnormal Events.	The as-built main condenser has the capability to accommodate TBS steam flow or at least 6 seconds following a loss of preferred power without the main condenser pressure exceeding the TBV isolation setpoint to mitigate AOOs.	0	1	NO
81	2.117.3	02.11.07-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:N61	2.11.7-1	3. The actual volume and plate out areas is greater than that assumed in Design Basis dose calculations.	The volume and plate out areas in the condenser final design shall be verified by inspection and analysis.	The as-built condenser exceeds the following parameters used to calculate the plate out factors for the dose analysis: • Condenser volume of ≥ 5.93E+3 m^3 (2.09E+5 ft^3) • Condenser horizontal plate area of ≥ 418 m^2 (4500 ft^2); and • Condenser horizontal cylinder area ≥ 2793 m^2 (30060 ft^2)	0	1	NO
82	2.12.1	02.01.02-03:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	1. The functional arrangement of the NBS is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.1.2, Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2 and as shown in Figures 2.1.2-1, 2.1.2-2, and 2.1.2-3.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built NBS conforms to the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.1.2, Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2 and Figures 2.1.2-1, 2.1.2-2, and 2.1.2-3.	0	1	NO
83	2.12.10	02.01.02-03:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	10. MSIVs and FWIVs fail closed upon loss of electrical power to the valve actuating solenoid.	Tests will be conducted on the as-built valve under preoperational conditions.	The MSIVs and FWIVs fail closed upon loss of electrical power to the valve actuating solenoid.	0	1	NO
84	2.12.11	02.01.02-03:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	11. Check valves listed in Table 2.1.2-1 open and close under system pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	Tests of installed valves for opening and closing, will be conducted under system preoperational pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	Based on the direction of the differential pressure across the valve, each check valve listed in Table 2.1.2-1 opens and closes.	0	1	NO
85	2.12.12	02.01.02-03:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	12. The throat diameter of each Main Steamline (MSL) flow restrictor is sized for design choke flow requirements.	Inspections of each as-built MSL flow restrictor throat diameter will be performed	The throat diameter of each MSL flow restrictor is less than or equal to 355 mm (14.0 in).	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
86	2.12.13	02.01.02-03:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	13. Each MSL flow restrictor has taps for two instrument connections to be used for monitoring the flow through its associated MSL.	Inspections of the as-built installation of each MSL flow restrictor will be conducted to verify that it provides for two instrument connections.	Each as-built MSL flow restrictor provides for two instrument connections.	0	1	NO
87	2.12.15a	02.01.02-03:15aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	15a. The MSIVs are capable of fast closing under design differential pressure, fluid flow and temperature conditions.	Type tests of the MSIV will be conducted in accordance with the design and purchase specifications to demonstrate that the MSIVs will fast close under design conditions.	The MSIVs are capable of fast closure in not less than 3 seconds and not more than 5 seconds under design conditions.	0	1	NO
88	2.12.15b	02.01.02-03:15bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	15b. The FWIVs are capable of fast closing under design differential pressure, fluid flow and temperature conditions.	Type tests of the FWIVs will be conducted in accordance with the design and purchase specifications to demonstrate that the FWIVs will fast close under design conditions.	The FWIVs are capable of fast closure in not less than 10 seconds and not more than 15 seconds under design conditions.	0	1	NO
89	2.12.16a	02.01.02-03:16aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	16a. When all four inboard or outboard MSIVs are stroked from full-open to full-closed position by their actuators, the combined leakage through the MSIVs for all four MSLs will be less than or equal to the design bases assumption value.	Tests at preoperational conditions along with analysis will be performed on the as-built MSIVs to determine the leakage as adjusted to the specified design conditions.	When all MSIVs are stroked from the full-open to full-closed position by their actuators, the combined leakage through the MSIVs for all four MSLs is less than or equal to a total combined leakage (corrected to standard conditions) of less than or equal to 94.4 liters/minute (3.33 ft^3/minute) for post-LOCA leakage.	0	1	NO
90	2.12.16b	02.01.02-03:16bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	16b. When all four FWIVs are stroked from full-open to full-closed position by their actuators, the combined liquid inflow leakage through the FWIVs for both feedwater lines will be less than or equal to the design bases assumption value.	Tests and analysis will be performed on the as-built FWIVs to determine the gas outflow leakage as adjusted to the specified design conditions.	When all FWIVs are stroked from the full-open to full-closed position by their actuators, the combined leakage through the FWIVs for both feedwater lines is less than or equal to a total combined gas outflow leakage (corrected to standard conditions) of less than or equal to 700 cc/minute (1.483 ft^3/hour) for post-LOCA leakage.	0	1	NO
91	2.12.16c	02.01.02-03:16cBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	16c. When all four FWIVs are stroked from full-open to full-closed position by their actuators, the combined gas outflow leakage through the FWIVs for both feedwater lines will be less than or equal to the design bases assumption value.	Tests and analysis will be performed on the as-built FWIVs to determine the gas outflow leakage as adjusted to the specified design conditions.	When all FWIVs are stroked from the full-open to full-closed position by their actuators, the combined leakage through the FWIVs for both feedwater lines is less than or equal to a total combined gas outflow leakage (corrected to standard conditions) of less than or equal to 700 cc/minute (1.483 ft^3/hour) for post-LOCA leakage.	0	1	NO
92	2.12.17	02.01.02-03:17BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	17. The opening pressure for the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) setpoint in mechanical lift mode validates the overpressure protection analysis by lifting at its nominal setpoint pressure.	Type tests or setpoint tests will be conducted in accordance with the ASME Code to certify the valves.	The mechanical lift nominal setpoint pressure of 8.366 ± 0.251 MPaG (1213 ± 36 psig).	0	1	NO
93	2.12.18	02.01.02-03:18BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	18. The opening time for the SRVs in the overpressure operation of self-actuated or mechanical lift mode, which is measured from when the pressure exceeds the valve set pressure to when the valve is fully open, shall be less than or equal to the design opening time.	Analysis and type tests will be conducted in accordance with the ASME Code to ensure that the valves open within the design opening time.	The opening time (as measured from when the pressure exceeds the valve set pressure to when the valve is fully open) for the SRVs in the overpressure operation of self-actuated or mechanical lift mode is less than or equal to 0.5 seconds.	0	1	NO
94	2.12.19	02.01.02-03:19BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	19. The steam discharge capacity of each SRV validates (i.e., is greater than or equal to that used in) the overpressure protection analysis.	Type tests will be conducted in accordance with the ASME Code Section III for relief valve certification.	Valve capacity stamping on each SRV records the certified capacity at rated setpoint of 138 kg/s (304 lbm/s) minimum.	0	1	NO
95	2.12.20	02.01.02-03:20BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	20. The opening pressure for the Safety Valves (SVs) validates (i.e. is less than or equal to that used in) the overpressure protection analysis.	Type tests or setpoint tests will be conducted in accordance with the ASME Code Section III to certify the valve.	The mechanical lift nominal setpoint pressure of 8.503 ± 0.255 MPaG (1233 ± 37 psig).	0	1	NO
96	2.12.21	02.01.02-03:21BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	21. The opening time for the SVs, measured from when the pressure exceeds the valve set pressure to when the valve is fully open, shall be less than or equal to the design opening time.	Analysis and type tests will be conducted in accordance with the ASME Code Section III to ensure that the valves open within the design opening time.	The opening time (measured from when the pressure exceeds the valve set pressure to when the valve is fully open) for the SVs is less than or equal to 0.5 seconds.	0	1	NO
97	2.12.22	02.01.02-03:22BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	22. The steam discharge capacity of each SV validates (i.e., is greater than or equal to that used in) the overpressure protection analysis.	Type tests will be conducted in accordance with the ASME Code Section III for relief valve certification.	Valve capacity stamping on each SV records the certified capacity at rated setpoint of 140.2 kg/s (309 lbm/s) minimum.	0	1	NO
98	2.12.23	02.01.02-03:23BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	23. The relief-mode actuator (and safety-related appurtenances) can open each SRV with the DW pressure at design pressure.	An analysis and type test will be performed to demonstrate the capacity Section III of the relief-mode actuation for each SRV.	The relief-mode actuation has the capacity to lift the SRVs to the full open position one time with the DW pressure at the DW design pressure when the accumulator is isolated from its pneumatic pressure source.	0	1	NO
99	2.12.24	02.01.02-03:24BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	24. The booster assembly opens each Depressurization Valve DPV in less than or equal to the design opening time (opening time to full rated capacity).	Type testing will be performed on the booster assemblies to confirm that they are capable of opening the valve at design basis conditions. Type testing, along with analyses to adjust for design basis conditions will be performed to demonstrate that the booster opens each DPV within the design opening time (opening time to full rated capacity) and design conditions.	Each DPV opens when actuated by the booster assembly in less than or equal to 0.45 seconds with an inlet pressure of 7,584 kPa ± 685 kPaG (1100 psig ± 99 psi).	0	1	NO
100	2.12.25	02.01.02-03:25BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	25. Each DPV minimum flow capacity is sufficient to support rapid depressurization of the RPV (i.e., has a flow capacity that is greater than or equal to the design flow capacity under design basis conditions).	Analyses and type tests will be performed.	The DPV flow capacity is greater than or equal to 239 kg/s (527 lbm/s) at an inlet pressure of 7.480 MPaG (1085 psig).	0	1	NO
101	2.12.28	02.01.02-03:28BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	28. Vacuum breakers are provided on SRV discharge lines to reduce the post-discharge reflood height of water in the discharge lines.	An inspection and analysis will be performed to confirm that the vacuum breakers are installed and to demonstrate that the vacuum breaker capacity and setpoint limit the water column in the discharge line.	The vacuum breakers are installed on the SRV discharge lines and the vacuum breaker capacity and setpoint limit the water column in the discharge line.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
102	2.12.29	02.01.02-03:29BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	29. The SRV discharge line vacuum breakers close to prevent steam bypass to the DW during SRV discharge, and open following discharge completion to permit pressure equalization with the DW and prevent ingestion of a water slug into the SRV discharge lines.	Type test will be performed on the vacuum breaker for disk-closed leakage at line pressure during SRV discharge, disk cracking (unseating) pressure, and full-open flow capacity.	The following test criteria are met: • At SRV discharge line pressure during SRV discharges, the vacuum breaker leak rate is less than or equal to design leak rate; • The disk unseat begins at design cracking pressure; and, • At disk full lift, the vacuum breaker achieves equal to or greater than design flow capacity.	0	1	NO
103	2.12.2a1	02.01.02-03:02a1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	2a1. The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of ASME Code Section III including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined.	0	1	NO
104	2.12.2a2	02.01.02-03:02a2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	2a2. The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
105	2.12.2a3	02.01.02-03:02a3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	2a3. The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-5 Data Reports, where applicable) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports exist and conclude that the components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
106	2.12.2b1	02.01.02-03:02b1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	2b1. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of ASME Code Section III, including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
107	2.12.2b2	02.01.02-03:02b2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	2b2. The as-built piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the piping design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
108	2.12.2b3	02.01.02-03:02b3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	2b3. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspections of the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports (including N-5 Data Reports where applicable) exist and conclude that the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
109	2.12.30	02.01.02-03:30BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	30. The pressure loss coefficient of each of the following components is within the uncertainty band of the pressure loss coefficient used in the natural circulation flow analysis: • Steam separator • Fuel bundle • Fuel support piece orifice • Control rod guide tubes • Shroud support	As-built component records will be inspected and compared against inputs to the natural circulation analysis, considering uncertainty, performed to calculate pressure loss coefficients.	The pressure loss coefficient of each of the following components is within the uncertainty band of the pressure loss coefficient used in the natural circulation flow analysis: • Steam separator • Fuel bundle • Fuel support piece orifice • Control rod guide • Shroud support	0	1	NO
110	2.12.31	02.01.02-03:31BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	31. The free volume for each of the following components is within the uncertainty band of the free volume used in natural circulation flow analysis: • RPV • Downcomer • Core • Chimney • Separator/dryer	Inspection of as-built component records will be performed to determine the component free volume for each of the listed components.	The free volume of each of the following components is within the uncertainty band of the free volume used in the natural circulation flow analysis: • RPV • Downcomer • Core • Chimney • Separator/dryer	0	1	NO
111	2.12.32	02.01.02-03:32BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	32. The hydraulic diameter, geometry of heated surfaces, and flow area in fuel assemblies are within the uncertainty band of the geometry used in the natural circulation flow analysis.	As-built dimension inspection and analyses will be performed to determine the geometry of the fuel assemblies to be loaded.	The hydraulic diameter, geometry of heated surfaces, and flow area in the fuel assemblies are within the uncertainty band of the geometry used in the natural circulation flow analysis.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
112	2.12.36	02.01.02-03:36BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	36. The main steam line and SRV/SV branch piping geometry precludes first and second shear layer wave acoustic resonance conditions from occurring and avoids pressure loads on the steam dryer at plant normal operating conditions.	Analysis of the as-built piping system and equipment analysis, for acoustic resonance at plant normal operating conditions, will be performed.	The main steam line and SRV/SV branch piping geometry precludes first and second shear layer wave acoustic resonance conditions from occurring and results in no significant pressure loads on the steam dryer at plant normal operating conditions.	0	1	NO
113	2.12.3a	02.01.02-03:03aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	3a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III nondestructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
114	2.12.3b	02.01.02-03:03bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	3b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
115	2.12.4a	02.01.02-03:04aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	4a. The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on those code components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III that are required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
116	2.12.4b	02.01.02-03:04bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	4b. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on the code piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III that is required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements in ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
117	2.12.5.i	02.01.02-03:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
118	2.12.5.ii	02.01.02-03:05BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
119	2.12.5.iii	02.01.02-03:05BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspection and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category I, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category I, including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
120	2.12.7a	02.01.02-03:07aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	7a. Each NBS mechanical train located outside the containment is physically separated from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related function.	Inspections and analysis will be conducted for each of the NBS mechanical trains located outside the containment.	Each NBS mechanical train located outside containment is protected against design basis events and their direct consequences by spatial separation, barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related function.	0	1	NO
121	2.12.7b	02.01.02-03:07bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	7b. Each NBS mechanical train located inside the containment is physically separated from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related function.	Inspections and analysis will be conducted for each of the NBS mechanical trains located inside the containment.	Each NBS mechanical train located inside containment is protected against design basis events and their direct consequences by spatial separation, barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related function.	0	1	NO
122	2.12.8a	02.01.02-03:08aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	8a. The MSIVs close upon command.	Valve closure tests will be performed on the as-built MSIVs using a manual closure command to simulate an isolation signal.	The MSIVs close upon command.	0	1	NO
123	2.12.8b	02.01.02-03:08bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	2.1.2-3	8b. The Feedwater Isolation Valves (FWIVs) close upon command.	Valve closure tests will be performed on the as-built FWIVs using a manual closure command to simulate an isolation signal.	The FWIVs close upon command	0	1	NO
124	2.123.1	02.12.03-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:P21	2.12.3-1	1. The RCCWS functional arrangement is as described in the Design Description of Subsection 2.12.3 and as shown on Figure 2.12.3-1.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built RCCWS System conforms to the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.12.3 and as shown on Figure 2.12.3-1.	0	1	NO
125	2.123.2	02.12.03-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:P21	2.12.3-1	2. The RCCWS provides the nonsafety-related function to support post-72 hour cooling for nuclear island chillers and standby diesel generators and provides cooling support for FAPCS.	Testing of the RCCWS will be performed to verify flow to the nuclear island chillers, standby diesel generators and FAPCS.	A flow path exists from the RCCWS to the nuclear island chillers, standby diesel generators, and to support operation of FAPCS.	0	1	NO
126	2.123.3	02.12.03-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C1C:P21	2.12.3-1	3. The RCCWS can be operated and controlled from the MCR.	Testing to demonstrate RCCWS flow will be performed on the RCCWS components using controls in the MCR.	RCCWS pumps can be operated and flow controlled from the MCR.	0	1	NO
127	2.123.4	02.12.03-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C1C:P21	2.12.3-1	4. RCCWS flow indication is provided in the MCR.	Inspection will verify that RCCWS flow indication exists and can be retrieved in the MCR.	The RCCWS flow indication exists and can be retrieved in the MCR.	0	1	NO
128	2.125.1	02.12.05-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:P25	2.12.5-1	1. The NICWS functional arrangement is described in the Design Description of Subsection 2.12.5 and as shown on Figure 2.12.5-1.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built NICWS System conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.12.5 and as shown on Figure 2.12.5-1.	0	1	NO
129	2.125.2	02.12.05-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:P25	2.12.5-1	2. The NICWS provides the nonsafety-related function to support post-72 hour cooling for RCCWS and HVAC systems.	Testing of the NICWS will be performed to verify flow to the RCCWS and HVAC systems.	A flow path exists from the NICWS to the RCCWS and HVAC systems.	0	1	NO
130	2.125.3	02.12.05-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C1C:P25	2.12.5-1	3. NICWS flow can be established and controlled from the MCR.	Testing will be performed to demonstrate NICWS flow will be performed on the NICWS components using controls in the MCR.	NICWS pumps and chillers can be operated and flow controlled from the MCR.	0	1	NO
131	2.125.4	02.12.05-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C1C:P25	2.12.5-1	4. NICWS flow indication is provided in the MCR.	Inspection will verify that NICWS flow indication exists and can be retrieved in the MCR.	The NICWS flow indication exists and can be retrieved in the MCR.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
132	2.127.1	02.12.07-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:P41	2.12.7-1	1. The PSWS functional arrangement is as described in the Design Description of Subsection 2.12.7 and as shown on Figure 2.12.7-1.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built PSWS System conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Subsection 2.12.7 and as shown on Figure 2.12.7-1.	0	1	NO
133	2.127.2	02.12.07-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:P41	2.12.7-1	2. The PSWS provides the nonsafety-related functions to support post-72 hour cooling for RCCWS.	Testing of the PSWS will be performed to verify flow to the RCCWS.	A flow path exists from the PSWS to the RCCWS.	0	1	NO
134	2.127.3	02.12.07-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:C:P41	2.12.7-1	3. The PSWS can be established and controlled from the MCR.	Testing will be performed to demonstrate flow on the PSWS components using controls in the MCR.	PSWS pumps can be operated and flow controlled from the MCR.	0	1	NO
135	2.127.4	02.12.07-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:C:P41	2.12.7-1	4. PSWS flow indication is provided in the MCR.	Inspection will verify that PSWS flow indication exists and can be retrieved in the MCR.	The PSWS flow indication exists and can be retrieved in the MCR.	0	1	NO
136	2.131.1	02.13.01-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	1. The functional arrangement of Electric Power Distribution System is as described in the Design Description of Subsection 2.13.1 and Table 2.13.1-1, and as shown on Figure 2.13.1-1.	Inspections of the as-built Electric Power Distribution System will be performed.	The as-built Electric Power Distribution System conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the design description of Subsection 2.13.1 and shown in Table 2.13.1-1 and, as shown on Figure 2.13.1-1.	0	1	NO
137	2.131.10	02.13.01-02:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	10. Equipment within the onsite portion of the PPS is rated to interrupt analyzed fault currents, including the fault current contribution from the offsite portion of the PPS.	Analysis of the as-built onsite portion of the PPS will be performed to determine the fault current interrupting requirements during design basis operating modes including the fault current contribution from the offsite portion of the PPS.	The as-built equipment within the onsite portion of the PPS, as determined by its ratings, exceeds the analyzed fault currents, including the fault current contribution from the offsite portion of the PPS.	0	1	NO
138	2.131.11a	02.13.01-02:11aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	11a. The onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuits are physically separate from the onsite portions of the alternate preferred power supply circuits from the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) and Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) to the PIP bus incoming line breakers.	Inspections of the as-built onsite normal preferred power supply circuits and alternate preferred power supply circuits will be performed.	For the as-built onsite portion of the PPS: • The non-segregated phase bus ducts provided for the electrical interconnection between the RAT and 6.9 kV switchgear buses are physically separated from the bus ducts provided for the interconnection of the UAT and the switchgear by distance or physical barriers so as to minimize, to the extent practical, the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under design basis conditions in accordance with IEEE-384.	0	1	NO
139	2.131.11b	02.13.01-02:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	11b. The onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuits are electrically independent from the onsite portions of the alternate preferred power supply circuits from the UAT and RAT to the PIP bus incoming line breakers.	Tests of the as-built onsite portions of the PPS normal preferred and alternate preferred power supply circuits will be conducted by providing a test signal in only one preferred power circuit at a time.	A test signal exists in only the circuit under test.	0	1	NO
140	2.131.11c	02.13.01-02:11cBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	11c. The onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits are electrically independent from the alternate preferred power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits from the UAT and RAT to the PIP bus incoming line breakers.	Tests of the as-built onsite portions of the normal preferred and alternate preferred power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits will be conducted by providing a test signal in only one circuit at a time.	A test signal exists in only the circuit under test.	0	1	NO
141	2.131.11d	02.13.01-02:11dBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	11d. The onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits are physically separated from the alternate preferred power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits from the UAT and RAT to the PIP bus incoming line breakers.	Inspections of the as-built onsite portions of the normal preferred and alternate preferred power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits will be performed.	The as-built onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits are physically separated from the alternate preferred power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits by distance or physical barriers so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under design basis conditions as defined in IEEE-384.	0	1	NO
142	2.131.11e	02.13.01-02:11eBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	11e. The UAT and RAT are physically separated to minimize the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under design basis conditions to the extent practical.	Inspection and analysis of the as-built UAT and RAT physical separation will be performed.	The UAT and RAT are physically separated by physical barriers, or are separated by distance, to minimize the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under design basis conditions to the extent practical, according to RG 1.189 separation criteria.	0	1	NO
143	2.131.12a	02.13.01-02:12aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	12a. The normal power supply circuits are physically separate from the alternate power supply circuits from the PIP buses to the Isolation Power Center bus incoming line breakers.	Inspections of the as-built normal power supply circuits and alternate power supply circuits will be performed.	The normal power supply circuits are physically separate from the alternate power supply circuits by distance or physical barriers so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under design basis conditions as defined in IEEE-384.	0	1	NO
144	2.131.12b	02.13.01-02:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	12b. The normal power supply circuits are electrically independent from the alternate power supply circuits from the PIP buses to the Isolation Power Center bus incoming line breakers.	Tests of the as-built normal and alternate power supply circuits will be conducted by providing a test signal in only one power circuit at a time.	A test signal exists in only the circuit under test.	0	1	NO
145	2.131.12c	02.13.01-02:12cBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	12c. The normal power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits are electrically independent from the alternate power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits from the PIP buses to the Isolation Power Center bus incoming line breakers.	Tests of the as-built normal and alternate power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits will be conducted by providing a test signal in only one circuit at a time.	A test signal exists in only the circuit under test.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
146	2.131.12d	02.13.01-02:12dBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	12d. The onsite portions of the normal power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits are physically separated from the alternate power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits from the PIP buses to the Isolation Power Center bus incoming line breakers.	Inspections of the as-built normal and alternate power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits will be performed.	The as-built normal power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits are physically separated from the alternate power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits by distance or physical barriers so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under design basis conditions as defined in IEEE-384.	0	1	NO
147	2.131.13	02.13.01-02:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	13. Interrupting devices for the Electric Power Distribution Preferred Power System are coordinated so as to isolate faulted equipment or circuits of the Plant Investment Protection Buses from the Preferred Power System, prevent damage to equipment, protect personnel, minimize system disturbances, and maintain continuity of the Preferred Power Supply System from the PIP buses to all safety-related loads and designated RTNSS B and C loads.	Analysis will be performed for all voltage levels to ensure that interrupting devices are properly coordinated.	Interrupting devices at all voltage levels are properly coordinated and the interrupter closest to a fault opens before other devices and isolate only the faulted equipment and or circuit.	0	1	NO
148	2.131.2.i	02.13.01-02:02BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	2. The 480 V AC Isolation Power Center equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.1-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspections will be performed to verify that the 480 V AC Isolation Power Center equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.1-1 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The Seismic Category I 480 V AC Isolation Power Center equipment identified in Table 2.13.1-1 is housed in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
149	2.131.2.ii	02.13.01-02:02BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	2. The 480 V AC Isolation Power Center equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.1-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type test and analyses of the Seismic Category I 480 V AC Isolation Power Center equipment identified in Table 2.13.1-1, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The Seismic Category I 480 V AC Isolation Power Center equipment identified in Table 2.13.1-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
150	2.131.2.iii	02.13.01-02:02BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	2. The 480 V AC Isolation Power Center equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.1-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspection and analyses will be performed to verify that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.1-2, including associated anchorage, is bound by the test or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built 480 V AC Isolation Power Center equipment identified in Table 2.13.1-2 including associated anchorage can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
151	2.131.3a	02.13.01-02:03aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	3a. Independence is provided between safety-related divisions as required by Regulatory Guide 1.75.	Tests will be performed on the as-built safety-related 480 V AC Isolation Power Centers by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	A test signal exists only in the as-built safety-related division under test in the 480 V AC Isolation Power Center.	0	1	NO
152	2.131.3b	02.13.01-02:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	3b. Separation is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment as required by Regulatory Guide 1.75.	Inspection and analysis of the as-built safety-related 480 V AC Isolation Power Centers will be performed.	For the as-built safety-related 480 V AC Isolation Power Centers, physical separation and electrical isolation as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75 exists between safety-related divisions. Physical separation and electrical isolation as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75 exists between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.	0	1	NO
153	2.131.4	02.13.01-02:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	4. Each safety-related Isolation Power Center supplies power to safety-related loads in its respective division.	Tests will be performed using a test signal to confirm that an electrical path exists from the as-built safety-related Isolation Power Center to its divisional safety-related loads. Each test may be a single test or a series of over-lapping tests.	Tests will be performed using a test signal to confirm that an electrical path exists from the as-built safety-related Isolation Power Center to its divisional safety-related loads. Each test may be a single test or a series of over-lapping tests.	0	1	NO
154	2.131.5	02.13.01-02:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	5. Isolation Power Centers and their associated loads are protected against undervoltage, degraded voltage and under-frequency conditions.	Testing will be performed using real or simulated signals.	The Isolation Power Centers are protected against under voltage, degraded voltage and under-frequency conditions by applying a real or simulated signal and verifying that the as-built Isolation Power Center bus isolates from the nonsafety-related system.	0	1	NO
155	2.131.6a	02.13.01-02:06aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	6a. The Electric Power Distribution System provides the capability for distributing nonsafety-related AC power from onsite sources to their designated RTNSS loads.	Tests will be performed using a test signal to confirm that an electrical path exists for each RTNSS load from its associated as-built bus. Each test may be a single test or a series of over-lapping tests.	A test signal originating from the as-built bus exists at the terminals of each associated RTNSS load.	0	1	NO
156	2.131.6b	02.13.01-02:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	6b. The Electric Power Distribution System provides a PIP bus undervoltage signal to trip the PIP bus normal and alternate preferred power supply breakers.	Testing will be performed using real or simulated PIP bus under voltage signals.	The as-built PIP bus normal and alternate preferred power supply breakers trip after receiving a real or simulated PIP bus under voltage signal.	0	1	NO
157	2.131.9	02.13.01-02:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R10	2.13.1-2	9. Equipment within the onsite portion of the Preferred Power Supply (PPS) is rated to supply necessary load requirements, including power, voltage, and frequency, during design basis operating modes.	Analysis of the as-built onsite portion of the PPS will be performed to determine load requirements during design basis operating modes. This analysis will, in part, specify required power, voltage, and frequency at the interface between the onsite and offsite portions of the PPS in order to provide adequate power, voltage, and frequency to the safety-related Isolation Power Center buses to support safety-related load operation.	The as-built equipment within the onsite portion of the PPS, as determined by its ratings, exceeds the analyzed load requirements, including power, voltage, and frequency, during design basis operating modes.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
158	2.133.1	02.13.03-03:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	1. The functional arrangement of the 250 V safety-related DC systems is as described in Subsection 2.13.3 Design Description and Table 2.13.3-1 and as shown on Figure 2.13.3-1.	Inspections of the as-built 250 V safety-related DC systems will be performed.	The as-built 250 V safety-related DC systems conform with the functional arrangement as shown in Figure 2.13.3-1 and as described in Subsection 2.13.3 and component locations are as shown in Table 2.13.3-1.	0	1	NO
159	2.133.12	02.13.03-03:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	12. Electrical cables for the safety-related 250 V DC system are rated to withstand fault current for the time required to clear the fault from their power source.	Analyses of the as-built safety-related 250 V DC system will be performed to determine possible fault currents.	For the as-built safety-related 250 V DC system, electrical cables will withstand the analyzed fault currents, as determined by manufacturer's ratings, for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.	0	1	NO
160	2.133.13	02.13.03-03:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	13. Protective devices for the safety-related 250 V DC system are rated to interrupt analyzed fault currents and are coordinated to only trip the protective device closest to the fault.	Analyses of the as-built safety-related 250 V DC system will be performed to determine possible fault currents and the required size of protective devices to ensure that they are coordinated to only trip the protective device closest to the fault.	For the as-built safety-related 250 V DC system, that the protective devices for the safety-related 250 V DC system loads are sized to only trip the protective device closest to the fault.	0	1	NO
161	2.133.14	02.13.03-03:14BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	14. Raceway for safety-related 250 V DC system circuits are sized in accordance with design requirements.	Analyses of the as-built safety-related 250 V DC system will be performed to determine required raceway sizing.	For the as-built safety-related 250 V DC system, raceway sizing is in accordance with design requirements and raceway loading is within that assumed in the electrical analyses.	0	1	NO
162	2.133.2	02.13.03-03:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	2. The functional arrangement of the 125 V and 250 V nonsafety-related DC systems is as shown on Figure 2.13.3-2 and as described in Subsection 2.13.3.	Inspections of the as-built 125 V and 250 V nonsafety-related DC systems will be performed.	The as-built 125 V and 250 V nonsafety-related DC systems conform with the functional arrangement as shown in Figure 2.13.3-2 and as described in Subsection 2.13.3.	0	1	NO
163	2.133.3.i	02.13.03-03:03BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	3. Two 250 V safety-related batteries in each division are together sized to supply their design loads, at the end of installed life, for a minimum of 72 hours without recharging.	i. Analyses for the as-built safety-related batteries to determine battery capacities will be performed based on the design duty cycle for each battery.	i. The as-built batteries in each division together have the capacity, as determined by the vendor performance specification, to supply their rated constant current for a minimum of 72 hours without recharging.	0	1	NO
164	2.133.3.ii	02.13.03-03:03BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	3. Two 250 V safety-related batteries in each division are together sized to supply their design loads, at the end of installed life, for a minimum of 72 hours without recharging.	ii. Tests of each as-built safety-related battery will be conducted by simulating loads which envelope the analyzed battery design duty cycle.	ii. The capacity of each as-built safety-related battery equals or exceeds the analyzed battery design duty cycle capacity.	0	1	NO
165	2.133.4.i	02.13.03-03:02BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	4. The 250 V safety-related DC systems equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.3-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspections will be performed to verify that the 250 V DC system equipment identified in Table 2.13.3-1 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The Seismic Category I 250 V DC system equipment is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
166	2.133.4.ii	02.13.03-03:02BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	4. The 250 V safety-related DC systems equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.3-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type test, analyses, or a combination of type test and analyses of the 250 V DC systems equipment identified in Table 2.13.3-1 as Seismic Category I will be performed using analytical assumption, or under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.	ii. The Seismic Category I 250 V DC system equipment can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
167	2.133.4.iii	02.13.03-03:02BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	4. The 250 V safety-related DC systems equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.3-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built 250 V DC systems equipment, including anchorage, identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.3-1 are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built 250 V DC system equipment, including anchorage, identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.1-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
168	2.133.5	02.13.03-03:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	5. The 250 V safety-related DC systems provide four independent and redundant safety-related divisions.	Tests will be performed on the as-built 250 V safety-related DC systems by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	A test signal exists only in the as-built safety-related division under test in the 250 V safety-related DC systems; and a test signal originating from the as-built divisional safety-related 250 V DC distribution panel exists at the terminals of its divisional safety-related loads.	0	1	NO
169	2.133.6	02.13.03-03:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	6. Separation is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment as required by Regulatory Guide 1.75.	Inspection and analysis of the as-built 250 V safety-related DC systems will be performed.	In the as-built 250 V safety-related DC systems, physical separation as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75 exists between safety–related divisions. Physical separation as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75 exists between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.	0	1	NO
170	2.133.7	02.13.03-03:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	7. Each battery charger associated with each 250 V DC safety-related battery is capable of restoring its battery after a bounding design basis event discharge to a state that the battery can perform its design basis function for subsequent postulated operational and design basis functions, while at the same time supplying the largest combined demands associated with the battery, within the time stated in the design basis, consistent with the requirement given in IEEE 308.	Testing of each 250 V DC safety-related battery charger will be performed.	Following a bounding design basis event discharge, the battery charger is capable of restoring its associated battery to a state that the battery can perform its design basis function for subsequent postulated operational and design basis functions while at the same time supplying the largest combined demands associated with the battery, within the time stated in the design basis, consistent with the requirement given in IEEE 308.	0	1	NO
171	2.133.8	02.13.03-03:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	8. The 250 V safety-related DC battery and battery charger circuit breakers, and DC distribution panels and their circuit breakers and fuses, are sized to supply their load requirements.	Analyses of the as-built 250 V safety-related DC electrical distribution system will be performed to determine the capacities of the battery and battery charger circuit breakers, and DC distribution panels and their circuit breakers and fuses.	The capacities of safety-related battery and battery charger circuit breakers, and DC distribution panels and their circuit breakers and fuses, as determined by their nameplate ratings, exceed their analyzed load and DC interrupting current requirements.	0	1	NO
172	2.133.9	02.13.03-03:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R16	2.13.3-3	9. The battery chargers are designed to prevent their AC source from becoming a load on the 250 V DC safety-related batteries when the AC power source is de-energized or has degraded voltage.	Testing of each 250 V DC safety-related battery charger will be performed to demonstrate that there is no power feedback from a loss of AC input power.	The 250 V DC safety-related battery chargers prevent the AC input source from becoming a load on the 250 V DC safety-related batteries during a loss of AC power condition.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
173	2.134.1	02.13.04-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R21	2.13.4-2	1. The functional arrangement of the Standby Onsite Power Supply is as described in Subsection 2.13.4 and in Table 2.13.4-1.	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built Standby Onsite Power Supply system conform with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Subsection 2.13.4 and Table 2.13.4-1.	0	1	NO
174	2.134.2a	02.13.04-02:02aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R21	2.13.4-2	2a. Upon receipt of an undervoltage signal from the Electric Power Distribution System, the standby diesel generator starts and achieves rated speed and voltage and sequences its designed loads while maintaining voltage and frequency within design limits.	Tests of the as-built Standby Onsite Power Supply system will be conducted by providing a real or simulated under voltage signal to start the standby diesel generators. Subsequently generated signals will start load sequencing.	The as-built standby diesel generator starts upon receipt of a real or simulated under voltage signal on its associated PIP bus, achieves rated speed and voltage, and sequences its designed loads while maintaining voltage and frequency within design limits.	0	1	NO
175	2.134.2b	02.13.04-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R21	2.13.4-2	2b. Each standby diesel generator is capable of operating at its nameplate rated load and is sized to accommodate its expected loads.	Testing will be performed to demonstrate that each as-built standby diesel generator will operate between rated and maximum nameplate load, and nameplate power factor for a time period required to reach engine temperature equilibrium. Analysis will be performed to demonstrate that the expected loads are within the nameplate rated load.	Each as-built standby diesel generator provides power at generator terminal rated voltage and frequency when operated at rated load, and expected loads are within the rated nameplate load.	0	1	NO
176	2.134.2c	02.13.04-02:02cBB:BBB:BB:BB:C£L:R21	2.13.4-2	2c. Each standby diesel generator fuel oil storage tank contains adequate fuel oil capacity for seven days of standby diesel generator operation based on expected SDG load.	The as-built standby fuel oil storage tank capacity will be calculated based on expected SDG load.	The as-built standby fuel oil storage tank capacity is adequate to supply seven days of fuel oil to the standby diesel generator under continuous operation based on expected SDG load.	0	1	NO
177	2.134.2d	02.13.04-02:02dBB:BBB:BB:BB:C£L:R21	2.13.4-2	2d. Each of the standby diesel generator fuel oil transfer pumps (two pumps per engine) starts automatically and transfers fuel oil from the standby fuel oil storage tank to the standby diesel generator day tank at a rate greater than or equal to the usage rate of the standby diesel generator.	Testing will be performed to demonstrate that each as-built fuel oil transfer pump starts automatically and transfers fuel oil from the standby fuel oil storage tank to the standby diesel generator day tank at a rate greater than or equal to the usage rate of the standby diesel generator when operating between rated and maximum nameplate load.	Each as-built fuel oil transfer pump starts automatically and transfers fuel oil from the standby fuel oil storage tank to the standby diesel generator day tank at a rate greater than or equal to the usage rate of the standby diesel generator when running operating between rated and maximum nameplate load.	0	1	NO
178	2.134.2e	02.13.04-02:02eBB:BBB:BB:BB:C£L:R21	2.13.4-2	2e. Each of the standby diesel generator starting air receivers (two receivers per engine) is capable of starting the engine at its low pressure alarm setpoint.	Testing will be performed for each as-built starting air receiver.	Each as-built starting air receiver is capable of starting the engine at its low pressure alarm setpoint.	0	1	NO
179	2.134.2f	02.13.04-02:02fBB:BBB:BB:BB:C£L:R21	2.13.4-2	2f. Each of the standby diesel generator jacket cooling water systems controls the flow of water to maintain required water temperature.	Testing of standby diesel generator jacket cooling water system will be performed to demonstrate flow of water to maintain required water temperature.	The standby diesel generator jacket cooling water system demonstrates flow of water to maintain required water temperature.	0	1	NO
180	2.134.2g	02.13.04-02:02gB:BBB:BB:BB:C£L:R21	2.13.4-2	2g. Each standby diesel generator has instrumentation provided to monitor lube oil temperature, pressure and sump level, ensuring proper operation of the system.	Inspection and testing will be performed to demonstrate that lube oil temperature, pressure and sump level instrumentation is provided and monitors operation of the system.	Each standby diesel generator has instrumentation provided to monitor lube oil temperature, pressure and sump level, ensuring proper operation of the system.	0	1	NO
181	2.134.2h	02.13.04-02:02hB:BBB:BB:BB:C£L:R21	2.13.4-2	2h. Each standby diesel generator is provided with a separate intake and exhaust system.	Inspection of the as-built intake and exhaust system will be conducted.	Each as-built DG is provided with a separate intake and exhaust system.	0	1	NO
182	2.134.2i	02.13.04-02:02iBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:R21	2.13.4-2	2i. Each standby diesel generator can be remotely operated from the MCR.	Each standby diesel generator will be started and stopped using manually initiated signals from the MCR.	Each standby diesel generator starts and stops when manually initiated signals are sent from the MCR.	0	1	NO
183	2.134.4	02.13.04-02:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R21	2.13.4-2	4. The functional arrangement of the Ancillary Diesel Onsite Power Supply System is as described in Subsection 2.13.4 and in Table 2.13.4-1.	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built Ancillary Diesel Onsite Power Supply System conforms to the functional arrangement as described in Subsection 2.13.4 and Table 2.13.4-1.	0	1	NO
184	2.134.5a	02.13.04-02:05aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R21	2.13.4-2	5a. Upon receipt of an undervoltage signal from the ancillary diesel 480 V AC bus, the ancillary diesel generator starts, achieves rated speed and voltage, and supplies power to the ancillary diesel bus.	Tests of the as-built Ancillary Diesel Onsite Power Supply System will be conducted by providing a real or simulated under voltage signal to start the ancillary diesel generators.	The as-built ancillary diesel generator starts upon receipt of a real or simulated under voltage signal on its associated bus, achieves rated speed and voltage, and supplies power to the ancillary diesel bus.	0	1	NO
185	2.134.5b	02.13.04-02:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R21	2.13.4-2	5b. Upon receipt of a low ancillary diesel room temperature signal, the ancillary diesel generator starts and achieves rated speed and voltage and supplies power to the ancillary diesel bus.	Tests of the as-built Ancillary Diesel Onsite Power Supply System will be conducted by providing a real or simulated low ancillary diesel room temperature signal to start the ancillary diesel generators	The as-built ancillary diesel generator starts upon receipt of a real or simulated low ancillary diesel room temperature signal, achieves rated speed and voltage, and supplies power to the ancillary diesel bus.	0	1	NO
186	2.134.5c	02.13.04-02:05cBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R21	2.13.4-2	5c. Each ancillary diesel generator is capabale of operating at its nameplate rated load and is sized to accommodate its expected loads.	Each as-built ancillary diesel generator will be operated between rated and maximum nameplate load, and nameplate power factor for a time period required to reach engine temperature equilibrium. Analysis will be performed to demonstrate that the expected loads are within the nameplate rated load.	Each as-built ancillary diesel generator provides power at generator terminal rated voltage and frequency when operated at rated load, and expected loads are within the rated nameplate load.	0	1	NO
187	2.134.5d	02.13.04-02:05dBB:BBB:BB:BB:C£L:R21	2.13.4-2	5d. Each ancillary diesel generator fuel oil storage tank contains adequate fuel oil capacity for seven days of ancillary diesel generator operation based on expected ADG load.	The as-built fuel oil storage tank capacity will be calculated based on expected ADG load.	The as-built fuel oil storage tank capacity is adequate to supply seven days of fuel oil to the ancillary diesel generator under continuous operation based on expected ADG load.	0	1	NO
188	2.134.5e	02.13.04-02:05eBB:BBB:BB:BB:C£L:R21	2.13.4-2	5e. Each of the ancillary diesel generator fuel oil transfer pumps start automatically and transfer fuel oil from the ancillary fuel oil storage tank to the ancillary diesel generator day tank at a rate greater than or equal to the usage rate of the ancillary diesel generator.	Testing will be performed to demonstrate that each as-built fuel oil transfer pump starts automatically and transfers fuel oil from the ancillary fuel oil storage tank to the ancillary diesel generator day tank at a rate greater than or equal to the usage rate of the ancillary diesel generator when operating between rated and maximum nameplate load.	Each as-built fuel oil transfer pump starts automatically and transfers fuel oil from the ancillary fuel oil storage tank to the ancillary diesel generator day tank at a rate greater than or equal to the usage rate of the ancillary diesel generator when operating between rated and maximum nameplate load.	0	1	NO
189	2.134.7i	02.13.04-02:07BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C£L:R21	2.13.4-2	7. Each ancillary diesel generator and its associated auxiliaries, buses, fuel tanks, and fuel oil transfer pumps conform to Seismic Category II requirements.	i. Type tests and analyses of the ancillary diesel generators, their associated auxiliaries, buses, fuel tanks, and fuel oil transfer pumps will be performed.	i. Each as-built ancillary diesel generator and its associated auxiliaries, buses, fuel tanks, and fuel oil transfer pumps conform to Seismic Category II requirements.	0	1	NO

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
190	2.134.7ii	02.13.04-02:07BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:EL:R21	2.13.4-2	7. Each ancillary diesel generator and its associated auxiliaries, buses, fuel tanks, and fuel oil transfer pumps conform to Seismic Category II requirements.	ii. Inspections of the as-built ancillary diesel generators, their associated auxiliaries, buses, fuel tanks, and fuel oil transfer pumps will be performed to verify that the equipment is installed in accordance with the configurations specified in the type tests and analyses.	ii. Each ancillary diesel generator and its associated auxiliaries, buses, fuel tanks, and fuel oil transfer pumps are installed in accordance with the configurations specified by the type tests and analyses.	0	1	NO
191	2.135.1	02.13.05-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	1. The functional arrangement of the safety-related UPS system is as described in Subsection 2.13.5 and Table 2.13.5-1 and is as shown on Figure 2.13.5-1.	Inspections of the as-built safety-related UPS system will be performed.	The as-built safety-related UPS system conforms with the functional arrangement as described in Subsection 2.13.5 and as shown in Figure 2.13.5-1.	0	1	NO
192	2.135.10	02.13.05-02:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	10. The safety-related UPS inverter high DC input voltage trip setpoint and time delay are greater than the associated battery charger and UPS rectifier high DC output voltage trip setpoint and time delay.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals of the UPS trips.	The safety-related UPS inverter high DC input voltage trip setpoint and time delay are greater than the associated battery charger and UPS rectifier high DC output voltage trip setpoint and time delay as demonstrated by applying test signals and verifying that: • The inverter high DC input voltage trip setpoint is greater than the battery charger and UPS input rectifier high DC output voltage trip, and; • The inverter high DC input voltage trip time delay is greater than the associated battery charger and UPS input rectifier high DC output voltage trip time delay.	0	1	NO
193	2.135.11.i	02.13.05-02:11BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	11. The safety-related UPS system supplies a voltage at the terminals of the safety-related utilization equipment that is within the equipment voltage tolerance limits.	i. Analyses of the as-built safety-related UPS 120 volt distribution system are performed to determine the voltage at the safety-related utilization equipment terminals.	i. The as-built safety-related UPS system supplies a voltage at the terminals of the safety-related utilization equipment that is within the utilization equipment voltage tolerance limits.	0	1	NO
194	2.135.11.ii	02.13.05-02:11BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	11. The safety-related UPS system supplies a voltage at the terminals of the safety-related utilization equipment that is within the equipment voltage tolerance limits.	ii. Type tests will be performed to confirm the safety-related utilization equipment functions properly at the established maximum and minimum terminal voltage tolerance limits.	ii. The safety-related utilization equipment functions properly at the established maximum and minimum terminal voltage tolerance limits.	0	1	NO
195	2.135.12	02.13.05-02:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	12. Electrical cables for the safety-related UPS system are rated to withstand fault current for the time required to clear the fault from their power source.	Analyses of the as-built safety-related UPS system will be performed to determine possible fault currents.	For the as-built safety-related UPS system, electrical cables can withstand the analyzed fault currents, as determined by manufacturer's ratings, for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.	0	1	NO
196	2.135.13	02.13.05-02:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	13. Protective devices for the safety-related UPS system are rated to interrupt analyzed fault currents and are coordinated to only trip the protective device closest to the fault.	Analyses of the as-built safety-related UPS system will be performed to determine possible fault currents and the required size of protective devices to ensure that they are coordinated to only trip the protective device closest to the fault.	For the as-built safety-related UPS system, the protective devices for the safety-related UPS system loads are sized to only trip the protective device closest to the fault.	0	1	NO
197	2.135.14	02.13.05-02:14BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	14. Raceway for safety-related UPS system circuits are sized in accordance with design requirements.	Analyses of the as-built safety-related UPS system will be performed to determine required raceway sizing.	For the as-built safety-related UPS system, raceway sizing is in accordance with design requirements and raceway loading is within that assumed in the electrical analyses.	0	1	NO
198	2.135.2	02.13.05-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	2. The functional arrangement of the nonsafety-related UPS system is as described in Subsection 2.13.5 and as shown on Figure 2.13.5-2.	Inspections of the as-built nonsafety-related UPS system will be performed.	The as-built nonsafety-related UPS system conforms with the functional arrangement as described in Subsection 2.13.5 and as shown in Figure 2.13.5-2.	0	1	NO
199	2.135.3.i	02.13.01-02:03BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	3. The UPS system equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.5-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspections will be performed to verify that the UPS system equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.5-1 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.13.5-1 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
200	2.135.3.ii	02.13.01-02:03BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	3. The UPS system equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.5-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of the UPS system safety-related Seismic Category I equipment will be performed using analytical assumptions, or under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.	ii. The as-built UPS system can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
201	2.135.3.iii	02.13.01-02:03BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	3. The UPS system equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.5-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii Inspections and analyses of the as-built UPS system equipment, including anchorage, identified in Table 2.13.5-1 are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built UPS system equipment, including anchorage, identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.5-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
202	2.135.4	02.13.05-02:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	4. The safety-related UPS system provides four independent and redundant safety-related divisions.	Tests will be performed on the as-built safety-related UPS system by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	A test signal exists only in the safety-related division under test in the as-built safety-related UPS system; and a test signal originating from the as-built divisional safety-related UPS distribution panel exists at the terminals of its divisional safety-related loads.	0	1	NO
203	2.135.5	02.13.05-02:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	5. Separation is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment, as required by Regulatory Guide 1.75.	Inspection of the as-built safety-related UPS system will be performed.	The as-built safety-related UPS system, physical separation and electrical isolation exist between safety-related divisions, as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75. Physical separation and electrical isolation exists between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment, as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75.	0	1	NO
204	2.135.6	02.13.05-02:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	6. Each safety-related UPS inverter is capable of supplying its AC load at both minimum and maximum battery terminal voltages.	Testing of each as-built safety-related UPS inverter will be performed by applying a combination of simulated or real loads with DC input at both minimum and maximum battery terminal voltage.	The as-built safety-related UPS inverter supplies its rated load while maintaining its rated voltage at its rated frequency, within tolerances acceptable for its AC loads.	0	1	NO

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
205	2.135.9	02.13.05-02:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R13	2.13.5-2	9. The safety-related UPS rectifiers are designed to prevent their AC source from becoming a load on the 250 V DC safety-related batteries when the AC power source is de-energized or has degraded voltage.	Testing of the each safety-related rectifier will be performed to demonstrate that there is no power feedback from a loss of AC input power.	The safety-related rectifiers prevent the AC input source from becoming a load on the 250 V DC safety-related batteries during a loss of AC power condition.	0	1	NO
206	2.138.1	02.13.08-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R15	2.13.8-1	1. The functional arrangement of Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.13.8.	Inspections of the as-built Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting will be conducted.	The as-built Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting conform to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.13.8.	0	1	NO
207	2.138.2	02.13.08-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R15	2.13.8-1	2. The Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting meets Seismic Category I requirements for mountings.	Analysis of the Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting mountings will be performed.	The Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting mountings meet Seismic Category I requirements.	0	1	NO
208	2.138.3	02.13.08-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R15	2.13.8-1	3. The Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting equipment and cables are physically separated.	Inspection of the as-built Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting equipment and cables will be performed.	The as-built Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting equipment and cables are physically separated between safety-related divisions and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment according to RG 1.75 and IEEE 384, through spatial separation, physical barriers, or separate raceways, conduit or metal troughs, up to the electrical isolation devices. safety-related cables are routed in respective divisional raceways or conduit. Nonsafety-related cables from the isolation devices to the light fixtures are in separate raceways or conduit.	0	1	NO
209	2.138.4	02.13.08-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R15	2.13.8-1	4. The Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting provides illumination levels equal to or greater than those recommended by the IESNA for at least 72 hours following a design basis accident and a loss of all AC power sources.	Testing of the as-built Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting will be performed.	The as-built Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting provides the illumination required by the IESNA for at least 72 hours following a design basis accident and a loss of all AC power sources.	0	1	NO
210	2.138.5	02.13.08-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R15	2.13.8-1	5. The DC Self-Contained Battery-Operated Lighting Units provide illumination levels equal to or greater than those recommended by the IESNA in the remote shutdown rooms and in those areas of the plant required for power restoration and recovery from a fire, for at least eight hours.	Testing of the as-built DC Self-Contained Battery-Operated Lighting Units will be performed.	Each of the as-built DC Self-Contained Battery-Operated Lighting Units provide the illumination required by the IESNA in the remote shutdown rooms and in areas of the plant required for power restoration / recovery from a fire to comply with the requirement of RG 1.189. Each unit will provide 8 hours of continuous illumination without battery recharge.	0	1	NO
211	2.138.6	02.13.08-01:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R15	2.13.8-1	6. Electrical isolation of the nonsafety-related Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station emergency lighting circuits from the safety-related Uninterruptible AC power supply is accomplished by the use of two series isolation devices.	Inspection and analysis of the as-built lighting circuits will be conducted to verify that the nonsafety-related control room and Remote Shutdown Station emergency lighting circuits and the safety-related Uninterruptible AC power supply are isolated by two series isolation devices.	The as-built nonsafety-related Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station emergency lighting circuits and the safety-related Uninterruptible AC Power Supply are isolated by two series isolation devices.	0	1	NO
212	2.138.7	02.13.08-01:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R15	2.13.8-1	7. The Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting shall be capable of being powered by a reliable power source after the first 72 hours of a design basis event.	Inspections and tests (as needed) will be performed that confirm the capability of powering the Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting from a reliable power source that will be available after the first 72-hours of a design basis event.	The Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting is capable of being powered from a reliable power source that will be available after the first 72-hours of a design basis event.	0	1	NO
213	2.139.1	02.13.09-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:R41	2.13.9-1	1. The functional arrangement of the Lightning Protection and Grounding system is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.13.9.	Inspections of the as-built Lightning Protection and Grounding system will be performed.	The as-built Lightning Protection and Grounding system exists and conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the design description of Subsection 2.13.9, and: • Connection exists between the instrument and computer grounding network and the plant ground grid. • Connection exists between the equipment and system grounding network and the plant ground grid. • Connection exists between the lightning protection network and the plant ground grid.	0	1	NO
214	2.151.1	02.15.01-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	1. The functional arrangement of the Containment System is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.15.1 and as shown in Figure 2.15.1-1.	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built Containment System conforms to the functional arrangement as described in Subsection 2.15.1 and Figure 2.15.1-1.	0	1	NO
215	2.151.10	02.15.01-02:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:T10	2.15.1-2	10. Containment electrical penetration assemblies, whose maximum available fault current (including failure of upstream devices) is greater than the continuous rating of the penetration, are protected against currents that are greater than the continuous ratings.	An analysis of the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies will be performed to demonstrate either (1) the maximum over current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous current rating of the penetration, or (2) circuits whose maximum available fault currents are greater than the continuous current rating of the penetration are provided with redundant over current interrupting devices.	Analysis exists for the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies and concludes that the penetrations, whose maximum available fault current (including failure of upstream devices) is greater than the continuous rating of the penetration, are protected against currents that are greater than their continuous ratings.	0	1	NO
216	2.151.12	02.15.01-02:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:T10	2.15.1-2	12. The amount of chlorine bearing cable insulation exposed to the containment atmosphere is limited.	Analyses and inspection will be used to confirm the final exposed chlorine bearing cable insulation mass.	The amount of chlorine bearing cable insulation exposed to the containment atmosphere (i.e. not within an enclosed cable tray, pipe, conduit, or metal cable jacketing) is ≤ 3400 kg (7500 lbs).	0	1	NO

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
217	2.151.13	02.15.01-02:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	13. The DW and WW volumes are adequately sized to accommodate the calculated maximum DW temperature and absolute pressure that are postulated to occur as a result of a design basis accident.	Using as-built dimensions, the DW and WW volumes will be calculated.	The as-built DW free gas volume is within the analyzed limits of the free gas volume assumed in the containment performance safety analysis; and the as-built WW free gas volume is greater than the analyzed limit of the free gas volume assumed in the containment performance safety-analysis.	0	1	NO
218	2.151.14	02.15.01-02:14BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	14. The water volume of the WW is adequately sized to condense the steam that is forced into the WW from the DW due to a postulated design basis event.	Using as-built dimensions of the WW and a minimum measured suppression pool depth of 5.4 meters (213 inches), the volume of the suppression pool will be calculated.	The calculated suppression pool water volume is equal to or greater than the water volume assumed in the containment performance safety analysis.	0	1	NO
219	2.151.15	02.15.01-02:15BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:T10	2.15.1-2	15. Each vacuum breaker isolation valve automatically closes if the vacuum breaker does not fully close when required.	A test will be performed by providing a simulated or real not-fully closed vacuum breaker signal originating from the closed position proximity sensor and temperature sensors to close the associated vacuum breaker isolation valve.	Each as-built vacuum breaker isolation valve automatically closes when a simulated or real not-fully closed signal is provided from the closed position proximity sensor of its associated vacuum breaker.	0	1	NO
220	2.151.16a	02.15.01-02:16aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:T10	2.15.1-2	16a. Each vacuum breaker has proximity sensors to detect open/close position. This indication is available in the main control room.	Testing will be performed with each as-built vacuum breaker to demonstrate that the proximity sensors indicate open and closed position. An inspection will be performed in the MCR.	Each as-built vacuum breaker proximity sensor indicates an open position with the vacuum breaker open and indicates a closed position when the vacuum breaker is in the fully closed position. The open and closed position indications of the as-built vacuum breakers are available in the main control room.	0	1	NO
221	2.151.16b	02.15.01-02:16bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:T10	2.15.1-2	16b. Each vacuum breaker has temperature sensors to detect bypass leakage. This indication is available in the main control room.	A type test will be performed on a vacuum breaker to detect bypass leakage at simulated design basis accident conditions. An inspection will be performed in the MCR.	Vacuum breaker temperature sensors discriminate within the range of $\geq$ 0.3 cm^2 and $\leq$ 0.6 cm^2 ($A/\sqrt{K}$) of bypass leakage area at design basis accident conditions. Indication exists in the MCR.	0	1	NO
222	2.151.17	02.15.01-02:17BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	17. The containment penetration isolation design for each fluid piping system requiring isolation meets the single-failure criterion to ensure completion of penetration isolation.	Single-failure analysis is performed on the isolation design of each fluid system penetration class or penetration, as applicable.	A study of all applicable containment fluid system penetrations demonstrates that, for each penetration or penetration class isolation design, the single-failure criterion is satisfied.	0	1	NO
223	2.151.18	02.15.01-02:18BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	18. DW to WW bypass leakage is less than the assumed value used in the containment capability design basis containment response analysis.	A DW to WW bypass leakage test will be conducted.	The results of the DW to WW bypass leakage is less than or equal to 50% of the assumed value in the containment capability design basis containment response analysis.	0	1	NO
224	2.151.19	02.15.01-02:19BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	19. Total DW to WW vacuum breaker bypass pathway leakage is less than the assumed value used in the containment capability design basis containment response analysis.	A DW to WW bypass leakage test will be conducted for each vacuum breaker and associated vacuum breaker isolation valve.	The results of the total DW to WW vacuum breaker bypass pathway leakage is less than or equal to 35% of the assumed value in the containment capability design basis containment response analysis.	0	1	NO
225	2.151.20	02.15.01-02:20BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	20. Each vacuum breaker opening differential pressure is less than or equal to the required opening differential pressure.	An opening differential pressure test will be conducted for each vacuum breaker.	The results of the opening differential pressure test is less than or equal to 3.07 kPa (0.445 psi).	0	1	NO
226	2.151.21	02.15.01-02:21BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	21. Each vacuum breaker closing differential pressure is greater than or equal to the required closing differential pressure.	A closing differential pressure test will be conducted for each vacuum breaker.	The vacuum breaker closing differential pressure is greater than or equal to 2.21 kPa (0.320 psi).	0	1	NO
227	2.151.22a	02.15.01-02:22aBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	22a. Containment isolation valves are located as close to the containment as practical, consistent with General Design Criteria 55, 56 and 57.	Inspection of piping design isometric drawings will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Based on a review of piping design isometric drawings, containment isolation valves are designed to be located as close to containment as practical, considering required access for: • In-service inspection of nonisolable welds, • 10CFR50 Appendix J leak testing, • Cutout and replacement of isolation valves using standard pipe fitting tools and equipment, • Local control, and • Valve seat resurfacing in place. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
228	2.151.22b	02.15.01-02:22bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	22b. The as-built location of containment isolation valves relative to containment shall be reconciled with design requirements.	A reconciliation evaluation of containment isolation valve locations relative to containment using as-designed and as-built information will be performed.	A design reconciliation has been completed for the as-built locations of containment isolation valves relative to the design requirements. The report documents the results of the reconciliation evaluation.	0	1	NO
229	2.151.23a	02.15.01-02:23aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:T11	2.15.1-2	23a. The containment boundary electric penetration assemblies are designed in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Division 1, Section III, Subsection NE for Class MC Components.	Inspection of ASME Code Certified Design Reports and required documents will be conducted.	ASME Code Certified Design Report(s) exist and conclude that the design of the containment boundary electric penetration assemblies comply with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Division 1, Section III, Subsection NE for Class MC Components, including for those stresses and loads related to seismic and electromagnetic forces produced by rated short-circuit currents.	0	1	NO
230	2.151.23b	02.15.01-02:23bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:T11	2.15.1-2	23b. The containment boundary electric penetration assemblies shall be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the components using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Certified Design Reports will be performed.	ASME Code Certified Design Report(s) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed in accordance with the ASME Code for as-built reconciliation of the containment boundary electric penetration assemblies. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
231	2.151.23c	02.15.01-02:23cBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:T11	2.15.1-2	23c. The containment boundary electric penetration assemblies are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Division 1, Section III, Subsection NE for Class MC Components.	Inspection of the components will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) and Inspection Report(s) exist and conclude that the containment boundary electric penetration assemblies are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Division 1, Section III, Subsection NE for Class MC Components.	0	1	NO

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
232	2.151.2a1	02.15.01-02:02a1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	2a1. The components identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA 3550) and required documents will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist for the components identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III and conclude compliance to NCA-3550, including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined.	0	1	NO
233	2.151.2a2	02.15.01-02:02a2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:T11	2.15.1-2	2a2. The RCCV and its liners are designed to meet the requirements in Article CC-3000 of ASME Code, Section III, Division 2, and seismic Category I requirements. The steel components of the RCCV are designed to meet the requirements in Article NE-3000 of ASME Code, Section III, Division 1.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Report and certified documents for the RCCV and its liners, and for the steel components of the RCCV will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist for the RCCV and its liners and steel components in accordance with ASME Code Section III, including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined.	0	1	NO
234	2.151.2a3	02.15.01-02:02a3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	2a3. The piping identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III is designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA 3550) and required documents for the piping will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	ASME Code Design Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist for the piping identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III and demonstrates compliance to NCA-3550, including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
235	2.151.2b1	02.15.01-02:02b1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	2b1. The design of the components identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III will be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the components using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA 3550) will be conducted.	The as-built components are reconciled with the design documents used for design analysis. For ASME Code Components, the reconciliation report includes comparison to the ASME Code Design Report (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and documents the results of the reconciliation analysis	0	1	NO
236	2.151.2b2	02.15.01-02:02b2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	2b2.The RCCV and its liners are designed to meet the requirements in Article CC-3000 of ASME Code, Section III, Division 2, and seismic Category I requirements. The steel components of the RCCV are designed to meet the requirements in Article NE-3000 of ASME Code, Section III, Division 1. The design of these components will be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the RCCV and its liners and steel components using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports will be conducted.	The as-built components are reconciled with the design documents used for design analysis. For ASME Code Components, the reconciliation report includes comparison to the ASME Code Design Report (certified, when required by ASME Code) and documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
237	2.151.2b3	02.15.01-02:02b3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	2b3.The as-built piping identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the piping design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the piping using the as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA 3550) will be conducted.	The as-built piping has been reconciled with the design documents used for design analysis. The reconciliation report includes comparison to the ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
238	2.151.2c1	02.15.01-02:02c1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	2c1. The components identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspections of the components will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-5 Data reports, where applicable) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports exist and conclude that the components identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
239	2.151.2c2	02.15.01-02:02c2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:T11	2.15.1-2	2c2. The RCCV and its liners are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with the requirements in Article CC-3000 of ASME Code, Section III, Division 2. The steel components of the RCCV are fabricated, installed, and inspected to meet the requirements in Article NE-3000 of ASME Code, Section III, Division 1.	Inspection of the ASME Code Section III documents for as-built components and piping, for the RCCV and its liners, and for the steel components of the RCCV will be conducted.	ASME Code Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III stress report(s) exist for the as-built RCCV and its liners and steel components. ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude that for ASME Section III, Division 2 construction, ASME Code Section III stress reports demonstrate compliance to NCA-3350 through NCA-3380, and NCA-3454. ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude that for ASME Section III, Division 1 construction, ASME Code Section III stress reports demonstrate compliance to NCA-3350. ASME code inspection reports document results of inspections.	0	1	NO
240	2.151.2c3	02.15.01-02:02c3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	2c3. The piping identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Section III documents for as-built will be conducted.	ASME Code Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that an ASME Code Section III stress report(s) exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III. ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude that for ASME Section III, Division 2 construction, ASME Code Section III stress reports demonstrate compliance to NCA-3350 through NCA-3380, and NCA-3454. ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude that for ASME Section III, Division 1 construction, ASME Code Section III stress reports demonstrate compliance to NCA-3350. ASME code inspection reports document results of inspections	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
241	2.151.3a	02.15.01-02:03aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	3a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examinations requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in the Containment System.	0	1	NO
242	2.151.3b	02.15.01-02:03bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	3b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III nondestructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in the Containment System.	0	1	NO
243	2.151.4.i	02.15.01-02:04BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	4. The components and piping identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	i. A hydrostatic pressure test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be tested.	i. ASME Code report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic pressure test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
244	2.151.4.ii	02.15.01-02:04BBB:BIi:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	4. The components and piping identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	ii. Impact testing will be performed on the containment and pressureretaining materials in accordance with the ASME Code Section III to confirm the fracture toughness of the materials.	ii. ASME Code report exists and concludes that the containment and pressure-retaining penetration materials comply with fracture toughness requirements of the ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
245	2.151.5.i	02.15.01-02:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	5. The Seismic Category I equipment identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety-related function.	i. Inspections will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b and 2.15.1-1c is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The Seismic Category I equipment identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, T2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c is housed in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
246	2.151.5.ii	02.15.01-02:05BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	5. The Seismic Category I equipment identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety-related function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of Seismic Category I equipment identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b and 2.15.1-1c, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.	ii. The Seismic Category I equipment identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b and 2.15.1-1c can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
247	2.151.5.iii	02.15.01-02:05BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	5. The Seismic Category I equipment identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety-related function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment, including anchorage, identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b and 2.15.1-1c, is bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment, including anchorage, identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c , can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
248	2.151.6a	02.15.01-02:06aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:T10	2.15.1-2	6a. The electrical safety-related components associated with actuation and status monitoring of final control elements of the Containment System equipment listed in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c receive power from their respective safety-related divisional power supplies.	Test(s) will be performed for the electrical safety-related components for the equipment of the Containment System listed in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time	The electrical components in a singular division for the equipment of the Containment System listed in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c receive power from a safety-related power supply in the same division.	0	1	NO
249	2.151.6b	02.15.01-02:06bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:T10	2.15.1-2	6b. Separate electrical penetrations are provided for circuits of each safety-related division and for nonsafety-related circuits.	Inspection of the as-built electrical containment penetrations will be performed.	Each as-built electrical penetration contains cables of only one division or contains nonsafety-related cables.	0	1	NO
250	2.151.6c	02.15.01-02:06cBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:T10	2.15.1-2	6c. The circuits of each electrical penetration are of the same voltage class.	Inspections of the as-built containment electrical penetrations will be performed.	Each as-built circuit of each electrical penetration is of the same voltage class.	0	1	NO
251	2.151.7	02.15.01-02:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	7. The containment system provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere.	Perform Type A, B and C leak rate tests in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.	Leak rates are less than the acceptance criterion established per 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.	0	1	NO
252	2.151.8	02.15.01-02:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	8. The containment system pressure boundary retains its structural integrity when subject to design pressure.	A Structural Integrity Test (SIT) of the containment structure is performed in accordance with Article CC-6000 of the ASME Code Section III, Division 2 and Regulatory Guide 1.136, after completion of the containment construction. The first prototype containment structure will be instrumented to measure strains per ASME Code Section III, Division 2, CC-6370.	The containment system pressure boundary retains its structural integrity when tested and evaluated in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Division 2 at a test pressure of at least 115% of the design pressure of 310 kPaG (45 psig).	0	1	NO
253	2.151.9.i	02.15.01-02:09BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	9. The containment system provides the safety function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity.	i. Tests will be performed to demonstrate that containment isolation valves close within the required response times.	i. The containment isolation valves close within the required response times identified in Table 2.15.1-1d.	0	1	NO
254	2.151.9.ii	02.15.01-02:09BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	9. The containment system provides the safety function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity.	ii. Tests will be performed to demonstrate that remote manual operated containment isolation valves reposition to the required post-accident position using real or simulated containment isolation signals.	ii. The remote manual operated valves identified in Table 2.15.1-1a as having a containment isolation signal reposition to the required postaccident state after receiving a containment isolation signal.	0	1	NO
255	2.151.9.iii	02.15.01-02:09BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	9. The containment system provides the safety function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity.	iii. Exercise testing of the process actuated check valves identified in Table 2.15.1-1a will be performed under preoperational test pressure, temperature and fluid flow conditions.	iii. Each as-built process actuated check valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.15.1-1a.	0	1	NO
256	2.151.9.iv	02.15.01-02:09BBB:Biv:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	9. The containment system provides the safety function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity.	iv. Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the lower drywell equipment and personnel hatches can be closed from outside the drywell.	iv. The lower drywell equipment and personnel hatches are able to be closed from outside the lower drywell, and a program in place to track the status of each hatch while open during MODE 5 and 6 operation.	0	1	NO
257	2.151.9.v	02.15.01-02:09BBB:BBv:BB:BB:C:ME:T10	2.15.1-2	9. The containment system provides the safety function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity.	v. Testing of the as-built valves will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive power.	v. After a loss of motive power, each remote manual valve identified in Table 2.15.1-1a assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
258	2.153.1	02.15.03-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:T12	2.15.3-2	1. The functional arrangement of the Containment Internal Structures is described in the Design Description of Subsection 2.15.3.	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built Containment Internal Structures conform with the Design Description in Subsection 2.15.3.	0	1	NO
259	2.153.2	02.15.03-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:T12	2.15.3-2	2. The Containment Internal Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1 are designed and constructed in accordance with ANSI/AISC N690 requirements.	Inspection and analyses will be performed for the as-built components of the Containment Internal Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1.	The as-built components of the Containment Internal Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1 comply with ANSI/AISC N690 requirements.	0	1	NO
260	2.153.3.i	02.15.03-02:03BBB:BBI:BB:BB:C:CS:T12	2.15.3-2	3. The Containment Internal Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1 conform to Seismic Category I requirements and can withstand seismic design basis loads, suppression pool hydrodynamic loads, design basis loss of coolant accident generated loads and annulus pressurization loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.	i. Analyses will be performed on the Containment Internal Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1 to ensure they meet Seismic Category I requirements and can withstand seismic design basis loads, suppression pool hydrodynamic loads, design basis loss of coolant accident generated loads and annulus pressurization loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.	i. The as-built Containment Internal Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads, suppression pool hydrodynamic loads, design basis loss of coolant accident generated loads and annulus pressurization loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.	0	1	NO
261	2.153.3.ii	02.15.03-02:03BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:CS:T12	2.15.3-2	3. The Containment Internal Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1 conform to Seismic Category I requirements and can withstand seismic design basis loads, suppression pool hydrodynamic loads, design basis loss of coolant accident generated loads and annulus pressurization loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.	ii. Inspections of the as-built Containment Internal Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1 will be performed to verify that they are housed in a Seismic Category I structure.	ii. The as-built Containment Internal Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1 are housed in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
262	2.153.5	02.15.03-02:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:T12	2.15.3-2	5. The diaphragm floor and vent wall structures that separate the DW and WW retain their integrity when subjected to the maximum design differential pressure.	Part of the containment Structural Integrity Test specified in Table 2.15.1-2 ITAAC # 8 will test the diaphragm floor and vent wall structure with a test pressure equal to 1.0 times the maximum design differential pressure conducted with the DW pressure greater than WW pressure.	The Structural Integrity Test results demonstrate compliance with ASME Code Section III requirements for the applied test pressure for the containment structures.	0	1	NO
263	2.153.9	02.15.03-02:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:T12	2.15.3-2	9. The drywell floor drain sump channels prevent molten debris from an accident from entering the drywell sump.	Inspections and measurements of the drywell floor drain sump channels are performed.	The drywell floor sump channels are sized to preclude debris from passing to the sump.	0	1	NO
264	2.154.1	02.15.04-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	1. The functional arrangement for the PCCS is as described in the Design Description in this Subsection 2.15.4, Table 2.15.4-1 and Figure 2.15.4-1.	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built PCCS conforms to the functional arrangement for the PCCS as described in the Design Description in this Subsection 2.15.4, Table 2.15.4-1 and Figure 2.15.4-1.	0	1	NO
265	2.154.10	02.15.04-02:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	10. The PCCS will be designed to limit the fraction of containment leakage through the condensers to an acceptable value.	A pneumatic leakage test of the PCCS will be conducted.	The combined leakage from each of the PCCS heat exchangers is ≤0.01% of containment air weight per day.	0	1	NO
266	2.154.11	02.15.04-02:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	11. The PCCS vent fans flow rate is sufficient to meet the beyond 72 hours containment cooling requirements following a design bases LOCA.	For each PCCS vent fan line, a flow rate test will be performed with the containment at pre-operational ambient conditions. Flow measurements will be taken on flow to the GDCS pools. An analysis of the test configuration will be performed.	The tested and analyzed flow rates are greater than or equal to the flow rates of the design basis LOCA containment analysis model for the PCCS vent fan lines at containment pre-operational ambient conditions.	0	1	NO
267	2.154.12	02.15.04-02:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C1C:T15	2.15.4-2	12. The PCCS vent fans can be remotely operated from the MCR.	PCCS vent fans will be started using manually initiated signals from the MCR.	The PCCS vent fans start and the block valves open when the PCCS vent fans are manually initiated from the MCR.	0	1	NO
268	2.154.13	02.15.04-02:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	13. The PCCS drain piping is installed to allow venting of non-condensable gases from the PCCS drain lines to the PCCS condenser vent lines to prevent collection in the PCCS drain lines.	Inspection(s) will be conducted of as-built PCCS drain piping to ensure there are no elevated piping loops or high-point traps in piping runs to the GDCS pools.	Based on inspection(s) of as-built PCCS drain piping, the as-built piping conforms to a design that allows venting of noncondensable gases from the PCCS drain lines to the PCCS condenser vent lines.	0	1	NO
269	2.154.14	02.15.04-02:14BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	14. The elevation of the PCCS vent fan discharge point is submerged within the drain pan located in the GDCS pool at an elevation below the lip of the drain pan.	A visual inspection will be performed of the PCCS vent fan discharge point relative to the lip of the drain pan.	The elevation of the discharge on the PCCS vent fan line is 24 cm (9.4 in) below the top of the drain pan lip with a tolerance of 1.4 cm (0.6 in).	0	1	NO
270	2.154.15	02.15.04-02:15BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	15. PCCS vent catalyst modules are mounted within each PCCS vent line.	Inspection will be performed of the as-built installation of PCCS vent catalyst modules in each PCCS vent line.	A total of 12 PCCS vent catalyst modules are installed with one module per PCCS vent line.	0	1	NO
271	2.154.16	02.15.04-02:16BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	16. To reduce hydrogen accumulation in the PCCS vent lines, vent line catalyst modules recombine hydrogen at a required minimum rate at a minimum allowed velocity.	Type tests will be performed to verify a minimum required hydrogen recombination rate at a minimum allowed velocity.	Type tests show that the as-built catalyst module will recombine hydrogen at a minimum rate of 1.66 kg/h (3.66 lbm/h) when exposed to a test stream consisting of 4% hydrogen in its stoichiometric ratio with oxygen, the balance being inert gas, and whose minimum velocity through the module is 0.166 m/s (0.545 ft/s).	0	1	NO
272	2.154.2a1	02.15.04-02:02a1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	2a1 The components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of ASME Code Section III including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, hydrogen combustion, and combined.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
273	2.154.2a2	02.15.04-02:02a2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	2a2. The components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
274	2.154.2a3	02.15.04-02:02a3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	2a3. The components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-5 Data Reports, where applicable) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports exist and conclude that the components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
275	2.154.2b1	02.15.04-02:02b1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	2b1. The piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III is designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of the ASME Code, Section III, including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, hydrogen combustion, and combined. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
276	2.154.2b2	02.15.04-02:02b2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	2b2.The as-built piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the piping design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
277	2.154.2b3	02.15.04-02:02b3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	2b3. The piping identified in Table 2.15.41 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspections of the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports (including N-5 Data Reports where applicable) exist and conclude that the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
278	2.154.3a	02.15.04-02:03aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	3a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
279	2.154.3b	02.15.04-02:03bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	3b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME CodeSection III non-destructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
280	2.154.4a	02.15.04-02:04aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	4a. The components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on those code components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III that are required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
281	2.154.4b	02.15.04-02:04bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	4b. The piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on the code piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III that is required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements in ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
282	2.154.5.i	02.15.04-02:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.15.4-1 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.15.4-1 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
283	2.154.5.ii	02.15.04-02:05BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
284	2.154.5.iii	02.15.04-02:05BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.15.4-1, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions, including the hydrodynamic effects of surrounding water for submerged components.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.15.4-1 including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads and the hydrodynamic effects of surrounding water for submerged components without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
285	2.154.6	02.15.04-02:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	6. Each mechanical train of the PCCS located inside the containment is physically separated from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related function.	Inspections or analysis will be conducted for each of the PCCS mechanical trains located inside the containment.	Each mechanical train of PCCS located inside containment is protected against design basis events and their direct consequences by spatial separation, barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related function.	0	1	NO
286	2.154.7	02.15.04-02:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	7. The PCCS together with the pressure suppression containment system will limit containment pressure to less than its design pressure for 72 hours after a LOCA.	Using prototype test data and as-built PCC unit information, an analysis will be performed to establish the heat removal capability of the PCC unit.	AAnalyzed containment pressure for 72 hours after a LOCA is less than containment design pressure, and the PCC unit heat removal capacity exceeds heat removal calculated in the design basis accident analysis following reactor depressurization below containment design pressure.	0	1	NO
287	2.154.9	02.15.04-02:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T15	2.15.4-2	9. The elevation of the PCCS vent discharge point is submerged in the suppression pool at an elevation below low water level and above the uppermost horizontal vent.	A visual inspection will be performed of the PCCS vent discharge point relative to the horizontal vents.	The elevation of the discharge on the PCCS vent line is > 0.85 m (33.5 in) and < 0.90 m (35.4 in) above the top of the uppermost horizontal vent.	0	1	NO
288	2.155.1	02.15.05-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T31	2.15.5-2	1. The containment can be inerted to less than or equal to 4% oxygen by volume.	Test of the containment in an inerted state will be conducted to determine oxygen concentration by volume.	The containment can be inerted to less than or equal to 4% oxygen by volume.	0	1	NO
289	2.155.3	02.15.05-02:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:T31	2.15.5-2	3. The DW temperature indications are retrievable in the main control room.	Inspections of main control room indications will be conducted and verified for retrievability of DW temperature indications.	The DW temperature indications are provided in the MCR.	0	1	NO
290	2.157.1	02.15.07-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:T62	2.15.7-2	1. The functional arrangement for the CMS is as described in the Design Description in this subsection 2.15.7, Table 2.15.7-1 and Figure 2.15.7-1.	Inspections of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built CMS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.15.7, Table 2.15.7-1 and Figure 2.15.7-1.	0	1	NO
291	2.157.2	02.15.07-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:T62	2.15.7-2	2. Each of the safety-related components identified in Table 2.15.7-1 is powered from its respective safety-related division.	Testing will be performed on the CMS by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	A test signal exists in the safety-related division (or at the equipment identified in Table 2.15.7-1 powered from the safety-related division) under test in the CMS.	0	1	NO
292	2.157.3	02.15.07-02:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:T62	2.15.7-2	3. Each CMS measured parameter in Table 2.15.7-1 will indicate the measured parameter and initiate separate alarms in the control room when values exceed applicable setpoints.	Using simulated signal inputs, CMS testing will be performed.	Each simulated signal representing a measured parameter in Table 2.15.7-1 indicates the measured parameter and initiates separate alarms in the control room when levels exceed applicable setpoints.	0	1	NO
293	2.157.4	02.15.07-02:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:T62	2.15.7-2	4. The Hydrogen/Oxygen (H_2/O_2) monitoring subsystem of CMS is active during normal operation. Additional sampling capacity is automatically initiated by a LOCA signal for post-accident monitoring of oxygen and hydrogen content in the containment.	Using simulated signals, CMS testing will be performed to verify that the system can be operated and that operation will initiate following a simulated LOCA signal.	The H2/O2 monitor can be operated and that it will be in operation within 90 minutes, including warm-up time, after occurrence of a LOCA initiation signal, which requires the monitor to be functional.	0	1	NO
294	2.157.5	02.15.07-02:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:T62	2.15.7-2	5. In each CMS Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring (SPTM) division, signals from the CMS SPTM temperature and the CMS suppression pool water narrow range transmitters are provided for the divisional RPS logic processors to calculate the suppression pool average temperature.	Tests will be conducted in each division of the SPTM using simulated temperature sensor signals.	For each SPTM division, output signals from the CMS SPTM temperature and the CMS suppression pool water narrow range transmitters are received to generate a suppression pool average temperature by the RPS logic processors.	0	1	NO
295	2.157.6.i	02.15.07-02:06BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:T62	2.15.7-2	6. The equipment identified in Table 2.15.7-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.15.7-1 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.15.7-1 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
296	2.157.6.ii	02.15.07-02:06BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:T62	2.15.7-2	6. The equipment identified in Table 2.15.7-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.15.7-1 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.15.7-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
297	2.157.6.iii	02.15.07-02:06BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:IC:T62	2.15.7-2	6. The equipment identified in Table 2.15.7-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.15.7-1, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.15.7-1 including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
298	2.158.1	02.15.08-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T49	2.15.8-1	1. Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners (PARs) are mounted within the Wetwell airspace and the Drywell compartments.	Inspection will be performed of the as-built installation of PARs in the Wetwell airspace and the Drywell compartments.	The PARs are installed in the Wetwell airspace and the Drywell.	0	1	NO
299	2.158.2	02.15.08-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:T49	2.15.8-1	2. PARs are of a quantity and size in each compartment (Wetwell and Drywell) to ensure a minimum safety factor.	An analysis will be performed to verify the quantity and size of the PARs configuration in each compartment (Wetwell and Drywell) and that the design conforms to a minimum safety factor of two with respect to the hydrogen generation rate at 72 hours.	The quantity and size of the installed PARs in each containment compartment (Wetwell and Drywell) conforms to a safety factor of at least two with respect to the hydrogen generation rate greater than 72 hours.	0	1	NO
300	2.161.1	02.16.01-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	1. The RB crane has a lifting capacity greater than its heaviest expected load.	A load test at 125% of the rated capacity will be performed.	The RB crane is successfully load tested at 125% of its rated capacity.	0	1	NO
301	2.161.10.i	02.16.01-01:10BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	10. The RB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load.	The following inspections and tests will be conducted: i. Nondestructive Examination on the welded structural connections of the RB crane will be performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 4251.4.	The following tests have been successfully completed for the as-built RB crane so that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load: i. Nondestructive Examination on the welded structural connections of the RB crane performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 4251.4	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
302	2.161.10.ii	02.16.01-01:10BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	10. The RB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load.	ii. The RB crane will be static load-tested to 125% of the manufacturer's rated load.	ii. The RB crane has passed static loadtesting to 125% of the manufacturer's rated load.	0	1	NO
303	2.161.10.iii	02.16.01-01:10BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	10. The RB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load.	iii. A Full-Load Test on the RB crane will be performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 7422.	iii. A Full-Load Test on the RB crane in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 7422.	0	1	NO
304	2.161.10.iv	02.16.01-01:10BBB:Biv:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	10. The RB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load.	iv. A No-Load Test on the RB crane will be performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 and 7421.1.	iv. A No-Load Test on the RB crane performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 and 7421.1.	0	1	NO
305	2.161.10.v	02.16.01-01:10BBB:BBv:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	10. The RB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load.	v. Inspection of the rope drum, sheeve blocks, and hook component dimensions and material composition.	v. Inspection records show the rope drum, sheave blocks, and hook component dimensions and material compositions match design specifications.	0	1	NO
306	2.161.10.vi	02.16.01-01:10BBB:Bvi:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	10. The RB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load.	vi. Inspection of the wire rope (s) for proper reeving.	vi. Inspection records show the wire rope (s) are correctly reeved.	0	1	NO
307	2.161.11.i	02.16.01-01:11BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	11. The FB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load.	The following inspections and tests will be conducted: i. Nondestructive Examination on the welded structural connections of the FB crane will be performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 4251.4.	The following tests have been successfully completed for the as-built FB crane so that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load: i. Nondestructive Examination on the welded structural connections of the FB crane performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 4251.4	0	1	NO
308	2.161.11.ii	02.16.01-01:11BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	11. The FB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load.	ii. The FB crane will be static load-tested to 125% of the manufacturer's rated load.	ii. The FB crane has passed static loadtesting to 125% of the manufacturer's rated load.	0	1	NO
309	2.161.11.iii	02.16.01-01:11BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	11. The FB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load.	iii. A Full-Load Test on the FB crane will be performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 7422.	iii. A Full-Load Test on the FB crane performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 7422.	0	1	NO
310	2.161.11.iv	02.16.01-01:11BBB:Biv:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	11. The FB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load.	iv. A No-Load Test on the FB crane will be performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 and 7421.1.	iv. A No-Load Test on the FB crane performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 and 7421.1.	0	1	NO
311	2.161.11.v	02.16.01-01:11BBB:BBv:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	11. The FB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load.	v. Inspection of the rope drum, sheeve blocks, and hook component dimensions and material composition.	v. Inspection records show the rope drum, sheave blocks, and hook component dimensions and material compositions match design specifications.	0	1	NO
312	2.161.11.vi	02.16.01-01:11BBB:Bvi:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	11. The FB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the crane to safely retain the load.	vi. Inspection of the wire rope (s) for proper reeving.	vi. Inspection records show the wire rope (s) are correctly reeved.	0	1	NO
313	2.161.12	02.16.01-01:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.16.1-1	12. The GDCS system is not susceptible to a load drop that could result in the GDCS not meeting the Technical Specifications for Modes 5 and 6.	Inspection and analysis of the GDCS piping will be performed.	The GDCS components are not susceptible to a load drop that could result in the GDCS not meeting the Technical Specification for Modes 5 and 6.	0	1	NO
314	2.161.2	02.16.01-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	2. The FB crane has a lifting capacity greater than its heaviest expected load.	A load test at 125% of the rated capacity will be performed.	The FB crane is successfully load tested at 125% of its rated capacity.	0	1	NO
315	2.161.3	02.16.01-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	3. The RB crane is interlocked to prevent movement of heavy loads over new or spent fuel in the RB.	Tests will be conducted of the as-built RB crane movement using a heavy load.	The RB crane interlock prevents the carrying of a load greater than one fuel assembly and its associated handling device over new or spent fuel in the RB.	0	1	NO
316	2.161.4	02.16.01-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	4. The FB crane is interlocked to prevent movement of heavy loads over spent fuel in the FB.	Tests will be conducted of the as-built FB crane movement using a heavy load.	The FB crane interlock prevents the carrying of a load greater than one fuel assembly and its associated handling device over spent fuel storage in the FB.	0	1	NO
317	2.161.5	02.16.01-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	5. The RB crane is classified as Seismic Category I to maintain crane structural integrity.	Inspection and analyses of the as-built RB crane will be performed to verify that the design meets Seismic Category I requirements.	The RB crane conforms to Seismic Category I requirements.	0	1	NO
318	2.161.6	02.16.01-01:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	6. The FB crane is classified as Seismic Category I to maintain crane structural integrity.	Inspection and analyses of the as-built FB crane will be performed to verify that the design meets Seismic Category I requirements.	The FB crane conforms to Seismic Category I requirements.	0	1	NO
319	2.161.7	02.16.01-01:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	7. The RB crane passes over the centers of gravity of heavy loads included in the certified design that are to be lifted.	Tests will be conducted of the as-built RB crane.	The RB crane passes over the expected locations of the centers of gravity of heavy loads included in the certified design that are to be lifted.	0	1	NO
320	2.161.8	02.16.01-01:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	8. The FB crane passes over the centers of gravity of heavy loads included in the certified design that are to be lifted.	Tests will be conducted of the as-built FB crane.	The FB crane passes over the expected locations of the centers of gravity of heavy loads included in the certified design that are to be lifted.	0	1	NO
321	2.161.9	02.16.01-01:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.16.1-1	9. Heavy load handling equipment other than the RB crane, FB crane, fuel handling machine and refueling machine are designed or interlocked such that movement of heavy loads is restricted to areas away from stored fuel.	Inspections of as-built heavy load handling equipment will be performed.	Heavy load handling equipment is designed or interlocked such that movement of heavy loads is restricted to areas away from stored fuel.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
322	2.1610.1	02.16.10-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U75	2.16.10-1	1. The Service Building (SB) analysis and design is the same as a Seismic Category I structure, including the load combinations and the acceptance criteria, for loads associated with: • Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornadoes (excluding tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain and snow. • Normal plant operation—live loads and dead loads.	Analyses of the SB will be conducted.	The SB analysis and design is the same as a Seismic Category I structure, including the load combinations and the acceptance criteria, for loads associated with: • Natural phenomena – wind, floods, tornadoes (excluding tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain and snow. • Normal plant operation – live loads and dead loads.	0	1	NO
323	2.1610.2	02.16.10-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U75	2.16.10-1	2. The SB is protected against external flooding. The following protection features are: • Water seals at pipe penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater levels.	Inspection of the as-built SB flood control features will be conducted	The following as-built SB flood protection features exist: • Water seals at pipe penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater levels.	0	1	NO
324	2.1610.3	02.16.10-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U75	2.16.10-1	3. The SB is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations from the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built SB structural integrity.	Inspection and reconciliation analyses of the as-built SB will be performed.	The as-built SB is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations reconciled appropriately to demonstrate structural integrity.	0	1	NO
325	2.1611.1	02.16.11-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U65	2.16.11-1	1. The Ancillary Diesel Building (ADB) analysis and design is the same as a Seismic Category I structure, including the load combinations and the acceptance criteria, for loads associated with: • Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornadoes (excluding tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain and snow. In addition, the ADB is designed for hurricane wind to protect RTNSS systems. • Normal plant operation—live loads and dead loads.	Analyses of the ADB will be conducted.	The ADB analysis and design is the same as a Seismic Category I structure, including the load combinations and the acceptance criteria, for loads ssociated with: • Natural phenomena – wind, floods, tornadoes (excluding tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain, snow and hurricane wind (for RTNSS protection). • Normal plant operation – live loads and dead loads.	0	1	NO
326	2.1611.2	02.16.11-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U65	2.16.11-1	2. The RTNSS systems in the ADB are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane wind and missiles.	Inspection of the as-built RTNSS systems in the ADB will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS systems in the ADB are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane wind and missiles	0	1	NO
327	2.1611.3	02.16.11-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U65	2.16.11-1	3. Internal flooding analysis of the ADB is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.111988 guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.	Internal flooding analysis of the ADB will be performed.	The internal flooding analysis of the ADB has been performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988 guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.	0	1	NO
328	2.1611.4	02.16.11-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U65	2.16.11-1	4. RTNSS equipment in the ADB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood condition.	Inspection of the as-built RTNSS equipment in the ADB will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS equipment in the ADB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood condition.	0	1	NO
329	2.1611.5	02.16.11-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U65	2.16.11-1	5. The ADB is protected against external flooding. The following protection features are: • Water seals at pipe penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater levels.	Inspection of the as-built ADB flood control features will be conducted.	The following as-built ADB flood protection features exist: • Water seals at pipe penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater levels.	0	1	NO
330	2.1611.6	02.16.11-01:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U65	2.16.11-1	6. The ADB is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations from the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built ADB structural integrity.	Inspection and reconciliation analyses of the as-built ADB will be performed.	The as-built ADB is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations reconciled appropriately to demonstrate structural integrity.	0	1	NO
331	2.1611.7	02.16.11-01:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U65	2.16.11-1	7. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems or Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	Inspection and analysis will be performed to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	Inspection and analysis of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs confirm that their failure will not impair the adequacy and acceptability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	0	1	NO
332	2.1612.1	02.16.12-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U65	2.16.12-1	1. The Firewater Service Complex (FWSC) is designed to accommodate the dynamic and static loading conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations that form the structural design basis. The loads are those associated with: • Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornadoes, tornado missiles, earthquakes, rain and snow. • Normal plant operation—live loads and dead loads.	Analyses of the FWSC will be conducted	The FWSC design conforms to the structural design basis loads specified in the Design Description of Subsection 2.16.12 associated with: • Natural phenomena - wind, floods, tornadoes, tornado missiles, earthquakes, rain and snow. • Normal plant operation—live loads and dead loads.	0	1	NO
333	2.1612.2	02.16.12-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U65	2.16.12-1	2. Internal flooding analysis of the FWSC is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11- 988 guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.	Internal flooding analysis of the FWSC will be performed.	Internal flooding analysis of the FWSC has been performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988 guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment	0	1	NO
334	2.1612.3	02.16.12-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U65	2.16.12-1	3. RTNSS equipment in the FWSC is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood conditions	Inspection of the as-built RTNSS equipment in the FWSC will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS equipment in the FWSC is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood condition.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
335	2.1612.4	02.16.12-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U65	2.16.12-1	4. The FWSC is protected against external flooding. The following protection features are: • Exterior access openings sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Wall thicknesses below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic loads. • Water seals in external walls at pipe and electrical penetrations below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops in all expansion and construction joints below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels. • Roofs designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water in excess of the structural capacity of the roof for design loads	Inspection of the as-built FWSC flood control features will be conducted.	The following as-built FWSC flood protection features exist: • Exterior access openings sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Wall thicknesses below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic loads. • Water seals in external walls at pipe and electrical penetrations below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in all expansion and construction joints below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels. • Roofs designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water in excess of the structural capacity of the roof for design loads.	0	1	NO
336	2.1612.5	02.16.12-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U65	2.16.12-1	5. The FWSC is constructed accordance with the design documents with any deviations from the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built FWSC structural integrity.	Inspection and reconciliation analyses of the as-built FWSC will be performed.	The as-built FWSC is constructed in accordance with the design documents with any deviations reconciled appropriately to demonstrate structural integrity.	0	1	NO
337	2.1613.1	02.16.13-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U80	2.16.13-1	1. The Electrical Building (EB) is designed to accommodate the dynamic and static loading conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations that form the structural design basis. The loads are those associated with: • Natural phenomena - hurricane wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and snow. • Normal plant operation - live loads and dead loads.	Analyses of the EB will be conducted	The EB design conforms to the structural design basis loads specified in the Design Description of Subsection 2.16.13 associated with: • Natural phenomena - hurricane wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and snow. • Normal plant operation - live loads and dead loads.	0	1	NO
338	2.1613.2	02.16.13-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U80	2.16.13-1	2. The RTNSS systems in the EB are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane wind and missiles.	Inspection of the as-built RTNSS equipment in the EB will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS systems in the EB are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane wind and missiles.	0	1	NO
339	2.1613.3	02.16.13-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U80	2.16.13-1	3. Internal flooding analysis of the EB is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.111988 guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.	Internal flooding analysis of the EB will be performed.	Internal flooding analysis of the EB has been performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11- 1988 guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.	0	1	NO
340	2.1613.4	02.16.13-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U80	2.16.13-1	4. RTNSS equipment in the EB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood condition.	Inspection of the as-built RTNSS equipment in the EB will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS equipment in the EB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood condition.	0	1	NO
341	2.1613.5	02.16.13-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U80	2.16.13-1	5. The EB is protected against external flooding. The following protection features are: • Water seals at pipe and electrical penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater levels.	Inspection of the as-built EB flood control features will be conducted	The following as-built EB flood protection features exist: • Water seals at pipe and electrical penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater levels.	0	1	NO
342	2.1613.6	02.16.13-01:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U80	2.16.13-1	6. The EB is constructed in accordance with the design documents with any deviations from the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built EB structural integrity.	Inspection and reconciliation analyses of the as-built EB will be performed.	The as-built EB is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations reconciled appropriately to demonstrate structural integrity.	0	1	NO
343	2.1614.1	02.16.14-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U84	2.16.14-1	1. The Service Water Building (SF) is designed to accommodate the dynamic and static loading conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations that form the structural design basis. The loads are those associated with: • Natural phenomena - hurricane wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and snow. • Normal plant operation - live loads and dead loads.	Analyses of the SF will be conducted	The SF design conforms to the structural design basis loads specified in the Design Description of Subsection 2.16.14 associated with: • Natural phenomena - hurricane wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and snow. • Normal plant operation - live loads and dead loads.	0	1	NO
344	2.1614.2	02.16.14-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U84	2.16.14-1	2. The RTNSS systems in the SF are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane wind and missiles.	Inspection of the as-built RTNSS equipment in the SF will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS systems in the SF are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane wind and missiles.	0	1	NO
345	2.1614.3	02.16.14-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U84	2.16.14-1	3. Internal flooding analysis of the SF is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.111988 guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.	Internal flooding analysis of the SF will be performed.	Internal flooding analysis of the SF has been performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11- 1988 guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.	0	1	NO
346	2.1614.4	02.16.14-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U84	2.16.14-1	4. RTNSS equipment in the SF is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood condition.	Inspection of the as-built RTNSS equipment in the SF will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS equipment in the SF is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood condition.	0	1	NO
347	2.1614.5	02.16.14-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U84	2.16.14-1	5. Plant Service Water equipment or other equipment designated as RTNSS that is located outdoors is qualified for flood condition and protected from hurricane wind and missiles when buried underground. RTNSS equipment that is not buried directly underground is protected by cell enclosures that provide flooding, wind and missile protection.	Inspection of the as-built RTNSS equipment located outdoors will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS equipment that is located outdoors is qualified for flood condition and protected from hurricane wind and missiles when buried underground. RTNSS equipment that is not buried directly underground is protected by cell enclosures that provide flooding wind and missile protection.	0	1	NO

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
348	2.1614.6	02.16.14-01:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U84	2.16.14-1	6. The SF is protected against external flooding. The following protection features are: • Water seals at pipe and electrical penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater levels.	Inspection of the as-built SF flood control features will be conducted	The following as-built SF flood protection features exist: • Water seals at pipe and electrical penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater levels.	0	1	NO
349	2.1614.7	02.16.14-01:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U84	2.16.14-1	7. The SF is constructed in accordance with the design documents with any deviations from the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built SF structural integrity.	Inspection and reconciliation analyses of the as-built SF will be performed.	The as-built SF is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations reconciled appropriately to demonstrate structural integrity.	0	1	NO
350	2.162.10.1	02.16.02-10:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U36	2.16.2-10	1. The functional arrangement of the Electrical Building Ventilation System (EBVS) is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.2.7 and shown in Figure 2.16.2-9.	Inspections of the EBVS configuration will be conducted.	The as-built EBVS system conforms with the description in Subsection 2.16.2.7 and shown in Figure 2.16.2-9.	0	1	NO
351	2.162.10.2	02.16.02-10:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U36	2.16.2-10	2. The EBVS provides post 72-hour cooling for Diesel Generators and safety-related Electrical Distribution, and support for electrical power to FAPCS.	System testing will be performed and cooling air flow to the specified cubicles will be verified.	The cooling air flow capability meets the requirements to support post 72-hour cooling for Diesel Generators and safety-related Electrical Distribution, and support for electrical power to FAPCS.	0	1	NO
352	2.162.10.3	02.16.02-10:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U36	2.16.2-10	3. The TSCVS air filtration units (AFU) include HEPA filters to provide a habitable work environment for personnel when nonsafety-related power is available.	An inspection of the as-built TSCVS HEPA filters procurement documentation will be performed.	The initially installed HEPA filters have been designed, constructed and tested in accordance with Section FC of ASME AG-1.	0	1	NO
353	2.162.10.4	02.16.02-10:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U36	2.16.2-10	4. The TSCVS AFU include charcoal absorbers to provide a habitable work environment for personnel when nonsafety-related power is available.	An inspection of the as-built TSCVS charcoal absorber procurement documentation will be performed.	The initially installed charcoal absorbers have been designed, constructed and tested in accordance with Section FE of ASME AG-1.	0	1	NO
354	2.162.10.5	02.16.02-10:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U36	2.16.2-10	5. The TSCVS AFU maintain the TSC at a slight positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas.	Testing will be performed to measure the differential pressure between the TSC and surrounding areas.	The as-built TSCVS filtration units maintain the TSC at a positive pressure of > 31Pa (0.125 inch water gauge) with respect to the surrounding areas at the required air addition flow rate.	0	1	NO
355	2.162.2.1	02.16.02-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	1. The functional arrangement of the RBVS is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.2.1 and as shown in Figures 2.16.2-1, 2.16.2-2 and 2.16.2-3.	Inspections of the RBVS configuration will be conducted.	The as-built RBVS conforms to the description in Subsection 2.16.2.1 and is as shown in Figures 2.16.2-1, 2.16.2-2 and 2.16.2-3.	0	1	NO
356	2.162.2.11	02.16.02-02:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	11. The Reactor Building HVAC Online Purge Exhaust Filters meet RG 1.140 and ASME AG-1 requirements for HEPA and carbon filter efficiency.	Each charcoal absorber will be tested in accordance with RG 1.140. HEPA filters will be tested in accordance with ASME AG-1, Section FC.	The as-built Reactor Building HVAC Online Purge Exhaust filter efficiency meet the acceptance criteria for laboratory and in place testing in accordance with RG 1.140 and ASME AG-1.	0	1	NO
357	2.162.2.12a	02.16.02-02:12aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	12a. The Reactor Building HVAC Accident Exhaust Filters maintains the CONAVS served areas of the reactor building at a minimum negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 inch W.G.) relative to surrounding clean areas when operating.	Testing will be performed to confirm that the Reactor Building HVAC Accident Exhaust Filters maintain the CONAVS area at a minimum negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 inch W.G.) relative to surrounding clean areas when operating each filter train.	The time average pressure differential in the as-built CONAVS served areas of the reactor building as measured by pressure differential indicators is minimum negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 inch W.G.).	0	1	NO
358	2.162.2.12b	02.16.02-02:12bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	12b. The Reactor Building HVAC Accident Exhaust Filters meet RG 1.140 and ASME AG-1 requirements for HEPA and carbon filter efficiency.	The Reactor Building HVAC Accident Exhaust Filters meet RG 1.140 and ASME AG-1 requirements for HEPA and carbon filter efficiency.	The as-built RB HVAC Accident Exhaust filter efficiencies meet the acceptance criteria for laboratory and in place testing in accordance with RG 1.140 and ASME AG-1.	0	1	NO
359	2.162.2.13	02.16.02-02:13BB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	13. The Reactor Building concrete acts as a heat sink that passively maintains the temperature of the Reactor Building rooms within an acceptable range for the first 72 hours following a design basis accident.	A Control Building and Reactor Building Environmental Temperature Analysis for ESBWR will be performed using the as-built heat sink dimensions, the as-built heat sink thermal properties, the as-built heat sink exposed surface area, the as-built thermal properties of materials covering parts of the heat sink, and the as-built heat loads.	The bulk average air temperature in the Reactor Building rooms will not exceed the Thermodynamic Environment Conditions Inside Reactor Building for Accident Conditions on a loss of active cooling for the first 72 hours following a design basis accident, given post design basis accident conditions and reconciled to as-built features and heat loads.	0	1	NO
360	2.162.2.2	02.16.02-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	2. The RBVS isolation dampers automatically close upon receipt of a high radiation signal (CONAVS and REPAVS) or loss of AC power (CONAVS, REPAVS and CLAVS).	Testing of the RBVS isolation dampers will be performed using simulated signals to close the RBVS isolation dampers.	Upon receipt of a simulated high radiation signal or a simulated loss of AC power signal, the as-built RBVS isolation dampers automatically close.	0	1	NO
361	2.162.2.3.i	02.16.02-02:03BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-1 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.16.2-1 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
362	2.162.2.3.ii	02.16.02-02:03BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-1 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
363	2.162.2.3.iii	02.16.02-02:03BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-1, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-1 including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
364	2.162.2.4	02.16.02-02:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	4. The RBVS maintains the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below 2% by volume.	Testing and analysis of the system will be performed to demonstrate the air flow capability of the RBVS is adequate to maintain the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below 2%.	The air flow capability of the as-built RBVS is adequate to maintain the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below 2%.	0	1	NO

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
365	2.162.2.5.i	02.16.02-02:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	5. CONAVS maintains served areas of the reactor building at a slightly negative pressure relative to surrounding clean areas to minimize the exfiltration of potentially contaminated air.	i. Testing will be performed to confirm that the contaminated areas of the reactor building served by CONAVS maintain a minimum negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 in wg) relative to surrounding clean areas when operating CONAVS supply and exhaust fans in the normal system fan lineup.	i. The time average pressure differential in the as-built CONAVS served areas of the reactor building as measured by each of the pressure differential indicators is minimum negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 in wg).	0	1	NO
366	2.162.2.5.ii	02.16.02-02:05BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	5. CONAVS maintains served areas of the reactor building at a slightly negative pressure relative to surrounding clean areas to minimize the exfiltration of potentially contaminated air.	ii. Testing will be performed to confirm the ventilation flow rate through the contaminated areas of the reactor building served by CONAVS when operating CONAVS supply and exhaust fans in the normal system fan lineup.	ii. The exhaust flow rate is greater than or equal to the as-built CONAVS supply flow rate.	0	1	NO
367	2.162.2.6.i	02.16.02-02:06BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	6. REPAVS maintains served areas of the reactor building at a slightly negative pressure relative to surrounding clean areas to minimize the exfiltration of potentially contaminated air.	i. Testing will be performed to confirm that the refueling area of the reactor building served by REPAVS maintains a minimum negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 in wg) relative to surrounding clean areas when operating REPAVS supply and exhaust fans in the normal system fan lineup.	i. The time average pressure differential in the as-built REPAVS served areas of the reactor building as measured by each of the pressure differential indicators is minimum negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 in wg).	0	1	NO
368	2.162.2.6.ii	02.16.02-02:06BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	6. REPAVS maintains served areas of the reactor building at a slightly negative pressure relative to surrounding clean areas to minimize the exfiltration of potentially contaminated air.	ii. Testing will be performed to confirm the ventilation flow rate through the refueling area of the reactor building served by REPAVS when operating REPAVS supply and exhaust fans in the normal system fan lineup.	ii. The exhaust flow rate is greater than or equal to the as-built REPAVS supply flow rate.	0	1	NO
369	2.162.2.7	02.16.02-02:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.2-2	7. The RBVS provides post 72-hour cooling for DCIS, CRD and RWCU pump rooms, electrical cabinet cooling and CRD / RWCU motor cooling.	Testing of the integrated system will be performed to demonstrate the air flow capability of the RBVS to support post-72 hour cooling for DCIS, CRD and RWCU pump rooms, electrical cabinet cooling and CRD / RWCU motor cooling.	The integrated system test demonstrates the air flow capability to support post- 72 hour cooling for DCIS, CRD and RWCU pump rooms, electrical cabinet cooling and CRD /RWCU motor cooling.	0	1	NO
370	2.162.2.9i	02.16.02-02:09BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:U40	2.16.2-2	9. Independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.	i. Tests will be performed on the RBVS dampers by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	i. The test signal exists only in the safety-related division under test in the as-built RBVS damper.	0	1	NO
371	2.162.2.9.ii	02.16.02-02:09BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:U40	2.16.2-2	9. Independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.	ii. Inspection of the as-built safety-related divisions in the system will be performed.	ii. Physical separation and electrical isolation exists between as-built RBVS dampers. Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment as defined by RG 1.75.	0	1	NO
372	2.162.4.1	02.16.02-04:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-4	1. The functional arrangement of the CRHAVS is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.2.2 and as shown in Figure 2.16.2-4.	Inspections of the CRHAVS configuration will be conducted.	The as-built CRHAVS conforms to the design description in this Subsection 2.16.2.2 and is as shown in Figure 2.16.2-4.	0	1	NO
373	2.162.4.10	02.16.02-04:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-4	10. CRHAVS Air Handling Units and Auxiliary Cooling Units support post72 hour control room habitability cooling and cooling for post-accident monitoring heat loads.	Testing of the integrated system will be performed to demonstrate the air-flow capability of the CRHAVS to support post-72 hour cooling for CRHA and Q-DCIS heat loads.	The integrated system test demonstrates the air-flow capability to support post-72 hour cooling for CRHA and Q-DCIS heat loads.	0	1	NO
374	2.162.4.11	02.16.02-04:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:U77	2.16.2-4	11. The CRHA is provided with differential pressure indication for monitoring under normal and emergency operation.	Testing will be performed to verify that the CRHA MCR pressure indication operates as-designed.	The as-built CRHA pressure indication is provided in the MCR.	0	1	NO
375	2.162.4.2	02.16.02-04:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-4	2. The CRHA isolation dampers automatically close upon receipt of any of the following signals: • high radiation in the CRHAVS intake; • high radiation downstream of an Emergency Filter Unit (EFU) during emergency operation; • low airflow through an EFU during emergency operation; • loss of AC power.	Testing of the CRHA isolation dampers will be performed using simulated signals to close the CRHA isolation dampers.	The as-built CRHA isolation dampers automatically close upon receipt of any of the following simulated signals: • high radiation in the CRHAVS intake; • a high radiation downstream of an Emergency Filter Unit (EFU) during emergency operation; • low airflow through an EFU during emergency operation; • a loss of AC power signal	0	1	NO
376	2.162.4.3.i	02.16.02-04:03BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-4	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-3 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-3 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.16.2-3 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
377	2.162.4.3.ii	02.16.02-04:03BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-4	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-3 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-3 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-3 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
378	2.162.4.3.iii	02.16.02-04:03BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-4	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-3 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-3, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-3 including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
379	2.162.4.4.i	02.16.02-04:04BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-4	4. The CRHAVS heat sink passively maintains the temperature of the CRHA within an acceptable range for the first 72 hours following a design basis accident.	i. A Control Building and Reactor Building Environmental Temperature Analysis for ESBWR will be performed using the as-built heat sink dimensions, the as-built heat sink thermal properties, the as-built heat sink exposed surface area, the as-built thermal properties of materials covering parts of the heat sink, and the as-built heat loads.	i. The CRHA maximum bulk average air temperature is 33.9°C (93° F) or less on a loss of active cooling for the first 72 hours following a design basis accident, given post design basis accident conditions and as reconciled to as-built features and heat loads.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
380	2.162.4.4.ii	02.16.02-04:04BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-4	4. The CRHAVS heat sink passively maintains the temperature of the CRHA within an acceptable range for the first 72 hours following a design basis accident.	ii. A Control Room Habitability Area Minimum Temperature Analysis will be performed using as-built design inputs established by Table 2.16.2-4 Item 4i, in addition to minimum assumed heat loads, minimum assumed outside air conditions and minimum assumed normal operation concrete heat sink temperatures.	ii. The CRHA minimum bulk average air temperature is 12.8° C (55° F) or above on a loss of normal heating for the first 72 hours following a design basis accident, given winter post design basis accident conditions and as reconciled to as-built features and assumed minimum temperatures.	0	1	NO
381	2.162.4.4.iii	02.16.02-04:04BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-4	4. The CRHAVS heat sink passively maintains the temperature of the CRHA within an acceptable range for the first 72 hours following a design basis accident.	iii. A Control Building and Reactor Building Environmental Temperature Analysis for ESBWR will be performed using the as-built design inputs established in Table 2.16.2-4 Item 4i and using the 0% Exceedance Value for wet bulb (non-coincident) temperature and corresponding High Humidity Diurnal Swing. A reconciliation analysis will be performed for the as-built features and heat loads, and limiting outdoor conditions.	iii. The CRHA maximum bulk average wet bulb globe temperature index is 32.2° C (90.0°F) or less on a loss of active cooling for the first 72 hours following a design basis accident, given post design basis accident conditions and as reconciled to as-built features and heat loads, and to limiting outdoor conditions.	0	1	NO
382	2.162.4.5.i	02.16.02-04:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:U77	2.16.2-4	5. Independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.	i. Tests will be performed on CRHA isolation damper and EFU operation by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	i. The test signal exists only in the safety-related division under test in the as-built CRHA isolation damper and EFU control.	0	1	NO
383	2.162.4.5.ii	02.16.02-04:05BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:U77	2.16.2-4	5. Independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.	ii. Inspection of the as-built safety-related divisions in the system will be performed.	ii. Physical separation and electrical isolation exists between as-built CRHA isolation dampers and EFU safety-related divisions. Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment as defined in RG 1.75.	0	1	NO
384	2.162.4.6.i	02.16.02-04:06BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:U77	2.16.2-4	6. CRHA isolation damper and EFU operational status (Open/Closed) indication is provided in the MCR.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify CRHA isolation damper and EFU operational status indication is installed in the MCR.	i. The as-built CRHA isolation damper and EFU operational status indication is provided in the MCR.	0	1	NO
385	2.162.4.6.ii	02.16.02-04:06BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:U77	2.16.2-4	6. CRHA isolation damper and EFU operational status (Open/Closed) indication is provided in the MCR.	ii. Testing will be performed to show that the operational status indication in the MCR accurately depicts the operational status of the CRHA isolation dampers and EFUs.	ii. The operational status indication accurately depicts the operational status of the as-built CRHA isolation dampers and EFUs.	0	1	NO
386	2.162.4.7	02.16.02-04:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-4	7. The free air volume of the control room envelope is greater than or equal to the volume assumed in safety analyses.	Analyses to be performed based on the as-built control room envelope to determine the free air volume (total volume minus equipment and walls).	The free air volume of the control room envelop is ≥ 2,200 m^3 (78,000 ft^3).	0	1	NO
387	2.162.4.8	02.16.02-04:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-4	8. Normal operation intake flow rate is greater than or equal to the flow rate assumed in the safety analyses.	Testing will be performed to verify the normal operation intake flow rate	The flow rate is ≥ 220 l/s (466 cfm).	0	1	NO
388	2.162.6.1	02.16.02-06:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	1. The functional arrangement of the EFU is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.2.3 and as shown in Figure 2.16.2-4.	Inspections of the EFU configuration will be conducted.	The as-built EFU system conforms with the design description in this Subsection 2.16.2.3 and is as shown in Figure 2.16.2-4.	0	1	NO
389	2.162.6.10	02.16.02-06:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	10. EFUs are tested to meet the laboratory test requirements described in ASME AG-1 and RG 1.52 for carbon absorber efficiency.	Each charcoal absorber will be laboratory tested in accordance with the requirements described in ASME AG-1, Section FE.	Charcoal absorber efficiency meets the acceptance criteria for laboratory testing per RG 1.52, Regulatory Position 7, when tested in accordance with the requirements described in ASME AG-1, Section FE.	0	1	NO
390	2.162.6.11	02.16.02-06:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	11. The standby EFU starts on a low flow signal from the operating EFU.	Testing will be performed to verify that the operating EFU is isolated and the standby EFU is automatically started on a low flow signal from the operating EFU.	A low flow test signal from the operating EFU will start the standby EFU.	0	1	NO
391	2.162.6.12	02.16.02-06:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	12. EFUs maintain habitable conditions in the CRHA.	Testing will ensure that the filtered air supply will not be reduced below the required 220 l/s (466 cfm) when the CRHA is isolated and being maintained at a positive pressure of >31 Pa (0.125 in. wg) with respect to the surrounding areas.	The as-built EFUs provide 220 l/s (466 cfm) of filtered air when the CRHA is isolated and being maintained at a positive pressure of >31 Pa (0.125 in. wg) with respect to the surrounding areas.	0	1	NO
392	2.162.6.2	02.16.02-06:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	2. The selected redundant EFU dampers open upon receipt of a control room habitability envelope isolation signal.	Testing of the EFU dampers will be performed using simulated control room habitability envelope isolation signal to open the EFU dampers.	Upon receipt of a simulated control room habitability envelope isolation signal, the as-built EFU dampers automatically open.	0	1	NO
393	2.162.6.3.i	02.16.02-06:03BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-5 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-5 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.16.2-5 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
394	2.162.6.3.ii	02.16.02-06:03BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-5 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-5 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-5 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
395	2.162.6.3.iii	02.16.02-06:03BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-5 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-5, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-5 including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
396	2.162.6.4.i	02.16.02-06:04BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	4. Independence for the EFU trains is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.	i. Tests will be performed on EFUs by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	i. The test signal exists only in the safety-related division under test for the EFU trains.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
397	2.162.6.4.ii	02.16.02-06:04BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	4. Independence for the EFU trains is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.	ii. Inspection of the as-built safety-related divisions in the EFU system will be performed.	ii. For the as-built EFU trains, physical separation or electrical isolation exists between these safety-related divisions. Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment as defined in RG 1.75.	0	1	NO
398	2.162.6.5a	02.16.02-06:05aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	5a. EFUs maintain the CRHA at the minimum positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas at the required air addition flow rate.	Testing will be performed to measure the differential pressure between the CRHA and surrounding adjacent areas.	The as-built EFUs maintain the CRHA at a positive pressure of > 31 Pa (0.125 in wg) with respect to the surrounding areas at the required air addition flow rate.	0	1	NO
399	2.162.6.5b	02.16.02-06:05bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	5b. The in-leakage does not exceed the unfiltered in-leakage assumed by control room operator dose analysis.	Tracer gas testing in accordance with ASTM E741 will be performed to measure the unfiltered in-leakage into the CRHA with EFUs operating.	The unfiltered in-leakage measured by tracer gas testing does not exceed the unfiltered in-leakage assumed by control room operator dose analysis.	0	1	NO
400	2.162.6.6	02.16.02-06:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:U77	2.16.2-6	6. The powered EFU dampers can be remotely operated from the MCR.	EFU dampers will be opened and closed using manually initiated signals from the MCR.	The as-built EFU dampers open and close when manually imitated signals are sent from the MCR.	0	1	NO
401	2.162.6.7	02.16.02-06:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U77	2.16.2-6	7. EFUs meet the in-place leakage testing requirements of ASME AG-1 and RG 1.52.	EFUs will be in-place leak tested in accordance with ASME AG-1, Section TA, to meet the requirements of RG 1.52.	The as-built EFUs meet the acceptance criteria for in-place testing per RG 1.52, Regulatory Position 6, when tested in accordance with the requirements described in ASME AG-1, Section TA.	0	1	NO
402	2.162.7.1	02.16.02-07:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U39	2.16.2-7	1. The functional arrangement of the Turbine Building Ventilation System (TBVS) is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.2.4 and shown in Figure 2.16.2-6.	Inspections of the TBVS configuration will be conducted.	The as-built TBVS system conforms with the design description in this Subsection 2.16.2.4 and shown in Figure 2.16.2-6.	0	1	NO
403	2.162.7.2	02.16.02-07:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U39	2.16.2-7	2. The TBVS provides post 72-hour cooling for DCIS in the Turbine Building and room cooling for the Nuclear Island Chilled Water System and RCCW pumps.	System testing will be performed and cooling air flow to the specified cubicles will be verified.	The cooling air flow capability meets the requirements to support post 72-hour cooling for DCIS in the Turbine Building and room cooling for the Nuclear Island Chilled Water System and RCCW pumps.	0	1	NO
404	2.162.9.1	02.16.02-09:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U98	2.16.2-9	1. The functional arrangement of the FBVS is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.2.5 and as shown in Figures 2.16.2-7 and 2.16.2-8.	Inspections of the FBVS configuration will be conducted.	The as-built FBVS system conforms to the design description in this Subsection 2.16.2.5 and as shown in Figures 2.16.2-7 and 2.16.2-8.	0	1	NO
405	2.162.9.2	02.16.02-09:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:U98	2.16.2-9	2. The Fuel Building HVAC isolation dampers automatically close upon receipt of a high radiation signal.	Using a simulated high radiation signal, tests will be performed on the (Fuel Building HVAC isolation dampers) isolation logic.	Upon receipt of a simulated high radiation signal, the Fuel Building HVAC isolation dampers automatically close.	0	1	NO
406	2.162.9.3.i	02.16.02-09:03BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:U98	2.16.2-9	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-8 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-8 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.16.2-8 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
407	2.162.9.3.ii	02.16.02-09:03BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:U98	2.16.2-9	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-8 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-8 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-8 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
408	2.162.9.3.iii	02.16.02-09:03BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:U98	2.16.2-9	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-8 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-8, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-8 including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
409	2.162.9.4.i	02.16.02-09:04BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:U98	2.16.2-9	4. The FBVS maintains the fuel building at a slightly negative pressure relative to surrounding areas.	i. Testing will be performed to confirm that the FBVS maintains a minimum negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 inch W.G.) when operating FBVS supply and exhaust AHUs in the normal system fan lineup.	i. The average differential pressure in the served areas of the fuel building as measured by the pressure differential indicators is a minimum negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 inch W.G.).	0	1	NO
410	2.162.9.4.ii	02.16.02-09:04BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:U98	2.16.2-9	4. The FBVS maintains the fuel building at a slightly negative pressure relative to surrounding areas.	ii. Testing will be performed to confirm the ventilation flow rate through the fuel building area when operating the FBVS supply and exhaust fans in the normal system fan lineup.	ii. The exhaust flow rate is greater than or equal to the FBVS supply flow rate.	0	1	NO
411	2.162.9.5	02.16.02-09:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U98	2.16.2-9	5. The FBVS provides post 72-hour cooling for FAPCS pump motors and N-DCIS.	System testing will be performed and cooling air-flow to the specified cubicles will be verified.	The cooling air-flow capability meets the requirements to support post 72-hour cooling for FAPCS pump motors and N-DCIS.	0	1	NO
412	2.163.1	02.16.03-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	1. The functional arrangement of the FPS is as described in Subsection 2.16.3 and as shown on Figure 2.16.3-1.	Inspection of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built FPS conforms with the basic configuration contained in the Design Description of Subsection 2.16.3 and Figure 2.16.3-1.	0	1	NO
413	2.163.1.1	02.16.3.1-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3.1-1	1. Fire barriers of three-hour fire resistance rating are provided that separate: • Safety-related systems from any potential fires in nonsafety-related areas that could affect the ability of safety-related systems to perform their safety function. • Redundant divisions or trains of safety-related systems from each other to prevent damage that could adversely affect a safe shutdown function from a single fire. • Components within a single safety-related electrical division that present a fire hazard to components in another safety-related division. • Electrical circuits (safety-related and nonsafety-related) whose fire-induced failure could cause a spurious actuation that could adversely affect a safe shutdown function.	Inspections will assure 3-hour fire barriers are installed.	All locations listed in Subsection 2.16.3.1 are protected by 3-hour fire barriers.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
414	2.163.1.2	02.16.3.1-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3.1-1	2. Penetrations through fire barriers are sealed or closed to provide fire resistance ratings at least equal to that of the barriers, and elevator doors will have a minimum fire rating of 1.5 hours..	Inspections will confirm that as-built penetrations through fire barriers are sealed or closed to provide fire resistance ratings at least equal to that required of the barriers (elevator doors at 1.5 hours).	The as-built penetrations through fire barriers provide fire resistance ratings at least equal to that required of the barriers and that elevator doors have a minimum rating of 1.5 hours.	0	1	NO
415	2.163.1.3	02.16.3.1-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3.1-1	3. Fire dampers protect ventilation duct openings in fire barriers.	Inspections will be performed to confirm the presence of fire dampers in ventilation duct openings.	The presence of fire dampers in ventilation duct openings, consistent with the fire areas identified in Table 2.16.3.1-1.	0	1	NO
416	2.163.1.4	02.16.3.1-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3.1-1	4. Exposed structural steel protecting areas containing safety-related equipment is fireproofed with material with a fire rating of up to three hours as determined from the FHA.	Inspections will be performed to confirm the presence of fireproofing on structural steel protecting areas containing safety-related equipment.	The presence of fireproofing on structural steel protecting areas containing safety-related equipment with material with a fire rating of up to three hours as determined from the FHA.	0	1	NO
417	2.163.1.5	02.16.3.1-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3.1-1	5. The exposure of the distributed control and information system (Q-DCIS and N-DCIS) equipment to heat and smoke caused by a fire in a single fire area does not cause spurious actuations that could adversely affect safe shutdown.	Inspections, tests and /or analyses will be performed to show that the exposure of the distributed control and information system (Q-DCIS and N-DCIS) equipment to smoke and heat caused by a fire in a single fire area does not cause spurious actuations that could adversely affect safe shutdown.	The exposure of the distributed control and information system (Q-DCIS and N-DCIS) equipment to smoke and heat caused by a fire in a single fire area does not cause spurious actuations that could adversely affect safe shutdown.	0	1	NO
418	2.163.2.i	02.16.03-02:02BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	2. The FPS components and piping identified in Table 2.16.3-1 and Table 2.16.3-1 remain functional during and after an SSE.	i. Analysis of the FPS components and piping identified in Table 2.16.3-1 will be performed to demonstrate that the components and piping will remain functional during and after an SSE.	i. Analyses demonstrate that the FPS components and piping identified in Table 2.16.3-1 and Table 2.16.3-1 will remain functional during and after an SSE.	0	1	NO
419	2.163.2.ii	02.16.03-02:02BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	2. The FPS components and piping identified in Table 2.16.3-1 and Table 2.16.3-1 remain functional during and after an SSE.	ii. Inspection of the as-built FPS components and piping identified in Table 2.16.3-1 will be performed to verify that the components and piping are installed in accordance with the configurations specified by the analyses.	ii. The as-built components and piping identified in Table 2.16.3-1 are installed in accordance with the configurations specified by the analyses.	0	1	NO
420	2.163.3.i	02.16.03-02:03BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	3. The FPS provides for manual fire suppression capability to plant areas containing safety-related equipment.	The following inspections will be performed: i. Inspection of the as-built manual fire suppression system outside the Containment not protected by a fixed fire suppression system will be performed to verify that any location that contains or could present a hazard to safety-related equipment can be reached by two effective hose streams with a maximum of 30.5 meters (100 feet) of hose.	The as-built manual fire suppression system has the following features: i. Standpipe and hose rack stations are located such that any safety-related equipment outside Containment not protected by a fixed fire suppression system can be reached by an effective hose stream 9.1 m (30 ft) with a maximum of 30.5 m (100 ft) of hose from each of two hose stations on separate standpipes.	0	1	NO
421	2.163.3.ii	02.16.03-02:03BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	3. The FPS provides for manual fire suppression capability to plant areas containing safety-related equipment.	ii. Inspection of the as-built manual fire suppression system will be performed to verify that any location outside Containment protected by a fixed fire suppression system that contains or could present a hazard to safety-related equipment can be reached by at least one hose stream with a maximum of 30.5 meters (100 feet) of hose.	ii. Standpipe and hose rack stations are located such that any safety-related equipment outside Containment protected by a fixed fire suppression system can be reached by an effective hose stream 9.1 m (30 ft) with a maximum of 30.5 m (100 ft) of hose from at least one hose station.	0	1	NO
422	2.163.3.iii	02.16.03-02:03BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	3. The FPS provides for manual fire suppression capability to plant areas containing safety-related equipment.	iii. Inspection of the as-built manual fire suppression system will be performed to verify that any location within Containment can be reached by two effective hose streams with a maximum of 61 meters (200 feet) of hose.	iii. Standpipe and hose rack stations are located such that any location within Containment can be reached by an effective hose stream 9.1 m (30 ft) with a maximum of 61 m (200 ft) of hose from each of two hose stations on separate standpipes.	0	1	NO
423	2.163.4a	02.16.03-02:04aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	4a. The FPS provides the primary storage tanks that contain the required combined minimum usable firewater storage capacity.	Inspection of the as-built water supply sources and volumetric calculations using as-built dimensions will be performed.	The as-built water supply sources meet the volumetric requirements of a combined minimum usable firewater storage capacity of ≥3900 m^3 (1,030,000 gallons) as specified in the Certified Design Commitment.	0	1	NO
424	2.163.4b	02.16.03-02:04bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	4b. The FPS provides the designated site-specific secondary firewater storage source contains thecombined minimum usable firewater storage capacity.	Inspection of the as-built water supply sources and volumetric calculations using as-built dimensions will be performed.	The as-built water supply sources meet the volumetric requirements of ≥2082 m^3 (550,000 gallons).	0	1	NO
425	2.163.5.i	02.16.03-02:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	5. Each fire pump provides the required minimum discharge flow with adequate pressure.	i. Testing or analysis (or both) of each fire pump will be performed to demonstrate that each fire pump provides a flow rate of at least 484 m^3/hr (2130 gpm).	i. Each fire pump provides a flow rate of at least 484 m^3/hr (2130 gpm).	0	1	NO
426	2.163.5.ii	02.16.03-02:05BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	5. Each fire pump provides the required minimum discharge flow with adequate pressure.	ii. Testing will be performed to demonstrate rated flow and rated water pressure at the most hydraulically remote standpipes in the Turbine Building and the Reactor Building.	ii. Acceptable flow and rated pressure at the most hydraulically remote Turbine Building and Reactor standpipe - a.) 40 mm (1.5 inch) hoses; total flow of 22.7 m^3/hr (100 gpm) at a minimum pressure of 448.2 kPaG (65 psig) and b.) 65 mm (2.5 inch) hoses; total flow of 113.5 m^3/hr (500 gpm) at a minimum pressure of 689 kPaG (100 psig).	0	1	NO
427	2.163.6	02.16.03-02:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	6. Smoke detectors provide fire detection capability and can be used to initiate fire alarms in areas containing safety-related equipment.	Testing will be performed on the as-built individual fire detectors in areas containing safety-related equipment by providing a simulated fire condition.	The as-built individual smoke detectors respond to simulated fire conditions and initiate fire alarms in areas containing safety-related equipment.	0	1	NO
428	2.163.7a	02.16.03-02:07aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	7a. The primary diesel-driven fire pump is available to provide post-72 hour makeup to the IC/PCCS pools and Spent Fuel Pool.	Test will be performed to demonstrate that the primary diesel-driven fire pump starts on a manual signal and supplies a minimum of 46 m^3/hr (≥200 gpm) makeup water to the IC/PCCS pool or the Spent Fuel Pool.	The primary diesel-driven fire pump starts on a manual signal and supplies a minimum of 46 m^3/hr (≥200 gpm) makeup water to the IC/PCCS pools or Spent Fuel Pool.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
429	2.163.7b	02.16.03-02:07bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	7b. The fuel oil tank for the primary diesel-driven fire pump contains adequate fuel oil capacity to support the function of providing makeup water from 72 hours to 7 days after an accident	The as-built primary diesel-driven fire pump fuel oil tank capacity will be calculated.	The as-built fuel oil tanks for the diesel-driven fire pumps have greater than a 3.79 m^3 (1000 gallon) capacity to support the function of providing makeup water from 72 hours to 7 days after an accident before refilling based upon the as-built fuel tanks and fuel consumption rates and margin criteria provided in NFPA 24.	0	1	NO
430	2.163.9	02.16.03-02:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.3-2	9. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems or Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	Inspection and analysis will be performed to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	Inspection and analysis of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs confirm that their failure will not impair the adequacy and acceptability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	0	1	NO
431	2.164.1	02.16.04-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U50	2.16.4-1	1. The functional arrangement of the EFDS is as described in Subsection 2.16.4.	Inspections of the as-built EFDS will be performed.	The as-built EFDS conforms with the description in Subsection 2.16.4.	0	1	NO
432	2.164.2	02.16.04-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U50	2.16.4-1	2. The EFDS collects liquid wastes from floor drainage in the DW and directs these wastes to the DW floor drain high conductivity waste (HCW) sump.	A test will be performed by pouring water into the floor drains in the DW inside the containment boundary.	The water poured into these drains is collected in the DW floor drain high conductivity waste (HCW) sump.	0	1	NO
433	2.164.3	02.16.04-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U50	2.16.4-1	3. The EFDS collects liquid wastes emanating from equipment in the DW and directs these wastes to the DW equipment drain low conductivity waste (LCW) sump.	A test will be performed by pouring water into equipment leak-off lines in the DW inside the containment boundary.	The water poured into these leak-off lines is collected in the DW equipment drain low conductivity waste (LCW) sump.	0	1	NO
434	2.165.1	02.16.05-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	1. The RB is designed and constructed to accommodate the dynamic, static and thermal loading conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations, which form the structural design basis. The loads are (as applicable) those associated with: • Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornados (including tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain and snow. • Internal events—floods, pipe breaks including LOCA and missiles. • Normal plant operation—live loads, dead loads, temperature effects and building vibration loads.	Analyses of the as-built RB will be conducted.	The as-built RB conforms to the structural design basis loads specified in the Design description of this subsection 2.16.5 associated with: • Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornados (including tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain and snow. • Internal events—floods, pipe breaks including LOCA and missiles. • Normal plant operation—live loads, dead loads, temperature effects and building vibration loads.	0	1	NO
435	2.165.10	02.16.05-02:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.5-2	10. The Reactor Building CONAVS area volume meets design assumptions for the mixing of fission products following a LOCA.	Inspections of the as-built dimensions of the areas in the RB credited in the design basis mixing analysis will be performed. The results will be compared to the calculation of the total mixing volume to verify that the results match the assumptions.	The as-built RB CONAVS area volume meets design assumptions for the mixing of fission products following a LOCA.	0	1	NO
436	2.165.11	02.16.05-02:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	11. RTNSS equipment in the RB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood conditions.	Inspections of the as-built RTNSS equipment in the RB will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS equipment in the RB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood conditions.	0	1	NO
437	2.165.12	02.16.05-02:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	12. The buffer pool is a reinforced concrete structure with a stainless steel liner that is equipped with embedments designed to Seismic Category I requirements.	Inspection and analysis of the as-built buffer pool will be performed.	The as-built buffer pool is a reinforced concrete structure with a stainless steel liner that is equipped with embedments and can withstand seismic dynamic loads without loss of structural integrity.	0	1	NO
438	2.165.13	02.16.05-02:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	13. Doors that connect the RB with the EB galleries are watertight for flooding of the galleries up to the ground level elevation.	Inspections of the doors for RB to EB galleries will be conducted.	The doors connecting the RB to EB are watertight doors.	0	1	NO
439	2.165.14	02.16.05-02:14BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	14. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems or Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety-related functions.	Inspection and analysis will be performed to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs will not impair the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety-related functions.	Inspection and analysis of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs confirm that their failure will not impair the adequacy and acceptability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety-related functions.	0	1	NO
440	2.165.15	02.16.05-02:15BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	15 Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems or Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	Inspection and analysis will be performed to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	Inspection and analysis of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs confirm that their failure will not impair the adequacy and acceptability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	0	1	NO
441	2.165.2	02.16.05-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	2. The functional arrangement of the RB is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.5 and is as shown in Figures 2.16.5-1 through 2.16.5-11.	Inspections of the as-built RB will be conducted.	The RB conforms to the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.5 and is as shown in Figures 2.16.5-1 through 2.16.5-11.	0	1	NO
442	2.165.3	02.16.05-02:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	3. The critical dimensions used for seismic analyses and the acceptable tolerances are provided in Table 2.16.5-1.	Inspection of the RB will be performed. Deviations from the design conditions will be analyzed using the design basis loads.	Reconciliation of construction deviations from the critical dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.16.5-1 will demonstrate that the as-built RB will withstand the design basis loads specified in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.5 without loss of structural integrity or the safety-related functions.	0	1	NO
443	2.165.4	02.16.05-02:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U40	2.16.5-2	4. The RB CONAVS area design provides a holdup volume and delays release of radioactivity to the environment consistent with the LOCA dose analysis maximum exfiltration. assumptions .	Leakage rate testing of the as-built RB CONAVS area under a differential pressure of 62.3 Pa (0.25 in wg.) will be conducted.	The RB CONAVS area leakage rate under the conditions expected to exist during a LOCA is < 141.6 l/s (300 cfm).	0	1	NO
444	2.165.5	02.16.05-02:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.5-2	5. The RB provides three-hour fire barriers for separation of the four independent safe shutdown divisions.	Inspections of the as-built RB will be conducted.	Each division is separated by fire barriers having > 3-hour fire ratings.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
445	2.165.6	02.16.05-02:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	6. For external flooding, the RB incorporates structural provisions into the plant design to protect the structures, systems, or components from postulated flood and groundwater conditions. This approach provides: • Wall thicknesses below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic loads; • Water stops in all expansion and construction joints below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels; • Waterproofing of external surfaces below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels; • Water seals in external walls at pipe and electrical penetrations below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels; and • Roofs designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water in excess of the structural capacity of the roof for design loads. • Exterior access opening sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels.	Inspection of the as-built flood control features will be conducted.	The as-built RB conforms with the following flood protection features specified in the Design Description of this subsection 2.16.5. • Wall thicknesses below flood level are designed to withstand hydrostatic loads; • Water stops in all expansion and construction joints below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels; • Waterproofing of external surfaces below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels; • Water seals in external walls at pipe penetrations below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels; and • Roofs are built to prevent pooling of large amounts of water in excess of the structural capacity of the roof for design loads. • Exterior access opening sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels.	0	1	NO
446	2.165.7	02.16.05-02:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	7. Protective features used to mitigate or eliminate the consequences of internal flooding are: • Structural enclosures or barriers • Curbs and sills • Leakage detection components • Drainage systems	Inspections of the as-built RB flood protection features will be conducted.	The following flood protection features specified in the Design Description 2.16.5 are in place in the as-built RB to mitigate or eliminate the consequences of internal flooding: • Structural enclosures or barriers • Curbs and sills • Leakage detection components • Drainage systems	0	1	NO
447	2.165.8	02.16.05-02:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	8. The internal flooding protection features prevent flood water in one division from propagating to other division(s) and ensure equipment necessary for safe shutdown is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood conditions by: • Divisional walls • Sills • Watertight doors	Inspections of the as-built RB flood protection features will be conducted.	The following flood protection features specified in the Design Description 2.16.5 are in place in the as-built RB to prevent flood water in one division from propagating to other division(s) and to ensure equipment necessary for safe shutdown not located above the maximum flood level for that location is qualified for flood conditions: • Divisional walls • Sills • Watertight doors	0	1	NO
448	2.165.9a	02.16.05-02:09aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	9a. The RB is protected against pressurization effects associated with postulated rupture of pipes containing high-energy fluid that occur in subcompartments of the RB.	Inspections of the RB subcompartments that rely on overpressure protection devices will be conducted.	The as-built RB subcompartments which rely on overpressure protection devices are equipped with over pressure protection devices specified in the Design Description 2.16.5.	0	1	NO
449	2.165.9b	02.16.05-02:09bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.16.5-2	9b. The RB structure in the refuel floor area is equipped with overpressure protection devices in the event of overpressure of this area.	Inspection and analysis of the as-built RB structure overpressure protection devices will be performed.	The as-built RB structure overpressure protection devices specified in the Design Description 2.16.5 can relieve excessive positive pressure generated by steam buildup during auxiliary pool design boiling conditions.	0	1	NO
450	2.166.1	02.16.06-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U73	2.16.6-2	1. The CB is designed and constructed to accommodate the dynamic, static, and thermal loading conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations, which form the structural design basis. The loads are those associated with: • Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornadoes (including tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain and snow. • Internal events—floods. • Normal plant operation—live loads, dead loads and temperature effects.	Analyses of the as-built CB loads will be conducted.	The as-built CB conforms to the structural design basis loads specified in the design Description of this subsection 2.16.6 associated with: • Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornadoes (including tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain and snow. • Internal events—floods. • Normal plant operation—live loads, dead loads and temperature effects	0	1	NO
451	2.166.2	02.16.06-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U73	2.16.6-2	2. The functional arrangement of the CB is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.6 and is as shown in Figures 2.16.6-1 through 2.16.6-5.	Inspections of the as-built CB will be conducted.	The CB conforms to the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.6 and as shown in Figures 2.16.6-1 through 2.16.6-5.	0	1	NO
452	2.166.3	02.16.06-02:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U73	2.16.6-2	3. The critical CB dimensions and acceptable tolerance are provided in Table 2.16.6-1.	Inspection of the as-built CB will be performed. Deviations from the design conditions will be analyzed using the design basis loads.	Reconciliation of construction deviations from the critical dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.16.6-1 demonstrates that the as-built CB will withstand the design basis loads specified in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.6 without loss of structural integrity or the safety-related functions.	0	1	NO
453	2.166.4	02.16.06-02:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U43	2.16.6-2	4. The MCR envelope is separated from the rest of the CB by walls, floors, doors and penetrations, which have three-hour fire ratings.	Inspections of the as-built CB will be conducted.	The as-built CB has a MCR envelope separated from the rest of the CB by walls, floors, doors and penetrations with >3-hour fire rating.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
454	2.166.5	02.16.06-02:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U73	2.16.6-2	5. The lowest elevation in the CB is divided into separate divisional areas for instrumentation and control equipment. CB flooding resulting from component failures in any of the CB divisions does not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. For external flooding, protection features are: • Exterior access openings sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Wall thickness below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic loads. • Water stops in all expansion and construction joints below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels. • Waterproofing of external surfaces below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels; • Water seals in external walls at pipe and electrical penetrations below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels; and • Roofs designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water in excess of the structural capacity of the roof for design loads. For internal flooding, protection features are: • Flood water in one division is prevented from propagating to other division(s) by divisional walls, sills and watertight doors. • Equipment necessary for safe shutdown is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood conditions.	Inspections of the as-built CB flood control features will be conducted.	The as-built CB contains the following features: For external flooding: • Exterior access openings are sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Wall thickness below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic loads. • Water stops in all expansion and construction joints below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels. • Waterproofing of external surfaces below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels; • Water seals in external walls at pipe and electrical penetrations below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels; and • Roofs designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water in excess of the structural capacity of the roof for design loads. For internal flooding: • Flood water in one division is prevented from propagating to other division(s) by divisional walls, sills and watertight doors. • Equipment necessary for safe shutdown is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood conditions.	0	1	NO
455	2.166.6	02.16.06-02:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U73	2.16.6-2	6. RTNSS equipment in the CB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood conditions.	Inspections of the as-built RTNSS equipment in the CB will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS equipment in the CB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood conditions.	0	1	NO
456	2.166.7	02.16.06-02:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U73	2.16.6-2	7. Doors that connect the CB with the EB galleries are watertight for flooding of the galleries up to the ground level elevation.	Inspections of the doors for CB to EB galleries will be conducted.	The doors connecting the CB to EB are watertight doors.	0	1	NO
457	2.166.8	02.16.06-02:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U73	2.16.6-2	8. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems or Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety-related functions.	Inspection and analysis will be performed to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs will not impair the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety-related functions.	Inspection and analysis of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs confirm that their failure will not impair the adequacy and acceptability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety-related functions.	0	1	NO
458	2.166.9	02.16.06-02:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U73	2.16.6-2	9. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems or Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	Inspection and analysis will be performed to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	Inspection and analysis of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs confirm that their failure will not impair the adequacy and acceptability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	0	1	NO
459	2.167.1	02.16.07-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U97	2.16.7-2	1. The FB is designed and constructed to accommodate the dynamic, static, and thermal loading conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations, which form the structural design basis. The loads are those associated with: • Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornadoes (including tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain and snow; • Internal events—floods; • Normal plant operation—live loads, dead loads and temperature effects; and • Loads from spent fuel storage racks.	Analyses of the as-built FB will be conducted.	The as-built FB conforms to the structural design basis loads specified in the Design Description of this subsection 2.16.7 associated with: • Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornadoes (including tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain and snow; • Internal events—floods; and • Normal plant operation—live loads, dead loads and temperature effects; and • Loads from spent fuel storage racks.	0	1	NO
460	2.167.10	02.16.07-02:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U97	2.16.7-2	10. The FB structure above the spent fuel pool is equipped with overpressure protection devices in the event of overpressure of this area.	Inspection and analysis of the as-built FB structure overpressure protection devices will be performed.	The as-built FB structure overpressure protection devices specified in the Design Description 2.16.7 can relieve excessive positive pressure generated by steam buildup during SFP design boiling conditions.	0	1	NO
461	2.167.11	02.16.07-02:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U97	2.16.7-2	11. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems or Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety-related functions.	Inspection and analysis will be performed to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs will not impair the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety-related functions.	Inspection and analysis of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs confirm that their failure will not impair the adequacy and acceptability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety-related functions.	0	1	NO
462	2.167.12	02.16.07-02:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U97	2.16.7-2	12. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems or Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	Inspection and analysis will be performed to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	Inspection and analysis of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs confirm that their failure will not impair the adequacy and acceptability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a seismic event.	0	1	NO
463	2.167.2	02.16.07-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:U97	2.16.7-2	2. The functional arrangement of the FB is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.7 and is as shown in Figures 2.16.7-1 through 2.16.7-6.	Inspections of the as-built FB will be conducted.	The FB conforms to the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.7 and as shown in Figures 2.16.7-1 through 2.16.7-6.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
464	2.167.3	02.16.07-02:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U97	2.16.7-2	3. The critical dimensions and acceptable tolerances for the FB are as described in Table 2.16.7-1.	Inspection of the FB will be performed. Deviations from the design conditions will be analyzed using the design basis loads.	Reconciliation of construction deviations from the critical dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.16.7-1 will demonstrate that the as-built FB will withstand the design basis loads specified in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.7 without loss of structural integrity or the safety-related functions.	0	1	NO
465	2.167.4	02.16.07-02:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U97	2.16.7-2	4. The walls forming the boundaries of the FB and penetrations through these walls have three-hour fire ratings.	Inspections of the as-built FB walls and penetrations will be conducted.	The as-built walls forming the boundaries of the FB and penetrations through these walls have > 3-hour fire ratings.	0	1	NO
466	2.167.5	02.16.07-02:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U97	2.16.7-2	5. The FB is protected against an external flooding. Protection features are: • Exterior access openings are sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels; • Wall thickness below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic loads; • Water seals at pipe and electrical penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops in all expansion and construction joints below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels; and • Roofs designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water in excess of the structural capacity of the roof for design loads.	Inspection of the as-built FB flood control features will be conducted.	The following as-built FB flood protection features exist: Protection features are: • Exterior access openings are sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Wall thickness below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic loads; • Water seals at pipe and electrical penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops in all expansion and construction joints below design basis maximum flood and groundwater levels; and • Roofs designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water in excess of the structural capacity of the roof for design loads.	0	1	NO
467	2.167.6	02.16.07-02:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U97	2.16.7-2	6. Internal flooding analysis of the FB is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.111988 guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.	Internal flooding analysis of the FB will be performed.	Internal flooding analysis of the FB has been performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11- 1988 guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.	0	1	NO
468	2.167.7	02.16.07-02:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U97	2.16.7-2	7. RTNSS equipment in the FB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood conditions.	Inspection of the as-built RTNSS equipment in the FB will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS equipment in the FB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood condition.	0	1	NO
469	2.167.8	02.16.07-02:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U97	2.16.7-2	8. The spent fuel pool is a reinforced concrete structure with a stainless steel liner that is equipped with embedments designed to Seismic Category I requirements.	Inspection or analysis of the as-built spent fuel pool will be performed.	The as-built spent fuel pool is a reinforced concrete structure with a stainless steel liner that is equipped with embedments and can withstand seismic dynamic loads without loss of structural integrity.	0	1	NO
470	2.167.9	02.16.07-02:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U97	2.16.7-2	9. The gates that connect the SFP to adjacent pools are designed to Seismic Category I requirements, and are designed so that the bottom of the gate is at least 3.05 m (10.0 ft) above TAF.	Inspection of the as-built spent fuel pool will be performed.	The gates that connect the SFP to adjacent pools can withstand seismic dynamic loads without loss of structural integrity, and are built so that the bottom of the gate is at least 3.05 m (10.0 ft) above TAF.	0	1	NO
471	2.168.1	02.16.08-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U72	2.16.8-1	1. The TB analysis and design is the same as a Seismic Category I structure, including the load combinations and the acceptance criteria, for loads associated with: • Natural phenomenon –wind, floods, tornadoes (excluding tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain and snow. In addition, the TB is designed for hurricane wind to protect RTNSS systems. • Normal plant operation—live loads and dead loads.	Analyses of the TB will be conducted.	The TB analysis and design is the same as a Seismic Category I structure including the load combinations and the acceptance criteria, for loads associated with: • Natural phenomena – wind, floods, tornadoes (excluding tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain, snow and hurricane wind (for RTNSS protection). • Normal plant operations – live loads and dead loads.	0	1	NO
472	2.168.2	02.16.08-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U72	2.16.8-1	2. The RTNSS systems in the TB are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane wind and missiles.	Inspection of the as-built RTNSS systems in the TB will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS systems in the TB are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane wind and missiles.	0	1	NO
473	2.168.3	02.16.08-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U72	2.16.8-1	3. The internal flooding analysis of the TB is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988 guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.	Internal flooding analysis of the TB will be performed.	Internal flooding analysis of the TB has been performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11- 1988 guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.	0	1	NO
474	2.168.4	02.16.08-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U72	2.16.8-1	4. RTNSS equipment in the TB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood condition.	Inspection of the as-built RTNSS equipment in the TB will be conducted.	The as-built RTNSS systems in the TB are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane wind and missiles.	0	1	NO
475	2.168.5	02.16.08-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U72	2.16.8-1	5. The TB is protected against external flooding. The following protection features are: • Water seals at pipe penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater levels.	Inspection of the as-built TB flood control features will be conducted	The following as-built TB flood protection features exist: • Water seals at pipe penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater levels.	0	1	NO
476	2.168.6	02.16.08-01:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U72	2.16.8-1	6. The TB is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations from the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built TB structural integrity.	Inspection and reconciliation analyses of the as-built TB will be performed.	The as-built TB is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations reconciled appropriately to demonstrate structural integrity.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
477	2.169.1	02.16.09-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U74	2.16.9-1	1. The RW method of analysis is the same as a Seismic Category I structure, including the load combinations and the acceptance criteria. The RW is designed in accordance with RG 1.143 Classification RW-IIa. The earthquake loading is the full SSE instead of ½ SSE as shown in RG 1.143. The RW loads are those associated with: • Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornadoes, tornado missiles, earthquakes, rain and snow. • Internal events - floods • Normal plant operation—live loads and dead loads.	Analyses of the RW will be conducted.	The RW method of analysis is the same as a Seismic Category I structure, including the load combinations and the acceptance criteria. The RW is designed in accordance with RG 1.143 Classification RW-IIa. The earthquake loading is the full SSE instead of ½ SSE as shown in RG 1.143. The RW loads are those associated with: • Natural phenomena – wind, floods, tornadoes, tornado missiles, earthquakes, rain and snow. • Internal events – floods. • Normal plant operation – live loads and dead loads.	0	1	NO
478	2.169.2	02.16.09-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U74	2.16.9-1	2. The RW is protected against external flooding. The following protection features are: • Water seals at pipe penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater levels.	Inspection of the as-built RW flood control features will be conducted.	The following as-built RW flood protection features exist: • Water seals at pipe penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater levels.	0	1	NO
479	2.169.3	02.16.09-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U74	2.16.9-1	3. The RW is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations from the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built RW structural integrity.	Inspection and reconciliation analyses of the as-built RW will be performed.	The as-built RW is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations reconciled appropriately to demonstrate structural integrity.	0	1	NO
480	2.19.10	02.19.00-01:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	10. Unoccupied vital areas are locked and alarmed with activated intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the Central Alarm Station.	Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of unoccupied vital area intrusion detection equipment and locking devices will be performed.	Unoccupied vital areas are locked and intrusion is detected and annunciated in the Central Alarm Station.	0	1	NO
481	2.19.11b	02.19.00-01:11bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	11b. The Central Alarm Station is located inside a protected area and the interior is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area.	Inspections of the Central Alarm Station location will be performed.	The Central Alarm Station is located inside a protected area and the interior is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area.	0	1	NO
482	2.19.12	02.19.00-01:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	12. The secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment contained in the Central Alarm Station and nonportable communications equipment contained in the Central Alarm Station is located within a vital area.	Inspections of the secondary security power supply will be performed.	The secondary security power supply for alarm annunciator equipment contained in the Central Alarm Station and non-portable communications equipment contained in the Central Alarm Station is located within a vital area.	0	1	NO
483	2.19.13a	02.19.00-01:13aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	13a. Security alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators are tamper indicating and self-checking, (e.g. an automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when on standby power.) Alarm annunciation shall indicate the type of alarm, (e.g., intrusion alarms, emergency exit alarm) and location.	Tests will be performed on all security alarm devices and transmission lines.	Security alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators are tamper indicating and self-checking (e.g., an automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when the system is on standby power) and that alarm annunciation indicates the type of alarm, (e.g., intrusion alarms, emergency exit alarms) and location.	0	1	NO
484	2.19.13b	02.19.00-01:13bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	13b. Intrusion detection and assessment systems provide visual display and audible annunciation of the alarm in the Central Alarm Station.	Tests will be performed on intrusion detection and assessment systems.	The intrusion detection and assessment systems provide a visual display and audible annunciation of alarms in the Central Alarm Station.	0	1	NO
485	2.19.14	02.19.00-01:14BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	14. Intrusion detection systems recording equipment exists to record onsite security alarm annunciation including the location of the alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication and the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.	Tests will be performed on the intrusio detection systems recording equipment.	Intrusion detection systems recording equipment is capable of recording each onsite security alarm annunciation including the location of the alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication and the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.	0	1	NO
486	2.19.15	02.19.00-01:15BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	15. Emergency exits through vital area boundaries are alarmed and secured by locking devices that allow prompt egress during an emergency.	Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of emergency exits through vital area boundaries will be performed.	Emergency exits through vital area boundaries are alarmed and secured by locking devices that allow prompt egress during an emergency.	0	1	NO
487	2.19.16a	02.19.00-01:16aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	16a. The Central Alarm Station has conventional (land line) telephone service with the control room and local law enforcement authorities.	Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the Central Alarm Station conventional (land line) telephone service will be performed.	The Central Alarm Station is equipped with conventional (land line) telephone service with the control room and local law enforcement authorities.	0	1	NO
488	2.19.16b	02.19.00-01:16bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	16b. The Central Alarm Station is capable of continuous communication with security personnel.	Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the Central Alarm Station continuous communication capability will be performed.	The Central Alarm Station is capable of continuous communication with security officers, watchmen or armed response individuals, or other security personnel that have responsibilities during a contingency event.	0	1	NO
489	2.19.16c	02.19.00-01:16cBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	16c. Non-portable communications equipment in the Central Alarm Station must remain operable from an independent power source in the event of the loss of normal power.	Tests, inspections or a combination of tests and inspections of the non-portable communications equipment will be performed.	Non-portable communication devices (including conventional telephone systems) in the Central Alarm Station are wired to an independent power supply that enables those systems to remain operable (without disruption) during the loss of normal power.	0	1	NO
490	2.19.1a	02.19.00-01:01aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	1a. Vital equipment shall be located only within a vital area.	Inspections will be performed of all vital equipment locations.	Vital equipment is located only within a vital area.	0	1	NO
491	2.19.1b	02.19.00-01:01bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	1b. Access to vital equipment requires passage through a vital area barrier with a capability to prevent unauthorized entry.	Inspections will be performed of all vital equipment locations.	Vital equipment is located such that access to the vital equipment requires passage through a vital area barrier.	0	1	NO
492	2.19.6	02.19.00-01:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:PS:Y86	2.19-1	6. The external walls, doors, ceiling and floors in the Main Control Room and Central Alarm Station are bullet resistant to at least Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) 752 (2006) Level 4.	Type test, analysis or a combination of type test and analysis of the external walls, doors, ceilings, and floors in the Main Control Room and Central Alarm Station will be performed.	The external walls, doors, ceilings, and floors in the Main Control Room and the Central Alarm Station are bullet resistant to at least UL 752 Level 4.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
493	2.21.1	02.02.01-06:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C11	2.2.1-6	1. RC&IS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.1 and Table 2.2.1-1.	Inspection(s) of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built system conforms with the functional arrangement defined in Subsection 2.2.1 and Table 2.2.1-1.	0	1	NO
494	2.21.2	02.02.01-06:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C11	2.2.1-6	2. RC&IS is divided into major functional groups as defined in Table 2.2.1-2.	Inspection(s) of the as-built system will be performed.	Test and inspection report(s) document that the as-built system is divided into major functional groups as defined in Table 2.2.1-2.	0	1	NO
495	2.21.3	02.02.01-06:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C11	2.2.1-6	3. RC&IS provides automatic functions and initiators, as defined in Table 2.2.1-3.	Test(s) will be performed for the initiators on the as-built RC&IS using simulated signals and actuators for the automatic functions defined in Table 2.2.1-3.	Test and type test report(s) document that the RC&IS is capable of performing the automatic functions as defined in Table 2.2.1-3.	0	1	NO
496	2.21.4	02.02.01-06:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C11	2.2.1-6	4. RC&IS provides rod block functions as defined in Table 2.2.1-4.	Test(s) will be performed using simulated signals and manual actions to confirm that the rod withdrawal and insertion commands are blocked as defined in Table 2.2.1-4.	The rod block functions defined in Table 2.2.1-4 are performed in response to simulated signals and manual actions.	0	1	NO
497	2.21.5	02.02.01-06:05aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C11	2.2.1-6	5. RC&IS provides controls, interlocks, and bypasses as defined in Table 2.2.1-5.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built system using simulated signals and manual actions.	The system controls, interlocks, and bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the main control room, or are performed in response to simulated signals and manual actions as defined in Table 2.2.1-5.	0	1	NO
498	2.21.7	02.02.01-06:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C11	2.2.1-6	7. RC&IS has a dual redundant architecture.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built system that simulate failure of each redundant channel.	The surviving channel continues to execute system functions with one failed channel.	0	1	NO
499	2.21.8	02.02.01-06:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C11	2.2.1-6	8. RC&IS equipment is powered by separate, non-divisional AC power sources.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built system by simulating a failure of AC power.	A test signal exists only in the channel under test.	0	1	NO
500	2.21.9	02.02.01-06:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C11	2.2.1-6	9. RC&IS has at least one power source being a nonsafety-related uninterruptible power supply.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built system by providing a test signal in only one channel at a time.	The test signal exists from at least one nonsafety-related uninterruptible AC power supply only in the channel under test.	0	1	NO
501	2.212.10	02.02.12-05:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C21	2.2.12-5	10. LD&IS isolation functions logic is designed to provide an actuation by requiring coincident trip of like, unbypassed parameters in at least two divisions to cause the trip output.	Test(s) of the LD&IS functions will be performed on the as-built SSLC/ESF.	The SSLC/ESF performs the LD&IS function trip outputs when a coincident trip of like, unbypassed parameters in at least two divisions occurs.	0	1	NO
502	2.212.11	02.02.12-05:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C21	2.2.12-5	11. MSIV LD&IS logic is de-energized to initiate the isolation function (i.e., fail-safe).	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built RTIF MSIV of the LD&IS functions by de-energizing the RTIF by division.	The RTIF de-energizes the MSIV LD&IS trip outputs when a coincident deenergization of at least two divisions occurs.	0	1	NO
503	2.212.12	02.02.12-05:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C21	2.2.12-5	12. DW floor drain high conductivity waste (HCW) sump instrumentation is designed with the sensitivity to detect a leakage step-change (increase) within one hour and to alarm at excess sump flow rates.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built DW floor drain high conductivity waste (HCW) sump instrumentation.	The DW floor drain high conductivity waste (HCW) sump instrumentation detects leakage step-changes (increases) of 3.8 liters/min (1.0 gpm) within one hour and alarms at sump flow rates in excess of 19 liters/min (5 gpm).	0	1	NO
504	2.212.2a	02.02.12-05:02aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C21	2.2.12-5	2a. RTIF LD&IS software monitors isolation MSIV function variables are as described in Table 2.2.12-2.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built RTIF using simulated signals and actuators for the MSIV isolation functions as described in Table 2.2.12-2.	The RTIF performs the MSIV isolation functions as described in Table 2.2.12-2.	0	1	NO
505	2.212.2b	02.02.12-05:02bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C21	2.2.12-5	2b. SSLC/ESF LD&IS software monitors non-MSIV isolation function variables as as described in Table 2.2.12-2.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built SSLC/ESF using simulated signals and actuators for the non-MSIV isolation functions as described in Table 2.2.12-2.	The SSLC/ESF performs the non-MSIV isolation functions as described in Table 2.2.12-2.	0	1	NO
506	2.212.3	02.02.12-05:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C21	2.2.12-5	3. RTIF and SSLC/ESF LD&IS software monitor leakage source variables as described in Table 2.2.12-3.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built RTIF software projects, SSLC/ESF software projects, and SSLC/ESF VDUs using simulated signals and actuators for the monitored variables as described in Table 2.2.12-3.	The monitored variables exist and can be retrieved in the main control room in response to simulated signals as described in Table 2.2.12-3.	0	1	NO
507	2.212.4	02.02.12-05:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C21	2.2.12-5	4. RTIF and SSLC/ESF LD&IS software provide controls, interlocks, and bypasses as described in Table 2.2.12-4.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built RTIF software projects, and SSLC/ESF software projects, (including the SSLC/VDUs) using simulated signals and actuators for the controls, interlocks, and bypasses as described in Table 2.2.12-4.	The RTIF and SSLC/ESF controls, interlocks, and bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the main control room, and are performed in response to simulated signals and manual actions as described in Table 2.2.12-4.	0	1	NO
508	2.213.1	02.02.13-04:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C74	2.2.13-4	1. The SSLC/ESF functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.13 and Table 2.2.13-1.	Inspections will be conducted of the as-built configuration.	The system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in Subsection 2.2.13 and Table 2.2.13-1.	0	1	NO
509	2.213.10	02.02.13-04:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C74	2.2.13-4	10. Redundant safety-related power supplies are provided for each division of the SSLC/ESF System.	Test(s) will be performed on the SSLC/ESF System by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	The test signal exists only in the safety-related division under test in the SSLC/ESF System.	0	1	NO
510	2.213.2	02.02.13-04:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C74	2.2.13-4	2. The SSLC/ESF provides automatic functions and initiators as described in Table 2.2.13-2.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built system using simulated signals.	The system is capable of performing the functions as described in Table 2.2.13-2.	0	1	NO
511	2.213.3	02.02.13-04:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C74	2.2.13-4	3. The SSLC/ESF provides controls, interlocks, and bypasses in the MCR as described in Table 2.2.13-3.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built system using simulated signals.	The system controls, interlocks and bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the main control room, and are performed in response to simulated signals and manual actions as described in Table 2.2.13-3.	0	1	NO
512	2.213.8	02.02.13-04:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C74	2.2.13-4	8. SSLC/ESF logic is designed to provide a trip initiation by requiring a coincident trip of like, unbypassed parameters in at least two divisions to cause the trip output.	Test(s) of the as-built SSLC/ESF system will be performed using simulated signals and actuators.	The as-built SSLC/ESF system performs trip initiation when a coincident trip of like, unbypassed paramenters occurs in at least two divisions.	0	1	NO
513	2.213.9	02.02.13-04:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C74	2.2.13-4	9. SSLC/ESF uses "energized-to-trip" and "fail-as-is" logic.	Test(s) of the as-built SSLC/ESFsystem will be performed using simulated signals and actuators.	The as-built SSLC/ESF system uses "energized-to-trip" and "fail-as-is" logic.	0	1	NO
514	2.214.1	02.02.14-04:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	1. The ATWS/SLC and DPS diverse instrumentation and control systems functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.14 and Table 2.2.14-1.	Inspection(s) will be conducted on the as-built system configuration	The system's conformance to the functional arrangement as described in Subsection 2.2.14 and Table 2.2.14-1.	0	1	NO
515	2.214.11	02.02.14-04:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	11. DPS controller cabinets are in fire areas separate from the other N-DCIS, RMU, and Q-DCIS cabinets.	Inspections will be performed to confirm as-built location of the DPS cabinets.	The as-built physical location of the DPS cabinets are in fire areas separate from the other N-DCIS, RMU, and Q-DCIS cabinets.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
516	2.214.12	02.02.14-04:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	12. ATWS/SLC System logic is designed to provide a trip initiation by requiring coincident trip of like, unbypassed parameters in at least two divisions to cause the trip output.	Test(s) will be performed on the ATWS/SLC system logic.	The as-built ATWS/SLC system logic provides trip initiation signals when a coincident trip signal exists in like, unbypassed parameters in at least two unbypassed divisions.	0	1	NO
517	2.214.13	02.02.14-04:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	13. Each ATWS/SLC System division is powered from its respective safety-related power supply.	Test(s) will be performed on the ATWS/SLC System by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	A test signal exists in the safety-related division under test in the ATWS/SLC System.	0	1	NO
518	2.214.14	02.02.14-04:14BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	14. DPS is powered from nonsafety-related load group power supplies.	Test(s) will be performed on the DPS by providing a test signal in only one DPS load group at a time.	A test signal exists in the load group under test in the DPS.	0	1	NO
519	2.214.15	02.02.14-04:15BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	15. DPS triple redundant digital controllers require agreement in at least two channels out of three channels for a coincident trip actuation.	Test(s) will be performed on the DPS by providing simulated signals to each DPS channel.	Trip actuation signals exist only when at least two channels are in coincident agreement.	0	1	NO
520	2.214.17	02.02.14-04:17BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	17. DPS process variable sensors are diverse from those used by the RPS and SSLC/ESF.	Analysis(es) will be performed on the DPS sensor failure modes and effects.	The DPS sensors are diverse from the RPS and SSLC/ESF sensors.	0	1	NO
521	2.214.18	02.02.14-04:18BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	18. The DPS network segment uses diverse hardware and software from that used by the RPS and SSLC/ESF.	Analysis(es) will be performed on the DPS network segment failure modes and effects.	The DPS network segment is diverse from the RPS and SSLC/ESF hardware and software.	0	1	NO
522	2.214.2	02.02.14-04:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	2. The ATWS/SLC and DPS diverse instrumentation and control systems provide automatic functions and initiators as described in Table 2.2.14-2.	Tests will be conducted on the ATWS/SLC and DPS safety-related and nonsafety-related components on the as-built system configuration using simulated signals.	The ATWS/SLC and DPS are capable of performing the functions as described in Table 2.2.14-2.	0	1	NO
523	2.214.3	02.02.14-04:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	3. The ATWS/SLC and DPS diverse instrumentation and control systems provide controls, interlocks and bypasses in the MCR as described in Table 2.2.14-3.	Test(s) will be performed on the ATWS/SLC and DPS safety-related and nonsafety-related logic using simulated signals and actuators for controls, interlocks, and bypasses, as described in Table 2.2.14-3.	The ATWS/SLC and DPS logic controls, interlocks and bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the main control room, and are performed in response to simulated signals and manual actions as described in Table 2.2.14-3.	0	1	NO
524	2.214.8.i	02.02.14-04:08BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	8. Confirmatory analyses support and validate the DPS design scope and the fire separation criteria.	i. Complete Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) per NUREG/CR6303 of the Q-DCIS to validate the DPS protection functions.	i. The FMEA completed per NUREG/CR-6303 of the Q-DCIS has been addressed in the DPS design scope.	0	1	NO
525	2.214.8.ii	02.02.14-04:08BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	8. Confirmatory analyses support and validate the DPS design scope and the fire separation criteria.	ii. Inspection of the DPS platform requirements phase summary baseline review report will be performed.	ii. The platform requirements phase summary baseline review report contains the validated DPS design scope.	0	1	NO
526	2.214.8.iii	02.02.14-04:08BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	8. Confirmatory analyses support and validate the DPS design scope and the fire separation criteria.	iii. Inspection(s) of the DPS platform test phase summary baseline review report(s) will be performed.	iii. The DPS platform(s) test phase summary baseline review report(s) • Identify and reconcile changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable DPS design scope. • Confirm that tests show that the DPS performs in accordance with the applicable DPS design scope.	0	1	NO
527	2.214.8.iv	02.02.14-04:08BBB:Biv:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	8. Confirmatory analyses support and validate the DPS design scope and the fire separation criteria.	iv. Inspections will be performed to confirm the control logic cabinets for each of the containment vacuum breaker isolation valves meet their fire protection separation criteria.	iv. The as-built location of the control logic cabinets for the containment vacuum breaker isolation valves are separated according to fire protection separation criteria for the various locations.	0	1	NO
528	2.215.10a1-1	02.02.15-02:10a1B:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "seal-in" features are provided to enable system-level safety-related functions to go to completion. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "seal-in" features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
529	2.215.10a1-2	02.02.15-02:10a1B:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "seal-in" features are provided to enable system-level safety-related functions to go to completion. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "seal-in" features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
530	2.215.10a1-3	02.02.15-02:10a1B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "seal-in" features are provided to enable system-level safety-related functions to go to completion. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "seal-in" features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
531	2.215.10a1-4	02.02.15-02:10a1B:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "seal-in" features are provided to enable system-level safety-related functions to go to completion. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "seal-in" features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
532	2.215.10a1-5	02.02.15-02:10a1B:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "seal-in" features are provided to enable system-level safety-related functions to go to completion. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "seal-in" features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
533	2.215.10a1-6	02.02.15-02:10a1B:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "seal-in" features are provided to enable system-level safety-related functions to go to completion. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "seal-in" features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
534	2.215.10a1-7	02.02.15-02:10a1B:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "seal-in" features are provided to enable system-level safety-related functions to go to completion. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "seal-in" features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
535	2.215.10a2-1	02.02.15-02:10a2B:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
536	2.215.10a2-2	02.02.15-02:10a2B:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
537	2.215.10a2-3	02.02.15-02:10a2B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
538	2.215.10a2-4	02.02.15-02:10a2B:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
539	2.215.10a2-5	02.02.15-02:10a2B:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
540	2.215.10a2-6	02.02.15-02:10a2B:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
541	2.215.10a2-7	02.02.15-02:10a2B:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10a2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project's design bases ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR verifies that the design bases show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show "manual reset" features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
542	2.215.10b1-1	02.02.15-02:10b1B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Tests will be performed to show that once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	Once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	0	1	YES
543	2.215.10b1-2	02.02.15-02:10b1B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Tests will be performed to show that once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	Once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
544	2.215.10b1-3	02.02.15-02:10b1B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Tests will be performed to show that once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	Once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	0	1	YES
545	2.215.10b1-4	02.02.15-02:10b1B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Tests will be performed to show that once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	Once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	0	1	YES
546	2.215.10b1-5	02.02.15-02:10b1B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Tests will be performed to show that once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	Once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	0	1	YES
547	2.215.10b1-6	02.02.15-02:10b1B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Tests will be performed to show that once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	Once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	0	1	YES
548	2.215.10b1-7	02.02.15-02:10b1B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.	Tests will be performed to show that once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	Once initiated (automatically and manually), the intended sequences of safety-related functions of the "execute features" continue until completion.	0	1	YES
549	2.215.10b2-1	02.02.15-02:10b2B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Tests of the "manual reset" features will be performed.	Tests show that after completion of protective actions, deliberate operator action to operate the "manual reset" features is required to, return the safety-related systems to normal.	0	1	YES
550	2.215.10b2-2	02.02.15-02:10b2B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Tests of the "manual reset" features will be performed.	Tests show that after completion of protective actions, deliberate operator action to operate the "manual reset" features is required to, return the safety-related systems to normal.	0	1	YES
551	2.215.10b2-3	02.02.15-02:10b2B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Tests of the "manual reset" features will be performed.	Tests show that after completion of protective actions, deliberate operator action to operate the "manual reset" features is required to, return the safety-related systems to normal.	0	1	YES
552	2.215.10b2-4	02.02.15-02:10b2B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Tests of the "manual reset" features will be performed.	Tests show that after completion of protective actions, deliberate operator action to operate the "manual reset" features is required to, return the safety-related systems to normal.	0	1	YES
553	2.215.10b2-5	02.02.15-02:10b2B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Tests of the "manual reset" features will be performed.	Tests show that after completion of protective actions, deliberate operator action to operate the "manual reset" features is required to, return the safety-related systems to normal.	0	1	YES
554	2.215.10b2-6	02.02.15-02:10b2B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Tests of the "manual reset" features will be performed.	Tests show that after completion of protective actions, deliberate operator action to operate the "manual reset" features is required to, return the safety-related systems to normal.	0	1	YES
555	2.215.10b2-7	02.02.15-02:10b2B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	10b2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-related systems to normal.	Tests of the "manual reset" features will be performed.	Tests show that after completion of protective actions, deliberate operator action to operate the "manual reset" features is required to, return the safety-related systems to normal.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
556	2.215.11a10-3	02.02.15-02:11a10:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a10.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The SSLC/ESF software project's design bases for N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data links are via a separate, dedicated, dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • SSLC/ESF message authentication (for absolute time) resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data links are via a separate, dedicated, dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules • Data links use optical fibers; • SSLC/ESF message authentication (for absolute time) resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data links are via a separate, dedicated, dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules • Data links use optical fibers; • SSLC/ESF message authentication (for absolute time) resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
557	2.215.11a1-1	02.02.15-02:11a1B:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
558	2.215.11a11-4	02.02.15-02:11a11:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a11.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The ICP software project's design bases for intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links • Data links use hard copper wires. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that design bases for intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links • Data links use hard copper wires. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
559	2.215.11a11-5	02.02.15-02:11a11:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a11.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The ICP software project's design bases for intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links • Data links use hard copper wires. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that design bases for intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links • Data links use hard copper wires. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
560	2.215.11a11-6	02.02.15-02:11a11:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a11.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The ICP software project's design bases for intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links • Data links use hard copper wires. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that design bases for intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links • Data links use hard copper wires. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
561	2.215.11a11-7	02.02.15-02:11a11:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a11.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The ICP software project's design bases for intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links • Data links use hard copper wires. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that design bases for intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links • Data links use hard copper wires. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
562	2.215.11a1-2	02.02.15-02:11a1B:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
563	2.215.11a12-4	02.02.15-02:11a12:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a12. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The ICP software project's design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the software project's design for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
564	2.215.11a12-5	02.02.15-02:11a12:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a12. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The ICP software project's design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the software project's design for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
565	2.215.11a12-6	02.02.15-02:11a12:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a12. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The ICP software project's design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the software project's design for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
566	2.215.11a12-7	02.02.15-02:11a12:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a12. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The ICP software project's design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the software project's design for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
567	2.215.11a1-3	02.02.15-02:11a1B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
568	2.215.11a1-4	02.02.15-02:11a1B:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
569	2.215.11a1-5	02.02.15-02:11a1B:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
570	2.215.11a1-6	02.02.15-02:11a1B:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
571	2.215.11a1-7	02.02.15-02:11a1B:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
572	2.215.11a2-1	02.02.15-02:11a2B:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
573	2.215.11a2-2	02.02.15-02:11a2B:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
574	2.215.11a2-3	02.02.15-02:11a2B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
575	2.215.11a2-4	02.02.15-02:11a2B:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
576	2.215.11a2-5	02.02.15-02:11a2B:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
577	2.215.11a2-6	02.02.15-02:11a2B:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
578	2.215.11a2-7	02.02.15-02:11a2B:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design of the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
579	2.215.11a3-1	02.02.15-02:11a3B:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
580	2.215.11a3-2	02.02.15-02:11a3B:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
581	2.215.11a3-3	02.02.15-02:11a3B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
582	2.215.11a3-4	02.02.15-02:11a3B:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
583	2.215.11a3-5	02.02.15-02:11a3B:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
584	2.215.11a3-6	02.02.15-02:11a3B:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
585	2.215.11a3-7	02.02.15-02:11a3B:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
586	2.215.11a4-1	02.02.15-02:11a4B:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a4. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The RTIF-NMS software project's design bases for intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires; • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links; • Data links use optical fibers; and • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires; • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links; • Data links use optical fibers; and • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires; • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links; • Data links use optical fibers; and • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis. {{Design Acceptance Criteria	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
587	2.215.11a4-2	02.02.15-02:11a4B:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a4. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The RTIF-NMS software project's design bases for intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires; • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links; • Data links use optical fibers; and • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires; • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links; • Data links use optical fibers; and • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires; • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links; • Data links use optical fibers; and • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis. {{Design Acceptance Criteria	1	0	YES
588	2.215.11a5-1	02.02.15-02:11a5B:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a5. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The RTIF-NMS software project's design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and • Data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and • Data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and • Data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
589	2.215.11a5-2	02.02.15-02:11a5B:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a5. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The RTIF-NMS software project's design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and • Data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and • Data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and • Data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
590	2.215.11a6-1	02.02.15-02:11a6B:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a6. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The RTIF-NMS software project's design bases for N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components; • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end; and • Data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components; • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end; and • Data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components; • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end; and • Data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
591	2.215.11a6-2	02.02.15-02:11a6B:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a6. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The RTIF-NMS software project's design bases for N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components; • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end; and • Data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components; • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end; and • Data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components; • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end; and • Data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
592	2.215.11a7-3	02.02.15-02:11a7B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a7. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The SSLC/ESF software project's design bases for intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs at the RMUs are measured with triple redundancy; • Sensor inputs and outputs sent to and from the RMUs are on a dedicated triply redundant communication backplane bus to triply redundant controller application processors; • Sensor inputs from the RMUs are sent via triply redundant optical fibers; • Actuator outputs from the RMUs are determined using commands from the triply redundant controller application processors; and • Actuator commands are sent via triply redundant optical fibers.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design for intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs at the RMUs are measured with triple redundancy; • Sensor inputs and outputs sent to and from the RMUs are on a dedicated triply redundant communication backplane bus to triply redundant controller application processors; • Data links for sensor inputs from the RMUs are sent via triply redundant optical fibers • Actuator outputs from the RMUs are determined using commands from the triply redundant controller application processors; and • Data links for actuator commands are sent via triply redundant optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs at the RMUs are measured with triple redundancy; • Sensor inputs and outputs sent to and from the RMUs are on a dedicated triply redundant communication backplane bus to triply redundant controller application processors; • Data links for sensor inputs from the RMUs are sent via triply redundant optical fibers • Actuator outputs from the RMUs are determined using commands from the triply redundant controller application processors; and • Data links actuator commands are sent via triply redundant optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
593	2.215.11a8-3	02.02.15-02:11a8B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a8.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The SSLC/ESF software project's design bases for intra-divisional VDU data communications have the following features; • Data inputs/outputs are to and from the SSLC/ESF platform; • Data inputs are only from RTIF-NMS platform; • Data inputs/outputs to and from the safety-related VDUs via dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules • Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for intra-divisional VDU data communications have the following features; • Data inputs/outputs are to and from the SSLC/ESF platform; • Data inputs are from RTIF-NMS platform; • Data inputs/outputs to and from the safety-related VDUs are via dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for intra-divisional VDU data communications have the following features; • Data inputs/outputs are to and from the SSLC/ESF platform; • Data inputs are from RTIF-NMS platform; • Data inputs/outputs to and from the safety-related VDUs are via dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
594	2.215.11a9-3	02.02.15-02:11a9B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11a9. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The SSLC/ESF software project's design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links supporting two-out-of-four voting logic are via dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links supporting two-out-of-four voting logic are via dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links supporting two-out-of-four voting logic are via dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
595	2.215.11b10-3	02.02.15-02:11b10:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b10. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built SSLC/ESF software project's N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data links are via a separate, dedicated, dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • SSLC/ESF message authentication (for absolute time) resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the N-DCIS data communications design between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data links are via a separate, dedicated, dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules • Data links use optical fibers; • SSLC/ESF message authentication (for absolute time) resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.	The N-DCIS data communications design between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data links are via a separate, dedicated, dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules • Data links use optical fibers; • SSLC/ESF message authentication (for absolute time) resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.	0	1	YES
596	2.215.11b1-1	02.02.15-02:11b1B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Tests will be performed to show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
597	2.215.11b11-4	02.02.15-02:11b11:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b11. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built ICP software project's intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the intra-divisional data communications design have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	The intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	0	1	YES
598	2.215.11b11-5	02.02.15-02:11b11:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b11. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built ICP software project's intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the intra-divisional data communications design have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	The intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	0	1	YES
599	2.215.11b11-6	02.02.15-02:11b11:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b11. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built ICP software project's intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the intra-divisional data communications design have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	The intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	0	1	YES
600	2.215.11b11-7	02.02.15-02:11b11:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b11. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built ICP software project's intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the intra-divisional data communications design have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	The intra-divisional data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and • Data links use hard copper wires.	0	1	YES
601	2.215.11b1-2	02.02.15-02:11b1B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Tests will be performed to show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	0	1	YES
602	2.215.11b12-4	02.02.15-02:11b12:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b12. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built ICP software project's inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional data communications design within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	The inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	0	1	YES
603	2.215.11b12-5	02.02.15-02:11b12:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b12. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built ICP software project's inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional data communications design within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	The inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
604	2.215.11b12-6	02.02.15-02:11b12:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b12. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built ICP software project's inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional data communications design within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	The inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	0	1	YES
605	2.215.11b12-7	02.02.15-02:11b12:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b12. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built ICP software project's inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional data communications design within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	The inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic; • Monitoring data links are point-to-point; • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.	0	1	YES
606	2.215.11b1-3	02.02.15-02:11b1B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Tests will be performed to show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	0	1	YES
607	2.215.11b1-4	02.02.15-02:11b1B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Tests will be performed to show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	0	1	YES
608	2.215.11b1-5	02.02.15-02:11b1B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Tests will be performed to show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	0	1	YES
609	2.215.11b1-6	02.02.15-02:11b1B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Tests will be performed to show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	0	1	YES
610	2.215.11b1-7	02.02.15-02:11b1B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	Tests will be performed to show that the software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	The as-built software project has four independent, redundant divisions.	0	1	YES
611	2.215.11b2-1	02.02.15-02:11b2B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	0	1	YES
612	2.215.11b2-2	02.02.15-02:11b2B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
613	2.215.11b2-3	02.02.15-02:11b2B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	0	1	YES
614	2.215.11b2-4	02.02.15-02:11b2B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	0	1	YES
615	2.215.11b2-5	02.02.15-02:11b2B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	0	1	YES
616	2.215.11b2-6	02.02.15-02:11b2B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	0	1	YES
617	2.215.11b2-7	02.02.15-02:11b2B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	The as-built software project's inter-divisional communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.	0	1	YES
618	2.215.11b3-1	02.02.15-02:11b3B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	0	1	YES
619	2.215.11b3-2	02.02.15-02:11b3B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	0	1	YES
620	2.215.11b3-3	02.02.15-02:11b3B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	0	1	YES
621	2.215.11b3-4	02.02.15-02:11b3B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	0	1	YES
622	2.215.11b3-5	02.02.15-02:11b3B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	0	1	YES
623	2.215.11b3-6	02.02.15-02:11b3B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
624	2.215.11b3-7	02.02.15-02:11b3B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	The as-built software project's safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.	0	1	YES
625	2.215.11b4-1	02.02.15-02:11b4B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b4. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built RTIF-NMS software project's intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires; • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links; • Data links use optical fibers; and • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires; • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links; • Data links use optical fibers; and • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis.	The intra-divisional input/out data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires; • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links; • Data links use optical fibers; and • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis.	0	1	YES
626	2.215.11b4-2	02.02.15-02:11b4B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b4. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built RTIF-NMS software project's intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires; • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links; • Data links use optical fibers; and • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires; • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links; • Data links use optical fibers; and • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis.	The intra-divisional input/out data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires; • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links; • Data links use optical fibers; and • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis.	0	1	YES
627	2.215.11b5-1	02.02.15-02:11b5B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b5. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built RTIF-NMS software project's inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and • Data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional data communications design within safety-related systems have the following features; • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and • Data links use optical fibers.	The inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and • Data links use optical fibers	0	1	YES
628	2.215.11b5-2	02.02.15-02:11b5B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b5. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built RTIF-NMS software project's inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and • Data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional data communications design within safety-related systems have the following features; • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and • Data links use optical fibers.	The inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and • Data links use optical fibers	0	1	YES
629	2.215.11b6-1	02.02.15-02:11b6B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b6. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built RTIF-NMS software project's N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components; • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end; and • Data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the N-DCIS data communications design between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components; • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end; and • Data links use optical fibers.	The N-DCIS data communications design between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components; • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end; and • Data links use optical fibers.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
630	2.215.11b6-2	02.02.15-02:11b6B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b6. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built RTIF-NMS software project's N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components; • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end; and • Data links use optical fibers.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the N-DCIS data communications design between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components; • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end; and • Data links use optical fibers.	The N-DCIS data communications design between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components; • Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components; • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end; and • Data links use optical fibers.	0	1	YES
631	2.215.11b7-3	02.02.15-02:11b7B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b7. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built SSLC/ESF software project's intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs at the RMUs are measured with triple redundancy; • Sensor inputs and outputs sent to and from the RMUs are on a dedicated triply redundant communication backplane bus to triply redundant controller application processors; • Sensor inputs from the RMUs are sent via triply redundant optical fibers; • Actuator outputs from the RMUs are determined using commands from the triply redundant controller application processors; and • Actuator commands are sent via triply redundant optical fibers.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the intra-divisional input/output data communications design have the following features; • Sensor inputs at the RMUs are measured with triple redundancy; • Sensor inputs and outputs sent to and from the RMUs are on a dedicated triply redundant communication backplane bus to triply redundant controller application processors; • Data links for sensor inputs from the RMUs are sent via triply redundant optical fibers • Actuator outputs from the RMUs are determined using commands from the triply redundant controller application processors; and • Data links for actuator commands are sent via triply redundant optical fibers.	The intra-divisional input/output data communications have the following features; • Sensor inputs at the RMUs are measured with triple redundancy; • Sensor inputs and outputs sent to and from the RMUs are on a dedicated triply redundant communication backplane bus to triply redundant controller application processors; • Data links for sensor inputs from the RMUs are sent via triply redundant optical fibers • Actuator outputs from the RMUs are determined using commands from the triply redundant controller application processors; and • Data links for actuator commands are sent via triply redundant optical fibers.	0	1	YES
632	2.215.11b8-3	02.02.15-02:11b8B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11.b8. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built SSLC/ESF software project's intra-divisional VDU data communications have the following features; • Data inputs/outputs are to and from the SSLC/ESF platform • Data inputs are only from RTIF-NMS platform; • Data inputs/outputs to and from the safety-related VDUs are via dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the intra-divisional VDU data communications design have the following features; • Data inputs/outputs are to and from the SSLC/ESF platform; • Data inputs are from RTIF-NMS platform; • Data inputs/outputs to and from the safety-related VDUs are via dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks	The intra-divisional VDU data communications have the following features; • Data inputs/outputs are to and from the SSLC/ESF platform; • Data inputs are from RTIF-NMS platform; • Data inputs/outputs to and from the safety-related VDUs are via dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.	1	0	YES
633	2.215.11b9-3	02.02.15-02:11b9B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	11b9. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems: The as-built SSLC/ESF software project's inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links supporting two-out-of-four voting logic are via dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that the inter-divisional data communications design within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links supporting two-out-of-four voting logic are via dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, has functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.	The inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links supporting two-out-of-four voting logic are via dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules; • Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.	0	1	YES
634	2.215.12a-1	02.02.15-02:12aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12a. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The software project has maintenance bypasses that allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining capability to accomplish their safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that tests of the maintenance bypasses allows test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the maintenance bypasses allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
635	2.215.12a-2	02.02.15-02:12aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12a. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The software project has maintenance bypasses that allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining capability to accomplish their safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that tests of the maintenance bypasses allows test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the maintenance bypasses allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
636	2.215.12a-3	02.02.15-02:12aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12a. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The software project has maintenance bypasses that allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining capability to accomplish their safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that tests of the maintenance bypasses allows test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the maintenance bypasses allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
637	2.215.12a-4	02.02.15-02:12aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12a. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The software project has maintenance bypasses that allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining capability to accomplish their safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that tests of the maintenance bypasses allows test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the maintenance bypasses allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
638	2.215.12a-5	02.02.15-02:12aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12a. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The software project has maintenance bypasses that allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining capability to accomplish their safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that tests of the maintenance bypasses allows test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the maintenance bypasses allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
639	2.215.12a-6	02.02.15-02:12aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12a. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The software project has maintenance bypasses that allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining capability to accomplish their safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that tests of the maintenance bypasses allows test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the maintenance bypasses allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
640	2.215.12a-7	02.02.15-02:12aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12a. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The software project has maintenance bypasses that allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining capability to accomplish their safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that tests of the maintenance bypasses allows test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the maintenance bypasses allow test and calibration of one out of four divisions while retaining their capability to accomplish their safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
641	2.215.12b1-1	02.02.15-02:12b1B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b1. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that the divisions not in bypass status will accomplish their safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed to show that the design allows for trip and bypass of individual functions in each safety-related system division to demonstrate that individual functions can be tripped and bypassed and those functions not in bypass remain functional.	Individual functions in each safety-related system division can be tripped and bypassed and those not in bypass remain functional.	0	1	YES
642	2.215.12b1-2	02.02.15-02:12b1B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b1. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that the divisions not in bypass status will accomplish their safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed to show that the design allows for trip and bypass of individual functions in each safety-related system division to demonstrate that individual functions can be tripped and bypassed and those functions not in bypass remain functional.	Individual functions in each safety-related system division can be tripped and bypassed and those not in bypass remain functional.	0	1	YES
643	2.215.12b1-3	02.02.15-02:12b1B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b1. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that the divisions not in bypass status will accomplish their safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed to show that the design allows for trip and bypass of individual functions in each safety-related system division to demonstrate that individual functions can be tripped and bypassed and those functions not in bypass remain functional.	Individual functions in each safety-related system division can be tripped and bypassed and those not in bypass remain functional.	0	1	YES
644	2.215.12b1-4	02.02.15-02:12b1B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b1. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that the divisions not in bypass status will accomplish their safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed to show that the design allows for trip and bypass of individual functions in each safety-related system division to demonstrate that individual functions can be tripped and bypassed and those functions not in bypass remain functional.	Individual functions in each safety-related system division can be tripped and bypassed and those not in bypass remain functional.	0	1	YES
645	2.215.12b1-5	02.02.15-02:12b1B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b1. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that the divisions not in bypass status will accomplish their safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed to show that the design allows for trip and bypass of individual functions in each safety-related system division to demonstrate that individual functions can be tripped and bypassed and those functions not in bypass remain functional.	Individual functions in each safety-related system division can be tripped and bypassed and those not in bypass remain functional.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
646	2.215.12b1-6	02.02.15-02:12b1B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b1. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that the divisions not in bypass status will accomplish their safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed to show that the design allows for trip and bypass of individual functions in each safety-related system division to demonstrate that individual functions can be tripped and bypassed and those functions not in bypass remain functional.	Individual functions in each safety-related system division can be tripped and bypassed and those not in bypass remain functional.	0	1	YES
647	2.215.12b1-7	02.02.15-02:12b1B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b1. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that the divisions not in bypass status will accomplish their safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed to show that the design allows for trip and bypass of individual functions in each safety-related system division to demonstrate that individual functions can be tripped and bypassed and those functions not in bypass remain functional.	Individual functions in each safety-related system division can be tripped and bypassed and those not in bypass remain functional.	0	1	YES
648	2.215.12b2-1	02.02.15-02:12b2B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b2. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	Tests will be performed to show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	When one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of- three voting scheme.	0	1	YES
649	2.215.12b2-2	02.02.15-02:12b2B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b2. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	Tests will be performed to show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	When one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of- three voting scheme.	0	1	YES
650	2.215.12b2-3	02.02.15-02:12b2B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b2. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	Tests will be performed to show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	When one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of- three voting scheme.	0	1	YES
651	2.215.12b2-4	02.02.15-02:12b2B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b2. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	Tests will be performed to show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	When one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of- three voting scheme.	0	1	YES
652	2.215.12b2-5	02.02.15-02:12b2B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b2. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	Tests will be performed to show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	When one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of- three voting scheme.	0	1	YES
653	2.215.12b2-6	02.02.15-02:12b2B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b2. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	Tests will be performed to show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	When one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of- three voting scheme.	0	1	YES
654	2.215.12b2-7	02.02.15-02:12b2B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	12b2. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project's maintenance bypasses show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	Tests will be performed to show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of-three voting scheme.	When one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-of- three voting scheme.	0	1	YES
655	2.215.13a-1	02.02.15-02:13aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13a. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
656	2.215.13a-2	02.02.15-02:13aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13a. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
657	2.215.13a-3	02.02.15-02:13aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13a. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
658	2.215.13a-4	02.02.15-02:13aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13a. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
659	2.215.13a-5	02.02.15-02:13aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13a. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
660	2.215.13a-6	02.02.15-02:13aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13a. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
661	2.215.13a-7	02.02.15-02:13aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13a. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the software project is housed within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
662	2.215.13b-1	02.02.15-02:13bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13b. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The as-built software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Tests will be performed to show the operation of the keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords.	Keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords allow for administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	0	1	YES
663	2.215.13b-2	02.02.15-02:13bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13b. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The as-built software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Tests will be performed to show the operation of the keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords.	Keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords allow for administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	0	1	YES
664	2.215.13b-3	02.02.15-02:13bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13b. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The as-built software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Tests will be performed to show the operation of the keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords.	Keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords allow for administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	0	1	YES
665	2.215.13b-4	02.02.15-02:13bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13b. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The as-built software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Tests will be performed to show the operation of the keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords.	Keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords allow for administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	0	1	YES
666	2.215.13b-5	02.02.15-02:13bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13b. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The as-built software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Tests will be performed to show the operation of the keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords.	Keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords allow for administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	0	1	YES
667	2.215.13b-6	02.02.15-02:13bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13b. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The as-built software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Tests will be performed to show the operation of the keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords.	Keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords allow for administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	0	1	YES
668	2.215.13b-7	02.02.15-02:13bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	13b. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The as-built software project is housed within cabinets with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	Tests will be performed to show the operation of the keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords.	Keylock doors, keylock switches, and passwords allow for administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.	0	1	YES
669	2.215.14a-1	02.02.15-02:14aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14a. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed of the self-diagnostic features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}.	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
670	2.215.14a-2	02.02.15-02:14aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14a. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed of the self-diagnostic features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}.	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria	1	0	YES
671	2.215.14a-3	02.02.15-02:14aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14a. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed of the self-diagnostic features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}.	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria	1	0	YES
672	2.215.14a-4	02.02.15-02:14aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14a. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed of the self-diagnostic features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}.	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria	1	0	YES
673	2.215.14a-5	02.02.15-02:14aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14a. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed of the self-diagnostic features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}.	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria	1	0	YES
674	2.215.14a-6	02.02.15-02:14aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14a. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed of the self-diagnostic features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}.	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria	1	0	YES
675	2.215.14a-7	02.02.15-02:14aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14a. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed of the self-diagnostic features. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}.	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria	1	0	YES
676	2.215.14b-1	02.02.15-02:14bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14b. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The as-built software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Tests of the as-built software projects will be performed of the self-diagnostic features.	Self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level by facilitating the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, or adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	0	1	YES
677	2.215.14b-2	02.02.15-02:14bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14b. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The as-built software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Tests of the as-built software projects will be performed of the self-diagnostic features.	Self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level by facilitating the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, or adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	0	1	YES
678	2.215.14b-3	02.02.15-02:14bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14b. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The as-built software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Tests of the as-built software projects will be performed of the self-diagnostic features.	Self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level by facilitating the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, or adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	0	1	YES
679	2.215.14b-4	02.02.15-02:14bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14b. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The as-built software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Tests of the as-built software projects will be performed of the self-diagnostic features.	Self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level by facilitating the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, or adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	0	1	YES
680	2.215.14b-5	02.02.15-02:14bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14b. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The as-built software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Tests of the as-built software projects will be performed of the self-diagnostic features.	Self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level by facilitating the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, or adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	0	1	YES
681	2.215.14b-6	02.02.15-02:14bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14b. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The as-built software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Tests of the as-built software projects will be performed of the self-diagnostic features.	Self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level by facilitating the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, or adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	0	1	YES
682	2.215.14b-7	02.02.15-02:14bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	14b. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The as-built software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	Tests of the as-built software projects will be performed of the self-diagnostic features.	Self-diagnostic functions locate failure to the component level by facilitating the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, or adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.	0	1	YES
683	2.215.15a-1	02.02.15-02:15aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15a. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
684	2.215.15a-2	02.02.15-02:15aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15a. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
685	2.215.15a-3	02.02.15-02:15aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15a. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
686	2.215.15a-4	02.02.15-02:15aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15a. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
687	2.215.15a-5	02.02.15-02:15aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15a. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
688	2.215.15a-6	02.02.15-02:15aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15a. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
689	2.215.15a-7	02.02.15-02:15aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15a. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR confirm that the software project's divisions are distinctly identified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
690	2.215.15b-1	02.02.15-02:15bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15b. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the as-built software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	The redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	0	1	YES
691	2.215.15b-2	02.02.15-02:15bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15b. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the as-built software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	The redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	0	1	YES
692	2.215.15b-3	02.02.15-02:15bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15b. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the as-built software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	The redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	0	1	YES
693	2.215.15b-4	02.02.15-02:15bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15b. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the as-built software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	The redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	0	1	YES
694	2.215.15b-5	02.02.15-02:15bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15b. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the as-built software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	The redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	0	1	YES
695	2.215.15b-6	02.02.15-02:15bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15b. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the as-built software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	The redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	0	1	YES
696	2.215.15b-7	02.02.15-02:15bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	15b. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the as-built software project are distinctly identified.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	The redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.	0	1	YES
697	2.215.16a-1	02.02.15-02:16aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16a. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that the Criterion 5.1 FMEA verifies that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
698	2.215.16a-2	02.02.15-02:16aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16a. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that the Criterion 5.1 FMEA verifies that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
699	2.215.16a-3	02.02.15-02:16aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16a. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that the Criterion 5.1 FMEA verifies that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
700	2.215.16a-4	02.02.15-02:16aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16a. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that the Criterion 5.1 FMEA verifies that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
701	2.215.16a-5	02.02.15-02:16aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16a. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that the Criterion 5.1 FMEA verifies that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
702	2.215.16a-6	02.02.15-02:16aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16a. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that the Criterion 5.1 FMEA verifies that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
703	2.215.16a-7	02.02.15-02:16aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16a. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Inspection of the software project design phase summary BRR will be performed to confirm that the Criterion 5.1 FMEA verifies that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design of other auxiliary features of the software project do not have failure modes that can degrade the software project's performance below an acceptable level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
704	2.215.16b-1	02.02.15-02:16bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16b. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the as-built software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project confirm the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	The as-built software project performance confirms the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	0	1	YES
705	2.215.16b-2	02.02.15-02:16bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16b. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the as-built software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project confirm the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	The as-built software project performance confirms the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	0	1	YES
706	2.215.16b-3	02.02.15-02:16bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16b. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the as-built software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project confirm the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	The as-built software project performance confirms the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	0	1	YES
707	2.215.16b-4	02.02.15-02:16bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16b. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the as-built software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project confirm the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	The as-built software project performance confirms the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	0	1	YES
708	2.215.16b-5	02.02.15-02:16bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16b. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the as-built software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project confirm the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	The as-built software project performance confirms the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	0	1	YES
709	2.215.16b-6	02.02.15-02:16bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16b. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the as-built software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project confirm the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	The as-built software project performance confirms the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	0	1	YES
710	2.215.16b-7	02.02.15-02:16bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	16b. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the as-built software project's performance below an acceptable level.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project confirm the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	The as-built software project performance confirms the results of the FMEA that other auxiliary features of the software project do not result in degradation below an acceptable level.	0	1	YES
711	2.215.17a1-1	02.02.15-02:17a1B:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
712	2.215.17a1-2	02.02.15-02:17a1B:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
713	2.215.17a1-3	02.02.15-02:17a1B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
714	2.215.17a1-4	02.02.15-02:17a1B:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
715	2.215.17a1-5	02.02.15-02:17a1B:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
716	2.215.17a1-6	02.02.15-02:17a1B:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
717	2.215.17a1-7	02.02.15-02:17a1B:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design phase summary BRR show that the design has the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
718	2.215.17a2-1	02.02.15-02:17a2B:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project's design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and; • Event-driven actions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR shows that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
719	2.215.17a2-2	02.02.15-02:17a2B:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project's design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and; • Event-driven actions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR shows that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
720	2.215.17a2-3	02.02.15-02:17a2B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project's design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and; • Event-driven actions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR shows that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
721	2.215.17a2-4	02.02.15-02:17a2B:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project's design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications: • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and; • Event-driven actions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR shows that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
722	2.215.17a2-5	02.02.15-02:17a2B:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project's design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and; • Event-driven actions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR shows that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
723	2.215.17a2-6	02.02.15-02:17a2B:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project's design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and; • Event-driven actions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR shows that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
724	2.215.17a2-7	02.02.15-02:17a2B:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17a2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project's design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and; • Event-driven actions.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR shows that the design bases show that in normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
725	2.215.17b1-1	02.02.15-02:17b1B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate automatic initiation and control for the required safety-related functions.	The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	0	1	YES
726	2.215.17b1-2	02.02.15-02:17b1B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate automatic initiation and control for the required safety-related functions.	The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	0	1	YES
727	2.215.17b1-3	02.02.15-02:17b1B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate automatic initiation and control for the required safety-related functions.	The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	0	1	YES
728	2.215.17b1-4	02.02.15-02:17b1B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate automatic initiation and control for the required safety-related functions.	The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	0	1	YES
729	2.215.17b1-5	02.02.15-02:17b1B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate automatic initiation and control for the required safety-related functions.	The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	0	1	YES
730	2.215.17b1-6	02.02.15-02:17b1B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate automatic initiation and control for the required safety-related functions.	The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	0	1	YES
731	2.215.17b1-7	02.02.15-02:17b1B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate automatic initiation and control for the required safety-related functions.	The as-built software project provides the means to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
732	2.215.17b2-1	02.02.15-02:17b2B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project's normal operation end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) do not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions.	The as-built software project, in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications), does not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven action	0	1	YES
733	2.215.17b2-2	02.02.15-02:17b2B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project's normal operation end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) do not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions.	The as-built software project, in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications), does not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven action	0	1	YES
734	2.215.17b2-3	02.02.15-02:17b2B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project's normal operation end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) do not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions.	The as-built software project, in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications), does not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven action	0	1	YES
735	2.215.17b2-4	02.02.15-02:17b2B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project's normal operation end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) do not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions.	The as-built software project, in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications), does not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven action	0	1	YES
736	2.215.17b2-5	02.02.15-02:17b2B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project's normal operation end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) do not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions.	The as-built software project, in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications), does not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven action	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
737	2.215.17b2-6	02.02.15-02:17b2B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project's normal operation end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) do not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions.	The as-built software project, in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications), does not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven action	0	1	YES
738	2.215.17b2-7	02.02.15-02:17b2B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	17b2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project's normal operation end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) do not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions	Inspection of the as-built software project will verify that in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications) the following features are not used; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions.	The as-built software project, in normal plant process control loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and communications), does not use the following features; • Non-deterministic data communications; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven action	0	1	YES
739	2.215.18a-1	02.02.15-02:18aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18a. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
740	2.215.18a-2	02.02.15-02:18aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18a. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
741	2.215.18a-3	02.02.15-02:18aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18a. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
742	2.215.18a-4	02.02.15-02:18aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18a. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
743	2.215.18a-5	02.02.15-02:18aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18a. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
744	2.215.18a-6	02.02.15-02:18aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18a. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
745	2.215.18a-7	02.02.15-02:18aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18a. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show main control room features that are capable of manually initiating and controlling automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
746	2.215.18b-1	02.02.15-02:18bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18b. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The as-built software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate that the as-built software project has main control room features that manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	The as-built software project. Using simulated signals and actuators, show that the main control room features manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	0	1	YES
747	2.215.18b-2	02.02.15-02:18bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18b. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The as-built software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate that the as-built software project has main control room features that manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	The as-built software project. Using simulated signals and actuators, show that the main control room features manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	0	1	YES
748	2.215.18b-3	02.02.15-02:18bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18b. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The as-built software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate that the as-built software project has main control room features that manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	The as-built software project. Using simulated signals and actuators, show that the main control room features manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	0	1	YES
749	2.215.18b-4	02.02.15-02:18bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18b. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The as-built software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate that the as-built software project has main control room features that manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	The as-built software project. Using simulated signals and actuators, show that the main control room features manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	0	1	YES
750	2.215.18b-5	02.02.15-02:18bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18b. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The as-built software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate that the as-built software project has main control room features that manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	The as-built software project. Using simulated signals and actuators, show that the main control room features manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	0	1	YES
751	2.215.18b-6	02.02.15-02:18bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18b. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The as-built software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate that the as-built software project has main control room features that manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	The as-built software project. Using simulated signals and actuators, show that the main control room features manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	0	1	YES
752	2.215.18b-7	02.02.15-02:18bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	18b. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The as-built software project has features in the main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals and actuators, to demonstrate that the as-built software project has main control room features that manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	The as-built software project. Using simulated signals and actuators, show that the main control room features manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at the division level.	0	1	YES
753	2.215.19a-1	02.02.15-02:19aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19a. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the software project's design bases is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plants design bases.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
754	2.215.19a-2	02.02.15-02:19aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19a. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the software project's design bases is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plants design bases.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
755	2.215.19a-3	02.02.15-02:19aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19a. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the software project's design bases is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plants design bases.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
756	2.215.19a-4	02.02.15-02:19aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19a. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the software project's design bases is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plants design bases.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
757	2.215.19a-5	02.02.15-02:19aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19a. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the software project's design bases is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plants design bases.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
758	2.215.19a-6	02.02.15-02:19aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19a. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the software project's design bases is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plants design bases.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
759	2.215.19a-7	02.02.15-02:19aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19a. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the software project's design bases is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plants design bases.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that the sense and command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
760	2.215.19b-1	02.02.15-02:19bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19b. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project's design basis is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plant's design bases.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	The sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	0	1	YES
761	2.215.19b-2	02.02.15-02:19bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19b. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project's design basis is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plant's design bases.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	The sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	0	1	YES
762	2.215.19b-3	02.02.15-02:19bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19b. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project's design basis is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plant's design bases.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	The sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	0	1	YES
763	2.215.19b-4	02.02.15-02:19bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19b. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project's design basis is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plant's design bases.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	The sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	0	1	YES
764	2.215.19b-5	02.02.15-02:19bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19b. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project's design basis is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plant's design bases.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	The sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	0	1	YES
765	2.215.19b-6	02.02.15-02:19bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19b. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project's design basis is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plant's design bases.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	The sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	0	1	YES
766	2.215.19b-7	02.02.15-02:19bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	19b. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project's design basis is derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the plant's design bases.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	The sense and command feature inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.	0	1	YES
767	2.215.1a-1	02.02.15-02:01aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1a. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The software project's design bases list the applicable design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
768	2.215.1a-2	02.02.15-02:01aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1a. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The software project's design bases list the applicable design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
769	2.215.1a-3	02.02.15-02:01aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1a. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The software project's design bases list the applicable design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
770	2.215.1a-4	02.02.15-02:01aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1a. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The software project's design bases list the applicable design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
771	2.215.1a-5	02.02.15-02:01aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1a. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The software project's design bases list the applicable design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
772	2.215.1a-6	02.02.15-02:01aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1a. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The software project's design bases list the applicable design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
773	2.215.1a-7	02.02.15-02:01aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1a. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The software project's design bases list the applicable design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
774	2.215.1b-1	02.02.15-02:01bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1b. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the design bases events, applicable reactor modes of operation, initial conditions requiring protective action, and allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
775	2.215.1b-2	02.02.15-02:01bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1b. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the design bases events, applicable reactor modes of operation, initial conditions requiring protective action, and allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
776	2.215.1b-3	02.02.15-02:01bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1b. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the design bases events, applicable reactor modes of operation, initial conditions requiring protective action, and allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
777	2.215.1b-4	02.02.15-02:01bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1b. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the design bases events, applicable reactor modes of operation, initial conditions requiring protective action, and allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
778	2.215.1b-5	02.02.15-02:01bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1b. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the design bases events, applicable reactor modes of operation, initial conditions requiring protective action, and allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
779	2.215.1b-6	02.02.15-02:01bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1b. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the design bases events, applicable reactor modes of operation, initial conditions requiring protective action, and allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
780	2.215.1b-7	02.02.15-02:01bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	1b. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the design bases events, applicable reactor modes of operation, initial conditions requiring protective action, and allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the design basis events and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR include a list of design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
781	2.215.20a1-1	02.02.15-02:20a1B:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design's phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
782	2.215.20a1-2	02.02.15-02:20a1B:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design's phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
783	2.215.20a1-3	02.02.15-02:20a1B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design's phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
784	2.215.20a1-4	02.02.15-02:20a1B:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design's phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
785	2.215.20a1-5	02.02.15-02:20a1B:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design's phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
786	2.215.20a1-6	02.02.15-02:20a1B:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design's phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
787	2.215.20a1-7	02.02.15-02:20a1B:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project design's phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are capable of automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
788	2.215.20a2-1	02.02.15-02:20a2B:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show removal of activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
789	2.215.20a2-2	02.02.15-02:20a2B:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show removal of activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
790	2.215.20a2-3	02.02.15-02:20a2B:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show removal of activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
791	2.215.20a2-4	02.02.15-02:20a2B:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show removal of activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
792	2.215.20a2-5	02.02.15-02:20a2B:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show removal of activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
793	2.215.20a2-6	02.02.15-02:20a2B:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show removal of activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
794	2.215.20a2-7	02.02.15-02:20a2B:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20a2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides for automatically removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that they show removal of activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR confirm that the systems are removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
795	2.215.20b1-1	02.02.15-02:20b1B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met	The software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	0	1	YES
796	2.215.20b1-2	02.02.15-02:20b1B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met	The software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	0	1	YES
797	2.215.20b1-3	02.02.15-02:20b1B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met	The software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	0	1	YES
798	2.215.20b1-4	02.02.15-02:20b1B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met	The software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	0	1	YES
799	2.215.20b1-5	02.02.15-02:20b1B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met	The software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	0	1	YES
800	2.215.20b1-6	02.02.15-02:20b1B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met	The software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	0	1	YES
801	2.215.20b1-7	02.02.15-02:20b1B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met	The software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.	0	1	YES
802	2.215.20b2-1	02.02.15-02:20b2B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project shows that it automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	The as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	0	1	YES
803	2.215.20b2-2	02.02.15-02:20b2B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project shows that it automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	The as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	0	1	YES
804	2.215.20b2-3	02.02.15-02:20b2B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project shows that it automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	The as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	0	1	YES
805	2.215.20b2-4	02.02.15-02:20b2B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project shows that it automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	The as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	0	1	YES
806	2.215.20b2-5	02.02.15-02:20b2B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project shows that it automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	The as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	0	1	YES
807	2.215.20b2-6	02.02.15-02:20b2B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project shows that it automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	The as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
808	2.215.20b2-7	02.02.15-02:20b2B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	20b2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project shows that it automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	The as-built software project automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.	0	1	YES
809	2.215.21a-1	02.02.15-02:21aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21a. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides the capability of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
810	2.215.21a-2	02.02.15-02:21aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21a. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides the capability of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
811	2.215.21a-3	02.02.15-02:21aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21a. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides the capability of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
812	2.215.21a-4	02.02.15-02:21aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21a. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides the capability of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
813	2.215.21a-5	02.02.15-02:21aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21a. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides the capability of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
814	2.215.21a-6	02.02.15-02:21aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21a. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides the capability of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
815	2.215.21a-7	02.02.15-02:21aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21a. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The software project's design bases provides the capability of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Inspections of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
816	2.215.21b1-1	02.02.15-02:21b1B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b1. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
817	2.215.21b1-2	02.02.15-02:21b1B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b1. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
818	2.215.21b1-3	02.02.15-02:21b1B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b1. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
819	2.215.21b1-4	02.02.15-02:21b1B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b1. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
820	2.215.21b1-5	02.02.15-02:21b1B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b1. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
821	2.215.21b1-6	02.02.15-02:21b1B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b1. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
822	2.215.21b1-7	02.02.15-02:21b1B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b1. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
823	2.215.21b2-1	02.02.15-02:21b2B:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b2. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
824	2.215.21b2-2	02.02.15-02:21b2B:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b2. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
825	2.215.21b2-3	02.02.15-02:21b2B:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b2. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
826	2.215.21b2-4	02.02.15-02:21b2B:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b2. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
827	2.215.21b2-5	02.02.15-02:21b2B:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b2. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
828	2.215.21b2-6	02.02.15-02:21b2B:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b2. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
829	2.215.21b2-7	02.02.15-02:21b2B:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	21b2. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	The as-built software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.	0	1	YES
830	2.215.22a-1	02.02.15-02:22aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22a. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: The software project's design bases setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
831	2.215.22a-2	02.02.15-02:22aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22a. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: The software project's design bases setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
832	2.215.22a-3	02.02.15-02:22aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22a. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: The software project's design bases setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
833	2.215.22a-4	02.02.15-02:22aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22a. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: The software project's design bases setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
834	2.215.22a-5	02.02.15-02:22aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22a. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: The software project's design bases setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
835	2.215.22a-6	02.02.15-02:22aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22a. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: The software project's design bases setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
836	2.215.22a-7	02.02.15-02:22aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22a. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: The software project's design bases setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a defined setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
837	2.215.22b-1	02.02.15-02:22bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22b. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: Any changes to the setpoints have been reconciled for the as-built software project.	Inspection of the installation phase setpoint analyses for the as-built software project will be performed to verify that the setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The installation phase setpoints for safety-related functions for the as-built software project are defined, determined and implemented using a defined setpoint methodology and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
838	2.215.22b-2	02.02.15-02:22bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22b. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: Any changes to the setpoints have been reconciled for the as-built software project.	Inspection of the installation phase setpoint analyses for the as-built software project will be performed to verify that the setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The installation phase setpoints for safety-related functions for the as-built software project are defined, determined and implemented using a defined setpoint methodology and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
839	2.215.22b-3	02.02.15-02:22bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22b. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: Any changes to the setpoints have been reconciled for the as-built software project.	Inspection of the installation phase setpoint analyses for the as-built software project will be performed to verify that the setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The installation phase setpoints for safety-related functions for the as-built software project are defined, determined and implemented using a defined setpoint methodology and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
840	2.215.22b-4	02.02.15-02:22bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22b. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: Any changes to the setpoints have been reconciled for the as-built software project.	Inspection of the installation phase setpoint analyses for the as-built software project will be performed to verify that the setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The installation phase setpoints for safety-related functions for the as-built software project are defined, determined and implemented using a defined setpoint methodology and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
841	2.215.22b-5	02.02.15-02:22bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22b. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: Any changes to the setpoints have been reconciled for the as-built software project.	Inspection of the installation phase setpoint analyses for the as-built software project will be performed to verify that the setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The installation phase setpoints for safety-related functions for the as-built software project are defined, determined and implemented using a defined setpoint methodology and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
842	2.215.22b-6	02.02.15-02:22bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22b. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: Any changes to the setpoints have been reconciled for the as-built software project.	Inspection of the installation phase setpoint analyses for the as-built software project will be performed to verify that the setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The installation phase setpoints for safety-related functions for the as-built software project are defined, determined and implemented using a defined setpoint methodology and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
843	2.215.22b-7	02.02.15-02:22bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	22b. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: Any changes to the setpoints have been reconciled for the as-built software project.	Inspection of the installation phase setpoint analyses for the as-built software project will be performed to verify that the setpoints for safety-related functions are defined, determined and implemented based on a defined setpoint methodology and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The installation phase setpoints for safety-related functions for the as-built software project are defined, determined and implemented using a defined setpoint methodology and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
844	2.215.23a-1	02.02.15-02:23aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23a. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR reference design documents that show that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
845	2.215.23a-2	02.02.15-02:23aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23a. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR reference design documents that show that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
846	2.215.23a-3	02.02.15-02:23aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23a. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR reference design documents that show that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
847	2.215.23a-4	02.02.15-02:23aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23a. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR reference design documents that show that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
848	2.215.23a-5	02.02.15-02:23aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23a. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR reference design documents that show that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
849	2.215.23a-6	02.02.15-02:23aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23a. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR reference design documents that show that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
850	2.215.23a-7	02.02.15-02:23aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23a. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR reference design documents that show that the software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
851	2.215.23b-1	02.02.15-02:23bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23b. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's as-built electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. The test signal will be injected in only one safety related division at a time.	Tests show that electrical components received test signals from a safety-related source in the same division, which verifies that the components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
852	2.215.23b-2	02.02.15-02:23bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23b. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's as-built electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. The test signal will be injected in only one safety related division at a time.	Tests show that electrical components received test signals from a safety-related source in the same division, which verifies that the components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	0	1	YES
853	2.215.23b-3	02.02.15-02:23bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23b. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's as-built electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. The test signal will be injected in only one safety related division at a time.	Tests show that electrical components received test signals from a safety-related source in the same division, which verifies that the components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	0	1	YES
854	2.215.23b-4	02.02.15-02:23bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23b. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's as-built electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. The test signal will be injected in only one safety related division at a time.	Tests show that electrical components received test signals from a safety-related source in the same division, which verifies that the components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	0	1	YES
855	2.215.23b-5	02.02.15-02:23bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23b. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's as-built electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. The test signal will be injected in only one safety related division at a time.	Tests show that electrical components received test signals from a safety-related source in the same division, which verifies that the components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	0	1	YES
856	2.215.23b-6	02.02.15-02:23bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23b. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's as-built electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. The test signal will be injected in only one safety related division at a time.	Tests show that electrical components received test signals from a safety-related source in the same division, which verifies that the components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	0	1	YES
857	2.215.23b-7	02.02.15-02:23bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	23b. Criterion 8.1, Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's as-built electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project's electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies. The test signal will be injected in only one safety related division at a time.	Tests show that electrical components received test signals from a safety-related source in the same division, which verifies that the components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related power supplies.	0	1	YES
858	2.215.24a-1	02.02.15-02:24aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24a. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
859	2.215.24a-2	02.02.15-02:24aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24a. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
860	2.215.24a-3	02.02.15-02:24aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24a. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
861	2.215.24a-4	02.02.15-02:24aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24a. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
862	2.215.24a-5	02.02.15-02:24aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24a. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
863	2.215.24a-6	02.02.15-02:24aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24a. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
864	2.215.24a-7	02.02.15-02:24aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24a. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The software project's design bases ensures that actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to ensure that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that safety-related systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
865	2.215.24b-1	02.02.15-02:24bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24b. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Tests will be performed on the as-built software project's as-built mechanical installation of the as-built software project's actuators to show that nonelectric power is received from safety-related sources.	Tests show that actuators receive nonelectric power from safety-related sources.	0	1	YES
866	2.215.24b-2	02.02.15-02:24bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24b. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Tests will be performed on the as-built software project's as-built mechanical installation of the as-built software project's actuators to show that nonelectric power is received from safety-related sources.	Tests show that actuators receive nonelectric power from safety-related sources.	0	1	YES
867	2.215.24b-3	02.02.15-02:24bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24b. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Tests will be performed on the as-built software project's as-built mechanical installation of the as-built software project's actuators to show that nonelectric power is received from safety-related sources.	Tests show that actuators receive nonelectric power from safety-related sources.	0	1	YES
868	2.215.24b-4	02.02.15-02:24bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24b. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Tests will be performed on the as-built software project's as-built mechanical installation of the as-built software project's actuators to show that nonelectric power is received from safety-related sources.	Tests show that actuators receive nonelectric power from safety-related sources.	0	1	YES
869	2.215.24b-5	02.02.15-02:24bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24b. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Tests will be performed on the as-built software project's as-built mechanical installation of the as-built software project's actuators to show that nonelectric power is received from safety-related sources.	Tests show that actuators receive nonelectric power from safety-related sources.	0	1	YES
870	2.215.24b-6	02.02.15-02:24bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24b. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Tests will be performed on the as-built software project's as-built mechanical installation of the as-built software project's actuators to show that nonelectric power is received from safety-related sources.	Tests show that actuators receive nonelectric power from safety-related sources.	0	1	YES
871	2.215.24b-7	02.02.15-02:24bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	24b. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project's actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.	Tests will be performed on the as-built software project's as-built mechanical installation of the as-built software project's actuators to show that nonelectric power is received from safety-related sources.	Tests show that actuators receive nonelectric power from safety-related sources.	0	1	YES
872	2.215.2a-1	02.02.15-02:02aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2a. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The software project's design bases list: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
873	2.215.2a-2	02.02.15-02:02aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2a. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The software project's design bases list: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
874	2.215.2a-3	02.02.15-02:02aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2a. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The software project's design bases list: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
875	2.215.2a-4	02.02.15-02:02aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2a. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The software project's design bases list: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
876	2.215.2a-5	02.02.15-02:02aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2a. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The software project's design bases list: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
877	2.215.2a-6	02.02.15-02:02aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2a. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The software project's design bases list: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
878	2.215.2a-7	02.02.15-02:02aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2a. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The software project's design bases list: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
879	2.215.2b-1	02.02.15-02:02bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2b. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
880	2.215.2b-2	02.02.15-02:02bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2b. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	0	1	YES
881	2.215.2b-3	02.02.15-02:02bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2b. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	0	1	YES
882	2.215.2b-4	02.02.15-02:02bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2b. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	0	1	YES
883	2.215.2b-5	02.02.15-02:02bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2b. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	0	1	YES
884	2.215.2b-6	02.02.15-02:02bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2b. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
885	2.215.2b-7	02.02.15-02:02bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	2b. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	Inspection of the software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of monitored variables and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action; • The analytical limit associated with each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable; and • The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of the protective action is ensured.	0	1	YES
886	2.215.3a-1	02.02.15-02:03aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3a. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The software project's design bases list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
887	2.215.3a-2	02.02.15-02:03aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3a. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The software project's design bases list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
888	2.215.3a-3	02.02.15-02:03aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3a. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The software project's design bases list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
889	2.215.3a-4	02.02.15-02:03aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3a. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The software project's design bases list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
890	2.215.3a-5	02.02.15-02:03aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3a. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The software project's design bases list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
891	2.215.3a-6	02.02.15-02:03aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3a. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The software project's design bases list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
892	2.215.3a-7	02.02.15-02:03aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3a. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The software project's design bases list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
893	2.215.3b-1	02.02.15-02:03bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3b. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The as-built software project's design bases, with changes reconciled, list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation and to ensure changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with applicable changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	0	1	YES
894	2.215.3b-2	02.02.15-02:03bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3b. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The as-built software project's design bases, with changes reconciled, list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation and to ensure changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with applicable changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	0	1	YES

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
895	2.215.3b-3	02.02.15-02:03bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3b. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The as-built software project's design bases, with changes reconciled, list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation and to ensure changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with applicable changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	0	1	YES
896	2.215.3b-4	02.02.15-02:03bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3b. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The as-built software project's design bases, with changes reconciled, list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation and to ensure changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with applicable changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	0	1	YES
897	2.215.3b-5	02.02.15-02:03bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3b. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The as-built software project's design bases, with changes reconciled, list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation and to ensure changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with applicable changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	0	1	YES
898	2.215.3b-6	02.02.15-02:03bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3b. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The as-built software project's design bases, with changes reconciled, list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation and to ensure changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with applicable changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	0	1	YES
899	2.215.3b-7	02.02.15-02:03bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	3b. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation: The as-built software project's design bases, with changes reconciled, list: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions subsequent to initiation and to ensure changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with applicable changes, deletions, and additions to, and changes thereto are reconciled for: • The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed; • The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means; • The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be performed; and • The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
900	2.215.4a-1	02.02.15-02:04aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4a. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The software project's design bases list the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
901	2.215.4a-2	02.02.15-02:04aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4a. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The software project's design bases list the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
902	2.215.4a-3	02.02.15-02:04aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4a. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The software project's design bases list the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
903	2.215.4a-4	02.02.15-02:04aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4a. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The software project's design bases list the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
904	2.215.4a-5	02.02.15-02:04aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4a. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The software project's design bases list the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
905	2.215.4a-6	02.02.15-02:04aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4a. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The software project's design bases list the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
906	2.215.4a-7	02.02.15-02:04aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4a. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The software project's design bases list the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
907	2.215.4b-1	02.02.15-02:04bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4b. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region) and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
908	2.215.4b-2	02.02.15-02:04bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4b. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region) and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
909	2.215.4b-3	02.02.15-02:04bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4b. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region) and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
910	2.215.4b-4	02.02.15-02:04bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4b. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region) and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
911	2.215.4b-5	02.02.15-02:04bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4b. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region) and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
912	2.215.4b-6	02.02.15-02:04bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4b. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region) and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
913	2.215.4b-7	02.02.15-02:04bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	4b. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the minimum number of sensors and locations of sensors for those variables that have a spatial dependence and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable minimum number and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region) and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
914	2.215.5a-1	02.02.15-02:05aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5a. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The software project's design bases list the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
915	2.215.5a-2	02.02.15-02:05aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5a. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The software project's design bases list the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
916	2.215.5a-3	02.02.15-02:05aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5a. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The software project's design bases list the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
917	2.215.5a-4	02.02.15-02:05aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5a. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The software project's design bases list the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
918	2.215.5a-5	02.02.15-02:05aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5a. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The software project's design bases list the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
919	2.215.5a-6	02.02.15-02:05aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5a. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The software project's design bases list the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
920	2.215.5a-7	02.02.15-02:05aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5a. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The software project's design bases list the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control power and the environment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
921	2.215.5b-1	02.02.15-02:05bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5b. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the range of transient and steadystate conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
922	2.215.5b-2	02.02.15-02:05bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5b. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the range of transient and steadystate conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
923	2.215.5b-3	02.02.15-02:05bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5b. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the range of transient and steadystate conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
924	2.215.5b-4	02.02.15-02:05bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5b. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the range of transient and steadystate conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
925	2.215.5b-5	02.02.15-02:05bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5b. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the range of transient and steadystate conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
926	2.215.5b-6	02.02.15-02:05bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5b. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the range of transient and steadystate conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
927	2.215.5b-7	02.02.15-02:05bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	5b. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the range of transient and steadystate conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to perform.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the identification of the range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR identify and comply with changes, deletions, and additions to the applicable range of transient and steady state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system will perform and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
928	2.215.6a-1	02.02.15-02:06aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6a. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The software project's design bases list the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
929	2.215.6a-2	02.02.15-02:06aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6a. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The software project's design bases list the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
930	2.215.6a-3	02.02.15-02:06aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6a. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The software project's design bases list the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
931	2.215.6a-4	02.02.15-02:06aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6a. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The software project's design bases list the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
932	2.215.6a-5	02.02.15-02:06aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6a. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The software project's design bases list the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
933	2.215.6a-6	02.02.15-02:06aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6a. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The software project's design bases list the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
934	2.215.6a-7	02.02.15-02:06aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6a. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The software project's design bases list the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system's performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
935	2.215.6b-1	02.02.15-02:06bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6b. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system performance and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's accounts for the applicable conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
936	2.215.6b-2	02.02.15-02:06bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6b. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system performance and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's accounts for the applicable conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
937	2.215.6b-3	02.02.15-02:06bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6b. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system performance and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's accounts for the applicable conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
938	2.215.6b-4	02.02.15-02:06bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6b. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system performance and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's accounts for the applicable conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
939	2.215.6b-5	02.02.15-02:06bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6b. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system performance and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's accounts for the applicable conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
940	2.215.6b-6	02.02.15-02:06bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6b. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system performance and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's accounts for the applicable conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
941	2.215.6b-7	02.02.15-02:06bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	6b. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of safety-related system's performance: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance.	Inspection of the as-built software project's installation phase summary BRR will be performed for the conditions having the potential for causing functional degradation of the safety-related system performance and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's accounts for the applicable conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related system performance and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
942	2.215.7a-1	02.02.15-02:07aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7a. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The software project's design bases list the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify that appropriate methods and qualitative and quantitative reliability goals were used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
943	2.215.7a-2	02.02.15-02:07aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7a. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The software project's design bases list the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify that appropriate methods and qualitative and quantitative reliability goals were used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
944	2.215.7a-3	02.02.15-02:07aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7a. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The software project's design bases list the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify that appropriate methods and qualitative and quantitative reliability goals were used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
945	2.215.7a-4	02.02.15-02:07aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7a. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The software project's design bases list the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify that appropriate methods and qualitative and quantitative reliability goals were used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
946	2.215.7a-5	02.02.15-02:07aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7a. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The software project's design bases list the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify that appropriate methods and qualitative and quantitative reliability goals were used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
947	2.215.7a-6	02.02.15-02:07aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7a. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The software project's design bases list the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify that appropriate methods and qualitative and quantitative reliability goals were used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
948	2.215.7a-7	02.02.15-02:07aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7a. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The software project's design bases list the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identify that appropriate methods and qualitative and quantitative reliability goals were used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
949	2.215.7b-1	02.02.15-02:07bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7b. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the as-built software project's design bases will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's design bases identifies applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
950	2.215.7b-2	02.02.15-02:07bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7b. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the as-built software project's design bases will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's design bases identifies applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
951	2.215.7b-3	02.02.15-02:07bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7b. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the as-built software project's design bases will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's design bases identifies applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
952	2.215.7b-4	02.02.15-02:07bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7b. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the as-built software project's design bases will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's design bases identifies applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
953	2.215.7b-5	02.02.15-02:07bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7b. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the as-built software project's design bases will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's design bases identifies applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
954	2.215.7b-6	02.02.15-02:07bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7b. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the as-built software project's design bases will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's design bases identifies applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
955	2.215.7b-7	02.02.15-02:07bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	7b. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety system design: The as-built software project's design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design.	Inspection of the as-built software project's design bases will be performed for identification of the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals, and to ensure that changes have been reconciled.	The as-built software project's design bases identifies applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system design and changes have been reconciled.	0	1	YES
956	2.215.8a-1	02.02.15-02:08aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8a. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The software project's design bases ensures that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS digital components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identifies that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
957	2.215.8a-2	02.02.15-02:08aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8a. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The software project's design bases ensures that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS digital components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identifies that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
958	2.215.8a-3	02.02.15-02:08aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8a. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The software project's design bases ensures that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS digital components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identifies that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
959	2.215.8a-4	02.02.15-02:08aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8a. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The software project's design bases ensures that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS digital components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identifies that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
960	2.215.8a-5	02.02.15-02:08aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8a. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The software project's design bases ensures that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS digital components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identifies that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
961	2.215.8a-6	02.02.15-02:08aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8a. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The software project's design bases ensures that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS digital components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identifies that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
962	2.215.8a-7	02.02.15-02:08aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8a. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The software project's design bases ensures that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS digital components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR will be performed to verify that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR identifies that; • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS components' response times) exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
963	2.215.8b-1	02.02.15-02:08bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8b. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The as-built software project ensures that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Test shows that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	0	1	YES
964	2.215.8b-2	02.02.15-02:08bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8b. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The as-built software project ensures that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Test shows that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	0	1	YES
965	2.215.8b-3	02.02.15-02:08bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8b. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The as-built software project ensures that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Test shows that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	0	1	YES
966	2.215.8b-4	02.02.15-02:08bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8b. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The as-built software project ensures that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Test shows that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
967	2.215.8b-5	02.02.15-02:08bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8b. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The as-built software project ensures that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Test shows that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	0	1	YES
968	2.215.8b-6	02.02.15-02:08bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8b. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The as-built software project ensures that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Test shows that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	0	1	YES
969	2.215.8b-7	02.02.15-02:08bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	8b. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design basis event: The as-built software project ensures that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Tests will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	Test shows that; • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.	0	1	YES
970	2.215.9a-1	02.02.15-02:09aBB:BBB:01:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9a. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The software project's design bases show compliance with the single-failure criterion.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR show that a Failures Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) have been completed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a FMEA has been completed and show the software project's safety-related functions required for design basis events can be performed in the presence of: • Single detectable failures within safety-related systems concurrent with identifiable but nondetectable failures; • Failures caused by the single failure; and • Failures and spurious system actions that cause or are caused by the Design Basis Event (DBE) requiring the safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
971	2.215.9a-2	02.02.15-02:09aBB:BBB:02:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9a. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The software project's design bases show compliance with the single-failure criterion.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR show that a Failures Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) have been completed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a FMEA has been completed and show the software project's safety-related functions required for design basis events can be performed in the presence of: • Single detectable failures within safety-related systems concurrent with identifiable but nondetectable failures; • Failures caused by the single failure; and • Failures and spurious system actions that cause or are caused by the Design Basis Event (DBE) requiring the safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
972	2.215.9a-3	02.02.15-02:09aBB:BBB:03:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9a. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The software project's design bases show compliance with the single-failure criterion.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR show that a Failures Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) have been completed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a FMEA has been completed and show the software project's safety-related functions required for design basis events can be performed in the presence of: • Single detectable failures within safety-related systems concurrent with identifiable but nondetectable failures; • Failures caused by the single failure; and • Failures and spurious system actions that cause or are caused by the Design Basis Event (DBE) requiring the safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
973	2.215.9a-4	02.02.15-02:09aBB:BBB:04:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9a. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The software project's design bases show compliance with the single-failure criterion.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR show that a Failures Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) have been completed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a FMEA has been completed and show the software project's safety-related functions required for design basis events can be performed in the presence of: • Single detectable failures within safety-related systems concurrent with identifiable but nondetectable failures; • Failures caused by the single failure; and • Failures and spurious system actions that cause or are caused by the Design Basis Event (DBE) requiring the safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
974	2.215.9a-5	02.02.15-02:09aBB:BBB:05:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9a. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The software project's design bases show compliance with the single-failure criterion.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR show that a Failures Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) have been completed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a FMEA has been completed and show the software project's safety-related functions required for design basis events can be performed in the presence of: • Single detectable failures within safety-related systems concurrent with identifiable but nondetectable failures; • Failures caused by the single failure; and • Failures and spurious system actions that cause or are caused by the Design Basis Event (DBE) requiring the safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
975	2.215.9a-6	02.02.15-02:09aBB:BBB:06:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9a. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The software project's design bases show compliance with the single-failure criterion.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR show that a Failures Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) have been completed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a FMEA has been completed and show the software project's safety-related functions required for design basis events can be performed in the presence of: • Single detectable failures within safety-related systems concurrent with identifiable but nondetectable failures; • Failures caused by the single failure; and • Failures and spurious system actions that cause or are caused by the Design Basis Event (DBE) requiring the safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
976	2.215.9a-7	02.02.15-02:09aBB:BBB:07:BB:D:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9a. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The software project's design bases show compliance with the single-failure criterion.	Inspection of the software project's design phase summary BRR show that a Failures Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) have been completed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The software project's design phase summary BRR show that a FMEA has been completed and show the software project's safety-related functions required for design basis events can be performed in the presence of: • Single detectable failures within safety-related systems concurrent with identifiable but nondetectable failures; • Failures caused by the single failure; and • Failures and spurious system actions that cause or are caused by the Design Basis Event (DBE) requiring the safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
977	2.215.9b-1	02.02.15-02:09bBB:BBB:01:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9b. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	Inspection will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	0	1	YES
978	2.215.9b-2	02.02.15-02:09bBB:BBB:02:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9b. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	Inspection will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	0	1	YES
979	2.215.9b-3	02.02.15-02:09bBB:BBB:03:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9b. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	Inspection will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	0	1	YES
980	2.215.9b-4	02.02.15-02:09bBB:BBB:04:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9b. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	Inspection will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	0	1	YES
981	2.215.9b-5	02.02.15-02:09bBB:BBB:05:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9b. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	Inspection will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	0	1	YES
982	2.215.9b-6	02.02.15-02:09bBB:BBB:06:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9b. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	Inspection will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	0	1	YES
983	2.215.9b-7	02.02.15-02:09bBB:BBB:07:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.15-2	9b. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	Inspection will be performed to show that the as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	The as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.	0	1	YES
984	2.216.1	02.02.16-04:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.16-4	1. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.16 and Table 2.2.16-1.	Inspection(s) will be performed on the as-built configuration.	The system conforms to the functional arrangement as defined in Subsection 2.2.16.	0	1	NO
985	2.216.16	02.02.14-04:16BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C72	2.2.14-4	16. DPS logic is "energize-to-actuate".	Test(s) will be performed on the DPS system logic.	Trip actuation signals are "energize-toactuate".	0	1	NO
986	2.216.2	02.02.16-04:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.16-4	2. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP provides automatic functions and initiators as described in Table 2.2.16-2.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP using simulated signals and actuators for the automatic functions defined in Table 2.2.16-2.	The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP performs the automatic functions defined in Table 2.2.16-2.	0	1	NO
987	2.216.3	02.02.16-04:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.16-4	3. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP provides controls, interlocks, and bypasses as described in Table 2.2.16-3.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP using simulated signals and actuators for the controls, interlocks, and bypasses defined in Table 2.2.16-3.	The system controls, interlocks and bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the main control room, and are performed in response to simulated signals.	0	1	NO
988	2.216.4	02.02.16-04:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.16-4	4. Divisional HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP safety-related power supplies power the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP divisional loads.	Test(s) will be performed on each as-built HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP division by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	The test signal exists only at the terminals of the respective divisional HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function loads.	0	1	NO
989	2.216.5	02.02.16-04:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	2.2.16-4	5. PIP power supplies power their respective HP CRD isolation bypass valves.	Test(s) will be performed on the power supply to each as-built HP CRD isolation bypass valve by introducing a test signal.	The test signal exists only at the respective PIP power supply.	0	1	NO

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
990	2.22.1	02.02.02-07:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	1. The functional arrangement of the CRD System comprises three major functional groups: fine motion control rod drive (FMCRD), hydraulic control unit (HCU), and CRD hydraulic subsystem, as described in Subsection 2.2.2 and Table 2.2.2-1 and as shown in Figure 2.2.2-1.	Inspection(s) of the as-built CRD system will be conducted.	The CRD system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in Subsection 2.2.2 and Table 2.2.2-1 and as shown in Figure 2.2.2-1.	0	1	NO
991	2.22.10	02.02.02-07:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C12	2.2.2-7	10. The PIP software project for the CRD system provides controls and interlocks as defined in Table 2.2.2-4.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built system using simulated signals.	The PIP network segments for the CRD system controls and interlocks exist, can be retrieved in the main control room, and perform in response to simulated signals and manual actions as defined in Table 2.2.2-4.	0	1	NO
992	2.22.12	02.02.02-07:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	12. The CRD system provides rapid control rod insertion in response to a scram signal.	Test(s) will be performed of each CRD control rod pair scram function using simulated signals.	The scram insertion time for each control rod pair is less than or equal to the maximum allowable scram times as defined in Table 2.2.2-2.	0	1	NO
993	2.22.15	02.02.02-07:15BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	15. The FMCRD has an electromechanical brake with a minimum required holding torque on the motor drive shaft.	Tests of each FMCRD brake will be conducted in a test facility.	The FMCRD electro-mechanical brake has a minimum required holding torque of 49 N-m (36 ft-lbf) on the motor drive shaft.	0	1	NO
994	2.22.16a	02.02.02-07:16aBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	16a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance have maintenance valves such that freeze seals will not be required.	Inspections of piping design isometric drawings will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	A review piping design isometric drawings, confirms that maintenance valves are included such that freeze seals will not be required. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
995	2.22.16b	02.02.02-07:16bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	16b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the CRD system that require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of valves on lines attached to the RPV system that require maintenance using as-designed and as-built information will be performed.	Design reconciliation has been completed for the as-built location of valves relative to the design requirements. A report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
996	2.22.17	02.02.02-07:17BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	17. HP CRD makeup water isolation valves are normally open and close on a signal to close and on loss of air.	Tests of the as-built HP CRD makeup water isolation valves will be performed.	The as-built HP CRD makeup water isolation valves are normally open and close on a signal to close and on loss of air.	0	1	NO
997	2.22.18	02.02.02-07:18BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	18. HP CRD makeup water isolation bypass valves are normally closed and open on a signal to open.	Tests of the as-built HP CRD makeup water isolation bypass valves will be performed.	The as-built HP CRD makeup water isolation bypass valves are normally closed and open on a signal to open.	0	1	NO
998	2.22.19	02.02.02-07:19BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C12	2.2.2-7	19. FMCRDs have continuous control rod position indication sensors that detect control rod position based on motor rotation.	Test(s) will be performed on the FMCRD continuous control rod position indication sensors by simulating motor run-in of each control rod.	FMCRDs have continuous control rod position indication in the MCR based on motor rotation.	0	1	NO
999	2.22.20	02.02.02-07:20BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C12	2.2.2-7	20. FMCRDs have scram position indication switches that detect intermediate and scram completion control rod positions.	Test(s) will be performed on the FMCRD scram position indication switches by simulating motor run-in of each control rod.	FMCRDs have scram position indication in the MCR for intermmediate and scram completion control rod positions.	0	1	NO
1000	2.22.21	02.02.02-07:21BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	21. FMCRDs have a bayonet control rod coupling mechanism that requires a minimum rotation to decouple.	Test(s) will be performed on each FMCRD control rod coupling mechanism.	After being rotated at least one-eighth turn the control rod coupling mechanism uncouples the FMCRD from the control rod.	0	1	NO
1001	2.22.22	02.02.02-07:22BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	22. FMCRDs have spring-loaded latches in the hollow piston that engage slots in the guide tube to prevent rotation of the bayonet coupling except at predefined positions.	Type test(s) will be performed on the FMCRD latches by rotating the bayonet coupling.	The FMCRD bayonet coupling rotates less than one-eighth turn when the spring-loaded latches in the hollow piston are engaged in slots in the guide tube.	0	1	NO
1002	2.22.23	02.02.02-07:23BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C12	2.2.2-7	23. FMCRDs have safety-related redundant rod separation switches that detect separation of the FMCRD from the control rod.	Test(s) will be performed on each FMCRD safety-related rod separation switch.	Each redundant safety-related rod separation switch detects separation of the FMCRD from the control rod and indicates the separation status in the MCR.	0	1	NO
1003	2.22.24	02.02.02-07:24BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	24. Each FMCRD has a magnetic coupling that connects the associated drive motor to the drive shaft through the associated CRD housing.	Type test(s) will be performed on the FMCRD magnetic coupling.	For each FMCRD, the associated drive motor that is outside the CRD housing rotates the associated drive shaft that is inside the associated CRD housing up to the torque rating required for the FMCRD operation.	0	1	NO
1004	2.22.25	02.02.02-07:25BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	25. FMCRDs have safety-related scram inlet port check valves that are installed to close under reverse flow.	Inspection(s) will be performed of the as-built inlet port check valve installation.	Safety-related scram inlet port check valves are installed with normal flow direction going into the reactor.	0	1	NO
1005	2.22.26	02.02.02-07:26BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	26. HCU scram pilot solenoid valves transfer open to vent on loss of power to both solenoids.	Test(s) will be performed on each HCU scram pilot solenoid valve.	Each HCU scram pilot solenoid valve transfers open to vent on loss of power to both solenoids.	0	1	NO
1006	2.22.27	02.02.02-07:27BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	27. Backup scram solenoid valves are closed on loss of power and transfer open to vent when energized.	Test(s) will be performed on each backup scram solenoid valve.	Each backup scram solenoid valve closes on loss of power and transfers open to vent when energized.	0	1	NO
1007	2.22.28	02.02.02-07:28BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	28. ARI valves are closed on loss of power and transfer open to vent when energized.	Test(s) will be performed on each ARI valve.	Each ARI valve closes on loss of power and transfers open to vent when energized.	0	1	NO
1008	2.22.29	02.02.02-07:29BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	29. Each HCU contains a nitrogen-water scram accumulator that can be charged to a sufficiently high pressure and with the necessary valves and components to fully insert two CRs.	Test(s) will be performed on each HCU and control rod pair, as applicable, with the reactor unpressurized, using simulated scram signals.	With each accumulator fully charged, each HCU fully inserts both control rod in the pair as applicable.	0	1	NO
1009	2.22.2a1	02.02.02-07:02a1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	2a1. The components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of ASME Code Section III including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1010	2.22.2a2	02.02.02-07:02a2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	2a2. The components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1011	2.22.2a3	02.02.02-07:02a3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	2a3. The components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N5 Data Reports, where applicable) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports exist and conclude that the components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
1012	2.22.2b1	02.02.02-07:02b1BB:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	2b1. The piping identified in Table 2.2.5-5 as ASME Code Section III is designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA 3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of ASME Code Section III, including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1013	2.22.2b2	02.02.02-07:02b2BB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	2b2. The as-built piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the piping design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1014	2.22.2b3	02.02.02-07:02b3BB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	2b3. The piping identified in Table 2.2.25 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1015	2.22.30	02.02.02-07:30BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C12	2.2.2-7	30. Scram accumulators are continuously monitored for water leakage by level instruments.	Test(s) will be performed on the level instruments in each scram accumulator.	Low scram accumulator water level is detected by each level instrument and is indicated in the MCR.	0	1	NO
1016	2.22.31	02.02.02-07:31BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C12	2.2.2-7	31. Divisional safety-related power supplies power safety-related FMCRD and HCU equipment.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built system by providing a test signal in only one divisional safety-related power supply at a time.	A test signal exists only in the FMCRD and HCU equipment powered by the divisional power supply under test.	0	1	NO
1017	2.22.3a	02.02.02-07:03aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	3a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III nondestructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1018	2.22.3b	02.02.02-07:03bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	3b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1019	2.22.4a	02.02.02-07:04aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	4a. The components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on those code components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III that are required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1020	2.22.4b	02.02.02-07:04bBB:BBB:005:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	4b. The piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on the code piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III that is required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements in ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1021	2.22.5.i	02.02.02-07:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
1022	2.22.5.ii	02.02.02-07:05BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1023	2.22.5.iii	02.02.02-07:05BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6 as Seismic Category I, including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1024	2.22.6	02.02.02-07:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	6. The FMCRD is capable of positioning control rod incrementally and continuously over its entire range.	Type test(s) will be performed of the motor run-in and withdrawal function on the FMCRD using a simulated control rod.	The FMCRD is capable of positioning control rod incrementally and continuously over its entire range.	0	1	NO
1025	2.22.7	02.02.02-07:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	7. Valves defined in Table 2.2.2-5 and 2.2.2-6 open and close under differential pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	Tests of installed valves will be performed for opening and closing under system preoperational differential pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	Upon receipt of the actuating signal, each valve changes position under differential pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	0	1	NO
1026	2.22.8a	02.02.02-07:08aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	8a. The CRD hydraulic subsystem has a high pressure makeup mode of operation that injects water to the RPV via the RWCU/SDC return path.	Test(s) of the CRD hydraulic subsystem high pressure makeup mode of operation will be conducted on the as-built system verifying that water is injected to the RPV via the RWCU/SDC return path.	The CRD hydraulic subsystem high pressure makeup mode of operation injects water to the RPV via the RWCU/SDC return path.	0	1	NO
1027	2.22.8b	02.02.02-07:08bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	8b. The CRD hydraulic subsystem has a safety-related isolation capability terminating water injection into the RPV.	Test(s) of the CRD hydraulic subsystem high pressure makeup mode of operation will be conducted on the as-built system verifying that water injection is terminated to the RPV via the safety-related isolation.	The CRD hydraulic subsystem high pressure makeup mode of operation terminates water injection to the RPV via the safety-related isolation.	0	1	NO
1028	2.22.8c	02.02.02-07:08cBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C12	2.2.2-7	8c. The CRD hydraulic subsystem has an isolation bypass capability allowing water injection to the RPV.	Test(s) of the CRD hydraulic subsystem high pressure makeup mode of operation will be conducted on the as-built system verifying that water is injected to the RPV via the isolation bypass.	The CRD hydraulic subsystem high pressure makeup mode of operation injects water to the RPV via the isolation bypass.	0	1	NO
1029	2.22.9	02.02.02-07:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C12	2.2.2-7	9. The PIP software project for the CRD system provides automatic functions, initiators, and associated interfacing systems as defined in Table 2.2.2-3.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built system using simulated signals initiated from all of the associated interfacing as-built systems as defined in Table 2.2.2-3.	The PIP network segments for the CRD system are capable of performing the automatic functions defined in Table 2.2.2-3 using simulated signals initiated from all of the associated interfacing as-built systems as defined in Table 2.2.2-3.	0	1	NO
1030	2.23.1	02.02.03-04:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C31	2.2.3-4	1. The FWCS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.3 and Table 2.2.3-1.	Inspections of the as-built system will be performed.	The FWCS functional arrangement is as defined in Subsection 2.2.3 and Table 2.2.3-1.	0	1	NO
1031	2.23.2	02.02.03-04:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C31	2.2.3-4	2. FWCS provides automatic functions and initiators as described in Table 2.2.3-2.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built system using simulated signals.	The system performs the functions defined in Table 2.2.3-2.	0	1	NO
1032	2.23.3	02.02.03-04:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C31	2.2.3-4	3. FWCS provides controls as defined in Table 2.2.3-3.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built system using simulated signals and manual actions.	The FWCS controls and interlocks exist, can be retrieved in the main control room, and are performed in response to simulated signals and manual actions as defined in Table 2.2.3-3.	0	1	NO
1033	2.23.5.i	02.02.03-04:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:C31	2.2.3-4	5. FWCS controllers are triple redundant and fault tolerant.	i. Test(s) will be performed simulating failure of each FWCS temperature controller.	i. Failure of any one FWCS temperature controller does not affect FWCS output.	0	1	NO
1034	2.23.5.ii	02.02.03-04:05BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:C31	2.2.3-4	5. FWCS controllers are triple redundant and fault tolerant.	ii. Test(s) will be performed simulating failure of each FWCS level controller.	ii. Failure of any one FWCS level controller does not affect FWCS output.	0	1	NO
1035	2.23.5.iii	02.02.03-04:05BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:IC:C31	2.2.3-4	5. FWCS controllers are triple redundant and fault tolerant.	iii. Test(s) will be performed simulating discrepancy between field voter output and the control signal acutally sent to the ASDs.	iii. "Lock-up" signal is sent to feedpump ASDs following discrepancy between field voter output and control signal actually sent.	0	1	NO
1036	2.23.5.iv	02.02.03-04:05BBB:Biv:BB:BB:C:IC:C31	2.2.3-4	5. FWCS controllers are triple redundant and fault tolerant.	iv. Test(s) will be performed simulating discrepancy between field voter output and the control signal actually sent to the modulating steam admission valves.	iv. "Lock-Up" signal is sent to the modulating steam admission valves of the seventh stage feedwater heater and the modulating heater bypass valves, following discrepancy between field voter output and control signal actually sent.	0	1	NO
1037	2.24.1	02.02.04-06:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	1. The functional arrangement of the SLC system is as described in Subsection 2.2.4 and shown in Figure 2.2.4-1.	Inspection(s) of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built system conforms to the functional arrangement described in Subsection 2.2.4 and shown in Figure 2.2.4-1.	0	1	NO
1038	2.24.10a1	02.02.04-06:10a1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	10a1. The components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of ASME Code Section III including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined.	0	1	NO
1039	2.24.10a2	02.02.04-06:10a2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	10a2. The components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1040	2.24.10a3	02.02.04-06:10a3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	10a3. The components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N5 Data Reports, where applicable) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports exist and conclude that the components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1041	2.24.10b1	02.02.04-06:10b1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	10b1. The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III is designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of the ASME Code, Section III, including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1042	2.24.10b2	02.02.04-06:10b2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	10b2. The as-built piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the piping design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1043	2.24.10b3	02.02.04-06:10b3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	10b3. The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspections of the piping identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports (including N-5 Data Reports where applicable) exist and conclude that the piping identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
1044	2.24.11a	02.02.04-06:11aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	11a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1045	2.24.11b	02.02.04-06:11bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	11b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1046	2.24.12a	02.02.04-06:12aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	12a. The components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on those code components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III that are required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1047	2.24.12b	02.02.04-06:12bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	12b. The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on the code piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III that is required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements in ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1048	2.24.13.i	02.02.04-06:13BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	13. The equipment identified in Tables 2.2.4-4 and Table 2.2.4-5 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-4 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.4-4 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
1049	2.24.13.ii	02.02.04-06:13BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	13. The equipment identified in Tables 2.2.4-4 and Table 2.2.4-5 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-4 and as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1050	2.24.13.iii	02.02.04-06:13BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	13. The equipment identified in Tables 2.2.4-4 and Table 2.2.4-5 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-4, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as Seismic Category I, including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1051	2.24.15	02.02.04-06:15BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C41	2.2.4-6	15. Each of the SLC System divisions and safety-related loads/components identified in Tables 2.2.4-4 and 2.2.4-5 is powered from its respective safety-related division.	Testing will be performed on the SLC System by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	A test signal exists in the safety-related division and at the equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-4 and Table 2.2.4-5 powered from the safety-related division under test in the SLC System.	0	1	NO
1052	2.24.16.i	02.02.04-06:16BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:C41	2.2.4-6	16. In the SLC System, independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.	i. Tests will be performed on the SLC System by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	i. The test signal exists only in the safety-related division under test in the System.	0	1	NO
1053	2.24.16.ii	02.02.04-06:16BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:C41	2.2.4-6	16. In the SLC System, independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.	ii. Inspection of the as-built safety-related divisions in the SLC System will be performed.	ii. For the as-built safety-related divisions in the SLC System: • Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between these safety-related divisions in accordance with RG 1.75. • Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between safety-related Divisions and nonsafety-related equipment in accordance with RG 1.75.	0	1	NO
1054	2.24.17a	02.02.04-06:17aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	17a. Each mechanical train of the SLC System located outside the containment is physically separated from the other train(s) so as to preclude damage to both trains.	Inspections and analysis will be conducted for each of the SLC System mechanical trains located outside the containment.	Each mechanical train of SLC System located outside containment is protected against design basis events and their direct consequences by spatial separation, barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as to preclude damage to both trains.	0	1	NO

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1055	2.24.17b	02.02.04-06:17bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	17b. Each mechanical train of the SLC System located inside the containment is physically separated from the other train(s) so as to preclude damage to both trains.	Inspections and analysis will be conducted for each of the SLC System mechanical trains located inside the containment.	Each mechanical train of SLC System located inside containment is protected against design basis events and their direct consequences by spatial separation, barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as to preclude damage to both trains.	0	1	NO
1056	2.24.18	02.02.04-06:18BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	18. Re-positionable (not squib) valves listed in Table 2.2.4-4 open, close, or both open and close under differential pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	Tests of installed valves will be performed for opening, closing, or both opening and closing under system preoperational differential pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	Upon receipt of the actuating signal, each valve opens, closes, or both opens and closes, depending upon the valve's safety function.	0	1	NO
1057	2.24.19	02.02.04-06:19BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	19. The pneumatically operated valve(s) listed in Table 2.2.4-4 fail in the mode listed if either electric power to the valve actuating solenoid is lost, or pneumatic pressure to the valve(s) is lost.	Tests will be conducted on the as-built valve(s).	The pneumatically operated valve(s) identified in Table 2.2.4-4 fail in the listed mode when either electric power to the valve actuating solenoid is lost, or pneumatic pressure to the valve(s) is lost.	0	1	NO
1058	2.24.2	02.02.04-06:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C41	2.2.4-6	2. The SLC System provides automatic functions and initiators are as defined in Table 2.2.4-2.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built SLC system Train A and Train B Logic Controllers using simulated signals and actuators for the automatic functions defined in Table 2.2.4-2.	The SLC system Train A and Train B Logic Controllers are capable of performing the automatic functions described in Table 2.2.4-2.	0	1	NO
1059	2.24.20	02.02.04-06:20BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	20. Check valves listed in Table 2.2.4-4 open and close under system pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	Tests of installed valves for opening and closing will be conducted under system preoperational pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	Based on the direction of the differential pressure across the valve, each check valve opensand closes.	0	1	NO
1060	2.24.21	02.02.04-06:21BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	21. The SLC System injection squib valve opens as designed.	A vendor type test will be performed on a squib valve to open as-designed.	Records of vendor type test conclude SLC injection squib valves used in the injection and equalization will open as designed.	0	1	NO
1061	2.24.22	02.02.04-06:22BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	22. The equivalent natural boron concentration at cold shutdown conditions for the total solution injection volume is based on the liquid inventory in the RPV at the main steam line nozzle elevation plus the liquid inventory in the reactor shutdown cooling piping and equipment of the RWCU/SDC system.	An analysis of the as-built system will be performed to determine the equivalent natural boron concentration at cold shutdown conditions for the total solution injection volume.	The equivalent natural boron concentration at cold shutdown conditions for the total solution injection volume is > 1100 ppm.	0	1	NO
1062	2.24.24a	02.02.04-06:24aBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	24a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance have maintenance valves such that freeze seals will not be required.	Inspections of piping design isometric drawings will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	A review of piping design isometric drawings confirms that maintenance valves are included such that freeze seals will not be required. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1063	2.24.24b	02.02.04-06:24bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	24b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV in the SLC System that require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.	A reconciliation evaluation of valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance using as-designed and as-built information will be performed.	Design reconciliation has been completed for the as-built location of valves relative to the design requirements.	0	1	NO
1064	2.24.25	02.02.04-06:25BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	25. Each accumulator tank has an injectable liquid volume of at least 7.80 m^3 (2060 gal).	Analysis of each as-built accumulator tank will be performed.	Each accumulator tank has an injectable volume of at least 7.80 m^3 (2060 gal).	0	1	NO
1065	2.24.26	02.02.04-06:26BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	26. Each accumulator tank has a cover gas volume above the liquid of at least 14.8 m^3 (523 ft^3).	Analysis of each as-built accumulator tank will be performed.	Each accumulator tank has a cover gas volume above the liquid of at least 14.8 m^3 (523 ft^3).	0	1	NO
1066	2.24.27	02.02.04-06:27BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	27. Each accumulator tank is capable of maintaining an initial nitrogen cover gas absolute pressure of least 14.82 MPa (2150 psia).	Analysis of each as-built accumulator tank will be performed.	Each accumulator tank is capable of maintaining an initial nitrogen cover gas absolute pressure of least 14.82 MPa (2150 psia).	0	1	NO
1067	2.24.3	02.02.04-06:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C41	2.2.4-6	3. The SLC system provides controls and interlocks as described in Table 2.2.4-3.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built SLC system Train A and Train B Logic Controllers using simulated signals and actuators for the controls and interlocks defined in Table 2.2.4-3.	The SLC system Train A and Train B Logic Controllers controls and interlocks exist, can be retrieved in the main control room, and perform in response to simulated signals and manual actions as described in Table 2.2.4-3.	0	1	NO
1068	2.24.7	02.02.04-06:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	7. During an ATWS, the SLC system shall be capable of injecting borated water into the RPV at flowrates that assure rapid power reduction.	Tests are conducted to measure injection time of the as-built SLC system by injecting demineralized water from both accumulators into the open RPV. The initial differential pressure (6.21 MPa) between the accumulators and the RPV are set to that expected at the beginning of an ATWS by adjusting the accumulator pressures. Analyses are performed to correlate test results to as-built SLC system performance during postulated ATWS conditions.	During an ATWS the as-built SLC system (both accumulators) injects borated water into the RPV within the following time frames: • The first 5.4 m^3 (190 ft^3)of solutioninjects in ≤ 196 seconds. • The first and second 5.4 m^3 (190 ft^3)of solution injects in ≤ 519 seconds.	0	1	NO
1069	2.24.8	02.02.04-06:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	8. The SLC system shall be capable of injecting borated water for use as makeup water to the RPV in response to a Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA).	Tests are conducted with the as-built SLC system to measure the total volume of demineralized water injected from both accumulators into the open RPV. These tests utilize the continuation of the tests conducted in ITAAC #7. Analyses are performed to correlate test results to as-built SLC system performance during postulated actual LOCA conditions.	The as-built SLC system (both accumulators) injects a total volume of ≥15.6 m^3 (551 ft^3)of borated water in response to a postulated LOCA.	0	1	NO
1070	2.24.9	02.02.04-06:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:C41	2.2.4-6	9. The redundant injection shut-off valves shown in Figure 2.2.4-1 as V1, V2, V3, and V4 are automatically closed by low accumulator level signals from their respective accumlator level monitors.	Test(s) will be performed using a simulated low accumulator level signal to close the injection shut-off valves V1, V2, V3, and V4.	The as-built injection shut-off valves identified in Figure 2.2.4-1 as V1, V2, V3, and V4 close upon receipt of a simulated low accumulator level signal.	0	1	NO
1071	2.25.1	02.02.05-04:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C51	2.2.5-4	1. NMS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.5 and Table 2.2.5-1.	Inspection(s) of the as-built system will be performed	The system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in Subsection 2.2.5 and Table 2.2.5-1.	0	1	NO
1072	2.25.10	02.02.05-04:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C51	2.2.5-4	10. The Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) subsystems monitor neutron flux from 1 % to 125 % of reactor rated power.	Test(s) will be performed using simulated signals.	The LPRM subsystems monitor neutron flux from 1 % to 125 % of reactor rated power.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1073	2.25.11	02.02.05-04:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C51	2.2.5-4	11. Each NMS division is powered by its divisional safety-related uninterruptible power supply.	Test(s) will be performed on the NMS by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	The test signal exists only in the safety-related division under test in the NMS.	0	1	NO
1074	2.25.12	02.02.05-04:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C51	2.2.5-4	12. LPRM provides signals that are proportional to the local neutron flux.	Test(s) will be performed on the NMS by providing test signals to each LPRM.	The test signal exists and can be retrieved in the MCR.	0	1	NO
1075	2.25.13	02.02.05-04:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C51	2.2.5-4	13. The LPRM detector assemblies have a design pressure of 8.62 MPa g (1250 psig).	Test(s) will be performed on each LPRM detector assembly.	The LPRM detector assembly withstands a pressure greater than 8.62 MpaG (1250 psig).	0	1	NO
1076	2.25.2	02.02.05-04:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C51	2.2.5-4	2. NMS provides automatic functions and initiators as described in Table 2.2.5-2.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built NMS using simulated signals and actuators for the automatic functions defined in Table 2.2.5-2.	The NMS performs the automatic functions defined in Table 2.2.5-2.	0	1	NO
1077	2.25.3	02.02.05-04:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C51	2.2.5-4	3. NMS provides controls, interlocks, and bypasses as described in Table 2.2.5-3.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built NMS and MCRP SSLC/ESF VDUs using simulated signals and actuators for the controls, interlocks, and bypasses defined in Table 2.2.5-3.	The NMS controls, interlocks and bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the main control room, and are performed in response to simulated signals and manual actions as defined in Table 2.2.5-3.	0	1	NO
1078	2.25.8	02.02.05-04:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C51	2.2.5-4	8. NMS divisions fail-safe to a trip condition on critical hardware failure, power failure, or loss of communication.	Test(s) will be performed using simulated signals.	The NMS divisions fail-safe to a trip condition on critical hardware failure, power failure, or loss of communication failure.	0	1	NO
1079	2.25.9	02.02.05-04:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C51	2.2.5-4	9. The Startup Range Neutron Monitor (SRNM) subsystem monitors neutron flux from the source range to 15% of the reactor rated power.	Test(s) will be performed using simulated signals.	The SRNM subsystem monitors neutron flux from the source range to 15% of the reactor rated power.	0	1	NO
1080	2.26.1	02.02.06-03:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C61	2.2.6-3	1. RSS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.6 and Table 2.2.6-1.	Inspection(s) will be performed to confirm that the as-built RSS is configured as described in Subsection 2.2.6 and Table 2.2.6-1.	The as-built RSS is configured as described in Subsection 2.2.6 and Table 2.2.6-1.	0	1	NO
1081	2.26.2	02.02.06-03:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C61	2.2.6-3	2. RSS provides dedicated controls as described in Table 2.2.6-2.	Test(s) will be performed on the dedicated controls as described in Table 2.2.6-2.	The RSS panels are capable of issuing control signals from the dedicated controls described in Table 2.2.6-2.	0	1	NO
1082	2.26.7	02.02.06-03:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C61	2.2.6-3	7. Safety-related systems in each RSS panel receive power from divisionally separate safety-related uninterruptible power supplies.	Test(s) will be performed on the RSS by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	The test signal exists only in the safety-related division under test in the RSS.	0	1	NO
1083	2.26.8	02.02.06-03:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C61	2.2.6-3	8. Nonsafety-related systems in each RSS panel receive power from nonsafety-related power supplies.	Test(s) will be performed on the RSS by providing a test signal in only one channel at a time.	Test signal exists from an uninterruptible AC power supply only in the channel under test.	0	1	NO
1084	2.27.1	02.02.07-04:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C71	2.2.7-4	1. RPS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.7 and Table 2.2.7-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.7-1.	Inspection(s), will be performed on the as-built RPS.	The RPS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in Subsection 2.2.7 and Table 2.2.7-1 and as shown in Figure 2.2.7-1.	0	1	NO
1085	2.27.10	02.02.07-04:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C71	2.2.7-4	10. Redundant safety-related power supplies are provided for each division of the RPS.	Test(s) will be performed on the RPS by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	The test signal exists only in the safety-related division under test in the RPS.	0	1	NO
1086	2.27.11	02.02.07-04:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C71	2.2.7-4	11. Automatic and manual scram initiation logic systems are independent of each other.	Analysis(es) will be performed on the automatic and manual scram initiation logic systems.	Single failures in an automatic scram initiation logic system do not propagate to the manual scram initiation logic system and single failures in a manual scram initiation logic system do not propagate to the automatic scram initiation logic system.	0	1	NO
1087	2.27.12	02.02.07-04:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C71	2.2.7-4	12. The RPS initiates a backup scram whenever an automatic scram is initiated in two-out-of four divisions or whenever a manual scram is intitated.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built RTIF platform of the backup scram function.	The RTIF platform performs the backup scram outputs when either a coincident scram in at least two divisions or a manual scram occurs.	0	1	NO
1088	2.27.13	02.02.07-04:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C71	2.2.7-4	13. The backup scram is not implemented through software.	Analysis(es) and inspections will be performed on the backup scram circuitry.	No software is used to implement the backup scram function.	0	1	NO
1089	2.27.2	02.02.07-04:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C71	2.2.7-4	2. RPS provides automatic functions and initiators as described in Table 2.2.7-2.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built RPS using simulated signals and actuators for the automatic functions defined in Table 2.2.7-2.	RPS provides automatic functions, initiators and associated interfacing systems as described in Table 2.2.7-2.	0	1	NO
1090	2.27.3	02.02.07-04:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C71	2.2.7-4	3. RPS provides controls, interlocks (system interfaces), and bypasses as described in Table 2.2.7-3.	Test(s) will be performed on the as-built RPS and SSLC/ESF VDUs using simulated signals and actuators for the controls, interlocks (system interfaces), and bypasses described in Table 2.2.7-3.	The RPS controls and interlocks (system interfaces), and bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the main control room SSLC/ESF VDUs, and are performed in response to simulated signals and manual actions as described in Table 2.2.7-3.	0	1	NO
1091	2.27.8	02.02.07-04:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C71	2.2.7-4	8. The RPS logic is designed to provide a trip initiation by requiring a coincident trip of like, unbypassed parameters in at least two divisions to cause the trip output.	Test(s) of the RPS functions will be performed on the as-built RTIF platform of the RPS functions.	The RTIF platform performs the RPS function trip outputs when a coincident trip of like, unbypassed parameters in at least two divisions occurs.	0	1	NO
1092	2.27.9	02.02.07-04:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C71	2.2.7-4	9. The RPS is fail-safe such that on loss of redundant divisional electrical power supplies the load drivers of that division change to the tripped state.	Test(s) of the RPS functions will be performed on the as-built RTIF platform of the RPS functions by de-energizing the RTIF platform by division.	The RTIF platform de-energizes the RPS trip outputs when a coincident deenergization of at least two divisions occurs.	0	1	NO
1093	2.29.1	02.02.09-03:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C85	2.2.9-3	1. The SB&PC System functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.9 and Table 2.2.9-1.	Inspections of the as-built SB&PC System will be conducted.	The as-built SB&PC System conforms to the functional arrangement as described in Subsection 2.2.9 and Table 2.2.9-1.	0	1	NO
1094	2.29.2	02.02.09-03:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C85	2.2.9-3	2. SB&PC System provides functions and initiating conditions as defined in Table 2.2.9-2.	Tests will be performed on the SB&PC System using simulated signals.	The SB&PC system performs the functions as described in Table 2.2.9-2.	0	1	NO
1095	2.29.4.i	02.02.09-03:04BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:C85	2.2.9-3	4. SB&PC controllers are triple redundant fault tolerant.	i. Test(s) will be performed simulating failure of any one SB&PC controller.	i. Failure of any one SB&PC controller has no effect on SB&PC valve position demand signal.	0	1	NO
1096	2.29.4.ii	02.02.09-03:04BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:C85	2.2.9-3	4. SB&PC controllers are triple redundant fault tolerant.	ii. Test(s) will be performed simulating failure of any two SB&PC controllers.	ii. Failure of any two SB&PC controllers generates a turbine trip signal.	0	1	NO

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1097	2.29.5.i	02.02.09-03:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:C85	2.2.9-3	5. SB&PC System has three redundant nonsafety-related uninterruptible AC power supplies.	i. Test(s) will be performed on the SB&PC system by providing a test signal in only one power supply channel at a time.	i. The test signal exists only in the power channel under test.	0	1	NO
1098	2.29.5.ii	02.02.09-03:05BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:C85	2.2.9-3	5. SB&PC System has three redundant nonsafety-related uninterruptible AC power supplies.	ii. Test(s) will be performed on the SB&PC system power supply configuration simulating failure of any one power supply.	ii. Loss of any one power supply at a time has no effect on SB&PC valve position demand signal.	0	1	NO
1099	2.29.5.iii	02.02.09-03:05BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:IC:C85	2.2.9-3	5. SB&PC System has three redundant nonsafety-related uninterruptible AC power supplies.	iii. Test(s) will be performed on the SB&PC system power supply configuration simulating failure of any two power supplies.	iii. Loss of any two power supplies at a time has no effect on SB&PC valve position demand signal.	0	1	NO
1100	2.31.1	02.03.01-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:D11	2.3.1-2	1. The PRMS functional arrangement is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.3.1, Figure 2.3.1-1, and Table 2.3.1-1.	Inspections shall be conducted on each as-built PRMS subsystem.	The as-built PRMS subsystems conform to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.3.1 and shown in Figure 2.3.1-1 in conjunction with Table 2.3.1-1.	0	1	NO
1101	2.31.2a	02.03.01-02:02aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:D11	2.3.1-2	2a. The safety-related PRMS subsystems as identified in Table 2.3.1-1 are powered from uninterruptible safety-related power sources.	Testing will be conducted to confirm that the PRMS safety-related subsystems identified in Table 2.3.1-1 are powered from uninterruptible safety-related power sources.	The safety-related PRMS subsystems identified in Table 2.3.1-1 receive electrical power from uninterruptible safety-related buses.	0	1	NO
1102	2.31.2b	02.03.01-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:D11	2.3.1-2	2b. The safety-related divisions of electric power for the PRMS subsystems identified in Table 2.3.1-1 are physically separated.	Inspections of the as-built divisions will be conducted.	Each subsystem division is physically separated from the other division in accordance with RG 1.75.	0	1	NO
1103	2.31.3.i	02.03.01-02:03BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:D11	2.3.1-2	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.3.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.1-1 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.3.1-1 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
1104	2.31.3.ii	02.03.01-02:03BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:D11	2.3.1-2	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.3.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.3.1-1 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.3.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1105	2.31.3.iii	02.03.01-02:03BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:IC:D11	2.3.1-2	3. The equipment identified in Table 2.3.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.3.1-1, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Tables 2.3.1-1 including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category II loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1106	2.31.4	02.03.01-02:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:D11	2.3.1-2	4. Safety-related PRMS subsystems provide the following: • Indications in MCR for radiation levels • Indications on SCUs for radiation levels • Alarms in MCR on radiation level exceeding setpoint • Indications on SCUs on radiation level exceeding setpoint • Alarms in MCR on upscale/downscale or inoperative conditions • Initiation of actions described in Table 2.3.1-1	Tests will be conducted by using a standard radiation source or portable calibration unit that exceeds a setpoint value that is preset for the testing to confirm that the as-built indications, alarms, and automatic initiation functions are met as described in Table 2.3.1-1.	The as-built indications, alarms, and automatic initiation functions are met as described in Table 2.3.1-1, considering the following: • Indications in MCR for radiation levels • Indications on SCUs for radiation levels • Alarms in MCR on radiation level exceeding setpoint • Indications on SCUs on radiation level exceeding setpoint • Alarms in MCR on upscale/downscale or inoperative conditions • Initiation of actions described in Table 2.3.1-1	0	1	NO
1107	2.31.5	02.03.01-02:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:D11	2.3.1-2	5. The nonsafety-related process monitors listed in Table 2.3.1-1 are provided.	Inspection for the existence of the monitors will be performed.	The nonsafety-related monitors exist.	0	1	NO
1108	2.31.6	02.03.01-02:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:D11	2.3.1-2	6. Safety-related PRMS subsystems initiate preventive actions to isolate or terminate plant processes or effluent releases as described in Table 2.3.1-1.	Tests will be conducted to confirm that the preventive actions are initiated and proper isolation or termination are secured on simulated high radiation levels. These tests will be performed in conjunction with each subsystem that contains the isolation boundaries.	The preventive actions requirements are met as described in Table 2.3.1-1.	0	1	NO
1109	2.31.7	02.03.01-02:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:D11	2.3.1-2	7. The nonsafety-related PRMS subsystem monitors which perform active/automatic control functions in order to control offsite doses below 10 CFR 20 limits provide the following: • Indications in MCR for radiation levels • Alarms in MCR on radiation level exceeding setpoint • Alarms in MCR on upscale/downscale or inoperative conditions	Tests will be conducted by using a standard radiation source or portable calibration unit that exceeds a setpoint value that is preset for the testing to confirm that the as-built indication, alarm, and automatic initiation functions are met.	The as-built indication, alarm, and automatic initiation functions are met.	0	1	NO
1110	2.32.1	02.03.02-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:D21	2.3.2-2	1. The functional arrangement (location) of the ARMS equipment is as described in Subsection 2.3.2 and as listed on Table 2.3.2-1.	Inspection of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built ARM system locations conform to Subsection 2.3.2 and Table 2.3.2-1.	0	1	NO
1111	2.32.2	02.03.02-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:D21	2.3.2-2	2. Each ARM channel listed in Table 2.3.2-1 initiates a MCR alarm and a local audible alarm (if provided) when the radiation level exceeds a preset limit.	Tests will be conducted using a simulated high radiation level signal to verify that the MCR alarm and local alarm (if provided) are on when the simulated signal exceeds a preset setpoint.	The MCR alarm and local audible alarm (if provided) are initiated when the simulated radiation level exceeds a preset limit.	0	1	NO
1112	2.32.3	02.03.02-02:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:D21	2.3.2-2	3. Each ARM channel listed in Table 2.3.2-1 is provided with indication of radiation level.	Tests will be conducted using a simulated high radiation signal to verify that the indications for each ARM channel responds to the simulated high radiation signal.	The indications for each ARM channel responds to the simulated high radiation signal.	0	1	NO
1113	2.41.1	02.04.01-03:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	1. The functional arrangement of the ICS is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.4.1, Table 2.4.1-1, Table 2.4.1-2, and as shown in Figure 2.4.1-1.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built ICS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.4.1, Table 2.4.1-1, Table 2.4.1-2, and as shown in Figure 2.4.1-1.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1114	2.41.10	02.04.01-03:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	10. The pneumatically operated valve(s) designated in Table 2.4.1-1 fail in the mode listed if either electric power to the valve actuating solenoid is lost, or pneumatic pressure to the valve(s) is lost.	Tests will be conducted on the as-built valve(s).	The pneumatically operated valve(s) identified in Table 2.4.1-1 fail in the listed mode when either electric power to the valve actuating solenoid is lost, or pneumatic pressure to the valve(s) is lost.	0	1	NO
1115	2.41.13	02.04.01-03:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	13. Each condensate return valve, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, opens to initiate the ICS.	Opening test of valves will be conducted under pre-operational differential pressure, fluid flow and temperature conditions.	Each condensate return valve opening time is no less than 7.5 seconds and no greater than 31 seconds under preoperational differential pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	0	1	NO
1116	2.41.14	02.04.01-03:14BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:B32	2.4.1-3	14. The normally open ICS isolation valves in the steam supply and condensate return lines, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, close automatically on receipt of high vent line radiation from the Process Radiation Monitoring System (PRMS).	An isolation valve closure test will be performed using simulated signals.	The ICS isolation valves close upon receipt of signals from the PRMS.	0	1	NO
1117	2.41.15	02.04.01-03:15BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:B32	2.4.1-3	15. The normally open ICS isolation valves in the steam supply and condensate return lines, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, close upon receipt of the folowing automatic actuation signals: • LD&IS •Open position on two or more DPVs	Valve closing tests will be performed using simulated automatic actuation signals.	The ICS isolation valves close upon receipt of automatic actuation signals.	0	1	NO
1118	2.41.16	02.04.01-03:16BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:B32	2.4.1-3	16. Each ICS train normally closed condensate return valve, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, opens upon receipt of the following automatic actuation signals: • RPV high pressure following a time delay • RPV water level below level 2 following a time delay • RPV water level below level 1 • Loss of power to 2 of 4 reactor feed pumps with the reactor mode switch in RUN • MSIVs in 2 of 4 steam lines less than fully open with the reactor mode switch in RUN	Valve opening tests will be performed using simulated automatic actuation signals.	The condensate return valves open upon receipt of automatic actuation signals.	0	1	NO
1119	2.41.17	02.04.01-03:17BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:B32	2.4.1-3	17. Each ICS train normally closed condensate return bypass valve, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, opens upon receipt of the following automatic actuation signals: • RPV high pressure following a time delay • RPV water level below level 2 following a time delay • RPV water level below level 1 • Loss of power to 2 of 4 reactor feed pumps with the reactor mode switch in RUN • MSIVs in 2 of 4 steamlines less than fully open with the reactor mode switch in RUN.	Valve opening tests will be performed using simulated automatic actuation signals.	The condensate return valves open upon receipt of automatic actuation signals.	0	1	NO
1120	2.41.18a	02.04.01-03:18aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ICE:B32	2.4.1-3	18a. The lower IC header vent valve (V-9) opens upon an ICS initiation signal generated by the SSLC/ESF platform followed by a time delay.	A valve-opening test will be performed on the lower IC header vent valve (V-9) using a simulated SSLC/ESF platform ICS initiation signal.	The lower IC header vent valve (V-9) opens upon an ICS initiation signal generated by the SSLC/ESF platform followed by a time delay.	0	1	NO
1121	2.41.18b	02.04.01-03:18BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:B32	2.4.1-3	18b. The lower IC header vent valve (V-10) opens upon an ICS initiation signal generated by the DPS platform followed by a time delay.	A valve-opening test will be performed on the lower IC header vent valve (V-10) using a simulated DPS platform ICS initiation signal.	The lower IC header vent valve (V-10) opens upon an ICS initiation signal generated by the DPS platform followed by a time delay.	0	1	NO
1122	2.41.20	02.04.01-03:20BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	20. The accumulators for the pneumatic isolation valves, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, in the ICS steam supply and condensate return valves have the capacity to close the valves three times with the DW at the DW design pressure.	A test and analysis or test will be performed to demonstrate the capacity of the isolation valve accumulators.	Isolation valve accumulators have the capacity to close the valves three times with the DW pressure at the design pressure.	0	1	NO
1123	2.41.21	02.04.01-03:21BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	21. Upon loss of pneumatic pressure to the condensate bypass valve (V-6), the valve strokes to the fully open position.	Tests will be performed to demonstrate that the condensate bypass valve will stroke to the full open position upon the loss of pneumatic pressure to the condensate bypass valve accumulator.	The condensate bypass valve fully opens when pneumatic pressure is removed from the condensate bypass valve.	0	1	NO
1124	2.41.22	02.04.01-03:22BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	22. Each ICS train has at least the minimum heat removal capacity assumed in analysis of Abnormal Events with reactor at or above normal operating pressure.	Using prototype test data and as-built IC unit information, an analysis will be performed to establish the heat removal capacity of the IC unit with IC pool at atmospheric saturated conditions.	The ICS train unit heat removal capacity is greater than or equal to 33.75 MWt (assumed in the analysis of Abnormal Events) with the reactor at or above normal operating pressure.	0	1	NO
1125	2.41.23	02.04.01-03:23BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	23. Each ICS train provides at least the minimum drainable liquid volume available for return to the RPV assumed in analysis of Abnormal Events.	An analysis will be performed for the as-built isolation condenser system.	The as-built ICS train provides at least 13.88m3 (490.1 ft3) (assumed in the analysis of Abnormal Events) of the liquid volume available for return to the RPV.	0	1	NO
1126	2.41.24.i	02.04.01-03:24BBB:BB1:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	24. The Equipment Pool and Reactor Well provide sufficient makeup water volume to the IC/PCCS expansion pool to support operation of the ICS and PCCS for the first 72 hours.	i. A valve-opening test will be performed on the pneumatic valves using simulated low-level water signal from the IC/PCCS expansion pool.	i. The two-series, valves open on a simulated low-level water signal from the IC/PCCS expansion pool.	0	1	NO
1127	2.41.24.ii	02.04.01-03:24BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	24. The Equipment Pool and Reactor Well provide sufficient makeup water volume to the IC/PCCS expansion pool to support operation of the ICS and PCCS for the first 72 hours.	ii. A physical measurement will be performed on the dimensions and water level in the IC/PCCS pools, Equipment Pool, and Reactor Well to demonstrate that the required water volume is achieved.	ii.Measurements show that the combined water volume of the IC/PCCS pools, Equipment Pool, and Reactor Well is no less than 6,290 m3 (222,000 ft3).	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1128	2.41.24.iii	02.04.01-03:24BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	24. The Equipment Pool and Reactor Well provide sufficient makeup water volume to the IC/PCCS expansion pool to support operation of the ICS and PCCS for the first 72 hours.	iii. A type test will be performed on the squib valve.	iii. The squib valves open on a simulated open signal.	0	1	NO
1129	2.41.25	02.04.01-03:25BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U71	2.4.1-3	25. The IC/PCCS pools are safety-related and Seismic Category I.	Inspections of the documentation for the IC/PCCS pools confirm that they are safety-related and Seismic Category I.	The IC/PCCS pools are safety-related and Seismic Category I.	0	1	NO
1130	2.41.26	02.04.01-03:26BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	26. Each ICS flow path is constrained to a maximum flow area at transitions between Class 1 piping from containment to Class 2 piping outside containment in order to limit flow in the event of a break.	Inspection will be performed to confirm that the flow area at these transition locations is limited.	Each steam supply branch line contains a flow limiter which is no greater than 76.2 mm (3 in) in diameter, and that the condensate branch lines are no greater than 101.6 mm (4 in) in diameter.	0	1	NO
1131	2.41.29a	02.04.01-03:29aBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	29a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance have maintenance valves such that freeze seals will not be required.	Inspections of piping design isometric drawings will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	A review of piping desing isometric drawings confirms that maintenance valves are included such that freeze seals will not be required. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1132	2.41.29b	02.04.01-03:29bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	29b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.	A reconciliation evaluation of valves on lines attached to the RPV using as-designed and as-built information will be performed.	A design reconciliation has been completed for the as-built location of valves relative to the design requirements.	0	1	NO
1133	2.41.2a1	02.04.01-03:02a1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	2a1. The components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of ASME Code Section III including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined.	0	1	NO
1134	2.41.2a2	02.04.01-03:02a2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	2a2. The components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1135	2.41.2a3	02.04.01-03:02a3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	2a3. The components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N5 Data Reports, where applicable) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports exist and conclude that the components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
1136	2.41.2b1	02.04.01-03:02b1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	2b1. The piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III is designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of the ASME Code, Section III, including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1137	2.41.2b2	02.04.01-03:02b2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	2b2. The as-built piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the piping design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1138	2.41.2b3	02.04.01-03:02b3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	2b3. The piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspections of the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports (including N-5 Data Reports where applicable) exist and conclude that the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
1139	2.41.30	02.04.01-03:30BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	30. The Lower IC Header Vent Line restricting orifices shown in Table 2.4.1-1 are sized so that the water level in the RPV during station blackout events does not reach the Level 1 setpoint within 72 hours of the blackout event.	Inspections of the as-built Lower IC Header Vent Line restricting orifice will be conducted.	The diameter of the Lower IC Header Vent Line restricting orifices shown in table 2.1.4-1 is 4.60 mm (0.181 in) ±0.025 mm (0.001 in).	0	1	NO
1140	2.41.3a	02.04.01-03:03aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	3a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III nondestructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1141	2.41.3b	02.04.01-03:03bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	3b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1142	2.41.4a	02.04.01-03:04aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	4a. The components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on those code components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III that are required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1143	2.41.4b	02.04.01-03:04bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	4b. The piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on the code piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III that is required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements in ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1144	2.41.5.i	02.04.01-03:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.4.1-1 and Table 2..4.1-2 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.4.1-1 and Table 2.4.1-2 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.1-1 and Table 2.4.1-2 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
1145	2.41.5.ii	02.04.01-03:05BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.4.1-1 and Table 2..4.1-2 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.4.1-1 and Table 2.4.1-2 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.4.1-1 and Table 2.4.1-2 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1146	2.41.5.iii	02.04.01-03:05BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.4.1-1 and Table 2..4.1-2 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.4.1-1 and Table 2.4.1-2, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions, including the hydrodynamic effects of surrounding water for submerged components.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.4.1-1 and Table 2.4.1-2 as Seismic Category I, including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads , including the hydrodynamic effects of surrounding water for submerged components without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1147	2.41.6a	02.04.01-03:06aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:B32	2.4.1-3	6a. Each of the ICS divisions (or safety-related loads/components) identified in Table 2.4.1-2 is powered from its respective safety-related division.	Testing will be performed on the ICS by providing a simulated test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	A simulated test signal exists in the safety-related division (or at the equipment identified in Table 2.4.1-2 powered from the safety-related division) under test in the ICS.	0	1	NO
1148	2.41.6b.i	02.04.01-03:06bBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:B32	2.4.1-3	6b. In the ICS, independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.	i. Tests will be performed on the ICS by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	i. The test signal exists only in the safety-related Division under test in the ICS.	0	1	NO
1149	2.41.6b.ii	02.04.01-03:06bBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:B32	2.4.1-3	6b. In the ICS, independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.	ii. Inspection of the as-built safety-related divisions in the ICS will be performed.	ii. The as-built safety-related divisions in the ICS are separated: • Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between these safety-related divisions in accordance with RG 1.75. • Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment in accordance with RG 1.75.	0	1	NO
1150	2.41.7a	02.04.01-03:07aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	7a. Each mechanical train of the ICS located outside the containment is physically separated from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related function.	Inspections and analysis will be conducted for each of the ICS mechanical trains located outside the containment.	Each mechanical train of ICS located outside containment is protected against design basis events and their direct consequences by spatial separation, barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related function.	0	1	NO
1151	2.41.7b	02.04.01-03:07bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	7b. Each mechanical train of the ICS located inside the containment is physically separated from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related function.	Inspections or analysis will be conducted for each of the ICS mechanical trains located inside the containment.	Each mechanical train of ICS located inside containment is protected against design basis events and their direct consequences by spatial separation, barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related function.	0	1	NO
1152	2.41.9	02.04.01-03:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B32	2.4.1-3	9. Re-positionable (NOT squib) valves designated in Table 2.4.1-1 open, close, or both open and close, under differential pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	Tests of installed valves will be performed for opening, closing, or both opening and also closing under system preoperational differential pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	Upon receipt of the actuating signal, each valve opens, closes, or both opens and closes, depending upon the valve's safety function.	0	1	NO
1153	2.42.1	02.04.02-03:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	1. The functional arrangement of the GDCS is as described in Subsection 2.4.2 and as listed in Table 2.4.2-1 and as shown on Figure 2.4.2-1.	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built GDCS conforms to the functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.4.2 and as listed in Table 2.4.2-1 and as shown in Figure 2.4.2-1.	0	1	NO
1154	2.42.10a	02.04.02-03:10aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	10a. Check valves designated on Figure 2.4.2-1 open and close under system pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.	Type tests of valves for opening and closing will be conducted.	Based on the direction of the differential pressure across the valve, each check valve opens and closes.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1155	2.42.10b	02.04.02-03:10bBBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	10b. The GDCS injection line check valves meet the criterion for maximum fully open flow coefficient in the reverse flow direction.	Type tests of the GDCS check valves to determine the fully open flow coefficient in the reverse flow direction will be conducted.	The fully open flow coefficient for the GDCS injection line check valves in the reverse flow direction is less than the value assumed in the LOCA analysis.	0	1	NO
1156	2.42.12	02.04.02-03:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	12. GDCS squib valves maintain RPV backflow leak tightness and maintain reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity during normal plant operation.	A test will be performed to demonstrate the squib valves are leak tight during normal plant conditions.	Testing concludes GDCS squib valves have zero leakage at normal plant operating pressure.	0	1	NO
1157	2.42.13	02.04.02-03:13BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	13. Each GDCS injection line includes a nozzle flow limiter to limit break size.	Inspections of the as-built GDCS injection flow limiters will be performed.	Each GDCS injection nozzle flow limiter is less than or equal to 4.562E-3 m^2 (0.0491 ft^2) and a nominal reactor-side outlet length to diameter ratio of 4 41.	0	1	NO
1158	2.42.14	02.04.02-03:14BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	14. Each GDCS equalizing line includes a nozzle flow limiter to limit break size.	Inspections of the as-built GDCS equalizing flow limiters will be taken.	Each GDCS equalizing line nozzle flow limiter is less than or equal to 2.027E-3 m^2 (0.0218 ft^2) and a nominal reactor-side outlet length to diameter ratio of 6 59	0	1	NO
1159	2.42.15	02.04.02-03:15BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	15. Each of the GDCS divisions is powered from its respective safety-related power division.	Tests will be performed on the GDCS by providing a test signal in only one safety-related power division at a time.	Testing confirms the signal exists only in the safety-related power division under test in the GDCS.	0	1	NO
1160	2.42.16	02.04.02-03:16BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	16. Each GDCS mechanical train located inside the containment is physically separated from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related function.	Inspections and analysis will be conducted for each of the GDCS mechanical trains located inside the containment.	Each GDCS mechanical train located inside containment is protected against design basis events and their direct consequences by spatial separation, barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related function.	0	1	NO
1161	2.42.17	02.04.02-03:17BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	17. The GDCS pools A, B/C, and D are sized to hold a minimum drainable water volume.	An analysis of combined minimum drainable volume for GDCS pools A, B/C, and D will be performed.	Analysis confirms the combined minimum drainable water volume for GDCS pools A, B/C, and D is 1636 m^3 (57770 ft^3)	0	1	NO
1162	2.42.18	02.04.02-03:18BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	18. The GDCS pools A, B/C, and D are sized to hold a specified minimum water level.	An analysis of minimum water level in GDCS pools A, B/C, and D will be performed.	Analysis confirms the minimum water level in GDCS pools A, B/C, and D can be at least 6.5 m (21.3 ft).	0	1	NO
1163	2.42.19	02.04.02-03:19BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	19. The elevation change between low water level of GDCS pools and the centerline of GDCS injection line nozzles is sufficient to provide gravity-driven flow.	An analysis of elevation change between low water level of GDCS pools and the centerline of GDCS injection line nozzles will be performed.	Analysis confirms the elevation change between low water level of GDCS pools and the centerline of GDCS injection line nozzles is 13.5 m (44.3 ft).	0	1	NO
1164	2.42.20	02.04.02-03:20BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	20. The minimum drainable volume from the suppression pool to the RPV is sufficient to meet long-term post-LOCA core cooling requirements.	An analysis of minimum drainable volume from the suppression pool to the RPV will be performed.	Analysis confirms the minimum drainable volume from the suppression pool to the RPV is 799 m^3 (28,200 ft^3).	0	1	NO
1165	2.42.21	02.04.02-03:21BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	21. The long-term GDCS minimum equalizing driving head is based on RPV Level 0.5.	An analysis of the minimum equalizing driving head will be performed.	Analysis confirms the minimum equalizing driving head is 1.0 m (3.28 ft).	0	1	NO
1166	2.42.22	02.04.02-03:22BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	22. The GDCS Deluge squib valves open as designed.	A vendor type test will be performed on a squib valve.	GDCS Deluge squib valves used open as designed.	0	1	NO
1167	2.42.24	02.04.02-03:24BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	24. The GDCS injection piping is installed to allow venting of non-condensable gases to GDCS pools and to RPV, to prevent collection in the GDCS injection pipes.	Inspection(s) will be conducted of as-built GDCS injection piping installation to ensure there are no elevated piping loops or high-point traps in piping run from squib valves to GDCS pools and to RPV inlet nozzles.	Based on inspection(s) of as-built GDCS injection piping, the as-built piping conforms to design that allows venting of non-condensable gases to GDCS pools and to RPV.	0	1	NO
1168	2.42.25	02.04.02-03:25BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:E50	2.4.2-3	25. Deluge system has redundant nonsafety-related Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) that are connected to thermocouples in each cell of the lower drywell Basemat-Internal Melt Arrest Coolability (BiMAC) system.	Inspections and tests will be performed to confirm the connection of the thermocouples to the PLCs.	One thermocouple from each cell is monitored in one PLC, while the other thermocouple from each cell is monitored in a second PLC.	0	1	NO
1169	2.42.26.i	02.04.02-03:26BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:IC:E50	2.4.2-3	26. When temperatures exceed the setpoint at one set of thermocouples coincident with setpoints being exceeded at a second set of thermocouples in adjacent cells, each PLC starts a deluge squib valve timer.	i. Tests will be performed to confirm timer initiation using simulated signals.	i. The timers are initiated when the temperature setpoint is exceeded.	0	1	NO
1170	2.42.26.ii	02.04.02-03:26BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:IC:E50	2.4.2-3	26. When temperatures exceed the setpoint at one set of thermocouples coincident with setpoints being exceeded at a second set of thermocouples in adjacent cells, each PLC starts a deluge squib valve timer.	ii. Type tests will be performed of the thermocouples to confirm detection of simulated core melt debris in the BiMAC cells.	ii. The thermocouples are capable of detecting simulated core melt debris in the BiMAC cells.	0	1	NO
1171	2.42.27	02.04.02-03:27BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:E50	2.4.2-3	27. The GDCS deluge valve squib initiation signals are inhibited when either of the safety-related deluge system lower drywell temperature switches sense temperatures lower than a preset value coincident with the presence of both deluge squib valve timer signals.	Tests will be performed using simulated signals to confirm that the GDCS deluge valve squib initiation signals are inhibited when either of the safety-related deluge system lower drywell temperature switches sense temperatures lower than a preset value coincident with the presence of both deluge squib valve timer signals.	The GDCs deluge valve squib initiation signals are inhibited when either of the safety-related deluge system lower drywell temperature switches sense temperatures lower than a preset value coincident with the presence of both deluge squib valve timer signals.	0	1	NO
1172	2.42.28a	02.04.02-03:28aBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	28a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance have maintenance valves such that freeze seals will not be required.	Inspections of piping design isometric drawings will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	A review of piping design isometric drawings confirms that maintenance valves included such that freeze seals will not be required. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1173	2.42.28b	02.04.02-03:28bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	28b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV in the GDCS that require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.	A reconciliation evaluation of valves on lines attached to the RPV using as-designed and as-built information will be performed.	A design reconciliation has been completed for the as-built location of valves relative to the design requirements.	0	1	NO
1174	2.42.29b	02.04.02-03:29bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	29b. The BiMAC has a material located on top of the BiMAC pipes to protect against melt impingement during the initial corium relocation event.	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built BiMAC contains a material located on top of the BiMAC pipes to protect against melt impingement during the initial corium relocation event.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1175	2.42.29c	02.04.02-03:29cBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	29c. The BiMAC is designed with a cover so that debris will penetrate it in a short period of time while providing protection for the BiMAC from CRD housings falling from the vessel.	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built BiMAC includes a cover plate providing protection for the BiMAC from CRD housings falling from the vessel while allowing debris to penetrate it in a short period of time.	0	1	NO
1176	2.42.29d	02.04.02-03:29dBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	29d. The BiMAC piping is inclined from horizontal to permit natural circulation flow.	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built BiMAC includes piping inclined sufficiently from horizontal to permit natural circulation flow.	0	1	NO
1177	2.42.29e	02.04.02-03:29eBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	29e. The material located on top of the BiMAC pipes does not generate non-condensable gases in quantities that would result in exceeding the containment ultimate pressure.	Analyses of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built BiMAC contains a material located on top of the BiMAC pipes that does not generate non-condensable gases in quantities that would result in exceeding the containment ultimate pressure.	0	1	NO
1178	2.42.2a1	02.04.02-03:02a1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	2a1. The components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of ASME Code Section III including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined.	0	1	NO
1179	2.42.2a2	02.04.02-03:02a2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	2a2. The components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1180	2.42.2a3	02.04.02-03:02a3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	2a3. The components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-5 Data Reports, where applicable) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports exist and conclude that the components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
1181	2.42.2b1	02.04.02-03:02b1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	2b1. The piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of the ASME Code, Section III, including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1182	2.42.2b2	02.04.02-03:02b2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	2b2. The as-built piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the piping design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1183	2.42.2b3	02.04.02-03:02b3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	2b3. The piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspections of the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports (including N-5 Data Reports where applicable) exist and conclude that the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
1184	2.42.3a	02.04.02-03:03aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	3a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.4.21 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III nondestructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1185	2.42.3b	02.04.02-03:03bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	3b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1186	2.42.4a	02.04.02-03:04aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	4a. The components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on those code components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III that are required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1187	2.42.4b	02.04.02-03:04bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	4b. The piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on the code piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III that is required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements in ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1188	2.42.5.i	02.04.02-03:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	5. The equipment identified in Tables 2.4.2-1 and Table 2.4.2-2 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.4.2-1 and Table 2.4.2-2 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.2-1 and Table 2.4.2-2 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
1189	2.42.5.ii	02.04.02-03:05BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	5. The equipment identified in Tables 2.4.2-1 and Table 2.4.2-2 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.4.2-1 and Table 2.4.2-2 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.4.2-1 and Table 2.4.2-2 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1190	2.42.5.iii	02.04.02-03:05BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	5. The equipment identified in Tables 2.4.2-1 and Table 2.4.2-2 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.4.2-1 and Table 2.4.2-2, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.4.2-1 and Table 2.4.2-2 as Seismic Category I, including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1191	2.42.8a	02.04.02-03:08aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	8a. The GDCS injection lines provide sufficient flow to maintain water coverage above Top of Active Fuel (TAF) for 72 hours following a design basis LOCA.	For each loop of the GDCS, an open reactor vessel test will be performed utilizing two test valves in place of the parallel squib valves in the GDCS injection line and connected to the GDCS actuation logic. Flow measurements will be taken on flow into the RPV. An analysis of the test configuration will be performed.	Based on analysis and test data, the flow rate, in conjunction with vessel depressurization and other modes of GDCS operation, maintains water coverage above TAF for 72 hours following the design basis LOCA.	0	1	NO
1192	2.42.8b	02.04.02-03:08bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	8b. The GDCS equalizing lines provide sufficient flow to maintain water coverage above TAF for 72 hours following a design basis LOCA.	For each loop of the GDCS, open reactor vessel testing will be performed utilizing one test valve in place of the squib valve in the GDCS equalizing line and connected to the GDCS actuation logic. Flow measurements will be taken on flow into the RPV. An analysis of the test configuration will be performed.	Based on analysis and test data, that the flow rate, in conjunction with vessel depressurization and other modes of GDCS operation, will maintain water coverage above TAF for 72 hours following the design basis LOCA.	0	1	NO
1193	2.42.9	02.04.02-03:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:E50	2.4.2-3	9. The GDCS squib valves used in the injection and equalization lines open as designed.	A vendor type test will be performed on a squib valve.	GDCS squib valves used in the injection and equalization lines open as designed.	0	1	NO
1194	2.510.1	02.05.10-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F42	2.5.10-1	1. The functional arrangement of the IFTS is as described in this Subsection 2.5.10.	Inspections of the as-built IFTS system will be performed.	The as-built IFTS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in this Subsection 2.5.10.	0	1	NO
1195	2.510.2.i	02.05.10-01:02BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:F42	2.5.10-1	2. The IFTS tubes and supporting structure can withstand an SSE without failure of the basic structure or compromising the integrity of adjacent equipment and structures. Therefore, the portion of the IFTS transfer tube assembly from where it interfaces with the upper fuel pool, the portion of the tube assembly extending through the building, the drain line connection, and the lower tube equipment (valve, support structure, and bellows) are designated as nonsafety-related and Seismic Category I. The winch, upper upender, and lower terminus are designated as nonsafety-related and Seismic Category II. The remaining equipment is designated as nonsafety-related and Seismic Category NS.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I and II equipment is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. Inspection results verify that the Seismic Category I and II equipment is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
1196	2.510.2.ii	02.05.10-01:02BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:F42	2.5.10-1	2. The IFTS tubes and supporting structure can withstand an SSE without failure of the basic structure or compromising the integrity of adjacent equipment and structures. Therefore, the portion of the IFTS transfer tube assembly from where it interfaces with the upper fuel pool, the portion of the tube assembly extending through the building, the drain line connection, and the lower tube equipment (valve, support structure, and bellows) are designated as nonsafety-related and Seismic Category I. The winch, upper upender, and lower terminus are designated as nonsafety-related and Seismic Category II. The remaining equipment is designated as nonsafety-related and Seismic Category NS.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of Seismic Category I and II equipment will be performed.	ii. The Seismic Category I and II equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1197	2.510.3	02.05.10-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F42	2.5.10-1	3. The IFTS is functionality capable of moving fuel.	Tests will be performed using installed controls and power supplies utilizing dummy fuel bundles for successful demonstration of fuel movement from the refuel pool to the spent fuel pool and return.	The as-built IFTS passes functional testing.	0	1	NO
1198	2.510.4	02.05.10-01:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F42	2.5.10-1	4. No single active failure can cause the draining of water from the upper pool in an uncontrolled manner into the spent fuel pool or other areas. There is sufficient redundancy and diversity in equipment and controls to prevent loss of load (carriage with fuel is released in an uncontrolled manner) and there are no modes of operation that allow simultaneous opening of valves that could cause draining of water from the upper pool in an uncontrolled manner.	Tests and inspections will be performed on the as-built IFTS to confirm it prevents loss of load and draining water from the upper pool in an uncontrolled manner.	The as-built IFTS prevents loss of load and draining water from the upper pool in an uncontrolled manner.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1199	2.510.5	02.05.10-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F42	2.5.10-1	5. The IFTS can be maintained filled with water for cooling in the event the fuel transport cart with fuel loaded within the IFTS cannot be moved.	Tests and inspection will be performed on the as-built IFTS that confirm the as-built IFTS can be maintained filled with water in the event the fuel transport cart with fuel loaded within the IFTS cannot be moved.	The as-built IFTS can be maintained filled with water in the event the fuel transport cart with fuel loaded within the IFTS cannot be moved.	0	1	NO
1200	2.510.6.i	02.05.10-01:06BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:F42	2.5.10-1	6. For personnel radiation protection, access (ingress and egress) to areas adjacent to the transfer tube is controlled through a system of physical barriers, interlocks and alarms.	i. Inspections will be performed to verify that physical barriers exist between the transfer tube and adjacent areas.	i. Physical barriers exist between the transfer tube and adjacent areas.	0	1	NO
1201	2.510.6.ii	02.05.10-01:06BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:F42	2.5.10-1	6. For personnel radiation protection, access (ingress and egress) to areas adjacent to the transfer tube is controlled through a system of physical barriers, interlocks and alarms.	ii. Tests and inspections will confirm that the as-built interlocks and alarms exist for controlling access to the transfer tube area and indicating operation of the IFTS.	ii. The as-built interlocks and alarms exist for controlling access to the transfer tube area and indicating operation of the IFTS.	0	1	NO
1202	2.55.1	02.05.05-03:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	1. The functional arrangement of the RB refueling machine is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.5.5.	Inspections of the as-built RB refueling machine will be performed.	The as-built RB refueling machine conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Subsection 2.5.5.	0	1	NO
1203	2.55.10.i	02.05.05-03:10BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	10. The FB fuel handling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.	The following tests, type test, and inspections will be performed: i. Nondestructive Examination on the welded structural connections of the FB fuel handling machine will be performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 4251.4.	The following tests have been successfully completed for the as-built FB fuel handling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) so that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load: i. Nondestructive Examination on the welded structural connections of the FB fuel handling machine performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 4251.4.	0	1	NO
1204	2.55.10.ii	02.05.05-03:10BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	10. The FB fuel handling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.	ii. The FB fuel handling machine hoist will be static load-tested to 125% of the manufacturer's rated load.	ii. The FB fuel handling machine hoist has been static load-tested to 125% of the manufacturer's rated load.	0	1	NO
1205	2.55.10.iii	02.05.05-03:10BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	10. The FB fuel handling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.	iii. A Full-Load Test on the FB fuel handling machine hoist will be performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 7422.	iii. A Full-Load Test on the FB fuel handling machine hoist performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 7422.	0	1	NO
1206	2.55.10.iv	02.05.05-03:10BBB:Biv:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	10. The FB fuel handling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.	iv. A No-Load Test on the FB fuel handling machine hoist will be performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 and 7421.1.	iv. A No-Load Test on the FB fuel handling machine hoist performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 and 7421.1.	0	1	NO
1207	2.55.10.v	02.05.05-03:10BBB:BBv:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	10. The FB fuel handling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.	v. Inspection of the rope drum, sheeve blocks, and hook component dimensions and material composition has been completed.	v. Inspection records show the rope drum, sheeve blocks, and hook component dimensions and material composition match design specifications.	0	1	NO
1208	2.55.10.vi	02.05.05-03:10BBB:Bvi:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	10. The FB fuel handling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.	vi. Inspection of the wire rope(s) for proper reeving has been completed.	vi. Inspection records show the wire rope (s) are correctly reeved.	0	1	NO
1209	2.55.11	02.05.05-03:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	11. The FB fuel handling machine passes over the centers of gravity of heavy loads included in the certified design that are to be lifted.	Tests will be conducted of the as-built FB fuel handling machine.	The FB fuel handling machine passes over the centers of gravity of heavy loads included in the certified design that are to be lifted.	0	1	NO
1210	2.55.12	02.05.05-03:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	12. The RB refueling machine passes over the centers of gravity of heavy loads included in the certified design that are to be lifted.	Tests will be conducted of the as-built RB refueling machine.	The RB refueling machine passes over the centers of gravity of heavy loads included in the certified design that are to be lifted.	0	1	NO
1211	2.55.2	02.05.05-03:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	2. The RB refueling machine is classified as nonsafety-related, but is designed as Seismic Category I.	Inspections and analyses of the as-built RB refueling machine will be performed.	The as-built RB refueling machine can withstand seismic dynamic loads without loss of load carrying or structural integrity functions.	0	1	NO
1212	2.55.3	02.05.05-03:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	3. The RB refueling machine has an auxiliary hoist with sufficient load capability.	Load tests on the as-built auxiliary hoists will be conducted in accordance with ANSI N14.6, 1993.	A successful load test of each as-built auxiliary hoist has been performed in accordance with ANSI N14.6, 1993.	0	1	NO
1213	2.55.4	02.05.05-03:04BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	4. The RB refueling machine is provided with controls interlocks.	Testing will be performed with actual or simulated signals to demonstrate that the as-built interlocks function as required.	The as-built interlocks function as follows: • Prevent hoisting a fuel assembly over the vessel with a control rod removed; • Prevent collision with fuel pool walls or other structures; • Limit travel of the fuel grapple; • Interlock grapple hook engagement with hoist load and hoist up power; and • Ensure correct sequencing of the transfer operation in the automatic or manual mode.	0	1	NO
1214	2.55.5	02.05.05-03:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	5. The functional arrangement of the FB fuel handling machine is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.5.5.	Inspections and analyses of the as-built FB fuel handling machine system will be performed.	The as-built FB fuel handling machine conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of the Subsection 2.5.5.	0	1	NO
1215	2.55.6	02.05.05-03:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	6. The FB fuel handling machine is classified as nonsafety-related, but is designed as Seismic Category I.	Inspections and analyses of the as-built FB fuel handling machine system will be performed.	The as-built FB fuel handling machine can withstand seismic dynamic loads without loss of load carrying or structural integrity functions.	0	1	NO
1216	2.55.7	02.05.05-03:07BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	7. The FB fuel handling machine has an auxiliary hoist with sufficient load capability.	Load tests on the as-built auxiliary hoists will be conducted.	A successful load test of the as-built auxiliary hoist has been performed at 125% of rated load capacity.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1217	2.55.8	02.05.05-03:08BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	8. The FB fuel handling machine is provided with controls and interlocks.	Test will be performed with actual or simulated signals to demonstrate that the as-built interlocks function as required.	The required interlocks function as follows: Prevent collision with fuel pool walls or other structures; • Limit travel of the fuel grapple; • Interlock grapple hook engagement with hoist load and hoist up power; and • Ensure correct sequencing of the transfer operation in the automatic or manual mode.	0	1	NO
1218	2.55.9.i	02.05.05-03:09BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	9. The RB refueling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.	The following tests, type tests, and inspections will be performed: i. Nondestructive Examination on the welded structural connections of the RB refueling machine will be performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 4251.4.	The following tests have been successfully completed for the as-built RB refueling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) so that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load: i. Nondestructive Examination on the welded structural connections of the RB refueling machine performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 4251.4.	0	1	NO
1219	2.55.9.ii	02.05.05-03:09BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	9. The RB refueling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.	ii. The RB refueling machine hoist will be static load-tested to 125% of the manufacturer's rated load.	ii. The RB refueling machine hoist has been static load-tested to 125% of the manufacturer's rated load.	0	1	NO
1220	2.55.9.iii	02.05.05-03:09BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	9. The RB refueling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.	iii. A Full-Load Test on the RB refueling machine hoist will be performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 7422.	iii. A Full-Load Test on the RB refueling machine hoist performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 7422.	0	1	NO
1221	2.55.9.iv	02.05.05-03:09BBB:Biv:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	9. The RB refueling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.	iv. A No-Load Test on the RB refueling machine hoist will be performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 and 7421.1.	iv. A No-Load Test on the RB refueling machine hoist performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 and 7421.1.	0	1	NO
1222	2.55.9.v	02.05.05-03:09BBB:BBv:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	9. The RB refueling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.	v. Inspection of the rope drum, sheeve blocks, and hook component dimensions and material composition has been completed.	v. Inspection records show the rope drum, sheeve blocks, and hook component dimensions and material compositions match design specifications.	0	1	NO
1223	2.55.9.vi	02.05.05-03:09BBB:Bvi:BB:BB:C:ME:F15	2.5.5-1	9. The RB refueling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.	vi. Inspection of the wire rope(s) for proper reeving has been completed.	vi. Inspection records show the wire rope (s) are correctly reeved.	0	1	NO
1224	2.56.1	02.05.06-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F16	2.5.6-1	1. New fuel storage racks are designed to withstand a design bases seismic event.	An inspection and analysis of the new fuel storage racks configuration will be performed to ensure the design conforms to the seismic analyses.	The new fuel racks can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads, and that the as-built configuration conforms to the analyses.	0	1	NO
1225	2.56.2	02.05.06-01:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F16	2.5.6-1	2. Spent fuel storage racks are designed to withstand a design bases seismic event.	An inspection and analysis of the spent fuel storage racks configuration will be performed to ensure the design conforms to the seismic analyses.	The spent fuel racks can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads and the as-built configuration conforms to the analyses.	0	1	NO
1226	2.56.5	02.05.06-01:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F16	2.5.6-1	5. The maximum spent fuel rack water coolant flow temperature at the rack exit shall be ≤ 121°C (250°F).	Analyses will be performed to determine the maximum temperature of the spent fuel racks.	Analyses confirm the maximum temperature in the spent fuel racks is ≤ 121°C (250°F) at rack exit under normal operating conditions.	0	1	NO
1227	2.56.6	02.05.06-01:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:F16	2.5.6-1	6. The maximum stresses in the spent fuel racks do not exceed ASME Code, Section III, design allowable during accident conditions.	Analyses will be performed to confirm that maximum stresses in the spent fuel racks do not exceed ASME Code, Section III, design allowables during accident conditions.	Analysis records confirm that the maximum stresses in the spent fuel racks will not exceed ASME Code, Section III, design allowable during accident conditions.	0	1	NO
1228	2.56.7.i	02.05.06-01:07BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:F16	2.5.6-1	7. The Spent Fuel Racks are capable of maintaining fuel subcritical.	i. Inspections will be performed on the as-built Spent Fuel Racks and arrays.	i. The as-built Spent Fuel Racks dimensions are within the tolerances used in the Fuel Storage Racks Criticality Analysis for the following features: • Borated stainless steel rack pitch • Borated stainless steel rack wall thickness • Exterior stainless steel wall thickness • Inner fuel box width • Edge fuel box width • Rack array spacing	0	1	NO
1229	2.56.7.ii	02.05.06-01:07BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:F16	2.5.6-1	7. The Spent Fuel Racks are capable of maintaining fuel subcritical.	ii. Inspections will be performed on the as-built Spent Fuel Racks and arrays.	ii. The as-built interlocking panels in the active fuel region that form the Spent Fuel Racks interior matrix conform to the design in the Fuel Storage Racks Criticality Analysis for the following features: • Panels are made of borated stainless steel • Borated stainless steel type • Boron content • Minimum density • Maximum gap between panels	0	1	NO
1230	2.56.7.iii	02.05.06-01:07BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:F16	2.5.6-1	7. The Spent Fuel Racks are capable of maintaining fuel subcritical.	iii. Inspections will be performed on the as-built Spent Fuel Racks and arrays.	iii. The as-built interlocking panels that form the Spent Fuel Racks exterior walls conform to the design in the Fuel Storage Racks Criticality Analysis for the following features: • Stainless steel type • Minimum density	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1231	2.56.8.i	02.05.06-01:08BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:F16	2.5.6-1	8. New Fuel Racks are capable of maintaining fuel subcritical.	i. Inspections will be performed on the as-built New Fuel Racks.	i. The as-built New Fuel Racks dimensions are within the tolerances used in the Fuel Storage Racks Criticality Analysis for the following features: • Between rack pitch • In-rack pitch • Rack array spacing • Rack inner fuel box width • Rack wall thickness • Four-sided bottom enclosure	0	1	NO
1232	2.56.8.ii	02.05.06-01:08BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:F16	2.5.6-1	8. New Fuel Racks are capable of maintaining fuel subcritical.	ii. Inspections will be performed on the as-built New Fuel Racks.	ii. The as-built New Fuel Rack walls conform to the design in the Fuel Storage Racks Criticality Analysis for the following design features: • Stainless steel type • Minimum density	0	1	NO
1233	2.61.1	02.06.01-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	1. The functional arrangement of the RWCU/SDC system is as described in the Design Description of Subsection 2.6.1, Table 2.6.1-1, and as shown in Figure 2.6.1-1.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built RWCU/SDC system conforms to the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.1, Table 2.6.1-1, and as shown in Figure 2.6.1-1.	0	1	NO
1234	2.61.10a	02.06.01-02:10aBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	10a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV system that require maintenance have maintenance valves such that freeze seals will not be required.	Inspections of piping design isometric drawings will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	A review of piping design isometric drawing confirms that maintenance valves are included such that freeze seals will not be required. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1235	2.61.10b	02.06.01-02:10bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	10b.The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV system of the RWCU/SDC system that require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.	A reconciliation evaluation of valves on lines attached to the RPV requiring maintenance using as-designed and as-built information will be performed.	A design reconciliation has been completed for the as-built location of valves relative to the design requirements. The report documents the results of the reconciliation evaluation.	0	1	NO
1236	2.61.3a	02.06.01-02:03aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	3a. The components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on those code components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III that are required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1237	2.61.3b	02.06.01-02:03bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	3b. The piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on the code piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III that is required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements in ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1238	2.61.5	02.06.01-02:05BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	5. Manual closure of the RPV bottom head isolation valve can be accomplished remotely.	Remote manual closure testing of the RPV bottom head isolation valve will be performed by closing the inboard containment isolation valve in the RWCU/SDC system suction line from the RPV bottom head.	The RPV bottom head isolation valve can be manually closed remotely.	0	1	NO
1239	2.61.6	02.06.01-02:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:G31	2.6.1-2	6. Each of the RWCU/SDC System containment isolation valves identified in Table 2.6.1-1 is powered from its respective safety-related division.	Testing will be performed on the RWCU/SDC system containment isolation valves by providing a test signal in only one safety-related division at a time.	A test signal exists in the safety-related division for the containment isolation valves identified in Table 2.6.1-1 powered from the safety-related division under test in the RWCU/SDC System.	0	1	NO
1240	2.61.7.i	02.06.01-02:07BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	7. The equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.6.1-1 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
1241	2.61.7.ii	02.06.01-02:07BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	7. The equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1242	2.61.7.iii	02.06.01-02:07BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	7. The equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I, including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1243	2.61.8a1	02.06.01-02:08a1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	8a1. The components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of ASME Code Section III including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined.	0	1	NO
1244	2.61.8a2	02.06.01-02:08a2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	8a2. The components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1245	2.61.8a3	02.06.01-02:08a3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	8a3. The components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-5 Data Reports, where applicable) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports exist and conclude that the components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
1246	2.61.8b1	02.06.01-02:08b1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	8b1. The piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III is designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of the ASME Code, Section III, including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1247	2.61.8b2	02.06.01-02:08b2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	8b2. The as-built piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the piping design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1248	2.61.8b3	02.06.01-02:08b3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	8b3. The piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspections of the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports (including N-5 Data Reports where applicable) exist and conclude that the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
1249	2.61.9a	02.06.01-02:09aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	9a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.6.11 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III nondestructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1250	2.61.9b	02.06.01-02:09bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G31	2.6.1-2	9b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1251	2.62.1	02.06.02-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	1. The functional arrangement of the FAPCS is as described in the Design Description of Subsection 2.6.2 and as shown in Figure 2.6.2-1.	Inspections of the as-built system will be conducted.	The as-built FAPCS conforms to the functional arrangement described in Subsection 2.6.2 and as shown on Figure 2.6.2-1.	0	1	NO
1252	2.62.11	02.06.02-02:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	11. Following a loss of active cooling without makeup that persists for 72 hours, the water level in the Spent Fuel Pool remains above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies.	Inspection of the Spent Fuel Pool as-built dimensions will be performed to determine the elevation of the pool weir relative to the bottom of the pool and the free volume between the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies and the weir elevation.	The elevation of the Spent Fuel Pool weir relative to the bottom of the pool is at least 14.35 m (47 ft) and that there is at least 1962 m^3 (69300 ft^3) of free volume above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies that can be filled with water.	0	1	NO
1253	2.62.12	02.06.02-02:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	12. Following a loss of active cooling without makeup that persists for 72 hours, the water level in the Buffer Pool remains above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies.	Inspection of the Buffer Pool as-built dimensions will be performed to determine the elevation of the pool weir relative to the bottom of the pool and the free volume between the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies and the weir elevation.	The elevation of the Buffer Pool weir relative to the bottom of the pool is at least 6.7 m (22 ft) and that there is at least 288 m^3 (10,200 ft^3) of free volume above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies (stored in the deep pit) that can be filled with water.	0	1	NO
1254	2.62.13a	02.06.02-02:13aBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	13a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance have maintenance valves such that freeze seals will not be required.	Inspections of piping design isometric drawings will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	A review of piping design isometric drawings confirms that maintenace valves are included such that freeze seals will not be required. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1255	2.62.13b	02.06.02-02:13bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	13b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV in the FAPCS that require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.	A reconciliation evaluation of valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance using as-designed and as-built information will be performed	A design reconciliation has been completed for the as-built location of valves relative to the design requirements. The report documents the results of the reconciliation evaluation.	0	1	NO
1256	2.62.14	02.06.02-02:14BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	14.Lines that are submerged in the spent fuel pool or buffer pool enter the pools above the normal water level are equipped with redundant anti-siphon holes that will preserve a water inventory above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies in the event of a break at a lower elevation.	Inspection of as-built submerged piping in the Spent Fuel Pool and Buffer Pool will be performed to confirm the presence of redundant anti-siphon holes.	Redundant anti-siphon holes are present on all submerged piping in the Spent Fuel Pool and Buffer Pool and the piping enters the pools above the normal water level to preserve the water inventory to a minimum of 10.26 m (33.7 ft) above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies in the event of a break at a lower elevation.	0	1	NO
1257	2.62.15	02.06.02-02:15BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	15. All low-pressure coolant injection piping and components between the RWCU/SDC System and the FAPCS, including the check valves and motor operated valves, are designed to withstand the full reactor pressure.	Inspection of the as-built low-pressure coolant injection piping between the RWCU/SDC System and the nonsafety-related motor operated valves will be performed.	The as-built low-pressure coolant injection piping and components between the RWCU/SDC System and the FAPCS, including the check valves and motor operated valves are designed to withstand the full reactor pressure.	0	1	NO
1258	2.62.16	02.06.02-02:16BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:G21	2.6.2-2	16. The nonsafety-related control cables, instrument cables and power cables for equipment in the FAPCS trains A and B are electrically independent.	Tests of the nonsafety-related control cables, instrument cables and power cables for equipment in the FAPCS trains A and B will be performed to show electrical independence.	The nonsafety-related control cables, instrument cables and power cables for equipment in the FAPCS trains A and B are electrically independent.	0	1	NO

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1259	2.62.17	02.06.02-02:17BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:G21	2.6.2-2	17. The nonsafety-related control cables, instrument cables and power cables for equipment in the FAPCS trains A and B are physically separated.	Inspections of the nonsafety-related control cables, instrument cables and power cables for equipment in the FAPCS trains A and B will be performed to show physical separation.	The nonsafety-related control cables, instrument cables and power cables for equipment in the FAPCS trains A and B are physically separated as defined by IEEE-384.	0	1	NO
1260	2.62.18a	02.06.02-02:18aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:EL:G21	2.6.2-2	18a. The electrical equipment supporting the two FAPCS trains is routed to the Reactor Building and Fuel Building through separate areas that do not contain installed equipment for lifting heavy loads.	Inspection of the electrical equipment supporting FAPCS will be conducted.	The electrical equipment supporting the two FAPCS trains is routed to the Reactor Building and Fuel Building through separate areas that do not contain installed equipment for lifting heavy loads.	0	1	NO
1261	2.62.18b	02.06.02-02:18bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:CS:U31	2.6.2-2	18b. Heavy loads that are being transported in the Reactor Building or the Fuel Building (where the majority of FAPCS equipment is located) that have the potential to simultaneously compromise both FAPCS trains will be handled by single failure-proof cranes.	Inspection of the Reactor Building and Fuel Building cranes will be conducted.	The Reactor Building and the Fuel Building cranes are single failure-proof cranes (see Table 2.16.1-1, ITAAC 10 and ITAAC 11).	0	1	NO
1262	2.62.2a1	02.06.02-02:02a1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	2a1. The components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of ASME Code Section III including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined.	0	1	NO
1263	2.62.2a2	02.06.02-02:02a2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	2a2.The components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1264	2.62.2a3	02.06.02-02:02a3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	2a3. The components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-5 Data Reports, where applicable) (certified, when required by ASME Code) and inspection reports exist and conclude that the components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	0	1	NO
1265	2.62.2b1	02.06.02-02:02b1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	2b1. The piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) and required documents will be conducted. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III complies with the requirements of the ASME Code, Section III, including those stresses applicable to loads related to fatigue (including environmental effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and combined. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1266	2.62.2b2	02.06.02-02:02b2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	2b2. The as-built piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be reconciled with the piping design requirements.	A reconciliation analysis of the piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1267	2.62.2b3	02.06.02-02:02b3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	2b3. The piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspections of the piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be conducted.	ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that design reconciliation has been completed, in accordance with ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III. The report documents the results of the reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1268	2.62.3a	02.06.02-02:03aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	3a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1269	2.62.3b	02.06.02-02:03bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	3b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1270	2.62.4a	02.06.02-02:04aBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	4a. The components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on those code components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III that are required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section II	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1271	2.62.4b	02.06.02-02:04bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	4b. The piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be conducted on those code components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III that are required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III.	ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.	0	1	NO
1272	2.62.5.i	02.06.02-02:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	i. Inspection will be performed to verify that the Seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.2-1 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.	i. The equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.6.2-1 is located in a Seismic Category I structure.	0	1	NO
1273	2.62.5.ii	02.06.02-02:05BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of equipment identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as Seismic Category I, will be performed using analytical assumptions, or will be performed under conditions which bound the Seismic Category I equipment design requirements.	ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1274	2.62.5.iii	02.06.02-02:05BBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	5. The equipment identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	iii. Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify that the as-built equipment identified in Table 2.6.21, including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions.	iii. The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.6.2-1 including anchorage, can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.	0	1	NO
1275	2.62.7a.i	02.06.02-02:07aBB:BBi:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	7a. The FAPCS performs the nonsafety-related suppression pool cooling functions.	i. Perform a test to confirm the flow path and minimum flowrate between the FAPCS and the suppression pools.	i. The cooling flow path is demonstrated and confirmed by operation of the function. The flow rate is ≥ 567.8 m3/hr (2500 gal/min).	0	1	NO
1276	2.62.7a.ii	02.06.02-02:07aBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	7a. The FAPCS performs the nonsafety-related suppression pool cooling functions.	ii. Perform a type test to confirm the heat transfer capacity of the FAPCS heat exchanger.	ii. The design heat removal capacity of a single FAPCS train is ≥ 8.3 MW under the following conditions: • Primary and secondary side flow rate ≤ 567.8 m^3/hr (2500 gpm) • Process inlet temperature ≤ 48.9ºC (120ºF) • Cooling water inlet temperature of ≥ 35ºC (95ºF)	0	1	NO
1277	2.62.7a.iii	02.06.02-02:07aBB:iii:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	7a. The FAPCS performs the nonsafety-related suppression pool cooling functions.	iii. Inspection of as-built FAPCS suppression pool suction intake will be performed to confirm the presence of a suction strainer with perforated plate hole sizes of < 2.508 mm (0.0988 inches).	iii. A suction strainer with perforated plate hole sizes of ≤ 2.508 mm (0.0988 inches) is present on FAPCS suppression pool suction intake.	0	1	NO
1278	2.62.7b	02.06.02-02:07bBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	7b. The FAPCS performs the nonsafety-related low-pressure coolant injection functions.	Perform a test to confirm the flow path and minimum flowrate from the FAPCS to the RWCU/SDC system.	The injection flow path is demonstrated and confirmed by operation of the function. The flowrate is ≥ 340 m^3/hr (1500 gal/min) at a differential pressure > 1.03 MPa (150 psi) and < 1.05 MPa (152 psi).	0	1	NO
1279	2.62.7c	02.06.02-02:07cBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	7c. The FAPCS provides the nonsafety-related external connection for emergency water to IC/PCCS pool and Spent Fuel Pool functions.	Perform a test to confirm flow path and flow capacity from the Fire Protection System and offsite water sources to the pools.	The makeup water flow path is demonstrated and confirmed by operation of the function.	0	1	NO
1280	2.62.9	02.06.02-02:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:G21	2.6.2-2	9. Safety-related level instruments with adequate operating ranges are provided for the Spent Fuel Pool, buffer pool, and IC/PCCS pools.	Inspections of the FAPCS will be conducted to verify that level instruments with adequate operating ranges are provided for the Spent Fuel Pool and IC/PCCS pools.	The as-built FAPCS provides Spent Fuel Pool, buffer pool, and IC/PCCS pool level instrumentation with adequate operating ranges. • Instruments for the SFP and buffer pool accurately indicate pool level over the range from normal water level to the top of the active fuel within ± 300 mm (1 ft). • Instruments for the IC/PCCS pools accurately indicated pool level over the range normal water level to the midpoint of the IC heat exchanger tube within ± 300 mm (1 ft).	0	1	NO
1281	3.1.3	03.01.00-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:ME:B21	3.1-1	3. Systems, structures, and components, that are required to be functional during and following an SSE, shall be protected against or qualified to withstand the dynamic and environmental effects associated with analyses of postulated failures in Seismic Category I and nonsafety-related piping systems.	Inspections of the as-designed pipe-break analysis results report will be conducted. Pipe break events involving high-energy fluid systems are analyzed for the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding, room pressurization, and temperature effects. Pipe break events involving moderate-energy fluid systems are analyzed for wetting from spray, flooding, and other environmental effects, as appropriate. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The as-designed pipe-break analysis concludes that for each postulated piping failure, the reactor can be shut down safely. Reports document the results of the analyses to determine where protection features are necessary to mitigate the consequences of a pipe break. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1282	3.1.6	03.01.00-01:06BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:ME:B21	3.1-1	6. On an individual component or system basis, the as-built systems, structures, and components shall be reconciled with the analyses results of the postulated failures in Seismic Category I and nonsafety-related piping systems..	A reconciliation analysis using the as-designed pipe-break analysis report and as-built information will be performed. Inspect the as-built piping systems and equipment to identify that the features that protect against dynamic effects of pipe failures, such as whip restraints, equipment shields, drainage systems, and physical separation of piping, equipment, and instrumentation are installed as defined in the design analyses.	On an individual component or system basis, the protective features are installed in the as-built plant as described in the design and reconciliation analysis.	0	1	NO
1283	3.2.1a1	03.02.00-01:01a1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1a1. The SMP is developed for the RTIF software projects.	Inspection of the SMP for the RTIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SMP for the RTIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1284	3.2.1a2	03.02.00-01:01a2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1a2. The SMP is developed for the NMS software projects.	Inspection of the SMP for the NMS software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SMP for NMS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1285	3.2.1a3	03.02.00-01:01a3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1a3. The SMP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	Inspection of the SMP for the SSLC/ESF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SMP for SSLC/ESF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1286	3.2.1a4	03.02.00-01:01a4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1a4. The SMP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	Inspection of the SMP for the ATWS/SLC software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SMP for ATWS/SLC software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1287	3.2.1a5	03.02.00-01:01a5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1a5. The SMP is developed for the VBIF software projects.	Inspection of the SMP for the VBIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SMP for VBIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1288	3.2.1a6	03.02.00-01:01a6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1a6. The SMP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.	Inspection of the SMP for the GENE DPS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SMP for GENE DPS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1289	3.2.1a7	03.02.00-01:01a7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1a7. The SMP is developed for the PIP software projects.	Inspection of the SMP for the PIP software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SMP for PIP software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1290	3.2.1a8	03.02.00-01:01a8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1a8. The SMP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	Inspection of the SMP for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SMP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1291	3.2.1a9	03.02.00-01:01a9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1a9. The SMP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	Inspection of the SMP for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SMP for ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1292	3.2.1b1	03.02.00-01:01b1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1b1. The SDP is developed for the RTIF software projects.	Inspection of the SDP for the RTIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SDP for the RTIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1293	3.2.1b2	03.02.00-01:01b2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1b2. The SDP is developed for the NMS software projects.	Inspection of the SDP for the NMS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SDP for NMS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1294	3.2.1b3	03.02.00-01:01b3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1b3. The SDP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	Inspection of the SDP for the SSLC/ESF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SDP for SSLC/ESF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1295	3.2.1b4	03.02.00-01:01b4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1b4 The SDP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	Inspection of the SDP for the ATWS/SLC software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SDP for ATWS/SLC software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1296	3.2.1b5	03.02.00-01:01b5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1b5. The SDP is developed for the VBIF software projects.	Inspection of the SDP for the VBIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SDP for VBIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1297	3.2.1b6	03.02.00-01:01b6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1b6. The SDP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.	Inspection of the SDP for the GENE DPS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SDP for GENE DPS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1298	3.2.1b7	03.02.00-01:01b7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1b7. The SDP is developed for the PIP software projects.	Inspection of the SDP for the PIP software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SDP for PIP software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1299	3.2.1b8	03.02.00-01:01b8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1b8. The SDP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	Inspection of the SDP for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SDP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1300	3.2.1b9	03.02.00-01:01b9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1b9. The SDP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects	Inspection of the SDP for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SDP for ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1301	3.2.1c1	03.02.00-01:01c1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1c1. The SIntP is developed for the RTIF software projects.	Inspection of the SIntP for the RTIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIntP for the RTIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1302	3.2.1c2	03.02.00-01:01c2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1c2. The SIntP is developed for the NMS software projects.	Inspection of the SIntP for the NMS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIntP for NMS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1303	3.2.1c3	03.02.00-01:01c3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1c3. The SIntP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	Inspection of the SIntP for the SSLC/ESF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIntP for SSLC/ESF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1304	3.2.1c4	03.02.00-01:01c4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1c4. The SIntP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	Inspection of the SIntP for the ATWS/SLC software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIntP for ATWS/SLC software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1305	3.2.1c5	03.02.00-01:01c5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1c5. The SIntP is developed for the VBIF software projects.	Inspection of the SIntP for the VBIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIntP for VBIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1306	3.2.1c6	03.02.00-01:01c6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1c6. The SIntP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.	Inspection of the SIntP for the GENE DPS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIntP for GENE DPS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1307	3.2.1c7	03.02.00-01:01c7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1c7. The SIntP is developed for the PIP software projects.	Inspection of the SIntP for the PIP software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIntP for PIP software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1308	3.2.1c8	03.02.00-01:01c8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1c8. The SIntP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	Inspection of the SIntP for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIntP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1309	3.2.1c9	03.02.00-01:01c9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1c9. The SIntP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	Inspection of the SIntP for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIntP for ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1310	3.2.1d1	03.02.00-01:01d1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1d1. The SIP is developed for the RTIF software projects.	Inspection of the SIP for the RTIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIP for the RTIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1311	3.2.1d2	03.02.00-01:01d2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1d2. The SIP is developed for the NMS software projects.	Inspection of the SIP for the NMS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIP for NMS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1312	3.2.1d3	03.02.00-01:01d3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1d3. The SIP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	Inspection of the SIP for the SSLC/ESF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIP for SSLC/ESF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1313	3.2.1d4	03.02.00-01:01d4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1d4. The SIP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	Inspection of the SIP for the ATWS/SLC software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIP for ATWS/SLC software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1314	3.2.1d5	03.02.00-01:01d5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1d5. The SIP is developed for the VBIF software projects.	Inspection of the SIP for the VBIF software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIP for VBIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1315	3.2.1d6	03.02.00-01:01d6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1d6. The SIP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.	Inspection of the SIP for the GENE DPS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIP for GENE DPS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1316	3.2.1d7	03.02.00-01:01d7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1d7. The SIP is developed for the PIP software projects.	Inspection of the SIP for the PIP software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIP for PIP software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1317	3.2.1d8	03.02.00-01:01d8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1d8. The SIP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	Inspection of the SIP for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1318	3.2.1d9	03.02.00-01:01d9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1d9. The SIP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	Inspection of the SIP for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SIP for ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1319	3.2.1e1	03.02.00-01:01e1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1e1. The SOMP is developed for the RTIF software projects.	Inspection of the SOMP for the RTIF software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SOMP for the RTIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1320	3.2.1e2	03.02.00-01:01e2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1e2. The SOMP is developed for the NMS software projects.	Inspection of the SOMP for the NMS software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SOMP for NMS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1321	3.2.1e3	03.02.00-01:01e3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1e3. The SOMP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	Inspection of the SOMP for the SSLC/ESF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SOMP for SSLC/ESF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1322	3.2.1e4	03.02.00-01:01e4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1e4. The SOMP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	Inspection of the SOMP for the ATWS/SLC software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SOMP for ATWS/SLC software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1323	3.2.1e5	03.02.00-01:01e5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1e5. The SOMP is developed for the VBIF software projects.	Inspection of the SOMP for the VBIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SOMP for VBIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1324	3.2.1e6	03.02.00-01:01e6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1e6. The SOMP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.	Inspection of the SOMP for the GENE DPS software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SOMP for GENE DPS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1325	3.2.1e7	03.02.00-01:01e7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1e7. The SOMP is developed for the PIP software projects.	Inspection of the SOMP for the PIP software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SOMP for PIP software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1326	3.2.1e8	03.02.00-01:01e8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1e8. The SOMP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	Inspection of the SOMP for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SOMP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1327	3.2.1e9	03.02.00-01:01e9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1e9. The SOMP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	Inspection of the SOMP for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SOMP for ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1328	3.2.1f1	03.02.00-01:01f1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1f1. The STrngP is developed for the RTIF software projects.	Inspection of the STrngP for the RTIF software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STrngP for the RTIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1329	3.2.1f2	03.02.00-01:01f2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1f2. The STrngP is developed for the NMS software projects.	Inspection of the STrngP for the NMS software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STrngP for NMS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1330	3.2.1f3	03.02.00-01:01f3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1f3. The STrngP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	Inspection of the STrngP for the SSLC/ESF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STrngP for SSLC/ESF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1331	3.2.1f4	03.02.00-01:01f4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1f4. The STrngP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	Inspection of the STrngP for the ATWS/SLC software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STrngP for ATWS/SLC software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1332	3.2.1f5	03.02.00-01:01f5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1f5. The STrngP is developed for the VBIF software projects.	Inspection of the STrngP for the VBIF software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STrngP for VBIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1333	3.2.1f6	03.02.00-01:01f6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1f6. The STrngP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.	Inspection of the STrngP for the GENE DPS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STrngP for GENE DPS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1334	3.2.1f7	03.02.00-01:01f7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1f7. The STrngP is developed for the PIP software projects.	Inspection of the STrngP for the PIP software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STrngP for PIP software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1335	3.2.1f8	03.02.00-01:01f8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1f8. The STrngP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	Inspection of the STrngP for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STrngP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1336	3.2.1f9	03.02.00-01:01f9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1f9. The STrngP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	Inspection of the STrngP for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STrngP for ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SMPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1337	3.2.1g1	03.02.00-01:01g1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1g1. The SQAP is developed for the RTIF software projects.	Inspection of the SQAP for the RTIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SQAP for the RTIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1338	3.2.1g2	03.02.00-01:01g2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1g2. The SQAP is developed for the NMS software projects.	Inspection of the SQAP for the NMS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SQAP for NMS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1339	3.2.1g3	03.02.00-01:01g3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1g3. The SQAP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	Inspection of the SQAP for the SSLC/ESF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SQAP for SSLC/ESF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1340	3.2.1g4	03.02.00-01:01g4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1g4. The SQAP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	Inspection of the SQAP for the ATWS/SLC software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SQAP for ATWS/SLC software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1341	3.2.1g5	03.02.00-01:01g5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1g5. The SQAP is developed for the VBIF software projects.	Inspection of the SQAP for the VBIF software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SQAP for VBIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1342	3.2.1g6	03.02.00-01:01g6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1g6. The SQAP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.	Inspection of the SQAP for the GENE DPS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SQAP for GENE DPS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1343	3.2.1g7	03.02.00-01:01g7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1g7. The SQAP is developed for the PIP software projects.	Inspection of the SQAP for the PIP software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SQAP for PIP software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1344	3.2.1g8	03.02.00-01:01g8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1g8. The SQAP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	Inspection of the SQAP for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SQAP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1345	3.2.1g9	03.02.00-01:01g9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1g9. The SQAP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	Inspection of the SQAP for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SQAP for ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1346	3.2.1h1	03.02.00-01:01h1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1h1. The SSP is developed for the RTIF software projects.	Inspection of the SSP for the RTIF software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SSP for the RTIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1347	3.2.1h2	03.02.00-01:01h2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1h2. The SSP is developed for the NMS software projects.	Inspection of the SSP for the NMS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SSP for NMS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1348	3.2.1h3	03.02.00-01:01h3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1h3. The SSP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	Inspection of the SSP for the SSLC/ESF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SSP for SSLC/ESF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1349	3.2.1h4	03.02.00-01:01h4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1h4. The SSP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	Inspection of the SSP for the ATWS/SLC software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SSP for ATWS/SLC software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1350	3.2.1h5	03.02.00-01:01h5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1h5. The SSP is developed for the VBIF software projects.	Inspection of the SSP for the VBIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SSP for VBIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1351	3.2.1h6	03.02.00-01:01h6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1h6. The SSP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.	Inspection of the SSP for the GENE DPS software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SSP for GENE DPS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1352	3.2.1h7	03.02.00-01:01h7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1h7. The SSP is developed for the PIP software projects.	Inspection of the SSP for the PIP software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SSP for PIP software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1353	3.2.1h8	03.02.00-01:01h8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1h8. The SSP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	Inspection of the SSP for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SSP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1354	3.2.1h9	03.02.00-01:01h9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1h9. The SSP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	Inspection of the SSP for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SSP for ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1355	3.2.1i1	03.02.00-01:01i1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1i1. The SVVP is developed for the RTIF software projects.	Inspection of the SVVP for the RTIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SVVP for the RTIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1356	3.2.1i2	03.02.00-01:01i2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1i2. The SVVP is developed for the NMS software projects.	Inspection of the SVVP for the NMS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SVVP for NMS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1357	3.2.1i3	03.02.00-01:01i3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1i3. The SVVP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	Inspection of the SVVP for the SSLC/ESF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SVVP for SSLC/ESF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1358	3.2.1i4	03.02.00-01:01i4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1i4. The SVVP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	Inspection of the SVVP for the ATWS/SLC software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SVVP for ATWS/SLC software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1359	3.2.1i5	03.02.00-01:01i5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1i5. The SVVP is developed for the VBIF software projects.	Inspection of the SVVP for the VBIF software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SVVP for VBIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1360	3.2.1i6	03.02.00-01:01i6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1i6. The SVVP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.	Inspection of the SVVP for the GENE DPS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SVVP for GENE DPS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1361	3.2.1i7	03.02.00-01;01i7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1i7. The SVVP is developed for the PIP software projects.	Inspection of the SVVP for the PIP software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SVVP for PIP software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1362	3.2.1i8	03.02.00-01:01i8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1i8. The SVVP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	Inspection of the SVVP for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SVVP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1363	3.2.1i9	03.02.00-01:01i9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1i9. The SVVP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	Inspection of the SVVP for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SVVP for ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1364	3.2.1j1	03.02.00-01:01j1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1j1. The SCMP is developed for the RTIF software projects.	Inspection of the SCMP for the RTIF software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SCMP for the RTIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1365	3.2.1j2	03.02.00-01:01j2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1j2. The SCMP is developed for the NMS software projects.	Inspection of the SCMP for the NMS software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SCMP for NMS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1366	3.2.1j3	03.02.00-01:01j3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1j3. The SCMP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	Inspection of the SCMP for the SSLC/ESF software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SCMP for SSLC/ESF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1367	3.2.1j4	03.02.00-01:01j4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1j4. The SCMP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	Inspection of the SCMP for the ATWS/SLC software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SCMP for ATWS/SLC software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1368	3.2.1j5	03.02.00-01:01j5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1j5. The SCMP is developed for the VBIF software projects.	Inspection of the SCMP for the VBIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SCMP for VBIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1369	3.2.1j6	03.02.00-01:01j6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1j6. The SCMP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.	Inspection of the SCMP for the GENE DPS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SCMP for GENE DPS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1370	3.2.1j7	03.02.00-01:01j7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1j7. The SCMP is developed for the PIP software projects.	Inspection of the SCMP for the PIP software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SCMP for PIP software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1371	3.2.1j8	03.02.00-01:01j8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1j8. The SCMP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	Inspection of the SCMP for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SCMP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1372	3.2.1j9	03.02.00-01:01j9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1j9. The SCMP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	Inspection of the SCMP for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The SCMP for ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1373	3.2.1k1	03.02.00-01:01k1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1k1. The STP is developed for the RTIF software projects.	Inspection of the STP for the RTIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STP for the RTIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1374	3.2.1k2	03.02.00-01:01k2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1k2. The STP is developed for the NMS software projects.	Inspection of the STP for the NMS software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STP for NMS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1375	3.2.1k3	03.02.00-01:01k3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1k3. The STP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	Inspection of the STP for the SSLC/ESF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STP for SSLC/ESF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1376	3.2.1k4	03.02.00-01:01k4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1k4. The STP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	Inspection of the STP for the ATWS/SLC software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STP for ATWS/SLC software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1377	3.2.1k5	03.02.00-01:01k5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1k5. The STP is developed for the VBIF software projects.	Inspection of the STP for the VBIF software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STP for VBIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1378	3.2.1k6	03.02.00-01:01k6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1k6. The STP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.	Inspection of the STP for the GENE DPS software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STP for GENE DPS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1379	3.2.1k7	03.02.00-01:01k7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1k7. The STP is developed for the PIP hardware and software projects.	Inspection of the STP for the PIP software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STP for PIP software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1380	3.2.1k8	03.02.00-01:01k8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1k8. The STP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function hardware and software projects.	Inspection of the STP for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1381	3.2.1k9	03.02.00-01:01k9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1k9. The STP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function hardware and software projects.	Inspection of the STP for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The STP for ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the SQAPM. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1382	3.2.1l1	03.02.00-01:01l1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1l1. The CySP is developed for the RTIF software projects.	Inspection of the CySP for the RTIF software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The CySP for the RTIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1383	3.2.1l2	03.02.00-01:01l2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1l2. The CySP is developed for the NMS software projects.	Inspection of the CySP for the NMS software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The CySP for NMS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the CySPP {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1384	3.2.1l3	03.02.00-01:01l3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1l3. The CySP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	Inspection of the CySP for the SSLC/ESF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The CySP for SSLC/ESF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1385	3.2.1l4	03.02.00-01:01l4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1l4. The CySP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	Inspection of the CySP for the ATWS/SLC software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The CySP for ATWS/SLC software projects complies with the criteria contained in the CySPP {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1386	3.2.1I5	03.02.00-01:01I5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1I5. The CySP is developed for the VBIF software projects.	Inspection of the CySP for the VBIF software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The CySP for VBIF software projects complies with the criteria contained in the CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1387	3.2.1I6	03.02.00-01:01I6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1I6. The CySP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.	Inspection of the CySP for the GENE DPS software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The CySP for GENE DPS software projects complies with the criteria contained in the CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1388	3.2.1I7	03.02.00-01:01I7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	1I7. The CySP is developed for the PIP software projects.	Inspection of the CySP for the PIP software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The CySP for PIP software projects complies with the criteria contained in the CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1389	3.2.1I8	03.02.00-01:01I8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1I8. The CySP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	Inspection of the CySP for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects will be performed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The CySP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1390	3.2.1I9	03.02.00-01:01I9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	1I9. The CySP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	Inspection of the CySP for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects will be performed. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The CySP for ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects complies with the criteria contained in the CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1391	3.2.2a1	03.02.00-01:02a1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2a1. The planning phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP are completed for the RTIF software projects.	The planning phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the RTIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the RTIF software projects planning phase activities were performed in compliance with the RTIF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1392	3.2.2a2	03.02.00-01:02a2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2a2. The planning phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP are completed for the NMS software projects.	The planning phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the NMS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the NMS software projects planning phase activities were performed in compliance with the NMS software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1393	3.2.2a3	03.02.00-01:02a3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2a3. The planning phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	The planning phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the SSLC/ESF software projects planning phase activities were performed in compliance with the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1394	3.2.2a4	03.02.00-01:02a4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2a4. The planning phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	The planning phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the ATWS/SLC software projects planning phase activities were performed in compliance with the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1395	3.2.2a5	03.02.00-01:02a5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2a5. The planning phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP are completed for the VBIF software projects.	The planning phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the VBIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the VBIF software projects planning phase activities were performed in compliance with the VBIF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1396	3.2.2a6	03.02.00-01:02a6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	2a6. The planning phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and CySP are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.	The planning phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the GENE DPS software projects {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the GENE DPS software projects planning phase activities were performed in compliance with the GENE DPS software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1397	3.2.2a7	03.02.00-01:02a7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	2a7. The planning phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are completed for the PIP software projects.	The planning phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the PIP software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the PIP software projects planning phase activities were performed in compliance with the PIP software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1398	3.2.2a8	03.02.00-01:02a8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2a8. The planning phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans and CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	The planning phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects planning phase activities were performed in compliance with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1399	3.2.2a9	03.02.00-01:02a9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2a9. The planning phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans and CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	The planning phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects planning phase activities were performed in compliance with the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1400	3.2.2b1	03.02.00-01:02b1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2b1. The requirements phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP are completed for the RTIF software projects.	The requirements phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the RTIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the RTIF software projects requirements phase activities were performed in compliance with the RTIF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1401	3.2.2b2	03.02.00-01:02b2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2b2. The requirements phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP are completed for the NMS software projects.	The requirements phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the NMS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the NMS software projects requirements phase activities were performed in compliance with the NMS software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1402	3.2.2b3	03.02.00-01:02b3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2b3. The requirements phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	The requirements phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the SSLC/ESF software projects requirements phase activities were performed in compliance with the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1403	3.2.2b4	03.02.00-01:02b4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2b4. The requirements phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	The requirements phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the ATWS/SLC software projects requirements phase activities were performed in compliance with the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1404	3.2.2b5	03.02.00-01:02b5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2b5. The requirements phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP are completed for the VBIF software projects.	The requirements phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the VBIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the VBIF software projects requirements phase activities were performed in compliance with the VBIF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1405	3.2.2b6	03.02.00-01:02b6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	2b6. The requirements phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and CySP are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.	The requirements phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the GENE DPS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the GENE DPS software projects requirements phase activities were performed in compliance with the GENE DPS software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1406	3.2.2b7	03.02.00-01:02b7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	2b7. The requirements phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are completed for the PIP software projects.	The requirements phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the PIP software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the PIP software projects requirements phase activities were performed in compliance with the PIP software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1407	3.2.2b8	03.02.00-01:02b8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2b8. The requirements phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans and CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	The requirements phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects requirements phase activities were performed in compliance with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1408	3.2.2b9	03.02.00-01:02b9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2b9. The requirements phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans and CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	The requirements phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects requirements phase activities were performed in compliance with the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1409	3.2.2c1	03.02.00-01:02c1B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2c1. The design phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP are completed for the RTIF software projects.	The design phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the RTIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the RTIF software projects design phase activities were performed in compliance with the RTIF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1410	3.2.2c2	03.02.00-01:02c2B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2c2. The design phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP are completed for the NMS software projects.	The design phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the NMS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the NMS software projects design phase activities were performed in compliance with the NMS software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1411	3.2.2c3	03.02.00-01:02c3B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2c3. The design phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	The design phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the SSLC/ESF software projects design phase activities were performed in compliance with the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1412	3.2.2c4	03.02.00-01:02c4B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2c4. The design phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	The design phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the ATWS/SLC software projects design phase activities were performed in compliance with the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1413	3.2.2c5	03.02.00-01:02c5B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2c5. The design phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP are completed for the VBIF software projects.	The design phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the VBIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the VBIF software projects design phase activities were performed in compliance with the VBIF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1414	3.2.2c6	03.02.00-01:02c6B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	2c6. The design phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and CySP are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.	The design phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the GENE DPS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the GENE DPS software projects design phase activities were performed in compliance with the GENE DPS software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1415	3.2.2c7	03.02.00-01:02c7B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C62	3.2-1	2c7. The design phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are completed for the PIP software projects.	The design phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the PIP software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the PIP software projects design phase activities were performed in compliance with the PIP software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1416	3.2.2c8	03.02.00-01:02c8B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2c8. The design phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans and CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	The design phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects design phase activities were performed in compliance with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1417	3.2.2c9	03.02.00-01:02c9B:BBB:BB:BB:D:IC:C63	3.2-1	2c9. The design phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans and CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	The design phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and conclude that the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects design phase activities were performed in compliance with the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1418	3.2.2d1	03.02.00-01:02d1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2d1. The implementation phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP are completed for the RTIF software projects.	The implementation phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the RTIF software projects	RTIF software projects implementation phase activities were performed in compliance with the RTIF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1419	3.2.2d2	03.02.00-01:02d2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2d2. The implementation phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP are completed for the NMS software projects.	The implementation phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the NMS software projects	NMS software projects implementation phase activities were performed in compliance with the NMS software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1420	3.2.2d3	03.02.00-01:02d3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2d3. The implementation phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	The implementation phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	SSLC/ESF software projects implementation phase activities were performed in compliance with the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1421	3.2.2d4	03.02.00-01:02d4B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2d4. The implementation phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	The implementation phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	ATWS/SLC software projects implementation phase activities were performed in compliance with the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1422	3.2.2d5	03.02.00-01:02d5B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2d5. The implementation phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP are completed for the VBIF software projects.	The implementation phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the VBIF software projects.	VBIF software projects implementation phase activities were performed in compliance with the VBIF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1423	3.2.2d6	03.02.00-01:02d6B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C62	3.2-1	2d6. The implementation phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and CySP are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.	The implementation phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the GENE DPS software projects.	GENE DPS software projects implementation phase activities were performed in compliance with the GENE DPS software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1424	3.2.2d7	03.02.00-01:02d7B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C62	3.2-1	2d7. The implementation phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are completed for the PIP software projects.	The implementation phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the PIP software projects.	PIP software projects implementation phase activities were performed in compliance with the PIP software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1425	3.2.2d8	03.02.00-01:02d8B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2d8. The implementation phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans and CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	The implementation phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects implementation phase activities were performed in compliance with the PIP software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1426	3.2.2d9	03.02.00-01:02d9B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2d9. The implementation phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans and CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	The implementation phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects implementation phase activities were performed in compliance with the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1427	3.2.2e1	03.02.00-01:02e1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2e1. The test phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP are completed for the RTIF software projects.	The test phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the RTIF software projects.	RTIF software projects test phase activities were performed in compliance with the RTIF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1428	3.2.2e2	03.02.00-01:02e2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2e2. The test phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP are completed for the NMS software projects.	The test phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the NMS software projects.	NMS software projects test phase activities were performed in compliance with the NMS software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1429	3.2.2e3	03.02.00-01:02e3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2e3. The test phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	The test phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	SSLC/ESF software projects test phase activities were performed in compliance with the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1430	3.2.2e4	03.02.00-01:02e4B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2e4. The test phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	The test phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	ATWS/SLC software projects test phase activities were performed in compliance with the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1431	3.2.2e5	03.02.00-01:02e5B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2e5. The test phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP are completed for the VBIF software projects.	The test phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the VBIF software projects.	VBIF software projects test phase activities were performed in compliance with the VBIF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP	0	1	NO
1432	3.2.2e6	03.02.00-01:02e6B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C62	3.2-1	2e6. The test phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and CySP are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.	The test phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the GENE DPS software projects.	GENE DPS software projects test phase activities were performed in compliance with the GENE DPS software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1433	3.2.2e7	03.02.00-01:02e7B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C62	3.2-1	2e7. The test phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are completed for the PIP software projects.	The test phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the PIP software projects.	PIP software projects test phase activities were performed in compliance with the PIP software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP	0	1	NO
1434	3.2.2e8	03.02.00-01:02e8B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2e8. The test phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans and CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	The test phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects test phase activities were performed in compliance with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1435	3.2.2e9	03.02.00-01:02e9B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	2e9. The test phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans and CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	The test phase outputs are inspected and analyzed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects test phase activities were performed in compliance with the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1436	3.2.3a1	03.02.00-01:03a1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3a1. The installation phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP are completed for the RTIF software projects.	The installation phase outputs for the RTIF software projects, including RTIF FAT and RTIF Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed .	RTIF software projects installation phase activities were performed in compliance with the RTIF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1437	3.2.3a2	03.02.00-01:03a2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3a2. The RTIF software projects performs as designed.	FAT is performed on the RTIF software projects	RTIF software projects is in compliance with the RTIF software plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1438	3.2.3a3	03.02.00-01:03a3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3a3. The RTIF software projects is cyber secure.	A cyber security FAT will be performed for the RTIF software projects.	RTIF software projects is in compliance with the RTIF cyber security program requirements as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1439	3.2.3b1	03.02.00-01:03b1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3b1. The installation phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP are completed for the NMS software projects.	The installation phase outputs for the NMS software projects, including NMS FAT and NMS Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed.	NMS software projects installation phase activities were performed in compliance with the NMS software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1440	3.2.3b2	03.02.00-01:03b2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3b2. The NMS software projects performs as designed.	FAT is performed on the NMS software projects.	NMS software projects is in compliance with the NMS software plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1441	3.2.3b3	03.02.00-01:03b3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3b3. The NMS software projects is cyber secure.	A cyber security FAT will be performed for the NMS software projects.	NMS software projects is in compliance with the NMS cyber security program requirements as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1442	3.2.3c1	03.02.00-01:03c1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3c1. The installation phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	The installation phase outputs for the SSLC/ESF software projects, including SSLC/ESF FAT and SSLC/ESF Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed.	SSLC/ESF software projects installation phase activities were performed in compliance with the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1443	3.2.3c2	03.02.00-01:03c2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3c2. The SSLC/ESF software projects performs as designed.	FAT is performed on the SSLC/ESF software projects.	SSLC/ESF software projects is in compliance with the SSLC/ESF software plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1444	3.2.3c3	03.02.00-01:03c3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3c3. The SSLC/ESF software projects is cyber secure.	A cyber security FAT will be performed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.	SSLC/ESF software projects is in compliance with the SSLC/ESF cyber security program requirements as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1445	3.2.3d1	03.02.00-01:03d1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3d1. The installation phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.	The installation phase outputs for the ATWS/SLC software projects, including ATWS/SLC FAT and ATWS/SLC Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed.	ATWS/SLC software projects installation phase activities were performed in compliance with the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1446	3.2.3d2	03.02.00-01:03d2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3d2. The ATWS/SLC software projects performs as designed.	FAT is performed on the ATWS/SLC software projects.	ATWS/SLC software projects is in compliance with the ATWS/SLC software plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1447	3.2.3d3	03.02.00-01:03d3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3d3. The ATWS/SLC software projects is cyber secure.	A cyber security FAT will be performed for the ATWS/SLC software projects	ATWS/SLC software projects is in compliance with the ATWS/SLC cyber security program requirements as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1448	3.2.3e1	03.02.00-01:03e1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3e1. The installation phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP are completed for the VBIF software projects.	The installation phase outputs for the VBIF software projects, including VBIF FAT and VBIF Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed	VBIF software projects installation phase activities were performed in compliance with the VBIF software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1449	3.2.3e2	03.02.00-01:03e2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3e2. The VBIF software projects performs as designed.	FAT is performed on the VBIF software projects	VBIF software projects is in compliance with the VBIF software plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1450	3.2.3e3	03.02.00-01:03e3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3e3. The VBIF software projects is cyber secure.	A cyber security FAT will be performed for the VBIF software projects	VBIF software projects is in compliance with the VBIF cyber security program requirements as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1451	3.2.3f1	03.02.00-01:03f1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C62	3.2-1	3f1. The installation phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and CySP are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.	The installation phase outputs for the GENE DPS software projects, including GENE DPS FAT and GENE DPS Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed.	GENE DPS software projects installation phase activities were performed in compliance with the GENE DPS software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1452	3.2.3f2	03.02.00-01:03f2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C62	3.2-1	3f2. The GENE DPS software projects performs as designed.	FAT is performed on the GENE DPS software projects.	GENE DPS software projects is in compliance with the GENE DPS software plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1453	3.2.3f3	03.02.00-01:03f3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C62	3.2-1	3f3. The GENE DPS software projects is cyber secure.	A cyber security FAT will be performed for the GENE DPS software projects.	GENE DPS software projects is in compliance with the GENE DPS cyber security program requirements as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1454	3.2.3g1	03.02.00-01:03g1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C62	3.2-1	3g1. The installation phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are completed for the PIP software projects.	The installation phase outputs for the PIP software projects, including PIP FAT and PIP Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed.	PIP software projects installation phase activities were performed in compliance with the PIP software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1455	3.2.3g2	03.02.00-01:03g2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C62	3.2-1	3g2. The PIP software projects performs as designed.	FAT is performed on the PIP software projects.	PIP software projects is in compliance with the PIP software plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1456	3.2.3g3	03.02.00-01:03g3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C62	3.2-1	3g3. The PIP software projects is cyber secure.	A cyber security FAT will be performed for the PIP software projects	PIP software projects is in compliance with the PIP cyber security program requirements as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1457	3.2.3h1	03.02.00-01:03h1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3h1. The installation phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans and CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	The installation phase outputs for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects, including HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function FAT and HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed.	HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects installation phase activities were performed in compliance with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1458	3.2.3h2	03.02.00-01:03h2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3h2. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects performs as designed.	FAT is performed on the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects	HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects is in compliance with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1459	3.2.3h3	03.02.00-01:03h3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3h3. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects is cyber secure.	A cyber security FAT will be performed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.	HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects is in compliance with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function cyber security program requirements as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1460	3.2.3i	03.02.00-01:03iBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3i. The complete ESBWR instrumentation and control systems with sensors and actuators is capable of operating as designed.	An overlapping and encompassing SAT is performed on the as-built platforms and network segments.	The complete ESBWR instrumentation and control system with sensors and actuators is capable of operating as designed and is in compliance with the software projects plans and CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1461	3.2.3j1	03.02.00-01:03j1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3j1. The RTIF software projects performs as designed.	A RTIF software projects SAT is performed.	The RTIF software projects is in compliance with the RTIF CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1462	3.2.3j2	03.02.00-01:03j2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3j2. The RTIF software projects is cyber secure.	A RTIF software projects cyber security SAT is performed.	RTIF software projects is in compliance with the RTIF CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1463	3.2.3k1	03.02.00-01:03k1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3k1. The NMS software projects performs as designed.	A NMS software projects SAT is performed.	The NMS software projects is in compliance with the NMS CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1464	3.2.3k2	03.02.00-01:03k2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3k2. The NMS software projects is cyber secure.	A NMS software projects cyber security SAT is performed.	NMS software projects is in compliance with the NMS CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1465	3.2.3l1	03.02.00-01:03l1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3l1. The SSLC/ESF software projects performs as designed.	A SSLC/ESF software projects SAT is performed	The SSLC/ESF software projects is in compliance with the SSLC/ESF CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1466	3.2.3l2	03.02.00-01:03l2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3l2. The SSLC/ESF software projects is cyber secure.	A SSLC/ESF software projects cyber security SAT is performed	SSLC/ESF software projects is in compliance with the SSLC/ESF CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1467	3.2.3m1	03.02.00-01:03m1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3m1. The ATWS/SLC software projects performs as designed.	An ATWS/SLC software projects SAT is performed.	The ATWS/SLC software projects is in compliance with the ATWS/SLC CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1468	3.2.3m2	03.02.00-01:03m2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3m2. The ATWS/SLC software projects is cyber secure.	An ATWS/SLC software projects cyber security SAT is performed	ATWS/SLC software projects is in compliance with the ATWS/SLC CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1469	3.2.3n1	03.02.00-01:03n1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3n1. The VBIF software projects performs as designed.	A VBIF software projects SAT is performed	The VBIF software projects is in compliance with the VBIF CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1470	3.2.3n2	03.02.00-01:03n2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3n2. The VBIF software projects is cyber secure.	A VBIF software projects cyber security SAT is performed.	VBIF software projects is in compliance with the VBIF CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1471	3.2.3o1	03.02.00-01:03o1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3o1. The GENE DPS software projects performs as designed.	A GENE DPS software projects SAT is performed.	The GENE DPS software projects is in compliance with the GENE DPS CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1472	3.2.3o2	03.02.00-01:03o2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3o2. The GENE DPS software projects is cyber secure.	A GENE DPS software projects cyber security SAT is performed	GENE DPS software projects is in compliance with the GENE DPS CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1473	3.2.3p1	03.02.00-01:03p1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C62	3.2-1	3p1. The PIP software projects performs as designed.	A PIP software projects SAT is performed	The PIP software projects is in compliance with the PIP CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1474	3.2.3p2	03.02.00-01:03p2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C62	3.2-1	3p2. The PIP software projects is cyber secure.	A PIP software projects cyber security SAT is performed.	PIP software projects is in compliance with the PIP CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1475	3.2.3q1	03.02.00-01:03q1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3q1. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects performs as designed.	A HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects SAT is performed	The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects is in compliance with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1476	3.2.3q2	03.02.00-01:03q2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3q2. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects is cyber secure.	A HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects cyber security SAT is performed	HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects is in compliance with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1477	3.2.3r1	03.02.00-01:03r1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3r1. The installation phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans and CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	The installation phase outputs for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects, including ICS DPV Isolation Function FAT and ICS DPV Isolation Function Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed.	ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects installation phase activities were performed in compliance with the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1478	3.2.3r2	03.02.00-01:03r2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3r2. The ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects performs as designed.	FAT is performed on the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects is in compliance with the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1479	3.2.3r3	03.02.00-01:03r3B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3r3. The ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects is cyber secure.	A cyber security FAT will be performed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.	ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects is in compliance with the ICS DPV Isolation Function CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1480	3.2.3s1	03.02.00-01:03s1B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3s1. The ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects performs as designed.	A ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects SAT is performed.	ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects is in compliance with the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO
1481	3.2.3s2	03.02.00-01:03s2B:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:C63	3.2-1	3s2. The ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects is cyber secure.	A ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects cyber security SAT is performed.	ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects is in compliance with the ICS DPV Isolation Function CySP as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1482	3.3.1	03.03.00-02:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:HF:HFE	3.3-2	1. Operating Experience Review (OER) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Operating Experience Review Implementation Plan.	An inspection is performed on the OER results summary report(s). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}	A results summary report(s) exists that concludes that the OER activity was conducted in accordance with the implementation plan and contains: • The scope of the OER; • The list of sources of operating experience reviewed and summary of documented results; • List of risk-important human actions and their resolutions from predecessor plants; and • A description of the process for issue analysis, tracking, and review. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1483	3.3.10	03.03.00-02:10BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:HF:HFE	3.3-2	10. Design Implementation is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Design Implementation Plan.	An inspection is performed on the Design Implementation results summary report(s).	A results summary report(s) exist that concludes that the Design Implementation activity was conducted in accordance with the implementation plan and contains: • The results of the final (as-built) HSI Verification concluding that the "As-Built" HSIs and their design characteristics correspond to the HSI Requirements and that Human Engineering Discrepancies (if any) resulting from nonconformance are resolved. • The results of the confirmation of the "As-Built" procedures and training design implementation concluding that Human Engineering Discrepancies resulting from adapted sections (if any) are resolved. • The results of the verification of HFE design not performed in the HF V&V concluding that items in the verification list meet verification criteria and Human Engineering Discrepancies (if any) resulting from non-conformance are resolved. • A description of the resolution to Human Engineering Discrepancies and Open issues in the issue tracking system (HFEITS). • A summary of turnover of remaining Human Engineering Discrepancies/HFEITS issues.	0	1	NO
1484	3.3.11	03.03.00-02:11BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:HF:HFE	3.3-2	11. The strategy for the Human Performance Monitoring (HPM) process is developed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Human Performance Monitoring Implementation Plan.	An inspection is performed on the HPM results summary report(s).	A results summary report(s) exists that concludes that the HPM strategy was developed in accordance with the implementation plan and contains: • A description of the HPM strategy including the scope, structure, and provisions for specific cause determination, trending of performance degradation and failures, and corrective actions. • A description of the database to track activities and corrective actions.	0	1	NO
1485	3.3.12	03.03.00-02:12BBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:HF:HFE	3.3-2	12. Integrated system validation scenarios are developed that incorporate detailed information related to sampling dimensions, scenario identification, scenario definition, simulation of remote actions, performance measurement characteristics, performance measurement selection, performance measurement criteria, test design, and data analysis.	An inspection is performed on the integrated system validation scenarios. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	The integrated system validation scenarios were developed in accordance with the HF V&V implementation plan and meet the review criteria in following sections of NUREG-0711, Rev. 2: • 11.4.1.2.1, Sampling Dimensions • 11.4.3.2.2, Validation Test Beds • 11.4.3.2.4, Scenario Definition • 11.4.3.2.5, Performance Measurement • 11.4.3.2.6, Test Design • 11.4.3.2.7, Data Analysis and Interpretation {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1486	3.3.2	03.03.00-02:02BBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:HF:HFE	3.3-2	2. Functional Requirements Analysis (FRA) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Functional Requirements Analysis Implementation Plan and Allocation of Functions (AOF) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Allocation of Functions Implementation Plan.	An inspection is performed on the FRA and AOF results summary report(s). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	A results summary report(s) exists that concludes that the FRA and AOF activities were conducted in accordance with the implementation plans and contains: • Scope of the FRA; • Functional hierarchy for plant safety functions including the identification of Critical Safety Functions; • Plant systems and configurations that support safety functions; • Definition of high-level plant functions, their support needs, and monitoring parameters; • Scope of AOF; • Safety function allocations. A summary of AOF results; and • A description of the process for refining and updating functional allocations. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1487	3.3.3	03.03.00-02:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:D:HF:HFE	3.3-2	3. Task Analysis is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Task Analysis Implementation Plan.	An inspection is performed on the Task Analysis results summary report(s). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	A results summary report(s) exists that concludes that the Task Analysis activity was conducted in accordance with the implementation plan and contains: • The scope of the Task Analysis. • A list of Task descriptions. • A description of the process for documenting and retaining task analysis results. • Examples of detailed task analysis results. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1488	3.3.4.i	03.03.00-02:04BBB:BBi:BB:BB:D:HF:HFE	3.3-2	4. Staffing and Qualifications (S&Q) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Staffing and Qualifications Implementation Plan.	i. An inspection is performed on the S&Q results summary report(s). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	i. A results summary report(s) exists that concludes that the S&Q design activity was conducted in accordance with the implementation plan and contains: • The scope of the S&Q activity. • A summary of design requirements and inputs to the S&Q. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1489	3.3.4.ii	03.03.00-02:04BBB:BII:BB:BB:C:HF:HFE	3.3-2	4. Staffing and Qualifications (S&Q) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Staffing and Qualifications Implementation Plan.	ii. An inspection is performed on the final S&Q results summary report(s).	ii. A final results summary report(s) exists that concludes that the S&Q process was conducted in accordance with the implementation plan and contains: • Final staffing levels and qualifications. • The basis for the S&Q concluding that issues and concerns raised in other HFE activities are addressed.	0	1	NO
1490	3.3.5.i	03.03.00-02:05BBB:BBi:BB:BB:D:HF:HFE	3.3-2	5. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Human Reliability Analysis Implementation Plan.	i. An inspection is performed on the HRA results summary report(s). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	i. A results summary report(s) exists that concludes that the HRA design was conducted in accordance with the implementation plan and contains: • The scope of the HRA. • A list of risk-important human actions input to Human Factors activities. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1491	3.3.5.ii	03.03.00-02:05BBB:BII:BB:BB:C:HF:HFE	3.3-2	5. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Human Reliability Analysis Implementation Plan.	ii. An inspection is performed on the final HRA results summary report(s).	ii. A final results summary report(s) exists that concludes that the HRA process was conducted in accordance with the implementation plan and contains: • A list of potentially risk-important human actions, human interactions, and operational failure events and a summary of how these basic events and their associated tasks, and scenarios are addressed during the various phases of the design process. • A summary that demonstrates how risk management actions taken in the design keep the potentially risk-important human interactions as low as practical. • A discussion of the validation of HRA assumptions.	0	1	NO

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1492	3.3.6.i	03.03.00-02:06BBB:BBi:BB:BB:D:HF:HFE	3.3-2	6. Human System Interface (HSI) Design is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Human System Interface Design Implementation Plan.	i. An inspection is performed on the HSI Design results summary report(s). {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	i. A results summary report(s) exists that concludes that the HSI Design specification was conducted in accordance with the implementation plan and contains: • The scope of the HSI Design. • A description of the concept of operations for HSI Design. • A list of HFE standards and guideline documents used in the activity. • Descriptions of the Style Guide and design specifications for HSI design. • A list of accident monitoring instruments that comply with RG 1.97 and supporting analysis. • A description of the functional requirement specification for HSIs. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	NO
1493	3.3.6.ii	03.03.00-02:06BBB:Bii:BB:BB:C:HF:HFE	3.3-2	6. Human System Interface (HSI) Design is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Human System Interface Design Implementation Plan.	ii. An inspection is performed on the final HSI Design results summary report(s).	ii. A final results summary report(s) exists that concludes that the HSI Design process was conducted in accordance with the implementation plan and contains: • A summary of the methods used for the evaluation and verification of the HSI. • A description of the final inventory of HSI including alarms, information displays, and controls. • The results of the verification concluding that all MCR and RSS minimum inventory HSIs described in Tables 3.3-1a and 3.3-1b are incorporated into the final inventory of HSIs.	0	1	NO
1494	3.3.9	03.03.00-02:09BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:HF:HFE	3.3-2	9. Human Factors Verification and Validation (HF V&V) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Human Factors Verification and Validation Implementation Plan.	An inspection is performed on the HF V&V results summary report(s).	A results summary report(s) exists that concludes that the HF V&V activity was conducted in accordance with the implementation plan and contains: • The scope of the HF V&V. • Major conclusions and their basis. • A description of the process for documenting and retaining the detailed HF V&V results. • A summary of the following activities: - Operational conditions used for the HF V&V. - HSI inventory and characterization. - HSI task support verification. - HFE design verification. - Integrated system validation. - Human Engineering Discrepancy resolution.	0	1	NO
1495	3.4.1	03.04.00-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:RP:A23	3.4-1	1. Plant design provides for containment of airborne radioactive materials, and the ventilation system ensures that concentrations of airborne radionuclides are maintained at levels consistent with personnel access needs.	Expected concentrations of airborne radioactive material will be analyzed by radionuclide for normal plant operations, anticipated operational occurrences for each equipment cubicle, corridor, and operating area requiring personnel access. Calculations will consider: • Design ventilation flow rates for each area; • Typical leakage characteristics for equipment located in each area • A radiation source term in each fluid system will be determined based upon an assumed off gas rate of 3,700 MBq/second (30 minute decay) appropriately adjusted for radiological decay and buildup of activated corrosion and wear products. • Testing of safety-related isolation dampers will be performed in accordance with IEEE-338 requirements.	Analyses results for radioactive airborne concentration demonstrates that: • For normally occupied rooms and areas of the plant (i.e., those areas requiring routine access to operate and maintain the plant), equilibrium concentrations of airborne radionuclides will be a small fraction (10% or less) of the occupational concentration limits listed in 10 CFR 20 Appendix B. • For rooms that require infrequent access (such as for non-routine equipment maintenance), the ventilation system is capable of reducing radioactive airborne concentrations to and maintaining them at or below the occupational concentration limits listed in 10 CFR 20 Appendix B during the periods that occupancy is required. • For rooms that seldom require access, plant design provides containment and ventilation to reduce airborne contamination spread to other areas of lower contamination. • A test report documents that isolation dampers close within the designed time frame and limit leakage to a rate below the design assumed leakage rate.	0	1	YES

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1496	3.4.3	03.04.00-01:03BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:RP:A23	3.4-1	3. The plant design provides radiation shielding for rooms, corridors and operating areas commensurate with their occupancy requirements.	Analyses (with inspections) of the expected radiation levels in each plant area will verify the adequacy of the shielding designs.	Analysis/inspection report(s) demonstrate that the maximum expected radiation dose rates in each plant area (deep dose equivalent measured at 30 cm from the source of the radiation, not contact dose rates) are no greater than the dose rates specified for the following zones, based on the access requirements of that area for plant operation and maintenance. Zone / Max Dose Rate (mSv/hr)[1] / Access Requirements A / 0.006 / Uncontrolled, unlimited access B / 0.01 / Controlled and unlimited access C / 0.05 / Controlled and limited access (20 hr/week) D / 0.25 / Controlled and limited access (4 hr/week) E / 1 / Controlled and limited access (1 hr/week) F / 10 / Limited and controlled access with special authorization	0	1	YES
1497	3.6.1	03.06.00-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:RL:A17	3.6-1	1. Ensure that the design of systems, structures, and components within the scope of the reliability assurance program (RAP SSCs) is consistent with the risk insights and key assumptions (e.g., SSC design, reliability, and availability).	An analysis will confirm that the design of all RAP SSCs has been completed in accordance with applicable D-RAP activities.	All RAP SSCs have been designed in accordance with the applicable reliability assurance activities for the D-RAP.	0	1	NO
1498	3.7.1	03.07.00-01:01BBB:BBB:BB:BB:C:IC:A32	3.7-1	1. The installed post-accident monitoring instrumentation (scope as determined by the Human Factors Engineering process in Section 3.3) conforms with the requirements (variables, types, performance criteria, design criteria, qualification criteria, display criteria, and quality assurance) as described in Section 3.7.	Inspections, tests or analysis will be performed to verify that the installed post-accident monitoring instrumentation conforms with the requirements as described in Section 3.7.	The installed post accident monitoring instrumentation conforms with the requirements as described in Section 3.7.	0	1	NO
1499	3.8.1-1.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:01:BB:C:EL:B21	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1500	3.8.1-1.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:01:BB:C:EL:B21	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1501	3.8.1-10.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:10:BB:C:EL:C71	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1502	3.8.1-10.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:10:BB:C:EL:C71	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1503	3.8.1-11.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:11:BB:C:EL:C72	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1504	3.8.1-11.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:11:BB:C:EL:C72	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1505	3.8.1-12.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:12:BB:C:EL:C74	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1506	3.8.1-12.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:12:BB:C:EL:C74	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1507	3.8.1-13.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:13:BB:C:EL:C41	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1508	3.8.1-13.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:13:BB:C:EL:C41	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1509	3.8.1-14.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:14:BB:C:EL:D11	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1510	3.8.1-14.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:14:BB:C:EL:D11	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1511	3.8.1-15.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:15:BB:C:EL:E50	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1512	3.8.1-15.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:15:BB:C:EL:E50	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1513	3.8.1-16.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:16:BB:C:EL:G21	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1514	3.8.1-16.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:16:BB:C:EL:G21	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1515	3.8.1-17.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:17:BB:C:EL:G31	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1516	3.8.1-17.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:17:BB:C:EL:G31	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1517	3.8.1-2.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:02:BB:C:EL:B32	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1518	3.8.1-2.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:02:BB:C:EL:B32	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1519	3.8.1-20.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:20:BB:C:EL:H21	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1520	3.8.1-20.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:20:BB:C:EL:H21	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1521	3.8.1-21.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:21:BB:C:EL:N21	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1522	3.8.1-21.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:21:BB:C:EL:N21	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1523	3.8.1-26.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:26:BB:C:EL:R10	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1524	3.8.1-26.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:26:BB:C:EL:R10	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1525	3.8.1-27.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:27:BB:C:EL:R13	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1526	3.8.1-27.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:27:BB:C:EL:R13	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1527	3.8.1-28.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:28:BB:C:EL:R16	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a mild environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1528	3.8.1-28.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:28:BB:C:EL:R16	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a mild environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a mild environment are qualified for a mild environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1529	3.8.1-29.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:29:BB:C:EL:R31	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1530	3.8.1-29.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:29:BB:C:EL:R31	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1531	3.8.1-3.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:03:BB:C:EL:C11	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1532	3.8.1-3.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:03:BB:C:EL:C11	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1533	3.8.1-30.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:30:BB:C:EL:T10	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1534	3.8.1-30.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:30:BB:C:EL:T10	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1535	3.8.1-31.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:31:BB:C:EL:T15	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1536	3.8.1-31.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:31:BB:C:EL:T15	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1537	3.8.1-32.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:32:BB:C:EL:T31	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1538	3.8.1-32.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:32:BB:C:EL:T31	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1539	3.8.1-34.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:34:BB:C:EL:T62	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1540	3.8.1-34.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:34:BB:C:EL:T62	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1541	3.8.1-35.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:35:BB:C:EL:U40	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1542	3.8.1-35.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:35:BB:C:EL:U40	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1543	3.8.1-36.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:36:BB:C:EL:U77	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a mild environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1544	3.8.1-36.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:36:BB:C:EL:U77	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a mild environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a mild environment are qualified for a mild environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1545	3.8.1-37.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:37:BB:C:EL:U98	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1546	3.8.1-37.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:37:BB:C:EL:U98	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1547	3.8.1-4.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:04:BB:C:EL:C12	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1548	3.8.1-4.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:04:BB:C:EL:C12	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1549	3.8.1-5.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:05:BB:C:EL:C21	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1550	3.8.1-5.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:05:BB:C:EL:C21	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1551	3.8.1-6.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:06:BB:C:EL:C31	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1552	3.8.1-6.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:06:BB:C:EL:C31	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1553	3.8.1-7.ii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:Bii:07:BB:C:EL:C51	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety-related or RTNSS function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1554	3.8.1-7.iii	03.08.00-02:01BBB:iii:07:BB:C:EL:C51	3.8-2	1. The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built electrical equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1555	3.8.2-1.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:01:BB:C:ME:B21	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1556	3.8.2-1.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:01:BB:C:ME:B21	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1557	3.8.2-13.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:13:BB:C:ME:C41	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1558	3.8.2-13.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:13:BB:C:ME:C41	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1559	3.8.2-14.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:14:BB:C:ME:D11	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1560	3.8.2-14.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:14:BB:C:ME:D11	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1561	3.8.2-15.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:15:BB:C:ME:E50	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1562	3.8.2-15.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:15:BB:C:ME:E50	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1563	3.8.2-16.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:16:BB:C:ME:G21	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1564	3.8.2-16.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:16:BB:C:ME:G21	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1565	3.8.2-17.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:17:BB:C:ME:G31	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1566	3.8.2-17.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:17:C:ME:G31	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1567	3.8.2-2.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:02:BB:C:ME:B32	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1568	3.8.2-2.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:02:BB:C:ME:B32	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1569	3.8.2-22.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:22:BB:C:ME:P10	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1570	3.8.2-22.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:22:BB:C:ME:P10	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1571	3.8.2-23.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:23:BB:C:ME:P25	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1572	3.8.2-23.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:23:BB:C:ME:P25	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1573	3.8.2-24.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:24:BB:C:ME:P51	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1574	3.8.2-24.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:24:BB:C:ME:P51	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1575	3.8.2-25.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:25:BB:C:ME:P54	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1576	3.8.2-25.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:25:BB:C:ME:P54	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1577	3.8.2-30.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:30:BB:C:ME:T10	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1578	3.8.2-30.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:30:BB:C:ME:T10	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1579	3.8.2-31.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:31:BB:C:ME:T15	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1580	3.8.2-31.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:31:C:ME:T15	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1581	3.8.2-32.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:32:BB:C:ME:T31	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1582	3.8.2-32.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:32:BB:C:ME:T31	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1583	3.8.2-33.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:33:BB:C:ME:T49	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1584	3.8.2-33.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:33:BB:C:ME:T49	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1585	3.8.2-34.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:34:BB:C:ME:T62	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1586	3.8.2-34.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:34:01:C:ME:T62	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1587	3.8.2-4.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:04:BB:C:ME:C12	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1588	3.8.2-4.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:04:BB:C:ME:C12	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1589	3.8.2-7.ii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:Bii:07:BB:C:IC:C51	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment is qualified to perform its safety-related or RTNSS function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1590	3.8.2-7.iii	03.08.00-02:02BBB:iii:07:BB:C:IC:C51	3.8-2	2. The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases accident environmental conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment are qualified for a harsh environment and are bounded by type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1591	3.8.3-18.i	03.08.00-02:03BBB:BBi:18:BB:D:IC:H11	3.8-2	3. The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental conditions	i. Analysis will be performed to identify the environmental design bases of digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be environmentally qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	i. The analyses results identify the environmental design bases for the Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be environmentally qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
1592	3.8.3-18.ii	03.08.00-02:03BBB:Bii:18:BB:C:IC:H11	3.8-2	3. The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental conditions	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The safety-related digital I&C equipment (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment is qualified to perform its safety function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1593	3.8.3-18.iii	03.08.00-02:03BBB:iii:18:BB:C:IC:H11	3.8-2	3. The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental conditions	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built digital I&C equipment located in a mild environment	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built safety-related digital I&C equipment (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a mild environment are qualified for a mild environment and are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1594	3.8.3-19.i	03.08.00-02:03BBB:BBi:19:BB:D:IC:H12	3.8-2	3. The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental conditions	i. Analysis will be performed to identify the environmental design bases of digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be environmentally qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	i. The analyses results identify the environmental design bases for the Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be environmentally qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
1595	3.8.3-19.ii	03.08.00-02:03BBB:Bii:19:BB:C:IC:H12	3.8-2	3. The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental conditions	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The safety-related digital I&C equipment (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment is qualified to perform its safety function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1596	3.8.3-19.iii	03.08.00-02:03BBB:iii:19:BB:C:IC:H12	3.8-2	3. The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental conditions	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built digital I&C equipment located in a mild environment	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built safety-related digital I&C equipment (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a mild environment are qualified for a mild environment and are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1597	3.8.3-8.i	03.08.00-02:03BBB:BBi:08:BB:D:IC:C61	3.8-2	3. The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental conditions	i. Analysis will be performed to identify the environmental design bases of digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be environmentally qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	i. The analyses results identify the environmental design bases for the Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be environmentally qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
1598	3.8.3-8.ii	03.08.00-02:03BBB:Bii:08:BB:C:IC:C61	3.8-2	3. The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental conditions	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The safety-related digital I&C equipment (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment is qualified to perform its safety function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1599	3.8.3-8.iii	03.08.00-02:03BBB:iii:08:BB:C:IC:C61	3.8-2	3. The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental conditions	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built digital I&C equipment located in a mild environment	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built safety-related digital I&C equipment (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a mild environment are qualified for a mild environment and are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1600	3.8.3-9.i	03.08.00-02:03BBB:BBi:09:BB:D;IC:C63	3.8-2	3. The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental conditions	i. Analysis will be performed to identify the environmental design bases of digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be environmentally qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	i. The analyses results identify the environmental design bases for the Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be environmentally qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
1601	3.8.3-9.ii	03.08.00-02:03BBB:Bii:09:BB:C:IC:C63	3.8-2	3. The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental conditions	ii. Type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The safety-related digital I&C equipment (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment is qualified to perform its safety function during the applicable normal and abnormal environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	0	1	YES
1602	3.8.3-9.iii	03.08.00-02:03BBB:iii:09:BB:C:IC:C63	3.8-2	3. The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental conditions	iii. Inspection will be performed of the EQD for the as-built digital I&C equipment located in a mild environment	iii. The EQD exists and concludes that the as-built safety-related digital I&C equipment (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a mild environment are qualified for a mild environment and are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1603	3.8.4-18.i	03.08.00-02:04BBB:BBi:18:BB:D:IC:H11	3.8-2	4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design bases event conditions.	i. Analysis will be performed to identify the dynamic and seismic design bases of digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be seismically qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	i. The analyses results identify the dynamic and seismic design bases for the Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be seismically qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
1604	3.8.4-18.ii	03.08.00-02:04BBB:Bii:18:BB:C:IC:H11	3.8-2	4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design bases event conditions.	ii. Dynamic and seismic type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) and subject to seismic qualification can withstand the dynamic and seismic conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis event without loss of safety function.	0	1	YES
1605	3.8.4-18.iii	03.08.00-02:04BBB:iii:18:BB:C:IC:H11	3.8-2	4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design bases event conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the DQD for the as-built equipment.	iii. The DQD exists and concludes that the as-built Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) and subject to seismic qualification is bounded by dynamic and seismic type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1606	3.8.4-19.i	03.08.00-02:04BBB:BBi:19:BB:D:IC:H12	3.8-2	4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design bases event conditions.	i. Analysis will be performed to identify the dynamic and seismic design bases of digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be seismically qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	i. The analyses results identify the dynamic and seismic design bases for the Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be seismically qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
1607	3.8.4-19.ii	03.08.00-02:04BBB:Bii:19:BB:C:IC:H12	3.8-2	4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design bases event conditions.	ii. Dynamic and seismic type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) and subject to seismic qualification can withstand the dynamic and seismic conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis event without loss of safety function.	0	1	YES
1608	3.8.4-19.iii	03.08.00-02:04BBB:iii:19:01:C:IC:H12	3.8-2	4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design bases event conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the DQD for the as-built equipment.	iii. The DQD exists and concludes that the as-built Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) and subject to seismic qualification is bounded by dynamic and seismic type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES

GEH ESBWR DCD Tier 1 Rev. 9 - ITAAC Table

Index Nbr	NRC Nbr	GEH Nbr	ITAAC Table Nbr	Design Commitment (DC)	Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA)	Acceptance Criteria (AC)	DAC-ITAAC	Con-ITAAC	Matrixed Table
1609	3.8.4-8.i	03.08.00-02:04BBB:BBi:08:BB:D:IC:C61	3.8-2	4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design bases event conditions.	i. Analysis will be performed to identify the dynamic and seismic design bases of digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be seismically qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	i. The analyses results identify the dynamic and seismic design bases for the Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be seismically qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
1610	3.8.4-8.ii	03.08.00-02:04BBB:Bii:08:BB:C:IC:C61	3.8-2	4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design bases event conditions.	ii. Dynamic and seismic type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) and subject to seismic qualification can withstand the dynamic and seismic conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis event without loss of safety function.	0	1	YES
1611	3.8.4-8.iii	03.08.00-02:04BBB:iii:08:BB:C:IC:C61	3.8-2	4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design bases event conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the DQD for the as-built equipment.	iii. The DQD exists and concludes that the as-built Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) and subject to seismic qualification is bounded by dynamic and seismic type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES
1612	3.8.4-9.i	03.08.00-02:04BBB:BBi:09:BB:D:IC:C63	3.8-2	4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design bases event conditions.	i. Analysis will be performed to identify the dynamic and seismic design bases of digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be seismically qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	i. The analyses results identify the dynamic and seismic design bases for the Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) to identify the equipment to be seismically qualified. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}	1	0	YES
1613	3.8.4-9.ii	03.08.00-02:04BBB:Bii:09:BB:C:IC:C63	3.8-2	4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design bases event conditions.	ii. Dynamic and seismic type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses, will be performed.	ii. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) and subject to seismic qualification can withstand the dynamic and seismic conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis event without loss of safety function.	0	1	YES
1614	3.8.4-9.iii	03.08.00-02:04BBB:iii:09:BB:C:IC:C63	3.8-2	4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design bases event conditions.	iii. Inspection will be performed of the DQD for the as-built equipment.	iii. The DQD exists and concludes that the as-built Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) and subject to seismic qualification is bounded by dynamic and seismic type tests, or a combination of type tests and analyses.	0	1	YES